VARIoT IoT vulnerabilities database

Apple iTunes before 8.1 does not properly inform the user about the origin of an authentication request, which makes it easier for remote podcast servers to trick a user into providing a username and password when subscribing to a crafted podcast. Apple iTunes is prone to an information-disclosure vulnerability and a denial-of-service vulnerability. Successfully exploiting these issues may allow an attacker to obtain sensitive information or cause the affected application to crash, denying service to legitimate users. Versions prior to Apple iTunes 8.1 are vulnerable. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Did you know? Our assessment and impact rating along with detailed information such as exploit code availability, or if an updated patch is released by the vendor, is not part of this mailing-list? Click here to learn more about our commercial solutions: http://secunia.com/advisories/business_solutions/ Click here to trial our solutions: http://secunia.com/advisories/try_vi/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: Apple iTunes Information Disclosure and Denial of Service SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA34254 VERIFY ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/34254/ DESCRIPTION: A vulnerability and a security issue have been reported in Apple iTunes, which can be exploited by malicious people to cause a DoS (Denial of Service) or to potentially disclose sensitive information. 1) An error in the processing of Digital Audio Access Protocol (DAAP) messages can be exploited to trigger the execution of an infinite loop via a specially crafted "Content-Length" parameter contained in the header of a DAAP message. NOTE: The vulnerability does not affect Mac OS X systems. The vulnerability and security issue are reported in version 8. SOLUTION: Update to version 8.1. PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: The vendor credits: 1) Xiaopeng Zhang, Zhenhua Liu, and Junfeng Jia of Fortinet's FortiGuard Global Security Research Team 2) Simon Bellwood ORIGINAL ADVISORY: http://support.apple.com/kb/HT3487 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help everybody keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ----------------------------------------------------------------------

Apple iTunes before 8.1 on Windows allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (infinite loop) via a Digital Audio Access Protocol (DAAP) message with a crafted Content-Length header. Apple iTunes is prone to an information-disclosure vulnerability and a denial-of-service vulnerability. Successfully exploiting these issues may allow an attacker to obtain sensitive information or cause the affected application to crash, denying service to legitimate users. Versions prior to Apple iTunes 8.1 are vulnerable.  Impact: ======= Denial of service.   Risk:  ===== Medium   Affected Software:  ================== Apple iTunes 8 for Windows, other versions may be affected  This issue does not affect Mac OS X systems References:  ===========  FortiGuard Advisory: http://www.fortiguardcenter.com/advisory/FGA-2009-11.html Apple Security Bulletin: http://support.apple.com/kb/HT3487  Apple Security Updates: http://support.apple.com/kb/ht1222  CVE ID: CVE-2009-0016  http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2009-0016  Acknowledgments:   ================ Xiaopeng Zhang, Zhenhua Liu, and Junfeng Jia of Fortinet's FortiGuard Global Security Research Team *** This email and any attachments thereto may contain private, confidential, and privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient. Any review, copying, or distribution of this email (or any attachments thereto) by others is strictly prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender immediately and permanently delete the original and any copies of this email and any attachments thereto. *** . ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Did you know? Our assessment and impact rating along with detailed information such as exploit code availability, or if an updated patch is released by the vendor, is not part of this mailing-list? Click here to learn more about our commercial solutions: http://secunia.com/advisories/business_solutions/ Click here to trial our solutions: http://secunia.com/advisories/try_vi/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: Apple iTunes Information Disclosure and Denial of Service SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA34254 VERIFY ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/34254/ DESCRIPTION: A vulnerability and a security issue have been reported in Apple iTunes, which can be exploited by malicious people to cause a DoS (Denial of Service) or to potentially disclose sensitive information. NOTE: The vulnerability does not affect Mac OS X systems. 2) An error in the implementation of the iTunes podcast feature can be exploited to entice a user into sending iTunes credentials to a podcast server via an authentication dialog presented when subscribing to a malicious podcast. The vulnerability and security issue are reported in version 8. SOLUTION: Update to version 8.1. PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: The vendor credits: 1) Xiaopeng Zhang, Zhenhua Liu, and Junfeng Jia of Fortinet's FortiGuard Global Security Research Team 2) Simon Bellwood ORIGINAL ADVISORY: http://support.apple.com/kb/HT3487 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help everybody keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ----------------------------------------------------------------------

Unspecified vulnerability in the Session Border Controller (SBC) before 3.0(2) for Cisco 7600 series routers allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (SBC card reload) via crafted packets to TCP port 2000. A remote attacker may exploit this issue to cause the affected device to reload. Repeated attacks can result in a denial-of-service condition. This issue is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCsq18958. Versions prior to Cisco SBC software 3.0(2) are vulnerable. This issue affects SBC for Cisco 7600 series routers. Cisco has released free software updates that address this vulnerability. Workarounds that mitigate this vulnerability are available. To determine the version of the Cisco SBC software running on a system, log in to the device and issue the show version command to display the system banner. card_A/Admin# show version system image file: [LCP] disk0:c76-sbck9-mzg.3.0.1_AS3_0_00.bin <output truncated> Cisco SBC software version 3.0.1 is running in the device used in this example. Additionally, the Cisco ACE Module, Cisco ACE 4710 Application Control Engine, Cisco ACE XML Gateway, Cisco ACE Web Application Firewall, and the Cisco ACE GSS (Global Site Selector) 4400 Series are not affected by this vulnerability. No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by this vulnerability. Details ======= The Session Border Controller (SBC) enables direct IP-to-IP interconnect between multiple administrative domains for session-based services providing protocol interworking, security, and admission control and management. The SBC is a multimedia device that sits on the border of a network and controls call admission to that network. Note: Only the Cisco SBC module reloads after successful exploitation. Note: TCP port 2000 is typically used by Skinny Call Control Protocol (SCCP) applications. However, the Cisco SBC module uses TCP port 2000 for high availability (redundancy) communication, but does not use the SCCP for this purpose. This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug IDs CSCsq18958 ( registered customers only) ; and has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) IDs CVE-2009-0619. Vulnerability Scoring Details ============================= Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerability in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== Successful exploitation of the vulnerability may cause a reload of the affected device. Cisco SBC software can be downloaded from: http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/sbc-7600-crypto When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. Workarounds =========== As a workaround, configure an access control list (ACL) in the signaling / media VLAN on the Route Processor (RP). The following examples show how VLAN 140 is configured as the signaling / media VLAN. A separate VLAN (VLAN 77) is configured as Fault Tolerance (FT). An ACL is added to the signaling/media VLAN on the RP filtering all TCP port 2000 packets to the alias IP address. Cisco SBC configuration interface vlan 140 ip address 10.140.1.90 255.255.255.0 alias 10.140.1.100 255.255.255.0 peer ip address 10.140.1.8 255.255.255.0 ! ft interface vlan 77 ip address 192.168.1.1 255.255.255.0 peer ip address 192.168.1. 255.255.255.0 RP Configuration !- ACL blocking all TCP port 2000 traffic to the 10.140.1.0 internal network ! access-list 100 deny tcp any host 10.140.1.100 eq 2000 access-list 100 permit ip any any ! interface Vlan140 ip address 10.140.1.1 255.255.255.0 !- ACL is applied to the VLAN interface to egress traffic ip access-group 100 out ! The alias command under VLAN 140 is configured with an IP address that floats between active and standby modules when using high availability. Only TCP port 2000 traffic destined to this IP address may trigger this vulnerability. An access control list (ACL) is configured to deny TCP port 2000 destined to the alias IP address (10.140.1.100). The ACL is applied egress in the RP. Note: TCP port 2000 is used by Skinny Call Control Protocol (SCCP) applications; however, in this case it is used by the SBC for internal communications. The previous ACL only blocks TCP port 2000 traffic to the alias IP address. TCP port 2000 is not used by the alias IP address. This ACL should not cause any collateral damage. Additional mitigations that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied Intelligence companion document for this Advisory: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20090304-sbc.shtml Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address this vulnerability. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/prod_warranties_item09186a008088e31f.html or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory. This vulnerability was found during internal testing. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at : http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090304-sbc.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +---------------------------------------+ | Revision | | Initial | | 1.0 | 2009-March-04 | public | | | | release | +---------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.8 (Darwin) iEYEARECAAYFAkmurgEACgkQ86n/Gc8U/uBrwwCfbQxCcSz4S4X3UpH4Mccg0Df1 KMoAn11BqKmRhw5mUuJOl3D/RrVxVrc7 =m2di -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

A vulnerability in JP1/Cm2/Network Node Manager (NNM) could cause a denial of service (DoS) condition when using the Shared Trace Service.A remote attacker could cause a denial of service (DoS) condition.

uCosminexus Portal Framework contains multiple vulnerabilities.A remote attacker could perform malicious acts, such as information leaking, identity spoofing and updating data with wrong values.

The username command in Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Module for Catalyst 6500 Switches and 7600 Routers and Cisco ACE 4710 Application Control Engine Appliance stores a cleartext password by default, which allows context-dependent attackers to obtain sensitive information. Ace 4710 is prone to a information disclosure vulnerability

Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the edit account page in the Web Server in Cisco Unified MeetingPlace Web Conferencing 6.0 before 6.0(517.0) (aka 6.0 MR4) and 7.0 before 7.0(2) (aka 7.0 MR1) allows remote authenticated users to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the E-mail Address field. Cisco Unified MeetingPlace Web Conferencing is prone to an HTML-injection vulnerability because it fails to sufficiently sanitize user-supplied data. Attacker-supplied HTML or JavaScript code could run in the context of the affected site, potentially allowing the attacker to steal cookie-based authentication credentials and to control how the site is rendered to the user; other attacks are also possible. Cisco Unified MeetingPlace is a set of multimedia conferencing solutions of Cisco (Cisco). This solution provides a user environment that integrates voice, video and Web conferencing. Unified MeetingPlace allows users to modify their own account settings, such as name, telephone extension, email address, etc. If the user sets a specially crafted E-mail Address field on the configuration file page, other users will cause cross-site scripting attacks when viewing the user's configuration file or the details of the meeting created by the user, in the browser session Execute the embedded malicious code

Unspecified vulnerability in the SNMPv2c implementation in Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Module for Catalyst 6500 Switches and 7600 Routers before A2(1.3) and Cisco ACE 4710 Application Control Engine Appliance before A3(2.1) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device reload) via a crafted SNMPv1 packet. Other attacks are also possible. Remote authentication users can cause denial of service by constructing SNMPv1 packets

Unspecified vulnerability in Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Module for Catalyst 6500 Switches and 7600 Routers before A2(1.2) and Cisco ACE 4710 Application Control Engine Appliance before A1(8.0) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device reload) via a crafted SNMPv3 packet. Other attacks are also possible

Unspecified vulnerability in the Web Server in Cisco Unified MeetingPlace Web Conferencing 6.0 before 6.0(517.0) (aka 6.0 MR4) and 7.0 before 7.0(2) (aka 7.0 MR1) allows remote attackers to bypass authentication and obtain administrative access via a crafted URL. An attacker can exploit this issue to gain administrative access to the affected application. This may allow the attacker to compromise the application and the underlying system; other attacks are also possible. This issue is tracked by Cisco Bug ID CSCsv65815. Unified MeetingPlace Web Conferencing 6.0 and 7.0 are vulnerable. Cisco has released free software updates that address this vulnerability. This advisory is posted at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-mtgplace.shtml Affected Products ================= Cisco Unified MeetingPlace conferencing solution provides functionality that allows organizations to host integrated voice, video, and web conferencing. The solution is deployed on-network, behind the firewall and integrated directly into an organization's private voice/data networks and enterprise applications. Cisco Unified MeetingPlace servers can be deployed so that the server is accessible from the Internet, allowing external parties to participate in meetings. No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by this vulnerability. Vulnerability Scoring Details ============================= Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at: http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss CSCsv65815 - Authentication Bypass in MeetingPlace Web Server CVSS Base Score - 9 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Partial Integrity Impact - Partial Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== Successful exploitation of the vulnerability may result in unauthorized access to the administrative functions of the Cisco Unified MeetingPlace application. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== This vulnerability is fixed in Cisco Unified MeetingPlace Web Conferencing software version 6.0(517.0) also known as Maintenance Release 4 (MR4) for the 6.0 release, and version 7.0(2) also known as Maintenance Release 1 (MR1) for the 7.0 release. The latest versions of Cisco MeetingPlace software can be downloaded from: http://tools.cisco.com/support/downloads/go/Redirect.x?mdfid=278875240 The Cisco Unified MeetingPlace Web Server software is available at: http://tools.cisco.com/support/downloads/go/Model.x?mdfid=278816725&mdfLevel=Software%20Version/Option&treeName=Voice%20and%20Unified%20Communications&modelName=Cisco%20Unified%20MeetingPlace%20Web%20Conferencing&treeMdfId=278875240 When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. Workarounds =========== There are no workarounds for this vulnerability. Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/prod_warranties_item09186a008088e31f.html or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at: http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== This vulnerability was reported to Cisco by National Australia Bank's Security Assurance team. Cisco would like to thank the National Australia Bank's Security Assurance team for the discovery and reporting of the vulnerability. The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-mtgplace.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +---------------------------------------+ | Revision | | Initial | | 1.0 | 2008-February-25 | public | | | | release | +---------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at: http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.5 (SunOS) iD8DBQFJpWeb86n/Gc8U/uARAty+AKCIt9MQ0A+BzIMX+MBZHjiod59WBACeMUgH rPsjG9qKmCDQlA6XlaLFMr0= =6x6Q -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/

Directory traversal vulnerability in Cisco Application Networking Manager (ANM) before 2.0 and Application Control Engine (ACE) Device Manager before A3(2.1) allows remote authenticated users to read or modify arbitrary files via unspecified vectors, related to "invalid directory permissions.". A successful exploit may allow attackers to obtain sensitive information, view or modify files, cause denial-of-service conditions, or gain unauthorized access to the affected application. This may aid in the complete compromise of the underlying computer. These vulnerabilities are independent of each other. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities may result in unauthorized system or host operating system access. A workaround that mitigates one of the issues is available. This advisory is posted at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-anm.shtml. Note: This advisory is being released simultaneously with a multiple vulnerabilities advisory impacting the ACE appliance and module software, which is posted at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-ace.shtml. Affected Products ================= Vulnerable Products - ------------------- The following are the products and versions affected by each vulnerability described within this advisory. +---------------------------------------+ | Vulnerability | Product | Version | | | Affected | Affected | |---------------+----------+------------| | Invalid | ACE | All | | Directory | Device | versions | | Permissions | Manager | prior to | | | | A3(2.1) | |---------------+----------+------------| | Invalid | | All | | Directory | ANM | versions | | Permissions | | prior to | | | | ANM 2.0 | |---------------+----------+------------| | | | All | | Default User | ANM | versions | | Credentials | | prior to | | | | ANM 2.0 | |---------------+----------+------------| | | | All | | MySQL Default | ANM | versions | | Credentials | | prior to | | | | ANM 2.0 | |---------------+----------+------------| | | | All | | Java Agent | | versions | | Privilege | ANM | prior to | | Escalation | | ANM 2.0 | | | | Update A | +---------------------------------------+ Determining ACE Device Manager Software Version +---------------------------------------------- The ACE Device Manager is embedded with the ACE appliance software. To display the version of system software that is currently running on the device, use the "show version" command. The following example includes the output of the "show version" command on a Cisco ACE appliance running software version A3(2.1): ACE-4710/Admin# show version Cisco Application Control Software (ACSW) TAC support: http://www.cisco.com/tac Copyright (c) 1985-2008 by Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. The copyrights to certain works contained herein are owned by other third parties and are used and distributed under license. Some parts of this software are covered under the GNU Public License. A copy of the license is available at http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html. Software loader: Version 0.95 system: Version A3(2.1) [build 3.0(0)A3(2.1) adbuild_14:33:29-2008/11/19_/auto/adbu-rel4/rel_a3_2_1_throttle_build/REL_3_0_0_A3_2_1] system image file: (nd)/192.168.65.32/scimitar.bin Device Manager version 1.1 (0) 20081113:2052 --- Determining ANM Software Version +------------------------------- To display the version of ANM software that is currently installed, login to the ANM server and select the "About" keyword in the upper right. An informational pop up window will be displayed. ANM Version 2.0 Update A is indicated in the example output below. Version: 2.0(0), Update: A Build Number: 709 Build Timestamp: 20081031:1226 Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable - --------------------------------- The Cisco ACE XML Gateway, Cisco ACE GSS (Global Site Selector) 4400 Series and Cisco ACE Web Application Firewall are not affected by any of these vulnerabilities. No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these vulnerabilities. Details ======= ANM is a network management application that manages Cisco ACE modules or appliances. ANM is installed on customer provided servers with a Red Hat Enterprise Linux operating system. The ACE Device Manager provides a browser-based interface for configuring and managing a single ACE appliance. The ACE Device Manager resides in flash memory on the ACE appliance. The following details are provided for each vulnerability addressed in this security advisory. These vulnerabilities could allow unauthorized access to ACE operating system and host operating system files. To exploit these vulnerabilities authentication is required to initially access either product. This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug IDs: * CSCsv66063 * CSCsv70130 This vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0615. Default User Credentials +----------------------- Versions of Cisco ANM prior to software version ANM 2.0 do not force credential changes during installation. This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug ID: * CSCsu52724 This vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0616. MySQL Default Credentials +------------------------ ANM versions prior to ANM 2.0 use a default MySQL root user password during installation. The MySQL database is installed by default when ANM is initially installed. This vulnerability can be exploited remotely with default credential authentication and without end-user interaction. Unauthorized access to the database may allow modification of system files that could impact the function of ANM or allow execution of commands on the underlying host operating system. The ACE appliance and module device configuration files in the MySQL database are encrypted. This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug ID: * CSCsu52632 This vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0617. Java Agent Privilege Escalation +------------------------------ ANM versions prior to ANM 2.0 Update A contain a remotely exploitable vulnerability that could allow an attacker to view configuration files and modify ANM processes including the capability to stop services. Exploitation of this issue could result in system information disclosure or denial of services. This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug ID: * CSCsu73001 This vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0618. Vulnerability Scoring Details +---------------------------- Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at: http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss * ACE Device Manager invalid directory permissions (CSCsv66063) CVSS Base Score - 9.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - Single Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * ANM invalid directory permissions (CSCsv70130) CVSS Base Score - 9.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - Single Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * ANM default user credentials during installation (CSCsu52724) CVSS Base Score - 10.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 8.7 Exploitability - High Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * ANM embedded MySQL default credentials (CSCsu52632) CVSS Base Score - 10.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 8.7 Exploitability - High Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * ANM Java agent privilege escalation (CSCsu73001) CVSS Base Score - 8.5 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Partial Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4 Exploitability - High Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== Successful exploitation of the ACE Device Manager and ANM invalid directory permission vulnerabilities may allow unauthorized access to view or modify the ACE Device Manager or ANM file system, including host operating system files. Modification of some system files could result in a denial of service condition. Exploitation of the ANM default user credential and ANM MySQL database default credential vulnerabilities may allow an attacker to gain unauthorized system access. Modification of ANM settings with the default user credentials could result in a denial of service condition. Unauthorized access to the MySQL database may allow modification of system files that could impact the function of ANM or allow execution of commands on the underlying host operating system. Successful exploitation of the ANM privilege escalation vulnerability may result in unauthorized remote access to system processes and services with the ability to modify. Modification of these services could result in a denial of service condition. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. Each row of the following software table identifies the earliest possible software release that contains the fix listed in the "First Fixed Release" column of the table. The "Recommended Release" column indicates the release which have fixes for all the published vulnerabilities at the time of this Advisory. +---------------------------------------+ | | First | Recommended | | Vulnerability | Fixed | Release | | | Release | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ACE Device | | | | Manager | | | | Invalid | A3(2.1) | A3(2.1) | | Directory | | | | Permissions | | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ANM Invalid | | ANM 2.0 | | Directory | ANM 2.0 | Update A | | Permissions | | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ANM Default | | ANM 2.0 | | User | ANM 2.0 | Update A | | Credentials | | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ANM MySQL | | ANM 2.0 | | Default | ANM 2.0 | Update A | | Credentials | | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ANM Java | ANM 2.0 | | | Agent | Update | ANM 2.0 | | Privilege | A | Update A | | Escalation | | | +---------------------------------------+ ANM 2.0 Update A can be downloaded from: http://www.cisco.com/cgi-bin/Software/Tablebuild/doftp.pl?ftpfile=/cisco/crypto/3DES/netmgmt/anm/1.2/anm2.0-update-A.bin ACE Device Manager A3(2.1) can be downloaded from: http://www.cisco.com/cgi-bin/Software/Tablebuild/doftp.pl?ftpfile=/cisco/crypto/3DES/ans/DNSS/ace4710/c4710ace-mz.A3_2_1.bin Workarounds =========== While this Security Advisory describes multiple distinct vulnerabilities, a workaround exists for only the following vulnerability. ANM Default User Credentials +--------------------------- The ANM user "admin" account password may be modified after installation by following the procedures documented for "Changing the Admin Password" located in the ANM User Guide at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/net_mgmt/application_networking_manager/2.0/user/guide/UG_admin.html#wp1053216 Applied Mitigation Bulletin +-------------------------- Additional mitigation techniques that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin companion document for this advisory: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20090225-anm.shtml Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/prod_warranties_item09186a008088e31f.html, or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml. Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts - -------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations - ------------------------------------------------- Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts - ----------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerabilities described in this advisory. Acknowledgement to the National Australia Bank's Security Assurance team for the discovery and reporting of the ACE Device Manager directory permissions vulnerability. The remaining vulnerabilities were identified through internal testing. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-anm.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +------------------------------------------------------------+ | Revision 1.0 | 2009 February 25 | Initial public release | +------------------------------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html. This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt. +-------------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright 2008 - 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. +-------------------------------------------------------------------- Updated: Feb 25, 2009 Document ID: 109451 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (GNU/Linux) iEYEARECAAYFAkmlezoACgkQ86n/Gc8U/uAexwCfYI7DnCQWq4XF2Id8o6bO4+zJ a6IAn0r51YyfdsXPFgYII7OPUWLzJHLU =xUPr -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/

Cisco Application Networking Manager (ANM) before 2.0 uses default usernames and passwords, which makes it easier for remote attackers to access the application, or cause a denial of service via configuration changes, related to "default user credentials during installation.". A successful exploit may allow attackers to obtain sensitive information, view or modify files, cause denial-of-service conditions, or gain unauthorized access to the affected application. This may aid in the complete compromise of the underlying computer. These vulnerabilities are independent of each other. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities may result in unauthorized system or host operating system access. A workaround that mitigates one of the issues is available. This advisory is posted at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-anm.shtml. Note: This advisory is being released simultaneously with a multiple vulnerabilities advisory impacting the ACE appliance and module software, which is posted at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-ace.shtml. Affected Products ================= Vulnerable Products - ------------------- The following are the products and versions affected by each vulnerability described within this advisory. +---------------------------------------+ | Vulnerability | Product | Version | | | Affected | Affected | |---------------+----------+------------| | Invalid | ACE | All | | Directory | Device | versions | | Permissions | Manager | prior to | | | | A3(2.1) | |---------------+----------+------------| | Invalid | | All | | Directory | ANM | versions | | Permissions | | prior to | | | | ANM 2.0 | |---------------+----------+------------| | | | All | | Default User | ANM | versions | | Credentials | | prior to | | | | ANM 2.0 | |---------------+----------+------------| | | | All | | MySQL Default | ANM | versions | | Credentials | | prior to | | | | ANM 2.0 | |---------------+----------+------------| | | | All | | Java Agent | | versions | | Privilege | ANM | prior to | | Escalation | | ANM 2.0 | | | | Update A | +---------------------------------------+ Determining ACE Device Manager Software Version +---------------------------------------------- The ACE Device Manager is embedded with the ACE appliance software. To display the version of system software that is currently running on the device, use the "show version" command. The following example includes the output of the "show version" command on a Cisco ACE appliance running software version A3(2.1): ACE-4710/Admin# show version Cisco Application Control Software (ACSW) TAC support: http://www.cisco.com/tac Copyright (c) 1985-2008 by Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. The copyrights to certain works contained herein are owned by other third parties and are used and distributed under license. Some parts of this software are covered under the GNU Public License. A copy of the license is available at http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html. Software loader: Version 0.95 system: Version A3(2.1) [build 3.0(0)A3(2.1) adbuild_14:33:29-2008/11/19_/auto/adbu-rel4/rel_a3_2_1_throttle_build/REL_3_0_0_A3_2_1] system image file: (nd)/192.168.65.32/scimitar.bin Device Manager version 1.1 (0) 20081113:2052 --- Determining ANM Software Version +------------------------------- To display the version of ANM software that is currently installed, login to the ANM server and select the "About" keyword in the upper right. An informational pop up window will be displayed. ANM Version 2.0 Update A is indicated in the example output below. Version: 2.0(0), Update: A Build Number: 709 Build Timestamp: 20081031:1226 Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable - --------------------------------- The Cisco ACE XML Gateway, Cisco ACE GSS (Global Site Selector) 4400 Series and Cisco ACE Web Application Firewall are not affected by any of these vulnerabilities. No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these vulnerabilities. Details ======= ANM is a network management application that manages Cisco ACE modules or appliances. ANM is installed on customer provided servers with a Red Hat Enterprise Linux operating system. The ACE Device Manager provides a browser-based interface for configuring and managing a single ACE appliance. The ACE Device Manager resides in flash memory on the ACE appliance. The following details are provided for each vulnerability addressed in this security advisory. Invalid Directory Permissions +---------------------------- Versions of the Cisco ACE Device Manager prior to software version A3(2.1) and Cisco ANM prior software version ANM 2.0 contain directory traversal vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities could allow unauthorized access to ACE operating system and host operating system files. To exploit these vulnerabilities authentication is required to initially access either product. This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug IDs: * CSCsv66063 * CSCsv70130 This vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0615. This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug ID: * CSCsu52724 This vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0616. MySQL Default Credentials +------------------------ ANM versions prior to ANM 2.0 use a default MySQL root user password during installation. The MySQL database is installed by default when ANM is initially installed. This vulnerability can be exploited remotely with default credential authentication and without end-user interaction. Unauthorized access to the database may allow modification of system files that could impact the function of ANM or allow execution of commands on the underlying host operating system. The ACE appliance and module device configuration files in the MySQL database are encrypted. This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug ID: * CSCsu52632 This vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0617. Java Agent Privilege Escalation +------------------------------ ANM versions prior to ANM 2.0 Update A contain a remotely exploitable vulnerability that could allow an attacker to view configuration files and modify ANM processes including the capability to stop services. Exploitation of this issue could result in system information disclosure or denial of services. This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug ID: * CSCsu73001 This vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0618. Vulnerability Scoring Details +---------------------------- Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at: http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss * ACE Device Manager invalid directory permissions (CSCsv66063) CVSS Base Score - 9.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - Single Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * ANM invalid directory permissions (CSCsv70130) CVSS Base Score - 9.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - Single Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * ANM default user credentials during installation (CSCsu52724) CVSS Base Score - 10.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 8.7 Exploitability - High Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * ANM embedded MySQL default credentials (CSCsu52632) CVSS Base Score - 10.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 8.7 Exploitability - High Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * ANM Java agent privilege escalation (CSCsu73001) CVSS Base Score - 8.5 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Partial Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4 Exploitability - High Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== Successful exploitation of the ACE Device Manager and ANM invalid directory permission vulnerabilities may allow unauthorized access to view or modify the ACE Device Manager or ANM file system, including host operating system files. Modification of some system files could result in a denial of service condition. Exploitation of the ANM default user credential and ANM MySQL database default credential vulnerabilities may allow an attacker to gain unauthorized system access. Unauthorized access to the MySQL database may allow modification of system files that could impact the function of ANM or allow execution of commands on the underlying host operating system. Successful exploitation of the ANM privilege escalation vulnerability may result in unauthorized remote access to system processes and services with the ability to modify. Modification of these services could result in a denial of service condition. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. Each row of the following software table identifies the earliest possible software release that contains the fix listed in the "First Fixed Release" column of the table. The "Recommended Release" column indicates the release which have fixes for all the published vulnerabilities at the time of this Advisory. +---------------------------------------+ | | First | Recommended | | Vulnerability | Fixed | Release | | | Release | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ACE Device | | | | Manager | | | | Invalid | A3(2.1) | A3(2.1) | | Directory | | | | Permissions | | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ANM Invalid | | ANM 2.0 | | Directory | ANM 2.0 | Update A | | Permissions | | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ANM Default | | ANM 2.0 | | User | ANM 2.0 | Update A | | Credentials | | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ANM MySQL | | ANM 2.0 | | Default | ANM 2.0 | Update A | | Credentials | | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ANM Java | ANM 2.0 | | | Agent | Update | ANM 2.0 | | Privilege | A | Update A | | Escalation | | | +---------------------------------------+ ANM 2.0 Update A can be downloaded from: http://www.cisco.com/cgi-bin/Software/Tablebuild/doftp.pl?ftpfile=/cisco/crypto/3DES/netmgmt/anm/1.2/anm2.0-update-A.bin ACE Device Manager A3(2.1) can be downloaded from: http://www.cisco.com/cgi-bin/Software/Tablebuild/doftp.pl?ftpfile=/cisco/crypto/3DES/ans/DNSS/ace4710/c4710ace-mz.A3_2_1.bin Workarounds =========== While this Security Advisory describes multiple distinct vulnerabilities, a workaround exists for only the following vulnerability. ANM Default User Credentials +--------------------------- The ANM user "admin" account password may be modified after installation by following the procedures documented for "Changing the Admin Password" located in the ANM User Guide at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/net_mgmt/application_networking_manager/2.0/user/guide/UG_admin.html#wp1053216 Applied Mitigation Bulletin +-------------------------- Additional mitigation techniques that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin companion document for this advisory: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20090225-anm.shtml Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/prod_warranties_item09186a008088e31f.html, or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml. Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts - -------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations - ------------------------------------------------- Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts - ----------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerabilities described in this advisory. Acknowledgement to the National Australia Bank's Security Assurance team for the discovery and reporting of the ACE Device Manager directory permissions vulnerability. The remaining vulnerabilities were identified through internal testing. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-anm.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +------------------------------------------------------------+ | Revision 1.0 | 2009 February 25 | Initial public release | +------------------------------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html. This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt. +-------------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright 2008 - 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. +-------------------------------------------------------------------- Updated: Feb 25, 2009 Document ID: 109451 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (GNU/Linux) iEYEARECAAYFAkmlezoACgkQ86n/Gc8U/uAexwCfYI7DnCQWq4XF2Id8o6bO4+zJ a6IAn0r51YyfdsXPFgYII7OPUWLzJHLU =xUPr -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/

Cisco Application Networking Manager (ANM) before 2.0 uses a default MySQL root password, which makes it easier for remote attackers to execute arbitrary operating-system commands or change system files. Cisco Application Network Manager (ANM) and Application Control Engine (ACE) Device Manager are prone to multiple security vulnerabilities, including directory-traversal issues, unauthorized access via default credentials, and a privilege-escalation issue. A successful exploit may allow attackers to obtain sensitive information, view or modify files, cause denial-of-service conditions, or gain unauthorized access to the affected application. This may aid in the complete compromise of the underlying computer. These vulnerabilities are independent of each other. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities may result in unauthorized system or host operating system access. A workaround that mitigates one of the issues is available. This advisory is posted at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-anm.shtml. Note: This advisory is being released simultaneously with a multiple vulnerabilities advisory impacting the ACE appliance and module software, which is posted at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-ace.shtml. Affected Products ================= Vulnerable Products - ------------------- The following are the products and versions affected by each vulnerability described within this advisory. +---------------------------------------+ | Vulnerability | Product | Version | | | Affected | Affected | |---------------+----------+------------| | Invalid | ACE | All | | Directory | Device | versions | | Permissions | Manager | prior to | | | | A3(2.1) | |---------------+----------+------------| | Invalid | | All | | Directory | ANM | versions | | Permissions | | prior to | | | | ANM 2.0 | |---------------+----------+------------| | | | All | | Default User | ANM | versions | | Credentials | | prior to | | | | ANM 2.0 | |---------------+----------+------------| | | | All | | MySQL Default | ANM | versions | | Credentials | | prior to | | | | ANM 2.0 | |---------------+----------+------------| | | | All | | Java Agent | | versions | | Privilege | ANM | prior to | | Escalation | | ANM 2.0 | | | | Update A | +---------------------------------------+ Determining ACE Device Manager Software Version +---------------------------------------------- The ACE Device Manager is embedded with the ACE appliance software. To display the version of system software that is currently running on the device, use the "show version" command. The following example includes the output of the "show version" command on a Cisco ACE appliance running software version A3(2.1): ACE-4710/Admin# show version Cisco Application Control Software (ACSW) TAC support: http://www.cisco.com/tac Copyright (c) 1985-2008 by Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. The copyrights to certain works contained herein are owned by other third parties and are used and distributed under license. Some parts of this software are covered under the GNU Public License. A copy of the license is available at http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html. Software loader: Version 0.95 system: Version A3(2.1) [build 3.0(0)A3(2.1) adbuild_14:33:29-2008/11/19_/auto/adbu-rel4/rel_a3_2_1_throttle_build/REL_3_0_0_A3_2_1] system image file: (nd)/192.168.65.32/scimitar.bin Device Manager version 1.1 (0) 20081113:2052 --- Determining ANM Software Version +------------------------------- To display the version of ANM software that is currently installed, login to the ANM server and select the "About" keyword in the upper right. An informational pop up window will be displayed. ANM Version 2.0 Update A is indicated in the example output below. Version: 2.0(0), Update: A Build Number: 709 Build Timestamp: 20081031:1226 Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable - --------------------------------- The Cisco ACE XML Gateway, Cisco ACE GSS (Global Site Selector) 4400 Series and Cisco ACE Web Application Firewall are not affected by any of these vulnerabilities. No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these vulnerabilities. Details ======= ANM is a network management application that manages Cisco ACE modules or appliances. ANM is installed on customer provided servers with a Red Hat Enterprise Linux operating system. The ACE Device Manager provides a browser-based interface for configuring and managing a single ACE appliance. The ACE Device Manager resides in flash memory on the ACE appliance. The following details are provided for each vulnerability addressed in this security advisory. Invalid Directory Permissions +---------------------------- Versions of the Cisco ACE Device Manager prior to software version A3(2.1) and Cisco ANM prior software version ANM 2.0 contain directory traversal vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities could allow unauthorized access to ACE operating system and host operating system files. To exploit these vulnerabilities authentication is required to initially access either product. This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug IDs: * CSCsv66063 * CSCsv70130 This vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0615. Default User Credentials +----------------------- Versions of Cisco ANM prior to software version ANM 2.0 do not force credential changes during installation. This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug ID: * CSCsu52724 This vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0616. MySQL Default Credentials +------------------------ ANM versions prior to ANM 2.0 use a default MySQL root user password during installation. The MySQL database is installed by default when ANM is initially installed. This vulnerability can be exploited remotely with default credential authentication and without end-user interaction. The ACE appliance and module device configuration files in the MySQL database are encrypted. This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug ID: * CSCsu52632 This vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0617. Java Agent Privilege Escalation +------------------------------ ANM versions prior to ANM 2.0 Update A contain a remotely exploitable vulnerability that could allow an attacker to view configuration files and modify ANM processes including the capability to stop services. Exploitation of this issue could result in system information disclosure or denial of services. This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug ID: * CSCsu73001 This vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0618. Vulnerability Scoring Details +---------------------------- Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at: http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss * ACE Device Manager invalid directory permissions (CSCsv66063) CVSS Base Score - 9.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - Single Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * ANM invalid directory permissions (CSCsv70130) CVSS Base Score - 9.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - Single Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * ANM default user credentials during installation (CSCsu52724) CVSS Base Score - 10.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 8.7 Exploitability - High Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * ANM embedded MySQL default credentials (CSCsu52632) CVSS Base Score - 10.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 8.7 Exploitability - High Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * ANM Java agent privilege escalation (CSCsu73001) CVSS Base Score - 8.5 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Partial Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4 Exploitability - High Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== Successful exploitation of the ACE Device Manager and ANM invalid directory permission vulnerabilities may allow unauthorized access to view or modify the ACE Device Manager or ANM file system, including host operating system files. Modification of some system files could result in a denial of service condition. Exploitation of the ANM default user credential and ANM MySQL database default credential vulnerabilities may allow an attacker to gain unauthorized system access. Modification of ANM settings with the default user credentials could result in a denial of service condition. Successful exploitation of the ANM privilege escalation vulnerability may result in unauthorized remote access to system processes and services with the ability to modify. Modification of these services could result in a denial of service condition. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. Each row of the following software table identifies the earliest possible software release that contains the fix listed in the "First Fixed Release" column of the table. The "Recommended Release" column indicates the release which have fixes for all the published vulnerabilities at the time of this Advisory. +---------------------------------------+ | | First | Recommended | | Vulnerability | Fixed | Release | | | Release | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ACE Device | | | | Manager | | | | Invalid | A3(2.1) | A3(2.1) | | Directory | | | | Permissions | | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ANM Invalid | | ANM 2.0 | | Directory | ANM 2.0 | Update A | | Permissions | | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ANM Default | | ANM 2.0 | | User | ANM 2.0 | Update A | | Credentials | | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ANM MySQL | | ANM 2.0 | | Default | ANM 2.0 | Update A | | Credentials | | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ANM Java | ANM 2.0 | | | Agent | Update | ANM 2.0 | | Privilege | A | Update A | | Escalation | | | +---------------------------------------+ ANM 2.0 Update A can be downloaded from: http://www.cisco.com/cgi-bin/Software/Tablebuild/doftp.pl?ftpfile=/cisco/crypto/3DES/netmgmt/anm/1.2/anm2.0-update-A.bin ACE Device Manager A3(2.1) can be downloaded from: http://www.cisco.com/cgi-bin/Software/Tablebuild/doftp.pl?ftpfile=/cisco/crypto/3DES/ans/DNSS/ace4710/c4710ace-mz.A3_2_1.bin Workarounds =========== While this Security Advisory describes multiple distinct vulnerabilities, a workaround exists for only the following vulnerability. ANM Default User Credentials +--------------------------- The ANM user "admin" account password may be modified after installation by following the procedures documented for "Changing the Admin Password" located in the ANM User Guide at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/net_mgmt/application_networking_manager/2.0/user/guide/UG_admin.html#wp1053216 Applied Mitigation Bulletin +-------------------------- Additional mitigation techniques that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin companion document for this advisory: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20090225-anm.shtml Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/prod_warranties_item09186a008088e31f.html, or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml. Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts - -------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations - ------------------------------------------------- Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts - ----------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerabilities described in this advisory. Acknowledgement to the National Australia Bank's Security Assurance team for the discovery and reporting of the ACE Device Manager directory permissions vulnerability. The remaining vulnerabilities were identified through internal testing. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-anm.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +------------------------------------------------------------+ | Revision 1.0 | 2009 February 25 | Initial public release | +------------------------------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html. This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt. +-------------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright 2008 - 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. +-------------------------------------------------------------------- Updated: Feb 25, 2009 Document ID: 109451 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (GNU/Linux) iEYEARECAAYFAkmlezoACgkQ86n/Gc8U/uAexwCfYI7DnCQWq4XF2Id8o6bO4+zJ a6IAn0r51YyfdsXPFgYII7OPUWLzJHLU =xUPr -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/

Unspecified vulnerability in the Java agent in Cisco Application Networking Manager (ANM) before 2.0 Update A allows remote attackers to gain privileges, and cause a denial of service (service outage) by stopping processes, or obtain sensitive information by reading configuration files. Cisco Application Network Manager (ANM) and Application Control Engine (ACE) Device Manager are prone to multiple security vulnerabilities, including directory-traversal issues, unauthorized access via default credentials, and a privilege-escalation issue. This may aid in the complete compromise of the underlying computer. These vulnerabilities are independent of each other. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities may result in unauthorized system or host operating system access. A workaround that mitigates one of the issues is available. This advisory is posted at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-anm.shtml. Note: This advisory is being released simultaneously with a multiple vulnerabilities advisory impacting the ACE appliance and module software, which is posted at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-ace.shtml. Affected Products ================= Vulnerable Products - ------------------- The following are the products and versions affected by each vulnerability described within this advisory. +---------------------------------------+ | Vulnerability | Product | Version | | | Affected | Affected | |---------------+----------+------------| | Invalid | ACE | All | | Directory | Device | versions | | Permissions | Manager | prior to | | | | A3(2.1) | |---------------+----------+------------| | Invalid | | All | | Directory | ANM | versions | | Permissions | | prior to | | | | ANM 2.0 | |---------------+----------+------------| | | | All | | Default User | ANM | versions | | Credentials | | prior to | | | | ANM 2.0 | |---------------+----------+------------| | | | All | | MySQL Default | ANM | versions | | Credentials | | prior to | | | | ANM 2.0 | |---------------+----------+------------| | | | All | | Java Agent | | versions | | Privilege | ANM | prior to | | Escalation | | ANM 2.0 | | | | Update A | +---------------------------------------+ Determining ACE Device Manager Software Version +---------------------------------------------- The ACE Device Manager is embedded with the ACE appliance software. To display the version of system software that is currently running on the device, use the "show version" command. The following example includes the output of the "show version" command on a Cisco ACE appliance running software version A3(2.1): ACE-4710/Admin# show version Cisco Application Control Software (ACSW) TAC support: http://www.cisco.com/tac Copyright (c) 1985-2008 by Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. The copyrights to certain works contained herein are owned by other third parties and are used and distributed under license. Some parts of this software are covered under the GNU Public License. A copy of the license is available at http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html. Software loader: Version 0.95 system: Version A3(2.1) [build 3.0(0)A3(2.1) adbuild_14:33:29-2008/11/19_/auto/adbu-rel4/rel_a3_2_1_throttle_build/REL_3_0_0_A3_2_1] system image file: (nd)/192.168.65.32/scimitar.bin Device Manager version 1.1 (0) 20081113:2052 --- Determining ANM Software Version +------------------------------- To display the version of ANM software that is currently installed, login to the ANM server and select the "About" keyword in the upper right. An informational pop up window will be displayed. ANM Version 2.0 Update A is indicated in the example output below. Version: 2.0(0), Update: A Build Number: 709 Build Timestamp: 20081031:1226 Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable - --------------------------------- The Cisco ACE XML Gateway, Cisco ACE GSS (Global Site Selector) 4400 Series and Cisco ACE Web Application Firewall are not affected by any of these vulnerabilities. No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these vulnerabilities. Details ======= ANM is a network management application that manages Cisco ACE modules or appliances. ANM is installed on customer provided servers with a Red Hat Enterprise Linux operating system. The ACE Device Manager provides a browser-based interface for configuring and managing a single ACE appliance. The ACE Device Manager resides in flash memory on the ACE appliance. The following details are provided for each vulnerability addressed in this security advisory. Invalid Directory Permissions +---------------------------- Versions of the Cisco ACE Device Manager prior to software version A3(2.1) and Cisco ANM prior software version ANM 2.0 contain directory traversal vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities could allow unauthorized access to ACE operating system and host operating system files. To exploit these vulnerabilities authentication is required to initially access either product. This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug IDs: * CSCsv66063 * CSCsv70130 This vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0615. Default User Credentials +----------------------- Versions of Cisco ANM prior to software version ANM 2.0 do not force credential changes during installation. This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug ID: * CSCsu52724 This vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0616. MySQL Default Credentials +------------------------ ANM versions prior to ANM 2.0 use a default MySQL root user password during installation. The MySQL database is installed by default when ANM is initially installed. This vulnerability can be exploited remotely with default credential authentication and without end-user interaction. Unauthorized access to the database may allow modification of system files that could impact the function of ANM or allow execution of commands on the underlying host operating system. The ACE appliance and module device configuration files in the MySQL database are encrypted. This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug ID: * CSCsu52632 This vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0617. Exploitation of this issue could result in system information disclosure or denial of services. This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug ID: * CSCsu73001 This vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0618. Vulnerability Scoring Details +---------------------------- Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at: http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss * ACE Device Manager invalid directory permissions (CSCsv66063) CVSS Base Score - 9.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - Single Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * ANM invalid directory permissions (CSCsv70130) CVSS Base Score - 9.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - Single Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * ANM default user credentials during installation (CSCsu52724) CVSS Base Score - 10.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 8.7 Exploitability - High Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * ANM embedded MySQL default credentials (CSCsu52632) CVSS Base Score - 10.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 8.7 Exploitability - High Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * ANM Java agent privilege escalation (CSCsu73001) CVSS Base Score - 8.5 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Partial Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4 Exploitability - High Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== Successful exploitation of the ACE Device Manager and ANM invalid directory permission vulnerabilities may allow unauthorized access to view or modify the ACE Device Manager or ANM file system, including host operating system files. Modification of some system files could result in a denial of service condition. Exploitation of the ANM default user credential and ANM MySQL database default credential vulnerabilities may allow an attacker to gain unauthorized system access. Modification of ANM settings with the default user credentials could result in a denial of service condition. Unauthorized access to the MySQL database may allow modification of system files that could impact the function of ANM or allow execution of commands on the underlying host operating system. Successful exploitation of the ANM privilege escalation vulnerability may result in unauthorized remote access to system processes and services with the ability to modify. Modification of these services could result in a denial of service condition. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. Each row of the following software table identifies the earliest possible software release that contains the fix listed in the "First Fixed Release" column of the table. The "Recommended Release" column indicates the release which have fixes for all the published vulnerabilities at the time of this Advisory. +---------------------------------------+ | | First | Recommended | | Vulnerability | Fixed | Release | | | Release | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ACE Device | | | | Manager | | | | Invalid | A3(2.1) | A3(2.1) | | Directory | | | | Permissions | | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ANM Invalid | | ANM 2.0 | | Directory | ANM 2.0 | Update A | | Permissions | | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ANM Default | | ANM 2.0 | | User | ANM 2.0 | Update A | | Credentials | | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ANM MySQL | | ANM 2.0 | | Default | ANM 2.0 | Update A | | Credentials | | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ANM Java | ANM 2.0 | | | Agent | Update | ANM 2.0 | | Privilege | A | Update A | | Escalation | | | +---------------------------------------+ ANM 2.0 Update A can be downloaded from: http://www.cisco.com/cgi-bin/Software/Tablebuild/doftp.pl?ftpfile=/cisco/crypto/3DES/netmgmt/anm/1.2/anm2.0-update-A.bin ACE Device Manager A3(2.1) can be downloaded from: http://www.cisco.com/cgi-bin/Software/Tablebuild/doftp.pl?ftpfile=/cisco/crypto/3DES/ans/DNSS/ace4710/c4710ace-mz.A3_2_1.bin Workarounds =========== While this Security Advisory describes multiple distinct vulnerabilities, a workaround exists for only the following vulnerability. ANM Default User Credentials +--------------------------- The ANM user "admin" account password may be modified after installation by following the procedures documented for "Changing the Admin Password" located in the ANM User Guide at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/net_mgmt/application_networking_manager/2.0/user/guide/UG_admin.html#wp1053216 Applied Mitigation Bulletin +-------------------------- Additional mitigation techniques that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin companion document for this advisory: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20090225-anm.shtml Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/prod_warranties_item09186a008088e31f.html, or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml. Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts - -------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations - ------------------------------------------------- Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts - ----------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerabilities described in this advisory. Acknowledgement to the National Australia Bank's Security Assurance team for the discovery and reporting of the ACE Device Manager directory permissions vulnerability. The remaining vulnerabilities were identified through internal testing. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-anm.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +------------------------------------------------------------+ | Revision 1.0 | 2009 February 25 | Initial public release | +------------------------------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html. This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt. +-------------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright 2008 - 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. +-------------------------------------------------------------------- Updated: Feb 25, 2009 Document ID: 109451 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (GNU/Linux) iEYEARECAAYFAkmlezoACgkQ86n/Gc8U/uAexwCfYI7DnCQWq4XF2Id8o6bO4+zJ a6IAn0r51YyfdsXPFgYII7OPUWLzJHLU =xUPr -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/

Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Module for Catalyst 6500 Switches and 7600 Routers before A2(1.1) uses default (1) usernames and (2) passwords for (a) the administrator and (b) web management, which makes it easier for remote attackers to perform configuration changes or obtain operating-system access. Other attacks are also possible. Workarounds that mitigate some of the vulnerabilities are available. Note: These vulnerabilities are independent of each other. A device may be affected by one vulnerability and not affected by another. This advisory is posted at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-ace.shtml Note: This advisory is being released simultaneously with a multiple vulnerability disclosure advisory that impacts the Cisco 4700 Series Application Control Engine Device Manager and Application Networking Manager module software. This advisory is posted at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-anm.shtml Affected Products ================= Vulnerable Products +------------------ The following table displays the products that are affected by each vulnerability that is described within this advisory. +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | | Products and Versions | | | Affected | |Vulnerability |-----------------------------| | | Cisco ACE | Cisco ACE | | | 4710 | Module | | | Appliance | | |-------------------------------------+--------------+--------------| | | All versions | All versions | | Default Usernames and Passwords | prior to A1 | prior to A2 | | | (8a) | (1.1) | |-------------------------------------+--------------+--------------| | | All versions | All versions | | Privilege Escalation Vulnerability | prior to A1 | prior to A2 | | | (8a) | (1.2) | |-------------------------------------+--------------+--------------| | | All versions | All versions | | Crafted SSH Packet Vulnerability | prior to A3 | prior to A2 | | | (2.1) | (1.3) | |-------------------------------------+--------------+--------------| | Crafted Simple Network Management | All versions | All versions | | Protocol version 2 (SNMPv2) Packet | prior to A3 | prior to A2 | | Vulnerability | (2.1) | (1.3) | |-------------------------------------+--------------+--------------| | | All versions | All versions | | Crafted SNMPv3 Packet Vulnerability | prior to A1 | prior to A2 | | | (8.0) | (1.2) | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ Determining Software Versions +---------------------------- To display the version of system software that is currently running on Cisco ACE Application Control Engine, use the show version command. The following example displays the output of the show version command on the Cisco ACE Application Control Engine software version A3(1.0): ACE-4710/Admin# show version Cisco Application Control Software (ACSW) TAC support: http://www.cisco.com/tac Copyright (c) 1985-2008 by Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. The copyrights to certain works contained herein are owned by other third parties and are used and distributed under license. Some parts of this software are covered under the GNU Public License. A copy of the license is available at http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html Software loader: Version 0.95 system: Version A3(1.0) [build 3.0(0)A3(0.0.148) adbuild_03:31:25-2008/08/06_/auto/adbure_nightly2/nightly_rel_a3_1_0_throttle/REL_3_0_0_A3_0_0 system image file: (nd)/192.168.65.31/scimitar.bin Device Manager version 1.1 (0) 20080805:0415 ... <output truncated> The following example displays the output of the show version command on a Cisco ACE Application Control Engine module software version A1(1): ACE-mod/Admin# show version Cisco Application Control Software (ACSW) TAC support: http://www.cisco.com/tac Copyright (c) 2002-2006, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. The copyrights to certain works contained herein are owned by other third parties and are used and distributed under license. Some parts of this software are covered under the GNU Public License. A copy of the license is available at http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html Software loader: Version 12.2[117] system: Version 3.0(0)A1(1) [build 3.0(0)A1(1) _01:26:21-2006/03/13_/auto/adbu-rel/ws/REL_3_0_0_A1_1] system image file: [LCP] disk0:c6ace-t1k9-mzg.3.0.0_A1_1.bin licensed features: no feature license is installed ... <output truncated> Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable +-------------------------------- The Cisco ACE XML Gateway, the Cisco ACE Web Application Firewall, and the Cisco ACE GSS 4400 Series Global Site Selector Appliances are not affected by any of the vulnerabilities that are described in this advisory. No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these vulnerabilities. Multiple vulnerabilities exist in both products. The following information provides the details about each of the vulnerabilities that are addressed in this advisory. The appliance and module do not prompt users to modify system account passwords during the initial configuration process. An attacker with knowledge of these accounts could modify the application configuration and, in certain instances, gain user access to the host operating system. This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCsq32379 ( registered customers only) and has also been assigned the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0621. An authenticated user could exploit this vulnerability to invoke administrative commands via the device command line interface (CLI). An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to cause the device to reload by sending a crafted SSH packet to it. Note: SSH access must be configured on the affected device for it to be vulnerable. SSH access is not enabled by default. A full TCP three-way handshake is not necessary to trigger the effects of this vulnerability. An authenticated attacker could send a crafted SNMPv1 packet to an affected device to cause it to reload. Note: SNMPv2c must be explicitly configured in an affected device in order to process any SNMPv2c transactions. SNMPv2c is not enabled by default. An where an attacker may could cause the a device to reload by sending a crafted SNMPv3 packet to it. Note: SNMPv3 must be explicitly configured in an affected device in order to process any SNMPv3 transactions. SNMPv3 is not enabled by default. Vulnerability Scoring Details ============================= Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss CSCsq43828 and CSCsq43229 - Default users and passwords on ACE module and appliance CVSS Base Score - 10 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 8.7 Exploitability - High Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCsq32379 - DM Default Account Credentials CVSS Base Score - 10 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 8.7 Exploitability - High Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCsq48546 and CSCsq09839 - Privilege escalation issue on ACE Module and ACE Appliance CVSS Base Score - 9 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - Single Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCsv01877 and CSCsv01738 - Crafted SSH packet may cause ACE module or appliance to reload CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCsu36038 and CSCsu47876 - Crafted SNMPv2c packet may crash ACE module and appliance CVSS Base Score - 6.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Single Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 5.6 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCso83126 and CSCsq45432 - Crafted SNMPv3 packet may crash ACE appliance CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== An attacker with knowledge of the Default Usernames and Passwords Vulnerability accounts could modify the device configuration and, in certain instances, gain user access to the host operating system. An exploit of the Privilege Escalation Vulnerability could allow an authenticated attacker to execute host operating system administrative commands. Successful exploitation of the Crafted SSH Packet Vulnerability, Crafted SNMPv2 Packet Vulnerability, and Crafted SNMPv3 Packet Vulnerability may cause a reload of the affected device. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. Each row of the software table (below) describes the earliest possible releases that contain the fix (along with the anticipated date of availability for each, if applicable) are listed in the "First Fixed Release" column of the table. The "Recommended Release" column indicates the releases which have fixes for all the published vulnerabilities at the time of this Advisory. A device running a release in the given train that is earlier than the release in a specific column (less than the First Fixed Release) is known to be vulnerable. Cisco recommends upgrading to a release equal to or later than the release in the "Recommended Releases" column of the table. +----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | | Products and Versions Affected | | |---------------------------------------------------------------------| | | Cisco ACE 4710 Appliance | Cisco ACE Module | |Vulnerability |----------------------------------+----------------------------------| | | First Fixed | Recommended | First | | | | Release | Release | Fixed | Recommended Release | | | | | Release | | |------------------------------------+---------------+------------------+------------+---------------------| | Default Usernames and Passwords | A1(8a) | A3(2.1) | A2(1.1) | A2(1.3) | |------------------------------------+---------------+------------------+------------+---------------------| | Privilege Escalation Vulnerability | A1(8a) | A3(2.1) | A2(1.2) | A2(1.3) | |------------------------------------+---------------+------------------+------------+---------------------| | Crafted SSH Packet Vulnerability | A3(2.1) | A3(2.1) | A2(1.3) | A2(1.3) | |------------------------------------+---------------+------------------+------------+---------------------| | Crafted SNMPv2 Packet | A3(2.1) | A3(2.1) | A2(1.3) | A2(1.3) | | Vulnerability | | | | | |------------------------------------+---------------+------------------+------------+---------------------| | Crafted SNMPv2 Packet | A1(8.0) | A3(2.1) | A2(1.2) | A2(1.3) | | Vulnerability | | | | | +----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ Cisco ACE module software can be downloaded from: http://tools.cisco.com/support/downloads/go/Redirect.x?mdfid=280557289 Cisco ACE 4710 Application Control Engine appliance software can be downloaded from: http://tools.cisco.com/support/downloads/go/Redirect.x?mdfid=281222179 Workarounds =========== This Security Advisory describes multiple distinct vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities and their respective workarounds are independent of each other. Default Usernames and Passwords +------------------------------ To change the default administrative password, use the username command in configuration mode. The syntax of this command is as follows: username admin [password [0 | 5] {password}] The keywords, arguments, and options are: admin--Specifies the default administrative user name. password--(Optional) Keyword that indicates that a password follows. 0--(Optional) Specifies a clear text password. 5--(Optional) Specifies an MD5-hashed strong encryption password. password--The password in clear text, encrypted text, or MD5 strong encryption, depending on the numbered option (0 or 5) that you enter. If you do not enter a numbered option, the password is in clear text by default. Enter a password as an unquoted text string with a maximum of 64 characters. For example, to create a user named admin that uses the clear text password my_super_secret_88312, enter the following command: ACE(config)# username admin password 0 my_super_secret_88312 Note: This process can also be followed to change the www user account credentials. The dm user is for accessing the Device Manager GUI and cannot be modified or deleted. The dm user is an internal user required by the Device Manager GUI; it is hidden on the ACE CLI. For more information refer to: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/app_ntwk_services/data_center_app_services/ace_appliances/vA3_1_0/configuration/virtualization/guide/config.html Privilege Escalation Vulnerability +--------------------------------- There are no workarounds for this vulnerability. Crafted SSH Packet Vulnerability +------------------------------- SSH management traffic that can be received by the ACE is controlled through the use of class maps, policy maps, and service policies. This Management Traffic Service example denies unauthorized SSH packets that are sent to an affected device. In the following example, 192.168.100.1 is considered a trusted source that requires SSH access to the affected device. Care should be taken to allow all required management access to the affected device. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability using spoofed packets. This workaround cannot provide complete protection against this vulnerability when the attack comes from a trusted source address. The following example demonstrates how SSH access to the ACE is only allowed from the 192.168.100.1 host: !-- Configure a class to allow SSH from the trusted source ! class-map type management match-all Permit_SSH_Class description Allow SSH from trusted sources Class match protocol ssh source-address 192.168.100.1 255.255.255.255 ! !-- Configure a management policy that allows ssh from the !--trusted source configured in the above class ! policy-map type management first-match Permit_SSH_Policy description Allow SSH from trusted sources Policy class Permit_SSH_Class permit ! !-- Apply the management policy globally ! service-policy input Permit_SSH_Policy Additional information about "Configuring SSH Management Sessions" is available at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/interfaces_modules/services_modules/ace/v3.00_A1/configuration/administration/guide/access.html#wp1049450 Additional information about "Configuring Class Maps and Policy Maps" is available at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/interfaces_modules/services_modules/ace/v3.00_A1/configuration/administration/guide/mapolcy.html warning Warning: It is possible to easily spoof the sender's IP address, which may defeat class maps and access control lists (ACLs) that permit communication to the device from trusted IP addresses. Crafted SNMPv2 and SNMPv3 Packet Vulnerabilities +----------------------------------------------- SNMP management traffic that can be received by the ACE is controlled through the use of class maps, policy maps, and service policies. This Management Traffic Service example denies unauthorized SNMP packets on UDP port 161 that are sent to an affected device. In the following example, 192.168.100.1 is considered a trusted source that requires SNMP access to the affected device. Care should be taken to allow all required management access to the affected device. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability using spoofed packets. This workaround cannot provide complete protection against this vulnerability when the attack comes from a trusted source address. !-- Configure a class to allow SNMP from the trusted source ! class-map type management match-all Permit_SNMP_Class description Allow SNMP from trusted sources Class 2 match protocol snmp source-address 192.168.100.1 255.255.255.255 ! !-- Configure a management policy that allows snmp from the !--trusted source configured in the above class ! policy-map type management first-match Permit_SNMP_Policy description Allow SNMP from trusted sources Policy class Permit_SNMP_Class permit !-- Apply the management policy globally ! service-policy input Permit_SNMP_Policy Additional information about "SNMP Management Traffic Services" is available at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/interfaces_modules/services_modules/ace/v3.00_A1/configuration/administration/guide/snmp.html#wp1034011 Additional information about "Configuring Class Maps and Policy Maps" is available at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/interfaces_modules/services_modules/ace/v3.00_A1/configuration/administration/guide/mapolcy.html Additional mitigation techniques that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin companion document for this advisory: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20090225-ace.shtml Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/prod_warranties_item09186a008088e31f.html or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory. These vulnerabilities were found during internal testing. Status of this Notice: FINAL THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at : http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-ace.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Revision 1.0 | 2009-February-25 | Initial public release | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.8 (Darwin) iEYEARECAAYFAkmlbsoACgkQ86n/Gc8U/uA9egCgiM1YYI9hZhS8iZ5kbEw6vxaq gM8AnjpFAJaZ/RK593w/5j/mRHxjkLVo =rWBu -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/

Cisco ACE 4710 Application Control Engine Appliance before A1(8a) uses default (1) usernames and (2) passwords for (a) the administrator, (b) web management, and (c) device management, which makes it easier for remote attackers to perform configuration changes to the Device Manager and other components, or obtain operating-system access. Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Module and Cisco ACE 4710 Application Control Engine are prone to multiple remote vulnerabilities: - Multiple authentication-bypass issues - A remote privilege-escalation issue - Multiple denial-of-service issues Attackers can exploit these issues to execute arbitrary commands, gain administrative access, and cause denial-of-service conditions. Other attacks are also possible. Workarounds that mitigate some of the vulnerabilities are available. Note: These vulnerabilities are independent of each other. A device may be affected by one vulnerability and not affected by another. This advisory is posted at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-ace.shtml Note: This advisory is being released simultaneously with a multiple vulnerability disclosure advisory that impacts the Cisco 4700 Series Application Control Engine Device Manager and Application Networking Manager module software. This advisory is posted at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-anm.shtml Affected Products ================= Vulnerable Products +------------------ The following table displays the products that are affected by each vulnerability that is described within this advisory. +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | | Products and Versions | | | Affected | |Vulnerability |-----------------------------| | | Cisco ACE | Cisco ACE | | | 4710 | Module | | | Appliance | | |-------------------------------------+--------------+--------------| | | All versions | All versions | | Default Usernames and Passwords | prior to A1 | prior to A2 | | | (8a) | (1.1) | |-------------------------------------+--------------+--------------| | | All versions | All versions | | Privilege Escalation Vulnerability | prior to A1 | prior to A2 | | | (8a) | (1.2) | |-------------------------------------+--------------+--------------| | | All versions | All versions | | Crafted SSH Packet Vulnerability | prior to A3 | prior to A2 | | | (2.1) | (1.3) | |-------------------------------------+--------------+--------------| | Crafted Simple Network Management | All versions | All versions | | Protocol version 2 (SNMPv2) Packet | prior to A3 | prior to A2 | | Vulnerability | (2.1) | (1.3) | |-------------------------------------+--------------+--------------| | | All versions | All versions | | Crafted SNMPv3 Packet Vulnerability | prior to A1 | prior to A2 | | | (8.0) | (1.2) | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ Determining Software Versions +---------------------------- To display the version of system software that is currently running on Cisco ACE Application Control Engine, use the show version command. The following example displays the output of the show version command on the Cisco ACE Application Control Engine software version A3(1.0): ACE-4710/Admin# show version Cisco Application Control Software (ACSW) TAC support: http://www.cisco.com/tac Copyright (c) 1985-2008 by Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. The copyrights to certain works contained herein are owned by other third parties and are used and distributed under license. Some parts of this software are covered under the GNU Public License. A copy of the license is available at http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html Software loader: Version 0.95 system: Version A3(1.0) [build 3.0(0)A3(0.0.148) adbuild_03:31:25-2008/08/06_/auto/adbure_nightly2/nightly_rel_a3_1_0_throttle/REL_3_0_0_A3_0_0 system image file: (nd)/192.168.65.31/scimitar.bin Device Manager version 1.1 (0) 20080805:0415 ... <output truncated> The following example displays the output of the show version command on a Cisco ACE Application Control Engine module software version A1(1): ACE-mod/Admin# show version Cisco Application Control Software (ACSW) TAC support: http://www.cisco.com/tac Copyright (c) 2002-2006, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. The copyrights to certain works contained herein are owned by other third parties and are used and distributed under license. Some parts of this software are covered under the GNU Public License. A copy of the license is available at http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html Software loader: Version 12.2[117] system: Version 3.0(0)A1(1) [build 3.0(0)A1(1) _01:26:21-2006/03/13_/auto/adbu-rel/ws/REL_3_0_0_A1_1] system image file: [LCP] disk0:c6ace-t1k9-mzg.3.0.0_A1_1.bin licensed features: no feature license is installed ... <output truncated> Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable +-------------------------------- The Cisco ACE XML Gateway, the Cisco ACE Web Application Firewall, and the Cisco ACE GSS 4400 Series Global Site Selector Appliances are not affected by any of the vulnerabilities that are described in this advisory. No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these vulnerabilities. Multiple vulnerabilities exist in both products. The following information provides the details about each of the vulnerabilities that are addressed in this advisory. The appliance and module do not prompt users to modify system account passwords during the initial configuration process. An attacker with knowledge of these accounts could modify the application configuration and, in certain instances, gain user access to the host operating system. This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCsq32379 ( registered customers only) and has also been assigned the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0621. An authenticated user could exploit this vulnerability to invoke administrative commands via the device command line interface (CLI). An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to cause the device to reload by sending a crafted SSH packet to it. Note: SSH access must be configured on the affected device for it to be vulnerable. SSH access is not enabled by default. A full TCP three-way handshake is not necessary to trigger the effects of this vulnerability. An authenticated attacker could send a crafted SNMPv1 packet to an affected device to cause it to reload. Note: SNMPv2c must be explicitly configured in an affected device in order to process any SNMPv2c transactions. SNMPv2c is not enabled by default. An where an attacker may could cause the a device to reload by sending a crafted SNMPv3 packet to it. Note: SNMPv3 must be explicitly configured in an affected device in order to process any SNMPv3 transactions. SNMPv3 is not enabled by default. Vulnerability Scoring Details ============================= Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss CSCsq43828 and CSCsq43229 - Default users and passwords on ACE module and appliance CVSS Base Score - 10 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 8.7 Exploitability - High Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCsq32379 - DM Default Account Credentials CVSS Base Score - 10 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 8.7 Exploitability - High Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCsq48546 and CSCsq09839 - Privilege escalation issue on ACE Module and ACE Appliance CVSS Base Score - 9 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - Single Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCsv01877 and CSCsv01738 - Crafted SSH packet may cause ACE module or appliance to reload CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCsu36038 and CSCsu47876 - Crafted SNMPv2c packet may crash ACE module and appliance CVSS Base Score - 6.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Single Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 5.6 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCso83126 and CSCsq45432 - Crafted SNMPv3 packet may crash ACE appliance CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== An attacker with knowledge of the Default Usernames and Passwords Vulnerability accounts could modify the device configuration and, in certain instances, gain user access to the host operating system. An exploit of the Privilege Escalation Vulnerability could allow an authenticated attacker to execute host operating system administrative commands. Successful exploitation of the Crafted SSH Packet Vulnerability, Crafted SNMPv2 Packet Vulnerability, and Crafted SNMPv3 Packet Vulnerability may cause a reload of the affected device. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. Each row of the software table (below) describes the earliest possible releases that contain the fix (along with the anticipated date of availability for each, if applicable) are listed in the "First Fixed Release" column of the table. The "Recommended Release" column indicates the releases which have fixes for all the published vulnerabilities at the time of this Advisory. A device running a release in the given train that is earlier than the release in a specific column (less than the First Fixed Release) is known to be vulnerable. Cisco recommends upgrading to a release equal to or later than the release in the "Recommended Releases" column of the table. +----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | | Products and Versions Affected | | |---------------------------------------------------------------------| | | Cisco ACE 4710 Appliance | Cisco ACE Module | |Vulnerability |----------------------------------+----------------------------------| | | First Fixed | Recommended | First | | | | Release | Release | Fixed | Recommended Release | | | | | Release | | |------------------------------------+---------------+------------------+------------+---------------------| | Default Usernames and Passwords | A1(8a) | A3(2.1) | A2(1.1) | A2(1.3) | |------------------------------------+---------------+------------------+------------+---------------------| | Privilege Escalation Vulnerability | A1(8a) | A3(2.1) | A2(1.2) | A2(1.3) | |------------------------------------+---------------+------------------+------------+---------------------| | Crafted SSH Packet Vulnerability | A3(2.1) | A3(2.1) | A2(1.3) | A2(1.3) | |------------------------------------+---------------+------------------+------------+---------------------| | Crafted SNMPv2 Packet | A3(2.1) | A3(2.1) | A2(1.3) | A2(1.3) | | Vulnerability | | | | | |------------------------------------+---------------+------------------+------------+---------------------| | Crafted SNMPv2 Packet | A1(8.0) | A3(2.1) | A2(1.2) | A2(1.3) | | Vulnerability | | | | | +----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ Cisco ACE module software can be downloaded from: http://tools.cisco.com/support/downloads/go/Redirect.x?mdfid=280557289 Cisco ACE 4710 Application Control Engine appliance software can be downloaded from: http://tools.cisco.com/support/downloads/go/Redirect.x?mdfid=281222179 Workarounds =========== This Security Advisory describes multiple distinct vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities and their respective workarounds are independent of each other. Default Usernames and Passwords +------------------------------ To change the default administrative password, use the username command in configuration mode. The syntax of this command is as follows: username admin [password [0 | 5] {password}] The keywords, arguments, and options are: admin--Specifies the default administrative user name. password--(Optional) Keyword that indicates that a password follows. 0--(Optional) Specifies a clear text password. 5--(Optional) Specifies an MD5-hashed strong encryption password. password--The password in clear text, encrypted text, or MD5 strong encryption, depending on the numbered option (0 or 5) that you enter. If you do not enter a numbered option, the password is in clear text by default. Enter a password as an unquoted text string with a maximum of 64 characters. For example, to create a user named admin that uses the clear text password my_super_secret_88312, enter the following command: ACE(config)# username admin password 0 my_super_secret_88312 Note: This process can also be followed to change the www user account credentials. The dm user is for accessing the Device Manager GUI and cannot be modified or deleted. The dm user is an internal user required by the Device Manager GUI; it is hidden on the ACE CLI. For more information refer to: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/app_ntwk_services/data_center_app_services/ace_appliances/vA3_1_0/configuration/virtualization/guide/config.html Privilege Escalation Vulnerability +--------------------------------- There are no workarounds for this vulnerability. Crafted SSH Packet Vulnerability +------------------------------- SSH management traffic that can be received by the ACE is controlled through the use of class maps, policy maps, and service policies. This Management Traffic Service example denies unauthorized SSH packets that are sent to an affected device. In the following example, 192.168.100.1 is considered a trusted source that requires SSH access to the affected device. Care should be taken to allow all required management access to the affected device. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability using spoofed packets. This workaround cannot provide complete protection against this vulnerability when the attack comes from a trusted source address. The following example demonstrates how SSH access to the ACE is only allowed from the 192.168.100.1 host: !-- Configure a class to allow SSH from the trusted source ! class-map type management match-all Permit_SSH_Class description Allow SSH from trusted sources Class match protocol ssh source-address 192.168.100.1 255.255.255.255 ! !-- Configure a management policy that allows ssh from the !--trusted source configured in the above class ! policy-map type management first-match Permit_SSH_Policy description Allow SSH from trusted sources Policy class Permit_SSH_Class permit ! !-- Apply the management policy globally ! service-policy input Permit_SSH_Policy Additional information about "Configuring SSH Management Sessions" is available at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/interfaces_modules/services_modules/ace/v3.00_A1/configuration/administration/guide/access.html#wp1049450 Additional information about "Configuring Class Maps and Policy Maps" is available at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/interfaces_modules/services_modules/ace/v3.00_A1/configuration/administration/guide/mapolcy.html warning Warning: It is possible to easily spoof the sender's IP address, which may defeat class maps and access control lists (ACLs) that permit communication to the device from trusted IP addresses. Crafted SNMPv2 and SNMPv3 Packet Vulnerabilities +----------------------------------------------- SNMP management traffic that can be received by the ACE is controlled through the use of class maps, policy maps, and service policies. This Management Traffic Service example denies unauthorized SNMP packets on UDP port 161 that are sent to an affected device. In the following example, 192.168.100.1 is considered a trusted source that requires SNMP access to the affected device. Care should be taken to allow all required management access to the affected device. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability using spoofed packets. This workaround cannot provide complete protection against this vulnerability when the attack comes from a trusted source address. !-- Configure a class to allow SNMP from the trusted source ! class-map type management match-all Permit_SNMP_Class description Allow SNMP from trusted sources Class 2 match protocol snmp source-address 192.168.100.1 255.255.255.255 ! !-- Configure a management policy that allows snmp from the !--trusted source configured in the above class ! policy-map type management first-match Permit_SNMP_Policy description Allow SNMP from trusted sources Policy class Permit_SNMP_Class permit !-- Apply the management policy globally ! service-policy input Permit_SNMP_Policy Additional information about "SNMP Management Traffic Services" is available at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/interfaces_modules/services_modules/ace/v3.00_A1/configuration/administration/guide/snmp.html#wp1034011 Additional information about "Configuring Class Maps and Policy Maps" is available at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/interfaces_modules/services_modules/ace/v3.00_A1/configuration/administration/guide/mapolcy.html Additional mitigation techniques that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin companion document for this advisory: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20090225-ace.shtml Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/prod_warranties_item09186a008088e31f.html or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory. These vulnerabilities were found during internal testing. Status of this Notice: FINAL THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at : http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-ace.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Revision 1.0 | 2009-February-25 | Initial public release | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.8 (Darwin) iEYEARECAAYFAkmlbsoACgkQ86n/Gc8U/uA9egCgiM1YYI9hZhS8iZ5kbEw6vxaq gM8AnjpFAJaZ/RK593w/5j/mRHxjkLVo =rWBu -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/

Unspecified vulnerability in Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Module for Catalyst 6500 Switches and 7600 Routers before A2(1.2) and Cisco ACE 4710 Application Control Engine Appliance before A1(8a) allows remote authenticated users to execute arbitrary operating-system commands through a command line interface (CLI). Other attacks are also possible. Remote authentication users can execute arbitrary system commands through the command line interface

Unspecified vulnerability in Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Module for Catalyst 6500 Switches and 7600 Routers before A2(1.3) and Cisco ACE 4710 Application Control Engine Appliance before A3(2.1) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device reload) via a crafted SSH packet. Other attacks are also possible. Remote authentication users can cause denial of service by constructing SSH packets

Apple Safari 4 Beta build 528.16 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) via a feeds: URI beginning with a (1) % (percent), (2) { (open curly bracket), (3) } (close curly bracket), (4) ^ (caret), (5) ` (backquote), or (6) | (pipe) character, followed by an & (ampersand) character. Apple Safari is prone to a denial-of-service vulnerability that stems from a NULL-pointer dereference. Attackers can exploit this issue to crash the affected application, denying service to legitimate users. Apple Safari 4 Beta is vulnerable; other versions may also be affected. Safari is the web browser bundled by default in the Apple family operating system. Malformed feeds in Apple Safari: URI Null Pointer Reference Denial of Service Vulnerability. Since the user input provided in the feeds: URI is not adequately filtered, if the user is tricked into following a malicious link, a null pointer dereference will be triggered, causing the Safari process to crash

The doRead method in Apache Tomcat 4.1.32 through 4.1.34 and 5.5.10 through 5.5.20 does not return a -1 to indicate when a certain error condition has occurred, which can cause Tomcat to send POST content from one request to a different request. Apache Tomcat from The Apache Software Foundation contains an information disclosure vulnerability. Apache Tomcat from the Apache Software Foundation is an implementation of the Java Servlet and JavaServer Page (JSP) technologies. This vulnerability was addressed and solved in ASF Bugzilla - Bug 40771. However there was no description regarding this vulnerability in ASF Bugzilla - Bug 40771. Therefore, The Apache Tomcat Development Team has decided to publish an advisory regarding this issue.A remote attacker could possibly obtain user credentials such as password, session ID, user ID, etc. According to the developer, unsupported Apache Tomcat 3.x, 4.0.x, and 5.0.x may also be affected. They have confirmed that Apache Tomcat 6.0.x is not affected. Remote attackers can exploit this issue to obtain sensitive data stored on the server. Information obtained may lead to further attacks. Publication of this issue was then postponed until now at the request of the reporter. For a vulnerability to exist the content read from the input stream must be disclosed, eg via writing it to the response and committing the response, before the ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException occurs which will halt processing of the request. Mitigation: Upgrade to: 4.1.35 or later 5.5.21 or later 6.0.0 or later Example: See original bug report for example of how to create the error condition. Credit: This issue was discovered by Fujitsu and reported to the Tomcat Security Team via JPCERT. References: http://tomcat.apache.org/security.html Mark Thomas -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.7 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iD8DBQFJpdGRb7IeiTPGAkMRAkK+AKC1m5WunqOmwuFYSYEoASF/AokgDQCffmxM U3IdbfYNVtRIzCW5XTvhv2E= =rJGg -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- . ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Did you know? Our assessment and impact rating along with detailed information such as exploit code availability, or if an updated patch is released by the vendor, is not part of this mailing-list? Click here to learn more about our commercial solutions: http://secunia.com/advisories/business_solutions/ Click here to trial our solutions: http://secunia.com/advisories/try_vi/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: Apache Tomcat POST Content Disclosure Vulnerability SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA34057 VERIFY ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/34057/ DESCRIPTION: A vulnerability has been reported in Apache Tomcat, which can be exploited by malicious people to potentially disclose sensitive information. The vulnerability is reported in versions 4.1.32 through 4.1.34 and 5.5.10 through 5.5.20. PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: The vendor credits Fujitsu, reporting via JPCERT. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: Apache Tomcat: http://tomcat.apache.org/security-4.html http://tomcat.apache.org/security-5.html http://www.mail-archive.com/users@tomcat.apache.org/msg57428.html JVN: http://jvn.jp/jp/JVN66905322/index.html ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help everybody keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ----------------------------------------------------------------------