VARIoT IoT vulnerabilities database

Unspecified vulnerability on the HP ProCurve 2610 switch before R.11.22, when DHCP is enabled, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via unknown vectors. The HP ProCurve Switch is a network switch developed by Hewlett-Packard. There is an unspecified error in the DHCP service provided by the device. The attacker can perform a denial of service attack on the device. HP ProCurve 2610 series switches are prone to multiple unspecified denial-of-service vulnerabilities because they fail to properly sanitize user-supplied input. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 SUPPORT COMMUNICATION - SECURITY BULLETIN Document ID: c02436045 Version: 1 HPSBGN02561 SSRT100194 rev.1 - HP ProCurve 2610 Switches running DHCP, Remote Denial of Service (DoS) NOTICE: The information in this Security Bulletin should be acted upon as soon as possible. Release Date: 2010-08-04 Last Updated: 2010-08-04 Potential Security Impact: Remote Denial of Service (DoS) Source: Hewlett-Packard Company, HP Software Security Response Team VULNERABILITY SUMMARY A potential security vulnerability has been identified in the ProCurve 2610 Switches running DHCP. The vulnerability could be remotely exploited resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS). References: CVE-2010-2708, HP PR#11503 SUPPORTED SOFTWARE VERSIONS*: ONLY impacted versions are listed. J9085A ProCurve Switch 2610-24 J9088A ProCurve Switch 2610-48 J9086A ProCurve Switch 2610-24/12PWR J9087A ProCurve Switch 2610-24-PWR J9089A ProCurve Switch 2610-48-PWR Released versions prior to R.11.22 BACKGROUND CVSS 2.0 Base Metrics =========================================================== Reference Base Vector Base Score CVE-2010-2708 (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P) 5 =========================================================== Information on CVSS is documented in HP Customer Notice: HPSN-2008-002 RESOLUTION HP has made the following software update available to resolve this vulnerability. Product Version: R.11.22 or later. The updates are available from the following location: http://www.procurve.com/customercare/support/software/switches.htm PRODUCT SPECIFIC INFORMATION None HISTORY: Version: 1 (rev.1) 4 August 2010 Initial release. Third Party Security Patches: Third party security patches that are to be installed on systems running HP software products should be applied in accordance with the customer's patch management policy. Support: For further information, contact normal HP Services support channel. Report: To report a potential security vulnerability with any HP supported product, send Email to: security-alert@hp.com It is strongly recommended that security related information being communicated to HP be encrypted using PGP, especially exploit information. To get the security-alert PGP key, please send an e-mail message as follows: To: security-alert@hp.com Subject: get key Subscribe: To initiate a subscription to receive future HP Security Bulletins via Email: http://h30046.www3.hp.com/driverAlertProfile.php?regioncode=NA&langcode=USENG&jumpid=in_SC-GEN__driverITRC&topiccode=ITRC On the web page: ITRC security bulletins and patch sign-up Under Step1: your ITRC security bulletins and patches -check ALL categories for which alerts are required and continue. Under Step2: your ITRC operating systems -verify your operating system selections are checked and save. To update an existing subscription: http://h30046.www3.hp.com/subSignIn.php Log in on the web page: Subscriber's choice for Business: sign-in. On the web page: Subscriber's Choice: your profile summary - use Edit Profile to update appropriate sections. To review previously published Security Bulletins visit: http://www.itrc.hp.com/service/cki/secBullArchive.do * The Software Product Category that this Security Bulletin relates to is represented by the 5th and 6th characters of the Bulletin number in the title: GN = HP General SW MA = HP Management Agents MI = Misc. 3rd Party SW MP = HP MPE/iX NS = HP NonStop Servers OV = HP OpenVMS PI = HP Printing & Imaging ST = HP Storage SW TL = HP Trusted Linux TU = HP Tru64 UNIX UX = HP-UX VV = HP VirtualVault System management and security procedures must be reviewed frequently to maintain system integrity. HP is continually reviewing and enhancing the security features of software products to provide customers with current secure solutions. "HP is broadly distributing this Security Bulletin in order to bring to the attention of users of the affected HP products the important security information contained in this Bulletin. HP recommends that all users determine the applicability of this information to their individual situations and take appropriate action. HP does not warrant that this information is necessarily accurate or complete for all user situations and, consequently, HP will not be responsible for any damages resulting from user's use or disregard of the information provided in this Bulletin. To the extent permitted by law, HP disclaims all warranties, either express or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, title and non-infringement." Copyright 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. Hewlett-Packard Company shall not be liable for technical or editorial errors or omissions contained herein. The information provided is provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. To the extent permitted by law, neither HP or its affiliates, subcontractors or suppliers will be liable for incidental,special or consequential damages including downtime cost; lost profits;damages relating to the procurement of substitute products or services; or damages for loss of data, or software restoration. The information in this document is subject to change without notice. Hewlett-Packard Company and the names of Hewlett-Packard products referenced herein are trademarks of Hewlett-Packard Company in the United States and other countries. Other product and company names mentioned herein may be trademarks of their respective owners. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (GNU/Linux) iEYEARECAAYFAkxZzb4ACgkQ4B86/C0qfVmHUQCguy73MxsSUepFrFfoFjArRbRa vCQAoLAW4GmoAl6OfZexNT44nitEZjq3 =7Fzj -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- . ---------------------------------------------------------------------- "From 2007 to 2009 vulnerabilities in a typical end-user PC almost doubled from about 220 to 420." Non-Microsoft software to blame for increase in vulnerabilities affecting typical Windows end-users, read more: http://secunia.com/gfx/pdf/Secunia_Half_Year_Report_2010.pdf ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: HP ProCurve 2610 Two Denial of Service Vulnerabilities SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA40864 VERIFY ADVISORY: Secunia.com http://secunia.com/advisories/40864/ Customer Area (Credentials Required) https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=40864 RELEASE DATE: 2010-08-06 DISCUSS ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/40864/#comments AVAILABLE ON SITE AND IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Last Update * Popularity * Comments * Criticality Level * Impact * Where * Solution Status * Operating System / Software * CVE Reference(s) http://secunia.com/advisories/40864/ ONLY AVAILABLE IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Authentication Level * Report Reliability * Secunia PoC * Secunia Analysis * Systems Affected * Approve Distribution * Remediation Status * Secunia CVSS Score * CVSS https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=40864 ONLY AVAILABLE WITH SECUNIA CSI AND SECUNIA PSI: * AUTOMATED SCANNING http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/personal/ http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/corporate/wsus_sccm_3rd_third_party_patching/ DESCRIPTION: Two vulnerabilities have been reported in HP ProCurve 2610 Series switches, which can be exploited by malicious people to cause a DoS (Denial of Service). No further information is currently available. This vulnerability is reported in versions prior to R.11.30. No further information is currently available. This vulnerability is reported in versions prior to R.11.22. PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: Reported by the vendor. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: HPSBGN02559 SSRT100192: http://itrc.hp.com/service/cki/docDisplay.do?docId=emr_na-c02436043 HPSBGN02561 SSRT100194: http://itrc.hp.com/service/cki/docDisplay.do?docId=emr_na-c02436045 OTHER REFERENCES: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ DEEP LINKS: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXTENDED DESCRIPTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXTENDED SOLUTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXPLOIT: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ----------------------------------------------------------------------

The FTP daemon in Wind River VxWorks does not close the TCP connection after a number of failed login attempts, which makes it easier for remote attackers to obtain access via a brute-force attack. Remote attackers can easily gain access with brute-force attacks

Unspecified vulnerability on the HP ProCurve 2626 and 2650 switches before H.10.80 allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information, modify data, and cause a denial of service via unknown vectors. The HP ProCurve Switch is a network switch developed by Hewlett-Packard. HP ProCurve 2626/2650 series switches are prone to an unspecified security bypass vulnerability. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- "From 2007 to 2009 vulnerabilities in a typical end-user PC almost doubled from about 220 to 420." Non-Microsoft software to blame for increase in vulnerabilities affecting typical Windows end-users, read more: http://secunia.com/gfx/pdf/Secunia_Half_Year_Report_2010.pdf ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: HP ProCurve 2626/2650 Security Bypass Vulnerability SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA40865 VERIFY ADVISORY: Secunia.com http://secunia.com/advisories/40865/ Customer Area (Credentials Required) https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=40865 RELEASE DATE: 2010-08-06 DISCUSS ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/40865/#comments AVAILABLE ON SITE AND IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Last Update * Popularity * Comments * Criticality Level * Impact * Where * Solution Status * Operating System / Software * CVE Reference(s) http://secunia.com/advisories/40865/ ONLY AVAILABLE IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Authentication Level * Report Reliability * Secunia PoC * Secunia Analysis * Systems Affected * Approve Distribution * Remediation Status * Secunia CVSS Score * CVSS https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=40865 ONLY AVAILABLE WITH SECUNIA CSI AND SECUNIA PSI: * AUTOMATED SCANNING http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/personal/ http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/corporate/wsus_sccm_3rd_third_party_patching/ DESCRIPTION: A vulnerability has been reported in HP ProCurve 2600 Series switches, which can be exploited by malicious people to bypass certain security restrictions. No further information is currently available. PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: Reported by the vendor. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: HPSBGN02560 SSRT100193: http://itrc.hp.com/service/cki/docDisplay.do?docId=emr_na-c02436047 OTHER REFERENCES: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ DEEP LINKS: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXTENDED DESCRIPTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXTENDED SOLUTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXPLOIT: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ---------------------------------------------------------------------- . -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 SUPPORT COMMUNICATION - SECURITY BULLETIN Document ID: c02436047 Version: 1 HPSBGN02560 SSRT100193 rev.1 - HP ProCurve 2626 and 2650 Switches, Remote Unauthorized Access NOTICE: The information in this Security Bulletin should be acted upon as soon as possible. Release Date: 2010-08-04 Last Updated: 2010-08-04 Potential Security Impact: Remote unauthorized access Source: Hewlett-Packard Company, HP Software Security Response Team VULNERABILITY SUMMARY A potential security vulnerability has been identified in ProCurve 2626 and 2650 Switches. The vulnerability could result in remote unauthorized access. References: CVE-2010-2707, HP PR#15972 SUPPORTED SOFTWARE VERSIONS*: ONLY impacted versions are listed. J8165A ProCurve Switch 2650-PWR J4899A, J4899B, and J4899C ProCurve Switch 2650 J8164A ProCurve Switch 2626-PWR J4900A, J4900B, and J4900C ProCurve Switch 2626 Released versions prior to H.10.80 BACKGROUND CVSS 2.0 Base Metrics =========================================================== Reference Base Vector Base Score CVE-2010-2707 (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P) 7.5 =========================================================== Information on CVSS is documented in HP Customer Notice: HPSN-2008-002 RESOLUTION HP has made the following software update available to resolve this vulnerability. Product Version: H.10.80 or later. The updates are available from the following location: http://www.procurve.com/customercare/support/software/switches.htm PRODUCT SPECIFIC INFORMATION None HISTORY: Version: 1 (rev.1) 4 August 2010 Initial release. Third Party Security Patches: Third party security patches that are to be installed on systems running HP software products should be applied in accordance with the customer's patch management policy. Support: For further information, contact normal HP Services support channel. Report: To report a potential security vulnerability with any HP supported product, send Email to: security-alert@hp.com It is strongly recommended that security related information being communicated to HP be encrypted using PGP, especially exploit information. To get the security-alert PGP key, please send an e-mail message as follows: To: security-alert@hp.com Subject: get key Subscribe: To initiate a subscription to receive future HP Security Bulletins via Email: http://h30046.www3.hp.com/driverAlertProfile.php?regioncode=NA&langcode=USENG&jumpid=in_SC-GEN__driverITRC&topiccode=ITRC On the web page: ITRC security bulletins and patch sign-up Under Step1: your ITRC security bulletins and patches -check ALL categories for which alerts are required and continue. Under Step2: your ITRC operating systems -verify your operating system selections are checked and save. To update an existing subscription: http://h30046.www3.hp.com/subSignIn.php Log in on the web page: Subscriber's choice for Business: sign-in. On the web page: Subscriber's Choice: your profile summary - use Edit Profile to update appropriate sections. To review previously published Security Bulletins visit: http://www.itrc.hp.com/service/cki/secBullArchive.do * The Software Product Category that this Security Bulletin relates to is represented by the 5th and 6th characters of the Bulletin number in the title: GN = HP General SW MA = HP Management Agents MI = Misc. 3rd Party SW MP = HP MPE/iX NS = HP NonStop Servers OV = HP OpenVMS PI = HP Printing & Imaging ST = HP Storage SW TL = HP Trusted Linux TU = HP Tru64 UNIX UX = HP-UX VV = HP VirtualVault System management and security procedures must be reviewed frequently to maintain system integrity. HP is continually reviewing and enhancing the security features of software products to provide customers with current secure solutions. "HP is broadly distributing this Security Bulletin in order to bring to the attention of users of the affected HP products the important security information contained in this Bulletin. HP recommends that all users determine the applicability of this information to their individual situations and take appropriate action. HP does not warrant that this information is necessarily accurate or complete for all user situations and, consequently, HP will not be responsible for any damages resulting from user's use or disregard of the information provided in this Bulletin. To the extent permitted by law, HP disclaims all warranties, either express or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, title and non-infringement." Copyright 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. Hewlett-Packard Company shall not be liable for technical or editorial errors or omissions contained herein. The information provided is provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. To the extent permitted by law, neither HP or its affiliates, subcontractors or suppliers will be liable for incidental,special or consequential damages including downtime cost; lost profits;damages relating to the procurement of substitute products or services; or damages for loss of data, or software restoration. The information in this document is subject to change without notice. Hewlett-Packard Company and the names of Hewlett-Packard products referenced herein are trademarks of Hewlett-Packard Company in the United States and other countries. Other product and company names mentioned herein may be trademarks of their respective owners. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (GNU/Linux) iEYEARECAAYFAkxZzb4ACgkQ4B86/C0qfVlGjwCgj7zooKj2/UJlVyAW4aMHMzxY fUAAnj8yZEL4EvjtEFaS+xY3WLxwcmu3 =Zbzo -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Unspecified vulnerability on the HP ProCurve 1800-24G switch with software PB.03.02 and earlier, and the ProCurve 1800-8G switch with software PA.03.02 and earlier, when SNMP is enabled, allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via unknown vectors. The HP ProCurve Switch is a network switch developed by Hewlett-Packard. HP ProCurve 1800 Switches are prone to an unspecified remote information-disclosure vulnerability. Other attacks with unspecified impact may also be possible. We will update this BID when more information becomes available. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- "From 2007 to 2009 vulnerabilities in a typical end-user PC almost doubled from about 220 to 420." Non-Microsoft software to blame for increase in vulnerabilities affecting typical Windows end-users, read more: http://secunia.com/gfx/pdf/Secunia_Half_Year_Report_2010.pdf ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: HP ProCurve 1800 SNMP Information Disclosure Vulnerability SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA40867 VERIFY ADVISORY: Secunia.com http://secunia.com/advisories/40867/ Customer Area (Credentials Required) https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=40867 RELEASE DATE: 2010-08-06 DISCUSS ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/40867/#comments AVAILABLE ON SITE AND IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Last Update * Popularity * Comments * Criticality Level * Impact * Where * Solution Status * Operating System / Software * CVE Reference(s) http://secunia.com/advisories/40867/ ONLY AVAILABLE IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Authentication Level * Report Reliability * Secunia PoC * Secunia Analysis * Systems Affected * Approve Distribution * Remediation Status * Secunia CVSS Score * CVSS https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=40867 ONLY AVAILABLE WITH SECUNIA CSI AND SECUNIA PSI: * AUTOMATED SCANNING http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/personal/ http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/corporate/wsus_sccm_3rd_third_party_patching/ DESCRIPTION: A vulnerability has been reported in HP ProCurve 1800 Series switches, which can be exploited by malicious people to disclose potentially sensitive information. SOLUTION: Apply updates. Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: Reported by the vendor. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: HPSBGN02501 SSRT071407: https://itrc.hp.com/service/cki/docDisplay.do?docId=emr_na-c02436028 OTHER REFERENCES: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ DEEP LINKS: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXTENDED DESCRIPTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXTENDED SOLUTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXPLOIT: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ---------------------------------------------------------------------- . -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 SUPPORT COMMUNICATION - SECURITY BULLETIN Document ID: c02436028 Version: 1 HPSBGN02501 SSRT071407 rev.1 - HP ProCurve 1800 Switches running SNMP, Remote Disclosure of Information NOTICE: The information in this Security Bulletin should be acted upon as soon as possible. Release Date: 2010-08-04 Last Updated: 2010-08-04 Potential Security Impact: Remote disclosure of information Source: Hewlett-Packard Company, HP Software Security Response Team VULNERABILITY SUMMARY A potential security vulnerability has been identified in HP ProCurve 1800 Switches running SNMP. The vulnerability could be remotely exploited resulting in a disclosure of information. References: CVE-2010-2705, HP PR#3791 SUPPORTED SOFTWARE VERSIONS*: ONLY impacted versions are listed. Third Party Security Patches: Third party security patches that are to be installed on systems running HP software products should be applied in accordance with the customer's patch management policy. Support: For further information, contact normal HP Services support channel. Report: To report a potential security vulnerability with any HP supported product, send Email to: security-alert@hp.com It is strongly recommended that security related information being communicated to HP be encrypted using PGP, especially exploit information. To get the security-alert PGP key, please send an e-mail message as follows: To: security-alert@hp.com Subject: get key Subscribe: To initiate a subscription to receive future HP Security Bulletins via Email: http://h30046.www3.hp.com/driverAlertProfile.php?regioncode=NA&langcode=USENG&jumpid=in_SC-GEN__driverITRC&topiccode=ITRC On the web page: ITRC security bulletins and patch sign-up Under Step1: your ITRC security bulletins and patches -check ALL categories for which alerts are required and continue. Under Step2: your ITRC operating systems -verify your operating system selections are checked and save. To update an existing subscription: http://h30046.www3.hp.com/subSignIn.php Log in on the web page: Subscriber's choice for Business: sign-in. On the web page: Subscriber's Choice: your profile summary - use Edit Profile to update appropriate sections. To review previously published Security Bulletins visit: http://www.itrc.hp.com/service/cki/secBullArchive.do * The Software Product Category that this Security Bulletin relates to is represented by the 5th and 6th characters of the Bulletin number in the title: GN = HP General SW MA = HP Management Agents MI = Misc. 3rd Party SW MP = HP MPE/iX NS = HP NonStop Servers OV = HP OpenVMS PI = HP Printing & Imaging ST = HP Storage SW TL = HP Trusted Linux TU = HP Tru64 UNIX UX = HP-UX VV = HP VirtualVault System management and security procedures must be reviewed frequently to maintain system integrity. HP is continually reviewing and enhancing the security features of software products to provide customers with current secure solutions. "HP is broadly distributing this Security Bulletin in order to bring to the attention of users of the affected HP products the important security information contained in this Bulletin. HP recommends that all users determine the applicability of this information to their individual situations and take appropriate action. HP does not warrant that this information is necessarily accurate or complete for all user situations and, consequently, HP will not be responsible for any damages resulting from user's use or disregard of the information provided in this Bulletin. To the extent permitted by law, HP disclaims all warranties, either express or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, title and non-infringement." Copyright 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. Hewlett-Packard Company shall not be liable for technical or editorial errors or omissions contained herein. The information provided is provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. To the extent permitted by law, neither HP or its affiliates, subcontractors or suppliers will be liable for incidental,special or consequential damages including downtime cost; lost profits;damages relating to the procurement of substitute products or services; or damages for loss of data, or software restoration. The information in this document is subject to change without notice. Hewlett-Packard Company and the names of Hewlett-Packard products referenced herein are trademarks of Hewlett-Packard Company in the United States and other countries. Other product and company names mentioned herein may be trademarks of their respective owners. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (GNU/Linux) iEYEARECAAYFAkxZzb4ACgkQ4B86/C0qfVnQtACfYS1KsuN0ChE28rYehq7Yclwz PK8An2F5W7Hyip992VLvYOOZ6B1D0b91 =EDXR -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Unspecified vulnerability on the Cisco Firewall Services Module (FWSM) with software 3.2 before 3.2(17.2), 4.0 before 4.0(11.1), and 4.1 before 4.1(1.2) for Catalyst 6500 series switches and 7600 series routers, when multi-mode is enabled, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device reload) via crafted (1) Telnet, (2) SSH, or (3) ASDM traffic over TCP, aka Bug ID CSCtg68694. The Cisco Firewall Services Module is a firewall service module used on multiple cisco products. Users can divide a single FWSM into multiple virtual devices, which is called a security context. Each security context has its own security policy, interface, and administrator. Multiple contexts are similar to multiple independent services, supporting routing tables, firewall functions, and management functions in multiple context modes. However, this vulnerability is only affected if the Cisco FWSM is configured in multi-mode (using a virtual firewall) and receives Telnet, SSH or ASDM connections. Note: This vulnerability requires three TCP handshakes to be completed before reuse. This vulnerability can only be triggered by communication for devices, and Transit communication cannot trigger this vulnerability. An attacker can exploit this issue to cause affected devices to reload, triggering a denial-of-service condition. This issue is tracked by Cisco Bug ID CSCtg68694. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- "From 2007 to 2009 vulnerabilities in a typical end-user PC almost doubled from about 220 to 420." Non-Microsoft software to blame for increase in vulnerabilities affecting typical Windows end-users, read more: http://secunia.com/gfx/pdf/Secunia_Half_Year_Report_2010.pdf ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: Cisco Firewall Services Module Multiple Denial of Service Vulnerabilities SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA40843 VERIFY ADVISORY: Secunia.com http://secunia.com/advisories/40843/ Customer Area (Credentials Required) https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=40843 RELEASE DATE: 2010-08-06 DISCUSS ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/40843/#comments AVAILABLE ON SITE AND IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Last Update * Popularity * Comments * Criticality Level * Impact * Where * Solution Status * Operating System / Software * CVE Reference(s) http://secunia.com/advisories/40843/ ONLY AVAILABLE IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Authentication Level * Report Reliability * Secunia PoC * Secunia Analysis * Systems Affected * Approve Distribution * Remediation Status * Secunia CVSS Score * CVSS https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=40843 ONLY AVAILABLE WITH SECUNIA CSI AND SECUNIA PSI: * AUTOMATED SCANNING http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/personal/ http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/corporate/wsus_sccm_3rd_third_party_patching/ DESCRIPTION: Some vulnerabilities have been reported in Cisco Firewall Services Module (FWSM), which can be exploited by malicious people to cause a DoS (Denial of Service). 1) Three errors exist in the SunRPC inspection engine while processing certain SunRPC messages. This can be exploited to reload a device via specially crafted SunRPC packets that transit the appliance. SOLUTION: Update to a fixed version. Please see the vendor's advisory for detailed patch information. PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: Reported by the vendor. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: cisco-sa-20100804-fwsm: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100804-fwsm.shtml OTHER REFERENCES: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ DEEP LINKS: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXTENDED DESCRIPTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXTENDED SOLUTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXPLOIT: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ---------------------------------------------------------------------- . Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Workarounds are available for the vulnerabilities disclosed in this advisory. Note: These vulnerabilities are independent of each other. This advisory is posted at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100804-fwsm.shtml Note: The Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances are affected by the SunRPC inspection vulnerabilities described in this advisory. A separate Cisco Security Advisory has been published to disclose this and other vulnerabilities that affect the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances. Affected versions of Cisco FWSM Software vary depending on the specific vulnerability. SunRPC inspection is enabled by default. To check if SunRPC inspection is enabled, use the "show service-policy | include sunrpc" command and confirm that the command returns output, as shown in the following example: fwsm#show service-policy | include sunrpc Inspect: sunrpc , packet 0, drop 0, reset-drop 0 Alternatively, a device that has SunRPC inspection enabled has a configuration similar to the following: class-map inspection_default match default-inspection-traffic ! policy-map global_policy class inspection_default ... inspect sunrpc ... ! service-policy global_policy global Note: The Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances are affected by the SunRPC inspection vulnerabilities described in this advisory. A separate Cisco Security Advisory has been published to disclose this and other vulnerabilities that affect the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances. The advisory is available at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100804-asa.shtml TCP Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Cisco FWSM Software version 3.x and 4.x are affected by this vulnerability when configured in multi-mode (with virtual firewalls) and with any of the following features: * ASDM Administrative Access * Telnet * SSH To verify if the FWSM is running in multiple mode, use the "show mode" command, as shown in the following example: FWSM(config)#show mode Security context mode: multiple The flash mode is the SAME as the running mode. The following commands are used to enable the HTTPS server and allow only hosts on the inside interface with an address in the 192.168.1.0 /24 network to create ASDM, SSH or Telnet connections: asa(config)# http server enable asa(config)# http 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 inside asa(config)# telnet 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 inside asa(config)# ssh 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 inside Determining Software Versions ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ To determine the version of Cisco FWSM Software that is running, issue the "show module" command from Cisco IOS Software or Cisco Catalyst Operating System Software to identify what modules and sub modules are installed on the system. The following example shows a system with a Cisco FWSM (WS-SVC-FWM-1) installed in slot 2: switch>show module Mod Ports Card Type Model Serial No. --- ----- -------------------------------------- ------------------ ----------- 1 16 SFM-capable 16 port 1000mb GBIC WS-X6516-GBIC SAL06334NS9 2 6 Firewall Module WS-SVC-FWM-1 SAD10360485 3 8 Intrusion Detection System WS-SVC-IDSM-2 SAD0932089Z 4 4 SLB Application Processor Complex WS-X6066-SLB-APC SAD093004BD 5 2 Supervisor Engine 720 (Active) WS-SUP720-3B SAL0934888E Mod MAC addresses Hw Fw Sw Status --- ---------------------------------- ------ ------------ ------------ ------- 1 0009.11e3.ade8 to 0009.11e3.adf7 5.1 6.3(1) 8.5(0.46)RFW Ok 2 0018.ba41.5092 to 0018.ba41.5099 4.0 7.2(1) 3.2(2)10 Ok 3 0014.a90c.9956 to 0014.a90c.995d 5.0 7.2(1) 5.1(6)E1 Ok 4 0014.a90c.66e6 to 0014.a90c.66ed 1.7 4.2(3) Ok 5 0013.c42e.7fe0 to 0013.c42e.7fe3 4.4 8.1(3) 12.2(18)SXF1 Ok [...] After locating the correct slot, issue the "show module <slot number>" command to identify the software version that is running, as shown in the following example: switch>show module 2 Mod Ports Card Type Model Serial No. --- ----- -------------------------------------- ------------------ ----------- 2 6 Firewall Module WS-SVC-FWM-1 SAD10360485 Mod MAC addresses Hw Fw Sw Status --- ---------------------------------- ------ ------------ ------------ ------- 2 0018.ba41.5092 to 0018.ba41.5099 4.0 7.2(1) 3.2(2)10 Ok [...] The preceding example shows that the FWSM is running software version 3.2(2)10 as indicated by the column under "Sw." Note: Recent versions of Cisco IOS Software will show the software version of each module in the output from the "show module" command; therefore, executing the "show module <slot number>" command is not necessary. If a Virtual Switching System (VSS) is used to allow two physical Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Switches to operate as a single logical virtual switch, the "show module switch all" command can display the software version of all FWSMs that belong to switch 1 and switch 2. The output from this command will be similar to the output from the "show module <slot number>" but will include module information for the modules in each switch in the VSS. Alternatively, version information can be obtained directly from the FWSM through the show version command, as shown in the following example: FWSM> show version FWSM Firewall Version 3.2(2)10 [...] Customers who use the Cisco Adaptive Security Device Manager (ASDM) to manage their devices can find the version of the software displayed in the table in the login window or in the upper left corner of the ASDM window. The version notation is similar to the following example. FWSM Version: 3.2(2)10 Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable +-------------------------------- With the exception of Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances, no other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these vulnerabilities. The FWSM offers firewall services with stateful packet filtering and deep packet inspection. These vulnerabilities are documented in Cisco bug IDs CSCte61710, CSCte61622, and CSCte61662; and have been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) IDs CVE-2010-2818, CVE-2010-2819, and CVE-2010-2820, respectively. Vulnerability Scoring Details ============================= Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at: http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss CSCte61710, CSCte61622, CSCte61662 - Passthrough traffic crashes FWSM with SunRPC inspection CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCtg68694 - FWSM may crash with certain TCP sessions in multiple mode CVSS Base Score - 7.1 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Medium Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== Successful exploitation of all the vulnerabilities described in this security advisory may cause a reload of the affected appliance. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | | Major | First | | Vulnerability | Release | Fixed | | | | Release | |--------------------------------------------+---------+------------| | | 3.1 | 3.1(17.2) | | |---------+------------| | SunRPC Inspection Denial of Service | 3.2 | 3.2(16.1) | | Vulnerabilities (CSCte61710, CSCte61622, |---------+------------| | and CSCte61662) | 4.0 | 4.0(10.1) | | |---------+------------| | | 4.1 | 4.1(1.1) | |--------------------------------------------+---------+------------| | | 3.1 | Not | | | | vulnerable | | |---------+------------| | TCP Denial of Service Vulnerability | 3.2 | 3.2(17.2) | | (CSCtg68694) |---------+------------| | | 4.0 | 4.0(11.1) | | |---------+------------| | | 4.1 | 4.1(1.2) | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ Recommended Releases ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The following table lists all recommended releases. These recommended releases contain the fixes for all vulnerabilities in this advisory. Cisco recommends upgrading to a release that is equal to or later than these recommended releases. +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Major Release | Recommended Release | |---------------------------+---------------------------------------| | 3.1 | 3.1(18) | |---------------------------+---------------------------------------| | 3.2 | 3.2(18) | |---------------------------+---------------------------------------| | 4.0 | 4.0(12) | |---------------------------+---------------------------------------| | 4.1 | 4.1(2) | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ Software Download ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Fixed Cisco FWSM Software can be downloaded from the Software Center on Cisco.com by visiting: http://www.cisco.com/cisco/web/download/index.html and navigating to: Security > Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Firewall Services Module > Firewall Services Module (FWSM) Software Workarounds =========== The SunRPC inspection vulnerabilities can be mitigated by disabling SunRPC inspection, if it is not required. Administrators can disable SunRPC inspection by issuing the "no inspect sunrpc" command in class configuration sub-mode within policy-map configuration. The TCP DoS vulnerability can be mitigated by only allowing trusted hosts to communicate with the FWSM via HTTPs, SSH, or Telnet. For example, the following commands are used to enable the HTTPS server and allow only hosts on the inside interface with an address in the 192.168.1.0/24 network to create ASDM, SSH or Telnet connections: asa(config)# http server enable asa(config)# http 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 inside asa(config)# telnet 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 inside asa(config)# ssh 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 inside Additional mitigation techniques that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin companion document for this advisory: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20100804-fwsm.shtml Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at: http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory. These vulnerabilities were found during the troubleshooting of customer service requests and internal testing. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100804-fwsm.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +---------------------------------------+ | Revision | | Initial | | 1.0 | 2010-August-04 | public | | | | release. | +---------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at: http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iD8DBQFMWMiN86n/Gc8U/uARAvJgAJ0S+X3dxciSvVwJbXA8vWnsb9lqkQCfcOna 6FAY8ScwLN4d+dsW3tBl5LU= =lHQS -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Stack-based buffer overflow in the IConfigurationAccess interface in the Invensys Wonderware Archestra ConfigurationAccessComponent ActiveX control in Wonderware Application Server (WAS) before 3.1 SP2 P01, as used in the Wonderware Archestra Integrated Development Environment (IDE) and the InFusion Integrated Engineering Environment (IEE), allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via the first argument to the UnsubscribeData method. Wonderware Archestra ConfigurationAccessComponent ActiveX The control contains a buffer overflow vulnerability. The UnsubscribeData method of the IConfigurationAccess interface privately wcscpy() copies the first parameter to the static size buffer, which can trigger a buffer overflow. Successful exploitation of a vulnerability can execute arbitrary instructions with application privileges. Wonderware Archestra ConfigurationAccessComponent ActiveX control is prone to a stack-based buffer-overflow vulnerability because it fails to perform adequate boundary checks on user-supplied data. Failed attempts will likely result in denial-of-service conditions. The vulnerable ActiveX control is included in the following products: Wonderware Application Server prior to 3.1 Service Pack 2 Patch 01

Unspecified vulnerability in the IKE implementation on Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances (ASA) 5500 series devices with software 7.0 before 7.0(8.11), 7.1 and 7.2 before 7.2(5), 8.0 before 8.0(5.15), 8.1 before 8.1(2.44), 8.2 before 8.2(2.10), and 8.3 before 8.3(1.1) and Cisco PIX Security Appliances 500 series devices allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device reload) via a crafted IKE message, aka Bug ID CSCte46507. plural Cisco Run on product IKE The implementation of IKE Service operation disruption due to incomplete message processing (DoS) There is a vulnerability that becomes a condition. The problem is Bug ID : CSCte46507 It is a problem.Skillfully crafted by a third party IKE Service disruption via message (DoS) There is a possibility of being put into a state. Cisco ASA security appliances are prone to a remote denial-of-service vulnerability. An attacker can exploit this issue to cause the affected device to reload, denying service to legitimate users. This issue is documented in Cisco bug ID CSCte46507. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- "From 2007 to 2009 vulnerabilities in a typical end-user PC almost doubled from about 220 to 420." Non-Microsoft software to blame for increase in vulnerabilities affecting typical Windows end-users, read more: http://secunia.com/gfx/pdf/Secunia_Half_Year_Report_2010.pdf ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: Cisco ASA 5500 Series Multiple Denial of Service Vulnerabilities SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA40842 VERIFY ADVISORY: Secunia.com http://secunia.com/advisories/40842/ Customer Area (Credentials Required) https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=40842 RELEASE DATE: 2010-08-05 DISCUSS ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/40842/#comments AVAILABLE ON SITE AND IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Last Update * Popularity * Comments * Criticality Level * Impact * Where * Solution Status * Operating System / Software * CVE Reference(s) http://secunia.com/advisories/40842/ ONLY AVAILABLE IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Authentication Level * Report Reliability * Secunia PoC * Secunia Analysis * Systems Affected * Approve Distribution * Remediation Status * Secunia CVSS Score * CVSS https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=40842 ONLY AVAILABLE WITH SECUNIA CSI AND SECUNIA PSI: * AUTOMATED SCANNING http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/personal/ http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/corporate/wsus_sccm_3rd_third_party_patching/ DESCRIPTION: Some vulnerabilities have been reported in Cisco ASA (Adaptive Security Appliance) 5500 Series, which can be exploited by malicious people to cause a DoS (Denial of Service). 1) Three errors exist in the SunRPC inspection engine while processing certain SunRPC messages. This can be exploited to reload a device via specially crafted UDP SunRPC packets that transit the appliance. 3) An error in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) inspection feature can be exploited to trigger an appliance reload via a specially crafted SIP packet that transits the appliance via TCP or UDP port 5060. Please see the vendor's advisory for detailed patch information. PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: Reported by the vendor. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: cisco-sa-20100804-asa: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100804-asa.shtml OTHER REFERENCES: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ DEEP LINKS: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXTENDED DESCRIPTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXTENDED SOLUTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXPLOIT: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ---------------------------------------------------------------------- . There are workarounds for some of the vulnerabilities disclosed in this advisory. This advisory is posted at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100804-asa.shtml Note: The Cisco Firewall Services Module (FWSM) is affected by the SunRPC DoS vulnerabilities. A separate Cisco Security Advisory has been published to disclose the vulnerabilities that affect the FWSM. Vulnerable Products +------------------ For specific version information, refer to the Software Versions and Fixes section of this advisory. A successful attack may result in a sustained DoS condition. Versions 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. SunRPC inspection is enabled by default. To check if SunRPC inspection is enabled, issue the "show service-policy | include sunrpc" command and confirm that output, such as what is displayed in the following example, is returned. ciscoasa# show service-policy | include sunrpc Inspect: sunrpc, packet 0, drop 0, reset-drop 0 The following configuration commands are used to enable SunRPC inspection in the Cisco ASA. class-map inspection_default match default-inspection-traffic ! policy-map global_policy class inspection_default ... inspect sunrpc ... A successful attack may result in a sustained DoS condition. Versions 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, 8.2.x, and 8.3.x are affected by one or more of these vulnerabilities. A Cisco ASA device configured for any of the following features is affected: * Secure Socket Layer Virtual Private Network (SSL VPN) * When the affected device is configured to accept Cisco Adaptive Security Device Manager (ASDM) connections * TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection * Cut-Through Proxy for Network Access when using HTTPS SSL VPN (or WebVPN) is enabled with the "enable <interface name>" command in "webvpn" configuration mode. SSL VPN is disabled by default. The following configuration snippet provides an example of a SSL VPN configuration. webvpn enable outside ... ASDM access is affected by three of these vulnerabilities. To use ASDM, the HTTPS server must be enabled to allow HTTPS connections to the Cisco ASA. The server can be enabled using the "http server enable [port]" command. The default port is 443. To specify hosts that can access the HTTP server internal to the security appliance, use the "http" command in global configuration mode. The TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection feature is affected by these vulnerabilities. This feature was introduced in Cisco ASA version 8.0(2) and is disabled by default. To determine if the TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection feature is enabled on the device, use the show tls-proxy command, as shown in the following example: ciscoasa# show tls-proxy Maximum number of sessions: 1200 TLS-Proxy 'sip_proxy': ref_cnt 1, seq# 3 Server proxy: Trust-point: local_ccm Client proxy: Local dynamic certificate issuer: LOCAL-CA-SERVER Local dynamic certificate key-pair: phone_common Cipher suite: aes128-sha1 aes256-sha1 Run-time proxies: Proxy 0xcbae1538: Class-map: sip_ssl, Inspect: sip Active sess 1, most sess 3, byte 3456043 ... <output truncated> TLS proxy supports SIP and Skinny protocols. TLS proxy for Skinny inspection can be enabled using the "inspect skinny <skinny_map> tls-proxy <proxy_name>", as shown in the following example: asa(config-pmap)# class inspection_default asa(config-pmap-c)# inspect skinny my-inspect tls-proxy my-tls-proxy asa(config)# service-policy global_policy global Note: Secure SCCP uses TCP port 2443; however, it can be configured to a different port. TLS proxy for SIP inspection can be enabled using the "inspect sip <map> tls-proxy <proxy_name>", as shown in the following example: asa(config-pmap)# class inspection_default asa(config-pmap-c)# inspect sip my-inspect tls-proxy my-tls-proxy asa(config)# service-policy global_policy global The Cisco ASA is also vulnerable when the Cut-Through Proxy for Network Access feature is used with HTTPS. This feature is enabled for direct authentication using HTTPS with the "aaa authentication listener https" command, as shown in the following example: ASA(config)# aaa authentication listener https inside port 443 Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ A DoS vulnerability affects the SIP inspection feature of Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances. Versions 7.0.x, 7.1.x, 7.2.x are not affected. Versions 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. SIP inspection is enabled by default. To check if SIP inspection is enabled, issue the "show service-policy | include sip" command and confirm that output, such as what is displayed in the following example, is returned. ciscoasa#show service-policy | include sip Inspect: sip , packet 0, drop 0, reset-drop 0 Alternatively, an appliance that has SIP inspection enabled has a configuration similar to the following: class-map inspection_default match default-inspection-traffic ! policy-map global_policy class inspection_default ... inspect sip ... ! service-policy global_policy global Note: The service policy could also be applied to a specific interface instead of a global configuration shown in the previous example. IKE is not enabled by default. If IKE is enabled, the "isakmp enable <interface name>" command appears in the configuration. For more information, refer to the End of Life announcement at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/vpndevc/ps5708/ps5709/ps2030/end_of_life_notice_cisco_pix_525_sec_app.html How to Determine the Running Software Version ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ To determine whether a vulnerable version of Cisco ASA Software is running on an appliance, administrators can issue the "show version" command. The following example shows a Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance that is running software version 8.3(1): ASA#show version | include Version Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Software Version 8.3(1) Device Manager Version 6.3(1) Customers who use Cisco ASDM to manage devices can locate the software version in the table that is displayed in the login window or upper-left corner of the Cisco ASDM window. Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable +-------------------------------- With the exception of the Cisco FWSM, no other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these vulnerabilities. It offers firewall, intrusion prevention system (IPS), anti-X, and VPN services. Sun RPC is used by Network File System (NFS) and Network Information Service (NIS). Sun RPC services can run on any port. When a client attempts to access a Sun RPC service on a server, it must learn the port that service is running on. The client does this by querying the port mapper process, usually rpcbind, on the well-known port of 111. Note: Only transit traffic can trigger these vulnerabilities; traffic that is destined to the appliance will not trigger the vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities can be triggered by using UDP packets, not TCP. These vulnerabilities are documented in Cisco bug IDs CSCtc77567, CSCtc79922, and CSCtc85753; and have been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) IDs CVE-2010-1578, CVE-2010-1579, and CVE-2010-1580, respectively. Transport Layer Security (TLS) Denial of Service Vulnerabilities ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ TLS and its predecessor, SSL, are cryptographic protocols that provide security for communications over IP data networks such as the Internet. A Cisco ASA device configured for SSL VPN, TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection, or configured to accept ASDM management connections is vulnerable. These vulnerabilities are documented in Cisco bug IDs CSCtd32627, CSCtf37506, and CSCtf55259; and have been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) IDs CVE-2010-1581, CVE-2010-2814, and CVE-2010-2815, respectively. Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SIP, as defined by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), enables call handling sessions, particularly two-party audio conferences, or "calls." SIP works with SDP for call signalling. SDP specifies the ports for the media stream. Using SIP, the Cisco ASA can support any SIP VoIP gateways and VoIP proxy servers. To support SIP calls through the Cisco ASA, signaling messages for the media connection addresses, media ports, and embryonic connections for the media must be inspected, because while the signaling is sent over a well-known destination port (UDP/TCP 5060), the media streams are dynamically allocated. Also, SIP embeds IP addresses in the user-data portion of the IP packet. SIP inspection applies NAT for these embedded IP addresses. SIP inspection is enabled by default. Note: Only transit traffic can trigger these vulnerabilities; traffic that is destined to the appliance will not trigger the vulnerabilities. Crafted Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Message Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ IPsec is an IP security feature that provides robust authentication and encryption of IP packets. IKE is a key management protocol standard that is used in conjunction with the IPsec standard. Note: Only traffic that is destined to the appliance may trigger this vulnerability when the affected device is configured for IPsec remote access or site-to-site VPNs. Vulnerability Scoring Details ============================= Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at: http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss CSCtc77567, CSCtc79922 and CSCtc85753 - SunRPC Inspection DoS Vulnerabilities CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCtd32627, CSCtf37506, and CSCtf55259- Transport Layer Security (TLS) DoS Vulnerabilities CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCtd32106 - Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Inspection DoS Vulnerability CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCte46507 - Crafted Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Message DoS Vulnerability CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== Successful exploitation of any of the vulnerabilities described in this security advisory may cause the affected device to reload. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult: http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Vulnerability | Major | First Fixed | | | Release | Release | |----------------------------------------+---------+----------------| | | 7.0 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.1 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.2 | 7.2(5) | | SunRPC Inspection DoS Vulnerabilities |---------+----------------| | (CSCtc77567, CSCtc79922, and | 8.0 | 8.0(5.19) | | CSCtc85753) |---------+----------------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.46) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(2) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.3 | Not vulnerable | |----------------------------------------+---------+----------------| | | 7.0 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.1 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.2 | 7.2(5) | | TLS DoS Vulnerabilities (CSCtd32627, |---------+----------------| | CSCtf37506, and CSCtf55259) | 8.0 | 8.0(5.15) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.44) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(2.17) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.3 | 8.3(1.6) | |----------------------------------------+---------+----------------| | | 7.0 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.1 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.2 | Not vulnerable | | SIP Inspection DoS Vulnerability |---------+----------------| | (CSCtd32106) | 8.0 | 8.0(5.17) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.45) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(2.13) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.3 | Not vulnerable | |----------------------------------------+---------+----------------| | | 7.0 | 7.0(8.11) | | |---------+----------------| | | | Vulnerable; | | | 7.1 | migrate to | | | | 7.2(5) | | |---------+----------------| | IKE Message DoS Vulnerability | 7.2 | 7.2(5) | | (CSCte46507) |---------+----------------| | | 8.0 | 8.0(5.15) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.44) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(2.10) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.3 | 8.3(1.1) | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ Note: Cisco ASA Software versions 7.1.x are affected by some of the vulnerabilities in this advisory. However, no fixed 7.1.x software versions are planned because the 7.1.x major release has reached the End of Software Maintenance Releases milestone. Refer to the EOL/EOS for the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance Software v7.1 notice for further information: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/vpndevc/ps6032/ps6094/ps6120/end_of_life_notice_cisco_asa_5500_series_adaptive_sec_app_sw.html Recommended Releases ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The following table lists all recommended releases. These recommended releases contain the fixes for all vulnerabilities in this advisory. Cisco recommends upgrading to a release that is equal to or later than these recommended releases. +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Major Release | Recommended Release | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 7.0 | 7.0(8.11) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 7.1 | Vulnerable; migrate to 7.2(5) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 7.2 | 7.2(5) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 8.0 | 8.0(5.19) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 8.1 | 8.1(2.47) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 8.2 | 8.2(2.17) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 8.3 | 8.3(2) | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ Software Download ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Cisco ASA Software versions 7.0(8.11), 8.0(5.19), 8.1(2.46), and 8.2(2.17) can be downloaded from: http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/ASAPSIRT?psrtdcat20e2 Cisco ASA Software versions 7.2(5) and 8.3(2) can be downloaded from: http://tools.cisco.com/support/downloads/pub/Redirect.x?mdfid=279513386 Workarounds =========== This Security Advisory describes multiple distinct vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities and their respective workarounds are independent of each other. In addition to the recommendations described below, mitigation techniques that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin companion document for this advisory: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20100804-asa.shtml SunRPC Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ These vulnerabilities can be mitigated by disabling SunRPC inspection if it is not required. Administrators can disable SunRPC inspection by issuing the "no inspect sunrpc" command in class configuration sub-mode within policy-map configuration. Transport Layer Security (TLS) Denial of Service Vulnerabilities ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ If SSL VPN (clientless or client-based) is not needed, it can be disabled by issuing the "clear configure webvpn" command. Administrators should make sure that ASDM connections are only allowed from trusted hosts. To identify the IP addresses from which the security appliance accepts HTTPS connections for ASDM, configure the http command for each trusted host address or subnet. The following example, shows how a trusted host with IP address 192.168.1.100 is added to the configuration: hostname(config)# http 192.168.1.100 255.255.255.255 The TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection feature is affected by these vulnerabilities. This feature can be disabled if it is not needed. Temporarily disabling the feature will mitigate these vulnerabilities. The Cut-Through Proxy for Network Access feature, when configured for HTTPS, is affected by these vulnerabilities. The only workaround is to disable the feature if not needed. To disable HTTPS Cut-Through Proxy authentication use the "no aaa authentication listener https" command, as shown in the following example: ASA(config)# no aaa authentication listener https inside port 443 Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ This vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling SIP inspection if it is not required. Administrators can disable SIP inspection by issuing the "no inspect sip" command in class configuration sub-mode within policy-map configuration. The "no crypto isakmp enable <interface-name>" command can be used to disable IKE on a specific interface. Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at: http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory. One of the TLS DoS vulnerabilities was reported to Cisco by CERT-FI. All the other vulnerabilities described in this advisory were found during internal testing. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100804-asa.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +---------------------------------------+ | Revision | | Initial | | 1.0 | 2010-August-04 | public | | | | release. | +---------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at: http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iD8DBQFMWYoH86n/Gc8U/uARAg8JAJ0W8ZSUZ0ldj0ncoIfxVKVuVeieygCgkLs4 GGmQ+3yNpX0udKpkA2431fg= =yQWz -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Unspecified vulnerability in the Transport Layer Security (TLS) implementation on Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances (ASA) 5500 series devices with software 7.2 before 7.2(5), 8.0 before 8.0(5.15), 8.1 before 8.1(2.44), 8.2 before 8.2(2.17), and 8.3 before 8.3(1.6) and Cisco PIX Security Appliances 500 series devices allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device reload) via a sequence of crafted TLS packets, aka Bug ID CSCtf37506. The problem is Bug ID : CSCtd37506 It is a problem.Skillfully crafted by a third party TLS Denial of service through a sequence of packets (DoS) There is a possibility of being put into a state. An attacker can exploit this issue to cause the affected device to crash and reload, denying service to legitimate users. This issue being tracked by Cisco bug ID CSCtf37506. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- "From 2007 to 2009 vulnerabilities in a typical end-user PC almost doubled from about 220 to 420." Non-Microsoft software to blame for increase in vulnerabilities affecting typical Windows end-users, read more: http://secunia.com/gfx/pdf/Secunia_Half_Year_Report_2010.pdf ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: Cisco ASA 5500 Series Multiple Denial of Service Vulnerabilities SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA40842 VERIFY ADVISORY: Secunia.com http://secunia.com/advisories/40842/ Customer Area (Credentials Required) https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=40842 RELEASE DATE: 2010-08-05 DISCUSS ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/40842/#comments AVAILABLE ON SITE AND IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Last Update * Popularity * Comments * Criticality Level * Impact * Where * Solution Status * Operating System / Software * CVE Reference(s) http://secunia.com/advisories/40842/ ONLY AVAILABLE IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Authentication Level * Report Reliability * Secunia PoC * Secunia Analysis * Systems Affected * Approve Distribution * Remediation Status * Secunia CVSS Score * CVSS https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=40842 ONLY AVAILABLE WITH SECUNIA CSI AND SECUNIA PSI: * AUTOMATED SCANNING http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/personal/ http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/corporate/wsus_sccm_3rd_third_party_patching/ DESCRIPTION: Some vulnerabilities have been reported in Cisco ASA (Adaptive Security Appliance) 5500 Series, which can be exploited by malicious people to cause a DoS (Denial of Service). 1) Three errors exist in the SunRPC inspection engine while processing certain SunRPC messages. This can be exploited to reload a device via specially crafted UDP SunRPC packets that transit the appliance. 3) An error in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) inspection feature can be exploited to trigger an appliance reload via a specially crafted SIP packet that transits the appliance via TCP or UDP port 5060. Please see the vendor's advisory for detailed patch information. PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: Reported by the vendor. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: cisco-sa-20100804-asa: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100804-asa.shtml OTHER REFERENCES: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ DEEP LINKS: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXTENDED DESCRIPTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXTENDED SOLUTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXPLOIT: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ---------------------------------------------------------------------- . There are workarounds for some of the vulnerabilities disclosed in this advisory. This advisory is posted at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100804-asa.shtml Note: The Cisco Firewall Services Module (FWSM) is affected by the SunRPC DoS vulnerabilities. A separate Cisco Security Advisory has been published to disclose the vulnerabilities that affect the FWSM. Affected versions of Cisco ASA Software will vary depending on the specific vulnerability. Vulnerable Products +------------------ For specific version information, refer to the Software Versions and Fixes section of this advisory. A successful attack may result in a sustained DoS condition. Versions 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. SunRPC inspection is enabled by default. To check if SunRPC inspection is enabled, issue the "show service-policy | include sunrpc" command and confirm that output, such as what is displayed in the following example, is returned. ciscoasa# show service-policy | include sunrpc Inspect: sunrpc, packet 0, drop 0, reset-drop 0 The following configuration commands are used to enable SunRPC inspection in the Cisco ASA. class-map inspection_default match default-inspection-traffic ! policy-map global_policy class inspection_default ... inspect sunrpc ... A successful attack may result in a sustained DoS condition. Versions 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, 8.2.x, and 8.3.x are affected by one or more of these vulnerabilities. A Cisco ASA device configured for any of the following features is affected: * Secure Socket Layer Virtual Private Network (SSL VPN) * When the affected device is configured to accept Cisco Adaptive Security Device Manager (ASDM) connections * TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection * Cut-Through Proxy for Network Access when using HTTPS SSL VPN (or WebVPN) is enabled with the "enable <interface name>" command in "webvpn" configuration mode. SSL VPN is disabled by default. The following configuration snippet provides an example of a SSL VPN configuration. webvpn enable outside ... ASDM access is affected by three of these vulnerabilities. To use ASDM, the HTTPS server must be enabled to allow HTTPS connections to the Cisco ASA. The server can be enabled using the "http server enable [port]" command. The default port is 443. To specify hosts that can access the HTTP server internal to the security appliance, use the "http" command in global configuration mode. The TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection feature is affected by these vulnerabilities. This feature was introduced in Cisco ASA version 8.0(2) and is disabled by default. To determine if the TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection feature is enabled on the device, use the show tls-proxy command, as shown in the following example: ciscoasa# show tls-proxy Maximum number of sessions: 1200 TLS-Proxy 'sip_proxy': ref_cnt 1, seq# 3 Server proxy: Trust-point: local_ccm Client proxy: Local dynamic certificate issuer: LOCAL-CA-SERVER Local dynamic certificate key-pair: phone_common Cipher suite: aes128-sha1 aes256-sha1 Run-time proxies: Proxy 0xcbae1538: Class-map: sip_ssl, Inspect: sip Active sess 1, most sess 3, byte 3456043 ... <output truncated> TLS proxy supports SIP and Skinny protocols. TLS proxy for Skinny inspection can be enabled using the "inspect skinny <skinny_map> tls-proxy <proxy_name>", as shown in the following example: asa(config-pmap)# class inspection_default asa(config-pmap-c)# inspect skinny my-inspect tls-proxy my-tls-proxy asa(config)# service-policy global_policy global Note: Secure SCCP uses TCP port 2443; however, it can be configured to a different port. TLS proxy for SIP inspection can be enabled using the "inspect sip <map> tls-proxy <proxy_name>", as shown in the following example: asa(config-pmap)# class inspection_default asa(config-pmap-c)# inspect sip my-inspect tls-proxy my-tls-proxy asa(config)# service-policy global_policy global The Cisco ASA is also vulnerable when the Cut-Through Proxy for Network Access feature is used with HTTPS. This feature is enabled for direct authentication using HTTPS with the "aaa authentication listener https" command, as shown in the following example: ASA(config)# aaa authentication listener https inside port 443 Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ A DoS vulnerability affects the SIP inspection feature of Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances. Versions 7.0.x, 7.1.x, 7.2.x are not affected. Versions 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. SIP inspection is enabled by default. To check if SIP inspection is enabled, issue the "show service-policy | include sip" command and confirm that output, such as what is displayed in the following example, is returned. ciscoasa#show service-policy | include sip Inspect: sip , packet 0, drop 0, reset-drop 0 Alternatively, an appliance that has SIP inspection enabled has a configuration similar to the following: class-map inspection_default match default-inspection-traffic ! policy-map global_policy class inspection_default ... inspect sip ... ! service-policy global_policy global Note: The service policy could also be applied to a specific interface instead of a global configuration shown in the previous example. IKE is not enabled by default. If IKE is enabled, the "isakmp enable <interface name>" command appears in the configuration. For more information, refer to the End of Life announcement at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/vpndevc/ps5708/ps5709/ps2030/end_of_life_notice_cisco_pix_525_sec_app.html How to Determine the Running Software Version ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ To determine whether a vulnerable version of Cisco ASA Software is running on an appliance, administrators can issue the "show version" command. The following example shows a Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance that is running software version 8.3(1): ASA#show version | include Version Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Software Version 8.3(1) Device Manager Version 6.3(1) Customers who use Cisco ASDM to manage devices can locate the software version in the table that is displayed in the login window or upper-left corner of the Cisco ASDM window. Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable +-------------------------------- With the exception of the Cisco FWSM, no other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these vulnerabilities. It offers firewall, intrusion prevention system (IPS), anti-X, and VPN services. Sun RPC is used by Network File System (NFS) and Network Information Service (NIS). Sun RPC services can run on any port. When a client attempts to access a Sun RPC service on a server, it must learn the port that service is running on. The client does this by querying the port mapper process, usually rpcbind, on the well-known port of 111. Note: Only transit traffic can trigger these vulnerabilities; traffic that is destined to the appliance will not trigger the vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities can be triggered by using UDP packets, not TCP. These vulnerabilities are documented in Cisco bug IDs CSCtc77567, CSCtc79922, and CSCtc85753; and have been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) IDs CVE-2010-1578, CVE-2010-1579, and CVE-2010-1580, respectively. A Cisco ASA device configured for SSL VPN, TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection, or configured to accept ASDM management connections is vulnerable. These vulnerabilities are documented in Cisco bug IDs CSCtd32627, CSCtf37506, and CSCtf55259; and have been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) IDs CVE-2010-1581, CVE-2010-2814, and CVE-2010-2815, respectively. Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SIP, as defined by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), enables call handling sessions, particularly two-party audio conferences, or "calls." SIP works with SDP for call signalling. SDP specifies the ports for the media stream. Using SIP, the Cisco ASA can support any SIP VoIP gateways and VoIP proxy servers. To support SIP calls through the Cisco ASA, signaling messages for the media connection addresses, media ports, and embryonic connections for the media must be inspected, because while the signaling is sent over a well-known destination port (UDP/TCP 5060), the media streams are dynamically allocated. Also, SIP embeds IP addresses in the user-data portion of the IP packet. SIP inspection applies NAT for these embedded IP addresses. SIP inspection is enabled by default. Note: Only transit traffic can trigger these vulnerabilities; traffic that is destined to the appliance will not trigger the vulnerabilities. Crafted Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Message Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ IPsec is an IP security feature that provides robust authentication and encryption of IP packets. IKE is a key management protocol standard that is used in conjunction with the IPsec standard. A DoS vulnerability exists in the IKE implementation of the Cisco ASA. Note: Only traffic that is destined to the appliance may trigger this vulnerability when the affected device is configured for IPsec remote access or site-to-site VPNs. Vulnerability Scoring Details ============================= Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at: http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss CSCtc77567, CSCtc79922 and CSCtc85753 - SunRPC Inspection DoS Vulnerabilities CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCtd32627, CSCtf37506, and CSCtf55259- Transport Layer Security (TLS) DoS Vulnerabilities CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCtd32106 - Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Inspection DoS Vulnerability CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCte46507 - Crafted Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Message DoS Vulnerability CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== Successful exploitation of any of the vulnerabilities described in this security advisory may cause the affected device to reload. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult: http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Vulnerability | Major | First Fixed | | | Release | Release | |----------------------------------------+---------+----------------| | | 7.0 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.1 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.2 | 7.2(5) | | SunRPC Inspection DoS Vulnerabilities |---------+----------------| | (CSCtc77567, CSCtc79922, and | 8.0 | 8.0(5.19) | | CSCtc85753) |---------+----------------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.46) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(2) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.3 | Not vulnerable | |----------------------------------------+---------+----------------| | | 7.0 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.1 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.2 | 7.2(5) | | TLS DoS Vulnerabilities (CSCtd32627, |---------+----------------| | CSCtf37506, and CSCtf55259) | 8.0 | 8.0(5.15) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.44) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(2.17) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.3 | 8.3(1.6) | |----------------------------------------+---------+----------------| | | 7.0 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.1 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.2 | Not vulnerable | | SIP Inspection DoS Vulnerability |---------+----------------| | (CSCtd32106) | 8.0 | 8.0(5.17) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.45) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(2.13) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.3 | Not vulnerable | |----------------------------------------+---------+----------------| | | 7.0 | 7.0(8.11) | | |---------+----------------| | | | Vulnerable; | | | 7.1 | migrate to | | | | 7.2(5) | | |---------+----------------| | IKE Message DoS Vulnerability | 7.2 | 7.2(5) | | (CSCte46507) |---------+----------------| | | 8.0 | 8.0(5.15) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.44) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(2.10) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.3 | 8.3(1.1) | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ Note: Cisco ASA Software versions 7.1.x are affected by some of the vulnerabilities in this advisory. However, no fixed 7.1.x software versions are planned because the 7.1.x major release has reached the End of Software Maintenance Releases milestone. These recommended releases contain the fixes for all vulnerabilities in this advisory. Cisco recommends upgrading to a release that is equal to or later than these recommended releases. +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Major Release | Recommended Release | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 7.0 | 7.0(8.11) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 7.1 | Vulnerable; migrate to 7.2(5) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 7.2 | 7.2(5) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 8.0 | 8.0(5.19) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 8.1 | 8.1(2.47) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 8.2 | 8.2(2.17) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 8.3 | 8.3(2) | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ Software Download ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Cisco ASA Software versions 7.0(8.11), 8.0(5.19), 8.1(2.46), and 8.2(2.17) can be downloaded from: http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/ASAPSIRT?psrtdcat20e2 Cisco ASA Software versions 7.2(5) and 8.3(2) can be downloaded from: http://tools.cisco.com/support/downloads/pub/Redirect.x?mdfid=279513386 Workarounds =========== This Security Advisory describes multiple distinct vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities and their respective workarounds are independent of each other. In addition to the recommendations described below, mitigation techniques that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin companion document for this advisory: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20100804-asa.shtml SunRPC Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ These vulnerabilities can be mitigated by disabling SunRPC inspection if it is not required. Administrators can disable SunRPC inspection by issuing the "no inspect sunrpc" command in class configuration sub-mode within policy-map configuration. Transport Layer Security (TLS) Denial of Service Vulnerabilities ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ If SSL VPN (clientless or client-based) is not needed, it can be disabled by issuing the "clear configure webvpn" command. Administrators should make sure that ASDM connections are only allowed from trusted hosts. To identify the IP addresses from which the security appliance accepts HTTPS connections for ASDM, configure the http command for each trusted host address or subnet. The following example, shows how a trusted host with IP address 192.168.1.100 is added to the configuration: hostname(config)# http 192.168.1.100 255.255.255.255 The TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection feature is affected by these vulnerabilities. This feature can be disabled if it is not needed. Temporarily disabling the feature will mitigate these vulnerabilities. The Cut-Through Proxy for Network Access feature, when configured for HTTPS, is affected by these vulnerabilities. The only workaround is to disable the feature if not needed. To disable HTTPS Cut-Through Proxy authentication use the "no aaa authentication listener https" command, as shown in the following example: ASA(config)# no aaa authentication listener https inside port 443 Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ This vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling SIP inspection if it is not required. Administrators can disable SIP inspection by issuing the "no inspect sip" command in class configuration sub-mode within policy-map configuration. Crafted Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Message Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ There are no workarounds for this vulnerability apart from disabling IKE on the affected device. The "no crypto isakmp enable <interface-name>" command can be used to disable IKE on a specific interface. Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at: http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory. One of the TLS DoS vulnerabilities was reported to Cisco by CERT-FI. All the other vulnerabilities described in this advisory were found during internal testing. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100804-asa.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +---------------------------------------+ | Revision | | Initial | | 1.0 | 2010-August-04 | public | | | | release. | +---------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at: http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iD8DBQFMWYoH86n/Gc8U/uARAg8JAJ0W8ZSUZ0ldj0ncoIfxVKVuVeieygCgkLs4 GGmQ+3yNpX0udKpkA2431fg= =yQWz -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Unspecified vulnerability in the Transport Layer Security (TLS) implementation on Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances (ASA) 5500 series devices with software 7.2 before 7.2(5), 8.0 before 8.0(5.15), 8.1 before 8.1(2.44), 8.2 before 8.2(2.17), and 8.3 before 8.3(1.6) and Cisco PIX Security Appliances 500 series devices allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device reload) via a sequence of crafted TLS packets, aka Bug ID CSCtf55259. The problem is Bug ID : CSCtf55259 It is a problem.Skillfully crafted by a third party TLS Denial of service through a sequence of packets (DoS) There is a possibility of being put into a state. An attacker can exploit this issue to cause an affected device to crash and reload, denying service to legitimate users. This issue being tracked by Cisco bug ID CSCtf55259. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- "From 2007 to 2009 vulnerabilities in a typical end-user PC almost doubled from about 220 to 420." Non-Microsoft software to blame for increase in vulnerabilities affecting typical Windows end-users, read more: http://secunia.com/gfx/pdf/Secunia_Half_Year_Report_2010.pdf ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: Cisco ASA 5500 Series Multiple Denial of Service Vulnerabilities SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA40842 VERIFY ADVISORY: Secunia.com http://secunia.com/advisories/40842/ Customer Area (Credentials Required) https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=40842 RELEASE DATE: 2010-08-05 DISCUSS ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/40842/#comments AVAILABLE ON SITE AND IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Last Update * Popularity * Comments * Criticality Level * Impact * Where * Solution Status * Operating System / Software * CVE Reference(s) http://secunia.com/advisories/40842/ ONLY AVAILABLE IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Authentication Level * Report Reliability * Secunia PoC * Secunia Analysis * Systems Affected * Approve Distribution * Remediation Status * Secunia CVSS Score * CVSS https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=40842 ONLY AVAILABLE WITH SECUNIA CSI AND SECUNIA PSI: * AUTOMATED SCANNING http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/personal/ http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/corporate/wsus_sccm_3rd_third_party_patching/ DESCRIPTION: Some vulnerabilities have been reported in Cisco ASA (Adaptive Security Appliance) 5500 Series, which can be exploited by malicious people to cause a DoS (Denial of Service). 1) Three errors exist in the SunRPC inspection engine while processing certain SunRPC messages. This can be exploited to reload a device via specially crafted UDP SunRPC packets that transit the appliance. 3) An error in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) inspection feature can be exploited to trigger an appliance reload via a specially crafted SIP packet that transits the appliance via TCP or UDP port 5060. Please see the vendor's advisory for detailed patch information. PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: Reported by the vendor. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: cisco-sa-20100804-asa: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100804-asa.shtml OTHER REFERENCES: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ DEEP LINKS: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXTENDED DESCRIPTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXTENDED SOLUTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXPLOIT: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ---------------------------------------------------------------------- . There are workarounds for some of the vulnerabilities disclosed in this advisory. This advisory is posted at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100804-asa.shtml Note: The Cisco Firewall Services Module (FWSM) is affected by the SunRPC DoS vulnerabilities. A separate Cisco Security Advisory has been published to disclose the vulnerabilities that affect the FWSM. Affected versions of Cisco ASA Software will vary depending on the specific vulnerability. Vulnerable Products +------------------ For specific version information, refer to the Software Versions and Fixes section of this advisory. A successful attack may result in a sustained DoS condition. Versions 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. SunRPC inspection is enabled by default. To check if SunRPC inspection is enabled, issue the "show service-policy | include sunrpc" command and confirm that output, such as what is displayed in the following example, is returned. ciscoasa# show service-policy | include sunrpc Inspect: sunrpc, packet 0, drop 0, reset-drop 0 The following configuration commands are used to enable SunRPC inspection in the Cisco ASA. class-map inspection_default match default-inspection-traffic ! policy-map global_policy class inspection_default ... inspect sunrpc ... A successful attack may result in a sustained DoS condition. Versions 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, 8.2.x, and 8.3.x are affected by one or more of these vulnerabilities. A Cisco ASA device configured for any of the following features is affected: * Secure Socket Layer Virtual Private Network (SSL VPN) * When the affected device is configured to accept Cisco Adaptive Security Device Manager (ASDM) connections * TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection * Cut-Through Proxy for Network Access when using HTTPS SSL VPN (or WebVPN) is enabled with the "enable <interface name>" command in "webvpn" configuration mode. SSL VPN is disabled by default. The following configuration snippet provides an example of a SSL VPN configuration. webvpn enable outside ... ASDM access is affected by three of these vulnerabilities. To use ASDM, the HTTPS server must be enabled to allow HTTPS connections to the Cisco ASA. The server can be enabled using the "http server enable [port]" command. The default port is 443. To specify hosts that can access the HTTP server internal to the security appliance, use the "http" command in global configuration mode. The TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection feature is affected by these vulnerabilities. This feature was introduced in Cisco ASA version 8.0(2) and is disabled by default. To determine if the TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection feature is enabled on the device, use the show tls-proxy command, as shown in the following example: ciscoasa# show tls-proxy Maximum number of sessions: 1200 TLS-Proxy 'sip_proxy': ref_cnt 1, seq# 3 Server proxy: Trust-point: local_ccm Client proxy: Local dynamic certificate issuer: LOCAL-CA-SERVER Local dynamic certificate key-pair: phone_common Cipher suite: aes128-sha1 aes256-sha1 Run-time proxies: Proxy 0xcbae1538: Class-map: sip_ssl, Inspect: sip Active sess 1, most sess 3, byte 3456043 ... <output truncated> TLS proxy supports SIP and Skinny protocols. TLS proxy for Skinny inspection can be enabled using the "inspect skinny <skinny_map> tls-proxy <proxy_name>", as shown in the following example: asa(config-pmap)# class inspection_default asa(config-pmap-c)# inspect skinny my-inspect tls-proxy my-tls-proxy asa(config)# service-policy global_policy global Note: Secure SCCP uses TCP port 2443; however, it can be configured to a different port. TLS proxy for SIP inspection can be enabled using the "inspect sip <map> tls-proxy <proxy_name>", as shown in the following example: asa(config-pmap)# class inspection_default asa(config-pmap-c)# inspect sip my-inspect tls-proxy my-tls-proxy asa(config)# service-policy global_policy global The Cisco ASA is also vulnerable when the Cut-Through Proxy for Network Access feature is used with HTTPS. This feature is enabled for direct authentication using HTTPS with the "aaa authentication listener https" command, as shown in the following example: ASA(config)# aaa authentication listener https inside port 443 Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ A DoS vulnerability affects the SIP inspection feature of Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances. Versions 7.0.x, 7.1.x, 7.2.x are not affected. Versions 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. SIP inspection is enabled by default. To check if SIP inspection is enabled, issue the "show service-policy | include sip" command and confirm that output, such as what is displayed in the following example, is returned. ciscoasa#show service-policy | include sip Inspect: sip , packet 0, drop 0, reset-drop 0 Alternatively, an appliance that has SIP inspection enabled has a configuration similar to the following: class-map inspection_default match default-inspection-traffic ! policy-map global_policy class inspection_default ... inspect sip ... ! service-policy global_policy global Note: The service policy could also be applied to a specific interface instead of a global configuration shown in the previous example. IKE is not enabled by default. If IKE is enabled, the "isakmp enable <interface name>" command appears in the configuration. For more information, refer to the End of Life announcement at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/vpndevc/ps5708/ps5709/ps2030/end_of_life_notice_cisco_pix_525_sec_app.html How to Determine the Running Software Version ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ To determine whether a vulnerable version of Cisco ASA Software is running on an appliance, administrators can issue the "show version" command. Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable +-------------------------------- With the exception of the Cisco FWSM, no other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these vulnerabilities. It offers firewall, intrusion prevention system (IPS), anti-X, and VPN services. Sun RPC is used by Network File System (NFS) and Network Information Service (NIS). Sun RPC services can run on any port. When a client attempts to access a Sun RPC service on a server, it must learn the port that service is running on. The client does this by querying the port mapper process, usually rpcbind, on the well-known port of 111. Note: Only transit traffic can trigger these vulnerabilities; traffic that is destined to the appliance will not trigger the vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities can be triggered by using UDP packets, not TCP. These vulnerabilities are documented in Cisco bug IDs CSCtc77567, CSCtc79922, and CSCtc85753; and have been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) IDs CVE-2010-1578, CVE-2010-1579, and CVE-2010-1580, respectively. A Cisco ASA device configured for SSL VPN, TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection, or configured to accept ASDM management connections is vulnerable. These vulnerabilities are documented in Cisco bug IDs CSCtd32627, CSCtf37506, and CSCtf55259; and have been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) IDs CVE-2010-1581, CVE-2010-2814, and CVE-2010-2815, respectively. Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SIP, as defined by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), enables call handling sessions, particularly two-party audio conferences, or "calls." SIP works with SDP for call signalling. SDP specifies the ports for the media stream. Using SIP, the Cisco ASA can support any SIP VoIP gateways and VoIP proxy servers. To support SIP calls through the Cisco ASA, signaling messages for the media connection addresses, media ports, and embryonic connections for the media must be inspected, because while the signaling is sent over a well-known destination port (UDP/TCP 5060), the media streams are dynamically allocated. Also, SIP embeds IP addresses in the user-data portion of the IP packet. SIP inspection applies NAT for these embedded IP addresses. SIP inspection is enabled by default. Note: Only transit traffic can trigger these vulnerabilities; traffic that is destined to the appliance will not trigger the vulnerabilities. Crafted Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Message Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ IPsec is an IP security feature that provides robust authentication and encryption of IP packets. IKE is a key management protocol standard that is used in conjunction with the IPsec standard. A DoS vulnerability exists in the IKE implementation of the Cisco ASA. Note: Only traffic that is destined to the appliance may trigger this vulnerability when the affected device is configured for IPsec remote access or site-to-site VPNs. Vulnerability Scoring Details ============================= Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at: http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss CSCtc77567, CSCtc79922 and CSCtc85753 - SunRPC Inspection DoS Vulnerabilities CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCtd32627, CSCtf37506, and CSCtf55259- Transport Layer Security (TLS) DoS Vulnerabilities CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCtd32106 - Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Inspection DoS Vulnerability CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCte46507 - Crafted Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Message DoS Vulnerability CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== Successful exploitation of any of the vulnerabilities described in this security advisory may cause the affected device to reload. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult: http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Vulnerability | Major | First Fixed | | | Release | Release | |----------------------------------------+---------+----------------| | | 7.0 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.1 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.2 | 7.2(5) | | SunRPC Inspection DoS Vulnerabilities |---------+----------------| | (CSCtc77567, CSCtc79922, and | 8.0 | 8.0(5.19) | | CSCtc85753) |---------+----------------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.46) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(2) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.3 | Not vulnerable | |----------------------------------------+---------+----------------| | | 7.0 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.1 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.2 | 7.2(5) | | TLS DoS Vulnerabilities (CSCtd32627, |---------+----------------| | CSCtf37506, and CSCtf55259) | 8.0 | 8.0(5.15) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.44) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(2.17) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.3 | 8.3(1.6) | |----------------------------------------+---------+----------------| | | 7.0 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.1 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.2 | Not vulnerable | | SIP Inspection DoS Vulnerability |---------+----------------| | (CSCtd32106) | 8.0 | 8.0(5.17) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.45) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(2.13) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.3 | Not vulnerable | |----------------------------------------+---------+----------------| | | 7.0 | 7.0(8.11) | | |---------+----------------| | | | Vulnerable; | | | 7.1 | migrate to | | | | 7.2(5) | | |---------+----------------| | IKE Message DoS Vulnerability | 7.2 | 7.2(5) | | (CSCte46507) |---------+----------------| | | 8.0 | 8.0(5.15) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.44) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(2.10) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.3 | 8.3(1.1) | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ Note: Cisco ASA Software versions 7.1.x are affected by some of the vulnerabilities in this advisory. However, no fixed 7.1.x software versions are planned because the 7.1.x major release has reached the End of Software Maintenance Releases milestone. These recommended releases contain the fixes for all vulnerabilities in this advisory. Cisco recommends upgrading to a release that is equal to or later than these recommended releases. +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Major Release | Recommended Release | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 7.0 | 7.0(8.11) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 7.1 | Vulnerable; migrate to 7.2(5) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 7.2 | 7.2(5) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 8.0 | 8.0(5.19) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 8.1 | 8.1(2.47) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 8.2 | 8.2(2.17) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 8.3 | 8.3(2) | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ Software Download ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Cisco ASA Software versions 7.0(8.11), 8.0(5.19), 8.1(2.46), and 8.2(2.17) can be downloaded from: http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/ASAPSIRT?psrtdcat20e2 Cisco ASA Software versions 7.2(5) and 8.3(2) can be downloaded from: http://tools.cisco.com/support/downloads/pub/Redirect.x?mdfid=279513386 Workarounds =========== This Security Advisory describes multiple distinct vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities and their respective workarounds are independent of each other. In addition to the recommendations described below, mitigation techniques that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin companion document for this advisory: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20100804-asa.shtml SunRPC Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ These vulnerabilities can be mitigated by disabling SunRPC inspection if it is not required. Administrators can disable SunRPC inspection by issuing the "no inspect sunrpc" command in class configuration sub-mode within policy-map configuration. Transport Layer Security (TLS) Denial of Service Vulnerabilities ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ If SSL VPN (clientless or client-based) is not needed, it can be disabled by issuing the "clear configure webvpn" command. Administrators should make sure that ASDM connections are only allowed from trusted hosts. To identify the IP addresses from which the security appliance accepts HTTPS connections for ASDM, configure the http command for each trusted host address or subnet. The following example, shows how a trusted host with IP address 192.168.1.100 is added to the configuration: hostname(config)# http 192.168.1.100 255.255.255.255 The TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection feature is affected by these vulnerabilities. This feature can be disabled if it is not needed. Temporarily disabling the feature will mitigate these vulnerabilities. The Cut-Through Proxy for Network Access feature, when configured for HTTPS, is affected by these vulnerabilities. The only workaround is to disable the feature if not needed. To disable HTTPS Cut-Through Proxy authentication use the "no aaa authentication listener https" command, as shown in the following example: ASA(config)# no aaa authentication listener https inside port 443 Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ This vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling SIP inspection if it is not required. Administrators can disable SIP inspection by issuing the "no inspect sip" command in class configuration sub-mode within policy-map configuration. Crafted Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Message Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ There are no workarounds for this vulnerability apart from disabling IKE on the affected device. The "no crypto isakmp enable <interface-name>" command can be used to disable IKE on a specific interface. Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at: http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory. One of the TLS DoS vulnerabilities was reported to Cisco by CERT-FI. All the other vulnerabilities described in this advisory were found during internal testing. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100804-asa.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +---------------------------------------+ | Revision | | Initial | | 1.0 | 2010-August-04 | public | | | | release. | +---------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at: http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iD8DBQFMWYoH86n/Gc8U/uARAg8JAJ0W8ZSUZ0ldj0ncoIfxVKVuVeieygCgkLs4 GGmQ+3yNpX0udKpkA2431fg= =yQWz -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in webacs/QuickSearchAction.do in the search feature in the web interface in Cisco Wireless Control System (WCS) before 6.0(194.0) and 7.x before 7.0.164 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the searchText parameter, aka Bug ID CSCtf14288. The Cisco Wireless Control System is prone to a cross-site scripting vulnerability because the application fails to sufficiently sanitize user-supplied input. Exploiting this vulnerability could allow an attacker to perform cross-site scripting attacks on unsuspecting users in the context of the affected website. As a result, the attacker may be able to steal cookie-based authentication credentials and launch other attacks. Cisco Wireless Control System versions 6.0.181.0 and prior are vulnerable. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Get tweets from Secunia http://twitter.com/secunia ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: Cisco Wireless Control System Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerabilities SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA40827 VERIFY ADVISORY: Secunia.com http://secunia.com/advisories/40827/ Customer Area (Credentials Required) https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=40827 RELEASE DATE: 2010-08-06 DISCUSS ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/40827/#comments AVAILABLE ON SITE AND IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Last Update * Popularity * Comments * Criticality Level * Impact * Where * Solution Status * Operating System / Software * CVE Reference(s) http://secunia.com/advisories/40827/ ONLY AVAILABLE IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Authentication Level * Report Reliability * Secunia PoC * Secunia Analysis * Systems Affected * Approve Distribution * Remediation Status * Secunia CVSS Score * CVSS https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=40827 ONLY AVAILABLE WITH SECUNIA CSI AND SECUNIA PSI: * AUTOMATED SCANNING http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/personal/ http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/corporate/wsus_sccm_3rd_third_party_patching/ DESCRIPTION: Some vulnerabilities have been reported in Cisco Wireless Control System, which can be exploited by malicious people to conduct cross-site scripting attacks. 1) Input passed via the "searchText" parameter to webacs/QuickSearchAction.do is not properly sanitised before being returned to the user. This can be exploited to execute arbitrary HTML and script code in a user's browser session in context of an affected site. 2) Certain unspecified input is not properly sanitised before being returned to the user. This can be exploited to execute arbitrary HTML and script code in a user's browser session in context of an affected site. 3) Certain input passed to searchClientAction.do and switchGeneralAction.do is not properly sanitised before being returned to the user. This can be exploited to execute arbitrary HTML and script code in a user's browser session in context of an affected site. SOLUTION: Update to version 6.0.196.0 or later. PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: 1) Tom Neaves 2, 3) Reported by the vendor. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: Cisco: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/wireless/controller/release/notes/crn7.0.html Tom Neaves: http://www.tomneaves.com/Cisco_Wireless_Control_System_XSS.txt OTHER REFERENCES: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ DEEP LINKS: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXTENDED DESCRIPTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXTENDED SOLUTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXPLOIT: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ----------------------------------------------------------------------

Unspecified vulnerability in the SunRPC inspection feature on Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances (ASA) 5500 series devices with software 7.2 before 7.2(5), 8.0 before 8.0(5.19), 8.1 before 8.1(2.47), and 8.2 before 8.2(2) and Cisco PIX Security Appliances 500 series devices allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device reload) via crafted SunRPC UDP packets, aka Bug ID CSCtc77567. plural Cisco Run on product SunRPC The inspection function includes SunRPC UDP Service operation disruption due to incomplete packet processing (DoS) There is a vulnerability that becomes a condition. The problem is Bug ID : CSCtc77567 It is a problem.Skillfully crafted by a third party SunRPC UDP Service disruption via packets (DoS) There is a possibility of being put into a state. An attacker can exploit this issue to cause affected devices to reload, triggering a denial-of-service condition. This issue is tracked by Cisco Bug IDs CSCtc77567 and CSCte61710. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- "From 2007 to 2009 vulnerabilities in a typical end-user PC almost doubled from about 220 to 420." Non-Microsoft software to blame for increase in vulnerabilities affecting typical Windows end-users, read more: http://secunia.com/gfx/pdf/Secunia_Half_Year_Report_2010.pdf ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: Cisco ASA 5500 Series Multiple Denial of Service Vulnerabilities SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA40842 VERIFY ADVISORY: Secunia.com http://secunia.com/advisories/40842/ Customer Area (Credentials Required) https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=40842 RELEASE DATE: 2010-08-05 DISCUSS ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/40842/#comments AVAILABLE ON SITE AND IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Last Update * Popularity * Comments * Criticality Level * Impact * Where * Solution Status * Operating System / Software * CVE Reference(s) http://secunia.com/advisories/40842/ ONLY AVAILABLE IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Authentication Level * Report Reliability * Secunia PoC * Secunia Analysis * Systems Affected * Approve Distribution * Remediation Status * Secunia CVSS Score * CVSS https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=40842 ONLY AVAILABLE WITH SECUNIA CSI AND SECUNIA PSI: * AUTOMATED SCANNING http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/personal/ http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/corporate/wsus_sccm_3rd_third_party_patching/ DESCRIPTION: Some vulnerabilities have been reported in Cisco ASA (Adaptive Security Appliance) 5500 Series, which can be exploited by malicious people to cause a DoS (Denial of Service). 1) Three errors exist in the SunRPC inspection engine while processing certain SunRPC messages. This can be exploited to reload a device via specially crafted UDP SunRPC packets that transit the appliance. 3) An error in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) inspection feature can be exploited to trigger an appliance reload via a specially crafted SIP packet that transits the appliance via TCP or UDP port 5060. Please see the vendor's advisory for detailed patch information. PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: Reported by the vendor. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: cisco-sa-20100804-asa: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100804-asa.shtml OTHER REFERENCES: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ DEEP LINKS: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXTENDED DESCRIPTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXTENDED SOLUTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXPLOIT: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ---------------------------------------------------------------------- . There are workarounds for some of the vulnerabilities disclosed in this advisory. This advisory is posted at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100804-asa.shtml Note: The Cisco Firewall Services Module (FWSM) is affected by the SunRPC DoS vulnerabilities. A separate Cisco Security Advisory has been published to disclose the vulnerabilities that affect the FWSM. Affected versions of Cisco ASA Software will vary depending on the specific vulnerability. Vulnerable Products +------------------ For specific version information, refer to the Software Versions and Fixes section of this advisory. A successful attack may result in a sustained DoS condition. Versions 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. SunRPC inspection is enabled by default. To check if SunRPC inspection is enabled, issue the "show service-policy | include sunrpc" command and confirm that output, such as what is displayed in the following example, is returned. ciscoasa# show service-policy | include sunrpc Inspect: sunrpc, packet 0, drop 0, reset-drop 0 The following configuration commands are used to enable SunRPC inspection in the Cisco ASA. class-map inspection_default match default-inspection-traffic ! policy-map global_policy class inspection_default ... inspect sunrpc ... A successful attack may result in a sustained DoS condition. Versions 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, 8.2.x, and 8.3.x are affected by one or more of these vulnerabilities. A Cisco ASA device configured for any of the following features is affected: * Secure Socket Layer Virtual Private Network (SSL VPN) * When the affected device is configured to accept Cisco Adaptive Security Device Manager (ASDM) connections * TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection * Cut-Through Proxy for Network Access when using HTTPS SSL VPN (or WebVPN) is enabled with the "enable <interface name>" command in "webvpn" configuration mode. SSL VPN is disabled by default. The following configuration snippet provides an example of a SSL VPN configuration. webvpn enable outside ... ASDM access is affected by three of these vulnerabilities. To use ASDM, the HTTPS server must be enabled to allow HTTPS connections to the Cisco ASA. The server can be enabled using the "http server enable [port]" command. The default port is 443. To specify hosts that can access the HTTP server internal to the security appliance, use the "http" command in global configuration mode. The TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection feature is affected by these vulnerabilities. This feature was introduced in Cisco ASA version 8.0(2) and is disabled by default. To determine if the TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection feature is enabled on the device, use the show tls-proxy command, as shown in the following example: ciscoasa# show tls-proxy Maximum number of sessions: 1200 TLS-Proxy 'sip_proxy': ref_cnt 1, seq# 3 Server proxy: Trust-point: local_ccm Client proxy: Local dynamic certificate issuer: LOCAL-CA-SERVER Local dynamic certificate key-pair: phone_common Cipher suite: aes128-sha1 aes256-sha1 Run-time proxies: Proxy 0xcbae1538: Class-map: sip_ssl, Inspect: sip Active sess 1, most sess 3, byte 3456043 ... <output truncated> TLS proxy supports SIP and Skinny protocols. TLS proxy for Skinny inspection can be enabled using the "inspect skinny <skinny_map> tls-proxy <proxy_name>", as shown in the following example: asa(config-pmap)# class inspection_default asa(config-pmap-c)# inspect skinny my-inspect tls-proxy my-tls-proxy asa(config)# service-policy global_policy global Note: Secure SCCP uses TCP port 2443; however, it can be configured to a different port. TLS proxy for SIP inspection can be enabled using the "inspect sip <map> tls-proxy <proxy_name>", as shown in the following example: asa(config-pmap)# class inspection_default asa(config-pmap-c)# inspect sip my-inspect tls-proxy my-tls-proxy asa(config)# service-policy global_policy global The Cisco ASA is also vulnerable when the Cut-Through Proxy for Network Access feature is used with HTTPS. This feature is enabled for direct authentication using HTTPS with the "aaa authentication listener https" command, as shown in the following example: ASA(config)# aaa authentication listener https inside port 443 Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ A DoS vulnerability affects the SIP inspection feature of Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances. Versions 7.0.x, 7.1.x, 7.2.x are not affected. Versions 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. SIP inspection is enabled by default. To check if SIP inspection is enabled, issue the "show service-policy | include sip" command and confirm that output, such as what is displayed in the following example, is returned. ciscoasa#show service-policy | include sip Inspect: sip , packet 0, drop 0, reset-drop 0 Alternatively, an appliance that has SIP inspection enabled has a configuration similar to the following: class-map inspection_default match default-inspection-traffic ! policy-map global_policy class inspection_default ... inspect sip ... ! service-policy global_policy global Note: The service policy could also be applied to a specific interface instead of a global configuration shown in the previous example. IKE is not enabled by default. If IKE is enabled, the "isakmp enable <interface name>" command appears in the configuration. For more information, refer to the End of Life announcement at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/vpndevc/ps5708/ps5709/ps2030/end_of_life_notice_cisco_pix_525_sec_app.html How to Determine the Running Software Version ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ To determine whether a vulnerable version of Cisco ASA Software is running on an appliance, administrators can issue the "show version" command. The following example shows a Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance that is running software version 8.3(1): ASA#show version | include Version Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Software Version 8.3(1) Device Manager Version 6.3(1) Customers who use Cisco ASDM to manage devices can locate the software version in the table that is displayed in the login window or upper-left corner of the Cisco ASDM window. Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable +-------------------------------- With the exception of the Cisco FWSM, no other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these vulnerabilities. It offers firewall, intrusion prevention system (IPS), anti-X, and VPN services. Sun RPC is used by Network File System (NFS) and Network Information Service (NIS). Sun RPC services can run on any port. When a client attempts to access a Sun RPC service on a server, it must learn the port that service is running on. The client does this by querying the port mapper process, usually rpcbind, on the well-known port of 111. Note: Only transit traffic can trigger these vulnerabilities; traffic that is destined to the appliance will not trigger the vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities can be triggered by using UDP packets, not TCP. Transport Layer Security (TLS) Denial of Service Vulnerabilities ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ TLS and its predecessor, SSL, are cryptographic protocols that provide security for communications over IP data networks such as the Internet. A Cisco ASA device configured for SSL VPN, TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection, or configured to accept ASDM management connections is vulnerable. Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SIP, as defined by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), enables call handling sessions, particularly two-party audio conferences, or "calls." SIP works with SDP for call signalling. SDP specifies the ports for the media stream. Using SIP, the Cisco ASA can support any SIP VoIP gateways and VoIP proxy servers. To support SIP calls through the Cisco ASA, signaling messages for the media connection addresses, media ports, and embryonic connections for the media must be inspected, because while the signaling is sent over a well-known destination port (UDP/TCP 5060), the media streams are dynamically allocated. Also, SIP embeds IP addresses in the user-data portion of the IP packet. SIP inspection applies NAT for these embedded IP addresses. SIP inspection is enabled by default. Note: Only transit traffic can trigger these vulnerabilities; traffic that is destined to the appliance will not trigger the vulnerabilities. This vulnerability is documented in Cisco bug ID CSCtd32106 and has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2010-2816. Crafted Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Message Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ IPsec is an IP security feature that provides robust authentication and encryption of IP packets. IKE is a key management protocol standard that is used in conjunction with the IPsec standard. A DoS vulnerability exists in the IKE implementation of the Cisco ASA. Note: Only traffic that is destined to the appliance may trigger this vulnerability when the affected device is configured for IPsec remote access or site-to-site VPNs. This vulnerability is documented in Cisco bug ID CSCte46507 and has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2010-2817. Vulnerability Scoring Details ============================= Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at: http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss CSCtc77567, CSCtc79922 and CSCtc85753 - SunRPC Inspection DoS Vulnerabilities CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCtd32627, CSCtf37506, and CSCtf55259- Transport Layer Security (TLS) DoS Vulnerabilities CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCtd32106 - Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Inspection DoS Vulnerability CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCte46507 - Crafted Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Message DoS Vulnerability CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== Successful exploitation of any of the vulnerabilities described in this security advisory may cause the affected device to reload. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult: http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Vulnerability | Major | First Fixed | | | Release | Release | |----------------------------------------+---------+----------------| | | 7.0 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.1 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.2 | 7.2(5) | | SunRPC Inspection DoS Vulnerabilities |---------+----------------| | (CSCtc77567, CSCtc79922, and | 8.0 | 8.0(5.19) | | CSCtc85753) |---------+----------------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.46) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(2) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.3 | Not vulnerable | |----------------------------------------+---------+----------------| | | 7.0 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.1 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.2 | 7.2(5) | | TLS DoS Vulnerabilities (CSCtd32627, |---------+----------------| | CSCtf37506, and CSCtf55259) | 8.0 | 8.0(5.15) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.44) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(2.17) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.3 | 8.3(1.6) | |----------------------------------------+---------+----------------| | | 7.0 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.1 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.2 | Not vulnerable | | SIP Inspection DoS Vulnerability |---------+----------------| | (CSCtd32106) | 8.0 | 8.0(5.17) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.45) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(2.13) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.3 | Not vulnerable | |----------------------------------------+---------+----------------| | | 7.0 | 7.0(8.11) | | |---------+----------------| | | | Vulnerable; | | | 7.1 | migrate to | | | | 7.2(5) | | |---------+----------------| | IKE Message DoS Vulnerability | 7.2 | 7.2(5) | | (CSCte46507) |---------+----------------| | | 8.0 | 8.0(5.15) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.44) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(2.10) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.3 | 8.3(1.1) | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ Note: Cisco ASA Software versions 7.1.x are affected by some of the vulnerabilities in this advisory. However, no fixed 7.1.x software versions are planned because the 7.1.x major release has reached the End of Software Maintenance Releases milestone. Refer to the EOL/EOS for the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance Software v7.1 notice for further information: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/vpndevc/ps6032/ps6094/ps6120/end_of_life_notice_cisco_asa_5500_series_adaptive_sec_app_sw.html Recommended Releases ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The following table lists all recommended releases. These recommended releases contain the fixes for all vulnerabilities in this advisory. Cisco recommends upgrading to a release that is equal to or later than these recommended releases. +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Major Release | Recommended Release | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 7.0 | 7.0(8.11) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 7.1 | Vulnerable; migrate to 7.2(5) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 7.2 | 7.2(5) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 8.0 | 8.0(5.19) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 8.1 | 8.1(2.47) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 8.2 | 8.2(2.17) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 8.3 | 8.3(2) | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ Software Download ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Cisco ASA Software versions 7.0(8.11), 8.0(5.19), 8.1(2.46), and 8.2(2.17) can be downloaded from: http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/ASAPSIRT?psrtdcat20e2 Cisco ASA Software versions 7.2(5) and 8.3(2) can be downloaded from: http://tools.cisco.com/support/downloads/pub/Redirect.x?mdfid=279513386 Workarounds =========== This Security Advisory describes multiple distinct vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities and their respective workarounds are independent of each other. In addition to the recommendations described below, mitigation techniques that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin companion document for this advisory: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20100804-asa.shtml SunRPC Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ These vulnerabilities can be mitigated by disabling SunRPC inspection if it is not required. Administrators can disable SunRPC inspection by issuing the "no inspect sunrpc" command in class configuration sub-mode within policy-map configuration. Transport Layer Security (TLS) Denial of Service Vulnerabilities ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ If SSL VPN (clientless or client-based) is not needed, it can be disabled by issuing the "clear configure webvpn" command. Administrators should make sure that ASDM connections are only allowed from trusted hosts. To identify the IP addresses from which the security appliance accepts HTTPS connections for ASDM, configure the http command for each trusted host address or subnet. The following example, shows how a trusted host with IP address 192.168.1.100 is added to the configuration: hostname(config)# http 192.168.1.100 255.255.255.255 The TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection feature is affected by these vulnerabilities. This feature can be disabled if it is not needed. Temporarily disabling the feature will mitigate these vulnerabilities. The Cut-Through Proxy for Network Access feature, when configured for HTTPS, is affected by these vulnerabilities. The only workaround is to disable the feature if not needed. To disable HTTPS Cut-Through Proxy authentication use the "no aaa authentication listener https" command, as shown in the following example: ASA(config)# no aaa authentication listener https inside port 443 Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ This vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling SIP inspection if it is not required. Administrators can disable SIP inspection by issuing the "no inspect sip" command in class configuration sub-mode within policy-map configuration. Crafted Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Message Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ There are no workarounds for this vulnerability apart from disabling IKE on the affected device. The "no crypto isakmp enable <interface-name>" command can be used to disable IKE on a specific interface. Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at: http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory. One of the TLS DoS vulnerabilities was reported to Cisco by CERT-FI. All the other vulnerabilities described in this advisory were found during internal testing. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100804-asa.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +---------------------------------------+ | Revision | | Initial | | 1.0 | 2010-August-04 | public | | | | release. | +---------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at: http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iD8DBQFMWYoH86n/Gc8U/uARAg8JAJ0W8ZSUZ0ldj0ncoIfxVKVuVeieygCgkLs4 GGmQ+3yNpX0udKpkA2431fg= =yQWz -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Unspecified vulnerability in the SunRPC inspection feature on Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances (ASA) 5500 series devices with software 7.2 before 7.2(5), 8.0 before 8.0(5.19), 8.1 before 8.1(2.47), and 8.2 before 8.2(2) and Cisco PIX Security Appliances 500 series devices allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device reload) via crafted SunRPC UDP packets, aka Bug ID CSCtc79922. plural Cisco Run on product SunRPC The inspection function includes SunRPC UDP Service operation disruption due to incomplete packet processing (DoS) There is a vulnerability that becomes a condition. The problem is Bug ID : CSCtc79922 It is a problem.Skillfully crafted by a third party SunRPC UDP Service disruption via packets (DoS) There is a possibility of being put into a state. An attacker can exploit this issue to cause affected devices to reload, triggering a denial-of-service condition. This issue is tracked by Cisco Bug IDs CSCtc79922 and CSCte61622. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- "From 2007 to 2009 vulnerabilities in a typical end-user PC almost doubled from about 220 to 420." Non-Microsoft software to blame for increase in vulnerabilities affecting typical Windows end-users, read more: http://secunia.com/gfx/pdf/Secunia_Half_Year_Report_2010.pdf ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: Cisco ASA 5500 Series Multiple Denial of Service Vulnerabilities SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA40842 VERIFY ADVISORY: Secunia.com http://secunia.com/advisories/40842/ Customer Area (Credentials Required) https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=40842 RELEASE DATE: 2010-08-05 DISCUSS ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/40842/#comments AVAILABLE ON SITE AND IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Last Update * Popularity * Comments * Criticality Level * Impact * Where * Solution Status * Operating System / Software * CVE Reference(s) http://secunia.com/advisories/40842/ ONLY AVAILABLE IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Authentication Level * Report Reliability * Secunia PoC * Secunia Analysis * Systems Affected * Approve Distribution * Remediation Status * Secunia CVSS Score * CVSS https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=40842 ONLY AVAILABLE WITH SECUNIA CSI AND SECUNIA PSI: * AUTOMATED SCANNING http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/personal/ http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/corporate/wsus_sccm_3rd_third_party_patching/ DESCRIPTION: Some vulnerabilities have been reported in Cisco ASA (Adaptive Security Appliance) 5500 Series, which can be exploited by malicious people to cause a DoS (Denial of Service). 1) Three errors exist in the SunRPC inspection engine while processing certain SunRPC messages. This can be exploited to reload a device via specially crafted UDP SunRPC packets that transit the appliance. 3) An error in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) inspection feature can be exploited to trigger an appliance reload via a specially crafted SIP packet that transits the appliance via TCP or UDP port 5060. Please see the vendor's advisory for detailed patch information. PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: Reported by the vendor. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: cisco-sa-20100804-asa: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100804-asa.shtml OTHER REFERENCES: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ DEEP LINKS: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXTENDED DESCRIPTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXTENDED SOLUTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXPLOIT: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ---------------------------------------------------------------------- . There are workarounds for some of the vulnerabilities disclosed in this advisory. This advisory is posted at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100804-asa.shtml Note: The Cisco Firewall Services Module (FWSM) is affected by the SunRPC DoS vulnerabilities. A separate Cisco Security Advisory has been published to disclose the vulnerabilities that affect the FWSM. Affected versions of Cisco ASA Software will vary depending on the specific vulnerability. Vulnerable Products +------------------ For specific version information, refer to the Software Versions and Fixes section of this advisory. A successful attack may result in a sustained DoS condition. Versions 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. SunRPC inspection is enabled by default. To check if SunRPC inspection is enabled, issue the "show service-policy | include sunrpc" command and confirm that output, such as what is displayed in the following example, is returned. ciscoasa# show service-policy | include sunrpc Inspect: sunrpc, packet 0, drop 0, reset-drop 0 The following configuration commands are used to enable SunRPC inspection in the Cisco ASA. class-map inspection_default match default-inspection-traffic ! policy-map global_policy class inspection_default ... inspect sunrpc ... A successful attack may result in a sustained DoS condition. Versions 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, 8.2.x, and 8.3.x are affected by one or more of these vulnerabilities. A Cisco ASA device configured for any of the following features is affected: * Secure Socket Layer Virtual Private Network (SSL VPN) * When the affected device is configured to accept Cisco Adaptive Security Device Manager (ASDM) connections * TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection * Cut-Through Proxy for Network Access when using HTTPS SSL VPN (or WebVPN) is enabled with the "enable <interface name>" command in "webvpn" configuration mode. SSL VPN is disabled by default. The following configuration snippet provides an example of a SSL VPN configuration. webvpn enable outside ... ASDM access is affected by three of these vulnerabilities. To use ASDM, the HTTPS server must be enabled to allow HTTPS connections to the Cisco ASA. The server can be enabled using the "http server enable [port]" command. The default port is 443. To specify hosts that can access the HTTP server internal to the security appliance, use the "http" command in global configuration mode. The TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection feature is affected by these vulnerabilities. This feature was introduced in Cisco ASA version 8.0(2) and is disabled by default. To determine if the TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection feature is enabled on the device, use the show tls-proxy command, as shown in the following example: ciscoasa# show tls-proxy Maximum number of sessions: 1200 TLS-Proxy 'sip_proxy': ref_cnt 1, seq# 3 Server proxy: Trust-point: local_ccm Client proxy: Local dynamic certificate issuer: LOCAL-CA-SERVER Local dynamic certificate key-pair: phone_common Cipher suite: aes128-sha1 aes256-sha1 Run-time proxies: Proxy 0xcbae1538: Class-map: sip_ssl, Inspect: sip Active sess 1, most sess 3, byte 3456043 ... <output truncated> TLS proxy supports SIP and Skinny protocols. TLS proxy for Skinny inspection can be enabled using the "inspect skinny <skinny_map> tls-proxy <proxy_name>", as shown in the following example: asa(config-pmap)# class inspection_default asa(config-pmap-c)# inspect skinny my-inspect tls-proxy my-tls-proxy asa(config)# service-policy global_policy global Note: Secure SCCP uses TCP port 2443; however, it can be configured to a different port. TLS proxy for SIP inspection can be enabled using the "inspect sip <map> tls-proxy <proxy_name>", as shown in the following example: asa(config-pmap)# class inspection_default asa(config-pmap-c)# inspect sip my-inspect tls-proxy my-tls-proxy asa(config)# service-policy global_policy global The Cisco ASA is also vulnerable when the Cut-Through Proxy for Network Access feature is used with HTTPS. This feature is enabled for direct authentication using HTTPS with the "aaa authentication listener https" command, as shown in the following example: ASA(config)# aaa authentication listener https inside port 443 Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ A DoS vulnerability affects the SIP inspection feature of Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances. Versions 7.0.x, 7.1.x, 7.2.x are not affected. Versions 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. SIP inspection is enabled by default. To check if SIP inspection is enabled, issue the "show service-policy | include sip" command and confirm that output, such as what is displayed in the following example, is returned. ciscoasa#show service-policy | include sip Inspect: sip , packet 0, drop 0, reset-drop 0 Alternatively, an appliance that has SIP inspection enabled has a configuration similar to the following: class-map inspection_default match default-inspection-traffic ! policy-map global_policy class inspection_default ... inspect sip ... ! service-policy global_policy global Note: The service policy could also be applied to a specific interface instead of a global configuration shown in the previous example. IKE is not enabled by default. If IKE is enabled, the "isakmp enable <interface name>" command appears in the configuration. For more information, refer to the End of Life announcement at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/vpndevc/ps5708/ps5709/ps2030/end_of_life_notice_cisco_pix_525_sec_app.html How to Determine the Running Software Version ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ To determine whether a vulnerable version of Cisco ASA Software is running on an appliance, administrators can issue the "show version" command. The following example shows a Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance that is running software version 8.3(1): ASA#show version | include Version Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Software Version 8.3(1) Device Manager Version 6.3(1) Customers who use Cisco ASDM to manage devices can locate the software version in the table that is displayed in the login window or upper-left corner of the Cisco ASDM window. Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable +-------------------------------- With the exception of the Cisco FWSM, no other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these vulnerabilities. It offers firewall, intrusion prevention system (IPS), anti-X, and VPN services. Sun RPC is used by Network File System (NFS) and Network Information Service (NIS). Sun RPC services can run on any port. When a client attempts to access a Sun RPC service on a server, it must learn the port that service is running on. The client does this by querying the port mapper process, usually rpcbind, on the well-known port of 111. Note: Only transit traffic can trigger these vulnerabilities; traffic that is destined to the appliance will not trigger the vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities can be triggered by using UDP packets, not TCP. Transport Layer Security (TLS) Denial of Service Vulnerabilities ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ TLS and its predecessor, SSL, are cryptographic protocols that provide security for communications over IP data networks such as the Internet. A Cisco ASA device configured for SSL VPN, TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection, or configured to accept ASDM management connections is vulnerable. Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SIP, as defined by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), enables call handling sessions, particularly two-party audio conferences, or "calls." SIP works with SDP for call signalling. SDP specifies the ports for the media stream. Using SIP, the Cisco ASA can support any SIP VoIP gateways and VoIP proxy servers. To support SIP calls through the Cisco ASA, signaling messages for the media connection addresses, media ports, and embryonic connections for the media must be inspected, because while the signaling is sent over a well-known destination port (UDP/TCP 5060), the media streams are dynamically allocated. Also, SIP embeds IP addresses in the user-data portion of the IP packet. SIP inspection applies NAT for these embedded IP addresses. SIP inspection is enabled by default. Note: Only transit traffic can trigger these vulnerabilities; traffic that is destined to the appliance will not trigger the vulnerabilities. This vulnerability is documented in Cisco bug ID CSCtd32106 and has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2010-2816. Crafted Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Message Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ IPsec is an IP security feature that provides robust authentication and encryption of IP packets. IKE is a key management protocol standard that is used in conjunction with the IPsec standard. A DoS vulnerability exists in the IKE implementation of the Cisco ASA. Note: Only traffic that is destined to the appliance may trigger this vulnerability when the affected device is configured for IPsec remote access or site-to-site VPNs. This vulnerability is documented in Cisco bug ID CSCte46507 and has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2010-2817. Vulnerability Scoring Details ============================= Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at: http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss CSCtc77567, CSCtc79922 and CSCtc85753 - SunRPC Inspection DoS Vulnerabilities CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCtd32627, CSCtf37506, and CSCtf55259- Transport Layer Security (TLS) DoS Vulnerabilities CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCtd32106 - Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Inspection DoS Vulnerability CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCte46507 - Crafted Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Message DoS Vulnerability CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== Successful exploitation of any of the vulnerabilities described in this security advisory may cause the affected device to reload. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult: http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Vulnerability | Major | First Fixed | | | Release | Release | |----------------------------------------+---------+----------------| | | 7.0 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.1 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.2 | 7.2(5) | | SunRPC Inspection DoS Vulnerabilities |---------+----------------| | (CSCtc77567, CSCtc79922, and | 8.0 | 8.0(5.19) | | CSCtc85753) |---------+----------------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.46) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(2) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.3 | Not vulnerable | |----------------------------------------+---------+----------------| | | 7.0 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.1 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.2 | 7.2(5) | | TLS DoS Vulnerabilities (CSCtd32627, |---------+----------------| | CSCtf37506, and CSCtf55259) | 8.0 | 8.0(5.15) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.44) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(2.17) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.3 | 8.3(1.6) | |----------------------------------------+---------+----------------| | | 7.0 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.1 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.2 | Not vulnerable | | SIP Inspection DoS Vulnerability |---------+----------------| | (CSCtd32106) | 8.0 | 8.0(5.17) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.45) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(2.13) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.3 | Not vulnerable | |----------------------------------------+---------+----------------| | | 7.0 | 7.0(8.11) | | |---------+----------------| | | | Vulnerable; | | | 7.1 | migrate to | | | | 7.2(5) | | |---------+----------------| | IKE Message DoS Vulnerability | 7.2 | 7.2(5) | | (CSCte46507) |---------+----------------| | | 8.0 | 8.0(5.15) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.44) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(2.10) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.3 | 8.3(1.1) | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ Note: Cisco ASA Software versions 7.1.x are affected by some of the vulnerabilities in this advisory. However, no fixed 7.1.x software versions are planned because the 7.1.x major release has reached the End of Software Maintenance Releases milestone. Refer to the EOL/EOS for the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance Software v7.1 notice for further information: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/vpndevc/ps6032/ps6094/ps6120/end_of_life_notice_cisco_asa_5500_series_adaptive_sec_app_sw.html Recommended Releases ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The following table lists all recommended releases. These recommended releases contain the fixes for all vulnerabilities in this advisory. Cisco recommends upgrading to a release that is equal to or later than these recommended releases. +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Major Release | Recommended Release | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 7.0 | 7.0(8.11) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 7.1 | Vulnerable; migrate to 7.2(5) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 7.2 | 7.2(5) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 8.0 | 8.0(5.19) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 8.1 | 8.1(2.47) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 8.2 | 8.2(2.17) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 8.3 | 8.3(2) | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ Software Download ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Cisco ASA Software versions 7.0(8.11), 8.0(5.19), 8.1(2.46), and 8.2(2.17) can be downloaded from: http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/ASAPSIRT?psrtdcat20e2 Cisco ASA Software versions 7.2(5) and 8.3(2) can be downloaded from: http://tools.cisco.com/support/downloads/pub/Redirect.x?mdfid=279513386 Workarounds =========== This Security Advisory describes multiple distinct vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities and their respective workarounds are independent of each other. In addition to the recommendations described below, mitigation techniques that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin companion document for this advisory: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20100804-asa.shtml SunRPC Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ These vulnerabilities can be mitigated by disabling SunRPC inspection if it is not required. Administrators can disable SunRPC inspection by issuing the "no inspect sunrpc" command in class configuration sub-mode within policy-map configuration. Transport Layer Security (TLS) Denial of Service Vulnerabilities ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ If SSL VPN (clientless or client-based) is not needed, it can be disabled by issuing the "clear configure webvpn" command. Administrators should make sure that ASDM connections are only allowed from trusted hosts. To identify the IP addresses from which the security appliance accepts HTTPS connections for ASDM, configure the http command for each trusted host address or subnet. The following example, shows how a trusted host with IP address 192.168.1.100 is added to the configuration: hostname(config)# http 192.168.1.100 255.255.255.255 The TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection feature is affected by these vulnerabilities. This feature can be disabled if it is not needed. Temporarily disabling the feature will mitigate these vulnerabilities. The Cut-Through Proxy for Network Access feature, when configured for HTTPS, is affected by these vulnerabilities. The only workaround is to disable the feature if not needed. To disable HTTPS Cut-Through Proxy authentication use the "no aaa authentication listener https" command, as shown in the following example: ASA(config)# no aaa authentication listener https inside port 443 Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ This vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling SIP inspection if it is not required. Administrators can disable SIP inspection by issuing the "no inspect sip" command in class configuration sub-mode within policy-map configuration. Crafted Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Message Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ There are no workarounds for this vulnerability apart from disabling IKE on the affected device. The "no crypto isakmp enable <interface-name>" command can be used to disable IKE on a specific interface. Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at: http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory. One of the TLS DoS vulnerabilities was reported to Cisco by CERT-FI. All the other vulnerabilities described in this advisory were found during internal testing. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100804-asa.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +---------------------------------------+ | Revision | | Initial | | 1.0 | 2010-August-04 | public | | | | release. | +---------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at: http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iD8DBQFMWYoH86n/Gc8U/uARAg8JAJ0W8ZSUZ0ldj0ncoIfxVKVuVeieygCgkLs4 GGmQ+3yNpX0udKpkA2431fg= =yQWz -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Unspecified vulnerability in the SunRPC inspection feature on Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances (ASA) 5500 series devices with software 7.2 before 7.2(5), 8.0 before 8.0(5.19), 8.1 before 8.1(2.47), and 8.2 before 8.2(2) and Cisco PIX Security Appliances 500 series devices allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device reload) via crafted SunRPC UDP packets, aka Bug ID CSCtc85753. plural Cisco Run on product SunRPC The inspection function includes SunRPC UDP Service operation disruption due to incomplete packet processing (DoS) There is a vulnerability that becomes a condition. The problem is Bug ID : CSCtc85753 It is a problem.Skillfully crafted by a third party SunRPC UDP Service disruption via packets (DoS) There is a possibility of being put into a state. An attacker can exploit this issue to cause affected devices to reload, triggering a denial-of-service condition. This issue is tracked by Cisco Bug IDs CSCtc85753 and CSCte61662. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- "From 2007 to 2009 vulnerabilities in a typical end-user PC almost doubled from about 220 to 420." Non-Microsoft software to blame for increase in vulnerabilities affecting typical Windows end-users, read more: http://secunia.com/gfx/pdf/Secunia_Half_Year_Report_2010.pdf ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: Cisco ASA 5500 Series Multiple Denial of Service Vulnerabilities SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA40842 VERIFY ADVISORY: Secunia.com http://secunia.com/advisories/40842/ Customer Area (Credentials Required) https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=40842 RELEASE DATE: 2010-08-05 DISCUSS ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/40842/#comments AVAILABLE ON SITE AND IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Last Update * Popularity * Comments * Criticality Level * Impact * Where * Solution Status * Operating System / Software * CVE Reference(s) http://secunia.com/advisories/40842/ ONLY AVAILABLE IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Authentication Level * Report Reliability * Secunia PoC * Secunia Analysis * Systems Affected * Approve Distribution * Remediation Status * Secunia CVSS Score * CVSS https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=40842 ONLY AVAILABLE WITH SECUNIA CSI AND SECUNIA PSI: * AUTOMATED SCANNING http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/personal/ http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/corporate/wsus_sccm_3rd_third_party_patching/ DESCRIPTION: Some vulnerabilities have been reported in Cisco ASA (Adaptive Security Appliance) 5500 Series, which can be exploited by malicious people to cause a DoS (Denial of Service). 1) Three errors exist in the SunRPC inspection engine while processing certain SunRPC messages. This can be exploited to reload a device via specially crafted UDP SunRPC packets that transit the appliance. 3) An error in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) inspection feature can be exploited to trigger an appliance reload via a specially crafted SIP packet that transits the appliance via TCP or UDP port 5060. Please see the vendor's advisory for detailed patch information. PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: Reported by the vendor. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: cisco-sa-20100804-asa: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100804-asa.shtml OTHER REFERENCES: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ DEEP LINKS: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXTENDED DESCRIPTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXTENDED SOLUTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXPLOIT: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ---------------------------------------------------------------------- . There are workarounds for some of the vulnerabilities disclosed in this advisory. This advisory is posted at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100804-asa.shtml Note: The Cisco Firewall Services Module (FWSM) is affected by the SunRPC DoS vulnerabilities. A separate Cisco Security Advisory has been published to disclose the vulnerabilities that affect the FWSM. Affected versions of Cisco ASA Software will vary depending on the specific vulnerability. Vulnerable Products +------------------ For specific version information, refer to the Software Versions and Fixes section of this advisory. A successful attack may result in a sustained DoS condition. Versions 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. SunRPC inspection is enabled by default. To check if SunRPC inspection is enabled, issue the "show service-policy | include sunrpc" command and confirm that output, such as what is displayed in the following example, is returned. ciscoasa# show service-policy | include sunrpc Inspect: sunrpc, packet 0, drop 0, reset-drop 0 The following configuration commands are used to enable SunRPC inspection in the Cisco ASA. class-map inspection_default match default-inspection-traffic ! policy-map global_policy class inspection_default ... inspect sunrpc ... A successful attack may result in a sustained DoS condition. Versions 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, 8.2.x, and 8.3.x are affected by one or more of these vulnerabilities. A Cisco ASA device configured for any of the following features is affected: * Secure Socket Layer Virtual Private Network (SSL VPN) * When the affected device is configured to accept Cisco Adaptive Security Device Manager (ASDM) connections * TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection * Cut-Through Proxy for Network Access when using HTTPS SSL VPN (or WebVPN) is enabled with the "enable <interface name>" command in "webvpn" configuration mode. SSL VPN is disabled by default. The following configuration snippet provides an example of a SSL VPN configuration. webvpn enable outside ... ASDM access is affected by three of these vulnerabilities. To use ASDM, the HTTPS server must be enabled to allow HTTPS connections to the Cisco ASA. The server can be enabled using the "http server enable [port]" command. The default port is 443. To specify hosts that can access the HTTP server internal to the security appliance, use the "http" command in global configuration mode. The TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection feature is affected by these vulnerabilities. This feature was introduced in Cisco ASA version 8.0(2) and is disabled by default. To determine if the TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection feature is enabled on the device, use the show tls-proxy command, as shown in the following example: ciscoasa# show tls-proxy Maximum number of sessions: 1200 TLS-Proxy 'sip_proxy': ref_cnt 1, seq# 3 Server proxy: Trust-point: local_ccm Client proxy: Local dynamic certificate issuer: LOCAL-CA-SERVER Local dynamic certificate key-pair: phone_common Cipher suite: aes128-sha1 aes256-sha1 Run-time proxies: Proxy 0xcbae1538: Class-map: sip_ssl, Inspect: sip Active sess 1, most sess 3, byte 3456043 ... <output truncated> TLS proxy supports SIP and Skinny protocols. TLS proxy for Skinny inspection can be enabled using the "inspect skinny <skinny_map> tls-proxy <proxy_name>", as shown in the following example: asa(config-pmap)# class inspection_default asa(config-pmap-c)# inspect skinny my-inspect tls-proxy my-tls-proxy asa(config)# service-policy global_policy global Note: Secure SCCP uses TCP port 2443; however, it can be configured to a different port. TLS proxy for SIP inspection can be enabled using the "inspect sip <map> tls-proxy <proxy_name>", as shown in the following example: asa(config-pmap)# class inspection_default asa(config-pmap-c)# inspect sip my-inspect tls-proxy my-tls-proxy asa(config)# service-policy global_policy global The Cisco ASA is also vulnerable when the Cut-Through Proxy for Network Access feature is used with HTTPS. This feature is enabled for direct authentication using HTTPS with the "aaa authentication listener https" command, as shown in the following example: ASA(config)# aaa authentication listener https inside port 443 Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ A DoS vulnerability affects the SIP inspection feature of Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances. Versions 7.0.x, 7.1.x, 7.2.x are not affected. Versions 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. SIP inspection is enabled by default. To check if SIP inspection is enabled, issue the "show service-policy | include sip" command and confirm that output, such as what is displayed in the following example, is returned. ciscoasa#show service-policy | include sip Inspect: sip , packet 0, drop 0, reset-drop 0 Alternatively, an appliance that has SIP inspection enabled has a configuration similar to the following: class-map inspection_default match default-inspection-traffic ! policy-map global_policy class inspection_default ... inspect sip ... ! service-policy global_policy global Note: The service policy could also be applied to a specific interface instead of a global configuration shown in the previous example. IKE is not enabled by default. If IKE is enabled, the "isakmp enable <interface name>" command appears in the configuration. For more information, refer to the End of Life announcement at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/vpndevc/ps5708/ps5709/ps2030/end_of_life_notice_cisco_pix_525_sec_app.html How to Determine the Running Software Version ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ To determine whether a vulnerable version of Cisco ASA Software is running on an appliance, administrators can issue the "show version" command. The following example shows a Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance that is running software version 8.3(1): ASA#show version | include Version Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Software Version 8.3(1) Device Manager Version 6.3(1) Customers who use Cisco ASDM to manage devices can locate the software version in the table that is displayed in the login window or upper-left corner of the Cisco ASDM window. Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable +-------------------------------- With the exception of the Cisco FWSM, no other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these vulnerabilities. It offers firewall, intrusion prevention system (IPS), anti-X, and VPN services. Sun RPC is used by Network File System (NFS) and Network Information Service (NIS). Sun RPC services can run on any port. When a client attempts to access a Sun RPC service on a server, it must learn the port that service is running on. The client does this by querying the port mapper process, usually rpcbind, on the well-known port of 111. Note: Only transit traffic can trigger these vulnerabilities; traffic that is destined to the appliance will not trigger the vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities can be triggered by using UDP packets, not TCP. Transport Layer Security (TLS) Denial of Service Vulnerabilities ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ TLS and its predecessor, SSL, are cryptographic protocols that provide security for communications over IP data networks such as the Internet. A Cisco ASA device configured for SSL VPN, TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection, or configured to accept ASDM management connections is vulnerable. Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SIP, as defined by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), enables call handling sessions, particularly two-party audio conferences, or "calls." SIP works with SDP for call signalling. SDP specifies the ports for the media stream. Using SIP, the Cisco ASA can support any SIP VoIP gateways and VoIP proxy servers. To support SIP calls through the Cisco ASA, signaling messages for the media connection addresses, media ports, and embryonic connections for the media must be inspected, because while the signaling is sent over a well-known destination port (UDP/TCP 5060), the media streams are dynamically allocated. Also, SIP embeds IP addresses in the user-data portion of the IP packet. SIP inspection applies NAT for these embedded IP addresses. SIP inspection is enabled by default. Note: Only transit traffic can trigger these vulnerabilities; traffic that is destined to the appliance will not trigger the vulnerabilities. This vulnerability is documented in Cisco bug ID CSCtd32106 and has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2010-2816. Crafted Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Message Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ IPsec is an IP security feature that provides robust authentication and encryption of IP packets. IKE is a key management protocol standard that is used in conjunction with the IPsec standard. A DoS vulnerability exists in the IKE implementation of the Cisco ASA. Note: Only traffic that is destined to the appliance may trigger this vulnerability when the affected device is configured for IPsec remote access or site-to-site VPNs. This vulnerability is documented in Cisco bug ID CSCte46507 and has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2010-2817. Vulnerability Scoring Details ============================= Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at: http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss CSCtc77567, CSCtc79922 and CSCtc85753 - SunRPC Inspection DoS Vulnerabilities CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCtd32627, CSCtf37506, and CSCtf55259- Transport Layer Security (TLS) DoS Vulnerabilities CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCtd32106 - Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Inspection DoS Vulnerability CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCte46507 - Crafted Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Message DoS Vulnerability CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== Successful exploitation of any of the vulnerabilities described in this security advisory may cause the affected device to reload. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult: http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Vulnerability | Major | First Fixed | | | Release | Release | |----------------------------------------+---------+----------------| | | 7.0 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.1 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.2 | 7.2(5) | | SunRPC Inspection DoS Vulnerabilities |---------+----------------| | (CSCtc77567, CSCtc79922, and | 8.0 | 8.0(5.19) | | CSCtc85753) |---------+----------------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.46) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(2) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.3 | Not vulnerable | |----------------------------------------+---------+----------------| | | 7.0 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.1 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.2 | 7.2(5) | | TLS DoS Vulnerabilities (CSCtd32627, |---------+----------------| | CSCtf37506, and CSCtf55259) | 8.0 | 8.0(5.15) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.44) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(2.17) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.3 | 8.3(1.6) | |----------------------------------------+---------+----------------| | | 7.0 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.1 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.2 | Not vulnerable | | SIP Inspection DoS Vulnerability |---------+----------------| | (CSCtd32106) | 8.0 | 8.0(5.17) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.45) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(2.13) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.3 | Not vulnerable | |----------------------------------------+---------+----------------| | | 7.0 | 7.0(8.11) | | |---------+----------------| | | | Vulnerable; | | | 7.1 | migrate to | | | | 7.2(5) | | |---------+----------------| | IKE Message DoS Vulnerability | 7.2 | 7.2(5) | | (CSCte46507) |---------+----------------| | | 8.0 | 8.0(5.15) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.44) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(2.10) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.3 | 8.3(1.1) | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ Note: Cisco ASA Software versions 7.1.x are affected by some of the vulnerabilities in this advisory. However, no fixed 7.1.x software versions are planned because the 7.1.x major release has reached the End of Software Maintenance Releases milestone. Refer to the EOL/EOS for the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance Software v7.1 notice for further information: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/vpndevc/ps6032/ps6094/ps6120/end_of_life_notice_cisco_asa_5500_series_adaptive_sec_app_sw.html Recommended Releases ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The following table lists all recommended releases. These recommended releases contain the fixes for all vulnerabilities in this advisory. Cisco recommends upgrading to a release that is equal to or later than these recommended releases. +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Major Release | Recommended Release | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 7.0 | 7.0(8.11) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 7.1 | Vulnerable; migrate to 7.2(5) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 7.2 | 7.2(5) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 8.0 | 8.0(5.19) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 8.1 | 8.1(2.47) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 8.2 | 8.2(2.17) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 8.3 | 8.3(2) | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ Software Download ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Cisco ASA Software versions 7.0(8.11), 8.0(5.19), 8.1(2.46), and 8.2(2.17) can be downloaded from: http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/ASAPSIRT?psrtdcat20e2 Cisco ASA Software versions 7.2(5) and 8.3(2) can be downloaded from: http://tools.cisco.com/support/downloads/pub/Redirect.x?mdfid=279513386 Workarounds =========== This Security Advisory describes multiple distinct vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities and their respective workarounds are independent of each other. In addition to the recommendations described below, mitigation techniques that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin companion document for this advisory: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20100804-asa.shtml SunRPC Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ These vulnerabilities can be mitigated by disabling SunRPC inspection if it is not required. Administrators can disable SunRPC inspection by issuing the "no inspect sunrpc" command in class configuration sub-mode within policy-map configuration. Transport Layer Security (TLS) Denial of Service Vulnerabilities ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ If SSL VPN (clientless or client-based) is not needed, it can be disabled by issuing the "clear configure webvpn" command. Administrators should make sure that ASDM connections are only allowed from trusted hosts. To identify the IP addresses from which the security appliance accepts HTTPS connections for ASDM, configure the http command for each trusted host address or subnet. The following example, shows how a trusted host with IP address 192.168.1.100 is added to the configuration: hostname(config)# http 192.168.1.100 255.255.255.255 The TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection feature is affected by these vulnerabilities. This feature can be disabled if it is not needed. Temporarily disabling the feature will mitigate these vulnerabilities. The Cut-Through Proxy for Network Access feature, when configured for HTTPS, is affected by these vulnerabilities. The only workaround is to disable the feature if not needed. To disable HTTPS Cut-Through Proxy authentication use the "no aaa authentication listener https" command, as shown in the following example: ASA(config)# no aaa authentication listener https inside port 443 Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ This vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling SIP inspection if it is not required. Administrators can disable SIP inspection by issuing the "no inspect sip" command in class configuration sub-mode within policy-map configuration. Crafted Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Message Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ There are no workarounds for this vulnerability apart from disabling IKE on the affected device. The "no crypto isakmp enable <interface-name>" command can be used to disable IKE on a specific interface. Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at: http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory. One of the TLS DoS vulnerabilities was reported to Cisco by CERT-FI. All the other vulnerabilities described in this advisory were found during internal testing. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100804-asa.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +---------------------------------------+ | Revision | | Initial | | 1.0 | 2010-August-04 | public | | | | release. | +---------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at: http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iD8DBQFMWYoH86n/Gc8U/uARAg8JAJ0W8ZSUZ0ldj0ncoIfxVKVuVeieygCgkLs4 GGmQ+3yNpX0udKpkA2431fg= =yQWz -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Unspecified vulnerability in the Transport Layer Security (TLS) implementation on Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances (ASA) 5500 series devices with software 7.2 before 7.2(5), 8.0 before 8.0(5.15), 8.1 before 8.1(2.44), 8.2 before 8.2(2.17), and 8.3 before 8.3(1.6) and Cisco PIX Security Appliances 500 series devices allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device reload) via a sequence of crafted TLS packets, aka Bug ID CSCtd32627. The problem is Bug ID : CSCtd32627 Problem.Expertly crafted by a third party TLS Denial of service via sequence of packets (DoS) May be in a state. An attacker can exploit this issue to cause an affected device to crash and reload, denying service to legitimate users. This issue being tracked by Cisco bug ID CSCtd32627. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- "From 2007 to 2009 vulnerabilities in a typical end-user PC almost doubled from about 220 to 420." Non-Microsoft software to blame for increase in vulnerabilities affecting typical Windows end-users, read more: http://secunia.com/gfx/pdf/Secunia_Half_Year_Report_2010.pdf ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: Cisco ASA 5500 Series Multiple Denial of Service Vulnerabilities SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA40842 VERIFY ADVISORY: Secunia.com http://secunia.com/advisories/40842/ Customer Area (Credentials Required) https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=40842 RELEASE DATE: 2010-08-05 DISCUSS ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/40842/#comments AVAILABLE ON SITE AND IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Last Update * Popularity * Comments * Criticality Level * Impact * Where * Solution Status * Operating System / Software * CVE Reference(s) http://secunia.com/advisories/40842/ ONLY AVAILABLE IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Authentication Level * Report Reliability * Secunia PoC * Secunia Analysis * Systems Affected * Approve Distribution * Remediation Status * Secunia CVSS Score * CVSS https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=40842 ONLY AVAILABLE WITH SECUNIA CSI AND SECUNIA PSI: * AUTOMATED SCANNING http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/personal/ http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/corporate/wsus_sccm_3rd_third_party_patching/ DESCRIPTION: Some vulnerabilities have been reported in Cisco ASA (Adaptive Security Appliance) 5500 Series, which can be exploited by malicious people to cause a DoS (Denial of Service). 1) Three errors exist in the SunRPC inspection engine while processing certain SunRPC messages. This can be exploited to reload a device via specially crafted UDP SunRPC packets that transit the appliance. 3) An error in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) inspection feature can be exploited to trigger an appliance reload via a specially crafted SIP packet that transits the appliance via TCP or UDP port 5060. Please see the vendor's advisory for detailed patch information. PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: Reported by the vendor. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: cisco-sa-20100804-asa: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100804-asa.shtml OTHER REFERENCES: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ DEEP LINKS: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXTENDED DESCRIPTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXTENDED SOLUTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXPLOIT: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ---------------------------------------------------------------------- . There are workarounds for some of the vulnerabilities disclosed in this advisory. This advisory is posted at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100804-asa.shtml Note: The Cisco Firewall Services Module (FWSM) is affected by the SunRPC DoS vulnerabilities. A separate Cisco Security Advisory has been published to disclose the vulnerabilities that affect the FWSM. Affected versions of Cisco ASA Software will vary depending on the specific vulnerability. Vulnerable Products +------------------ For specific version information, refer to the Software Versions and Fixes section of this advisory. A successful attack may result in a sustained DoS condition. Versions 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. SunRPC inspection is enabled by default. To check if SunRPC inspection is enabled, issue the "show service-policy | include sunrpc" command and confirm that output, such as what is displayed in the following example, is returned. ciscoasa# show service-policy | include sunrpc Inspect: sunrpc, packet 0, drop 0, reset-drop 0 The following configuration commands are used to enable SunRPC inspection in the Cisco ASA. class-map inspection_default match default-inspection-traffic ! policy-map global_policy class inspection_default ... inspect sunrpc ... A successful attack may result in a sustained DoS condition. Versions 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, 8.2.x, and 8.3.x are affected by one or more of these vulnerabilities. A Cisco ASA device configured for any of the following features is affected: * Secure Socket Layer Virtual Private Network (SSL VPN) * When the affected device is configured to accept Cisco Adaptive Security Device Manager (ASDM) connections * TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection * Cut-Through Proxy for Network Access when using HTTPS SSL VPN (or WebVPN) is enabled with the "enable <interface name>" command in "webvpn" configuration mode. SSL VPN is disabled by default. The following configuration snippet provides an example of a SSL VPN configuration. webvpn enable outside ... ASDM access is affected by three of these vulnerabilities. To use ASDM, the HTTPS server must be enabled to allow HTTPS connections to the Cisco ASA. The server can be enabled using the "http server enable [port]" command. The default port is 443. To specify hosts that can access the HTTP server internal to the security appliance, use the "http" command in global configuration mode. The TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection feature is affected by these vulnerabilities. This feature was introduced in Cisco ASA version 8.0(2) and is disabled by default. To determine if the TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection feature is enabled on the device, use the show tls-proxy command, as shown in the following example: ciscoasa# show tls-proxy Maximum number of sessions: 1200 TLS-Proxy 'sip_proxy': ref_cnt 1, seq# 3 Server proxy: Trust-point: local_ccm Client proxy: Local dynamic certificate issuer: LOCAL-CA-SERVER Local dynamic certificate key-pair: phone_common Cipher suite: aes128-sha1 aes256-sha1 Run-time proxies: Proxy 0xcbae1538: Class-map: sip_ssl, Inspect: sip Active sess 1, most sess 3, byte 3456043 ... <output truncated> TLS proxy supports SIP and Skinny protocols. TLS proxy for Skinny inspection can be enabled using the "inspect skinny <skinny_map> tls-proxy <proxy_name>", as shown in the following example: asa(config-pmap)# class inspection_default asa(config-pmap-c)# inspect skinny my-inspect tls-proxy my-tls-proxy asa(config)# service-policy global_policy global Note: Secure SCCP uses TCP port 2443; however, it can be configured to a different port. TLS proxy for SIP inspection can be enabled using the "inspect sip <map> tls-proxy <proxy_name>", as shown in the following example: asa(config-pmap)# class inspection_default asa(config-pmap-c)# inspect sip my-inspect tls-proxy my-tls-proxy asa(config)# service-policy global_policy global The Cisco ASA is also vulnerable when the Cut-Through Proxy for Network Access feature is used with HTTPS. This feature is enabled for direct authentication using HTTPS with the "aaa authentication listener https" command, as shown in the following example: ASA(config)# aaa authentication listener https inside port 443 Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ A DoS vulnerability affects the SIP inspection feature of Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances. Versions 7.0.x, 7.1.x, 7.2.x are not affected. Versions 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. SIP inspection is enabled by default. To check if SIP inspection is enabled, issue the "show service-policy | include sip" command and confirm that output, such as what is displayed in the following example, is returned. ciscoasa#show service-policy | include sip Inspect: sip , packet 0, drop 0, reset-drop 0 Alternatively, an appliance that has SIP inspection enabled has a configuration similar to the following: class-map inspection_default match default-inspection-traffic ! policy-map global_policy class inspection_default ... inspect sip ... ! service-policy global_policy global Note: The service policy could also be applied to a specific interface instead of a global configuration shown in the previous example. IKE is not enabled by default. If IKE is enabled, the "isakmp enable <interface name>" command appears in the configuration. For more information, refer to the End of Life announcement at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/vpndevc/ps5708/ps5709/ps2030/end_of_life_notice_cisco_pix_525_sec_app.html How to Determine the Running Software Version ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ To determine whether a vulnerable version of Cisco ASA Software is running on an appliance, administrators can issue the "show version" command. The following example shows a Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance that is running software version 8.3(1): ASA#show version | include Version Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Software Version 8.3(1) Device Manager Version 6.3(1) Customers who use Cisco ASDM to manage devices can locate the software version in the table that is displayed in the login window or upper-left corner of the Cisco ASDM window. Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable +-------------------------------- With the exception of the Cisco FWSM, no other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these vulnerabilities. It offers firewall, intrusion prevention system (IPS), anti-X, and VPN services. Sun RPC is used by Network File System (NFS) and Network Information Service (NIS). Sun RPC services can run on any port. When a client attempts to access a Sun RPC service on a server, it must learn the port that service is running on. The client does this by querying the port mapper process, usually rpcbind, on the well-known port of 111. Note: Only transit traffic can trigger these vulnerabilities; traffic that is destined to the appliance will not trigger the vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities can be triggered by using UDP packets, not TCP. These vulnerabilities are documented in Cisco bug IDs CSCtc77567, CSCtc79922, and CSCtc85753; and have been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) IDs CVE-2010-1578, CVE-2010-1579, and CVE-2010-1580, respectively. A Cisco ASA device configured for SSL VPN, TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection, or configured to accept ASDM management connections is vulnerable. These vulnerabilities are documented in Cisco bug IDs CSCtd32627, CSCtf37506, and CSCtf55259; and have been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) IDs CVE-2010-1581, CVE-2010-2814, and CVE-2010-2815, respectively. Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SIP, as defined by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), enables call handling sessions, particularly two-party audio conferences, or "calls." SIP works with SDP for call signalling. SDP specifies the ports for the media stream. Using SIP, the Cisco ASA can support any SIP VoIP gateways and VoIP proxy servers. To support SIP calls through the Cisco ASA, signaling messages for the media connection addresses, media ports, and embryonic connections for the media must be inspected, because while the signaling is sent over a well-known destination port (UDP/TCP 5060), the media streams are dynamically allocated. Also, SIP embeds IP addresses in the user-data portion of the IP packet. SIP inspection applies NAT for these embedded IP addresses. SIP inspection is enabled by default. Note: Only transit traffic can trigger these vulnerabilities; traffic that is destined to the appliance will not trigger the vulnerabilities. Crafted Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Message Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ IPsec is an IP security feature that provides robust authentication and encryption of IP packets. IKE is a key management protocol standard that is used in conjunction with the IPsec standard. A DoS vulnerability exists in the IKE implementation of the Cisco ASA. Note: Only traffic that is destined to the appliance may trigger this vulnerability when the affected device is configured for IPsec remote access or site-to-site VPNs. Vulnerability Scoring Details ============================= Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at: http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss CSCtc77567, CSCtc79922 and CSCtc85753 - SunRPC Inspection DoS Vulnerabilities CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCtd32627, CSCtf37506, and CSCtf55259- Transport Layer Security (TLS) DoS Vulnerabilities CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCtd32106 - Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Inspection DoS Vulnerability CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCte46507 - Crafted Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Message DoS Vulnerability CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== Successful exploitation of any of the vulnerabilities described in this security advisory may cause the affected device to reload. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult: http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Vulnerability | Major | First Fixed | | | Release | Release | |----------------------------------------+---------+----------------| | | 7.0 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.1 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.2 | 7.2(5) | | SunRPC Inspection DoS Vulnerabilities |---------+----------------| | (CSCtc77567, CSCtc79922, and | 8.0 | 8.0(5.19) | | CSCtc85753) |---------+----------------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.46) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(2) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.3 | Not vulnerable | |----------------------------------------+---------+----------------| | | 7.0 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.1 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.2 | 7.2(5) | | TLS DoS Vulnerabilities (CSCtd32627, |---------+----------------| | CSCtf37506, and CSCtf55259) | 8.0 | 8.0(5.15) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.44) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(2.17) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.3 | 8.3(1.6) | |----------------------------------------+---------+----------------| | | 7.0 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.1 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.2 | Not vulnerable | | SIP Inspection DoS Vulnerability |---------+----------------| | (CSCtd32106) | 8.0 | 8.0(5.17) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.45) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(2.13) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.3 | Not vulnerable | |----------------------------------------+---------+----------------| | | 7.0 | 7.0(8.11) | | |---------+----------------| | | | Vulnerable; | | | 7.1 | migrate to | | | | 7.2(5) | | |---------+----------------| | IKE Message DoS Vulnerability | 7.2 | 7.2(5) | | (CSCte46507) |---------+----------------| | | 8.0 | 8.0(5.15) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.44) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(2.10) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.3 | 8.3(1.1) | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ Note: Cisco ASA Software versions 7.1.x are affected by some of the vulnerabilities in this advisory. However, no fixed 7.1.x software versions are planned because the 7.1.x major release has reached the End of Software Maintenance Releases milestone. These recommended releases contain the fixes for all vulnerabilities in this advisory. Cisco recommends upgrading to a release that is equal to or later than these recommended releases. +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Major Release | Recommended Release | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 7.0 | 7.0(8.11) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 7.1 | Vulnerable; migrate to 7.2(5) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 7.2 | 7.2(5) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 8.0 | 8.0(5.19) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 8.1 | 8.1(2.47) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 8.2 | 8.2(2.17) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 8.3 | 8.3(2) | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ Software Download ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Cisco ASA Software versions 7.0(8.11), 8.0(5.19), 8.1(2.46), and 8.2(2.17) can be downloaded from: http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/ASAPSIRT?psrtdcat20e2 Cisco ASA Software versions 7.2(5) and 8.3(2) can be downloaded from: http://tools.cisco.com/support/downloads/pub/Redirect.x?mdfid=279513386 Workarounds =========== This Security Advisory describes multiple distinct vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities and their respective workarounds are independent of each other. In addition to the recommendations described below, mitigation techniques that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin companion document for this advisory: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20100804-asa.shtml SunRPC Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ These vulnerabilities can be mitigated by disabling SunRPC inspection if it is not required. Administrators can disable SunRPC inspection by issuing the "no inspect sunrpc" command in class configuration sub-mode within policy-map configuration. Administrators should make sure that ASDM connections are only allowed from trusted hosts. To identify the IP addresses from which the security appliance accepts HTTPS connections for ASDM, configure the http command for each trusted host address or subnet. The following example, shows how a trusted host with IP address 192.168.1.100 is added to the configuration: hostname(config)# http 192.168.1.100 255.255.255.255 The TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection feature is affected by these vulnerabilities. This feature can be disabled if it is not needed. Temporarily disabling the feature will mitigate these vulnerabilities. The Cut-Through Proxy for Network Access feature, when configured for HTTPS, is affected by these vulnerabilities. The only workaround is to disable the feature if not needed. To disable HTTPS Cut-Through Proxy authentication use the "no aaa authentication listener https" command, as shown in the following example: ASA(config)# no aaa authentication listener https inside port 443 Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ This vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling SIP inspection if it is not required. Administrators can disable SIP inspection by issuing the "no inspect sip" command in class configuration sub-mode within policy-map configuration. Crafted Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Message Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ There are no workarounds for this vulnerability apart from disabling IKE on the affected device. The "no crypto isakmp enable <interface-name>" command can be used to disable IKE on a specific interface. Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at: http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory. One of the TLS DoS vulnerabilities was reported to Cisco by CERT-FI. All the other vulnerabilities described in this advisory were found during internal testing. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100804-asa.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +---------------------------------------+ | Revision | | Initial | | 1.0 | 2010-August-04 | public | | | | release. | +---------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at: http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iD8DBQFMWYoH86n/Gc8U/uARAg8JAJ0W8ZSUZ0ldj0ncoIfxVKVuVeieygCgkLs4 GGmQ+3yNpX0udKpkA2431fg= =yQWz -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Unspecified vulnerability in the SIP inspection feature on Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances (ASA) 5500 series devices with software 8.0 before 8.0(5.17), 8.1 before 8.1(2.45), and 8.2 before 8.2(2.13) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device reload) via crafted SIP packets, aka Bug ID CSCtd32106. The problem is Bug ID : CSCtd32106 It is a problem.Skillfully crafted by a third party SIP Service disruption via packets (DoS) There is a possibility of being put into a state. An attacker can exploit this issue to cause a vulnerable device to reload, triggering a denial-of-service condition. This issue is tracked by Cisco Bug ID CSCtd32106. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- "From 2007 to 2009 vulnerabilities in a typical end-user PC almost doubled from about 220 to 420." Non-Microsoft software to blame for increase in vulnerabilities affecting typical Windows end-users, read more: http://secunia.com/gfx/pdf/Secunia_Half_Year_Report_2010.pdf ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: Cisco ASA 5500 Series Multiple Denial of Service Vulnerabilities SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA40842 VERIFY ADVISORY: Secunia.com http://secunia.com/advisories/40842/ Customer Area (Credentials Required) https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=40842 RELEASE DATE: 2010-08-05 DISCUSS ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/40842/#comments AVAILABLE ON SITE AND IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Last Update * Popularity * Comments * Criticality Level * Impact * Where * Solution Status * Operating System / Software * CVE Reference(s) http://secunia.com/advisories/40842/ ONLY AVAILABLE IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Authentication Level * Report Reliability * Secunia PoC * Secunia Analysis * Systems Affected * Approve Distribution * Remediation Status * Secunia CVSS Score * CVSS https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=40842 ONLY AVAILABLE WITH SECUNIA CSI AND SECUNIA PSI: * AUTOMATED SCANNING http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/personal/ http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/corporate/wsus_sccm_3rd_third_party_patching/ DESCRIPTION: Some vulnerabilities have been reported in Cisco ASA (Adaptive Security Appliance) 5500 Series, which can be exploited by malicious people to cause a DoS (Denial of Service). 1) Three errors exist in the SunRPC inspection engine while processing certain SunRPC messages. This can be exploited to reload a device via specially crafted UDP SunRPC packets that transit the appliance. 3) An error in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) inspection feature can be exploited to trigger an appliance reload via a specially crafted SIP packet that transits the appliance via TCP or UDP port 5060. Please see the vendor's advisory for detailed patch information. PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: Reported by the vendor. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: cisco-sa-20100804-asa: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100804-asa.shtml OTHER REFERENCES: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ DEEP LINKS: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXTENDED DESCRIPTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXTENDED SOLUTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXPLOIT: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ---------------------------------------------------------------------- . There are workarounds for some of the vulnerabilities disclosed in this advisory. This advisory is posted at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100804-asa.shtml Note: The Cisco Firewall Services Module (FWSM) is affected by the SunRPC DoS vulnerabilities. A separate Cisco Security Advisory has been published to disclose the vulnerabilities that affect the FWSM. Affected versions of Cisco ASA Software will vary depending on the specific vulnerability. Vulnerable Products +------------------ For specific version information, refer to the Software Versions and Fixes section of this advisory. A successful attack may result in a sustained DoS condition. Versions 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. SunRPC inspection is enabled by default. To check if SunRPC inspection is enabled, issue the "show service-policy | include sunrpc" command and confirm that output, such as what is displayed in the following example, is returned. ciscoasa# show service-policy | include sunrpc Inspect: sunrpc, packet 0, drop 0, reset-drop 0 The following configuration commands are used to enable SunRPC inspection in the Cisco ASA. class-map inspection_default match default-inspection-traffic ! policy-map global_policy class inspection_default ... inspect sunrpc ... A successful attack may result in a sustained DoS condition. Versions 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, 8.2.x, and 8.3.x are affected by one or more of these vulnerabilities. A Cisco ASA device configured for any of the following features is affected: * Secure Socket Layer Virtual Private Network (SSL VPN) * When the affected device is configured to accept Cisco Adaptive Security Device Manager (ASDM) connections * TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection * Cut-Through Proxy for Network Access when using HTTPS SSL VPN (or WebVPN) is enabled with the "enable <interface name>" command in "webvpn" configuration mode. SSL VPN is disabled by default. The following configuration snippet provides an example of a SSL VPN configuration. webvpn enable outside ... ASDM access is affected by three of these vulnerabilities. To use ASDM, the HTTPS server must be enabled to allow HTTPS connections to the Cisco ASA. The server can be enabled using the "http server enable [port]" command. The default port is 443. To specify hosts that can access the HTTP server internal to the security appliance, use the "http" command in global configuration mode. The TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection feature is affected by these vulnerabilities. This feature was introduced in Cisco ASA version 8.0(2) and is disabled by default. To determine if the TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection feature is enabled on the device, use the show tls-proxy command, as shown in the following example: ciscoasa# show tls-proxy Maximum number of sessions: 1200 TLS-Proxy 'sip_proxy': ref_cnt 1, seq# 3 Server proxy: Trust-point: local_ccm Client proxy: Local dynamic certificate issuer: LOCAL-CA-SERVER Local dynamic certificate key-pair: phone_common Cipher suite: aes128-sha1 aes256-sha1 Run-time proxies: Proxy 0xcbae1538: Class-map: sip_ssl, Inspect: sip Active sess 1, most sess 3, byte 3456043 ... <output truncated> TLS proxy supports SIP and Skinny protocols. TLS proxy for Skinny inspection can be enabled using the "inspect skinny <skinny_map> tls-proxy <proxy_name>", as shown in the following example: asa(config-pmap)# class inspection_default asa(config-pmap-c)# inspect skinny my-inspect tls-proxy my-tls-proxy asa(config)# service-policy global_policy global Note: Secure SCCP uses TCP port 2443; however, it can be configured to a different port. TLS proxy for SIP inspection can be enabled using the "inspect sip <map> tls-proxy <proxy_name>", as shown in the following example: asa(config-pmap)# class inspection_default asa(config-pmap-c)# inspect sip my-inspect tls-proxy my-tls-proxy asa(config)# service-policy global_policy global The Cisco ASA is also vulnerable when the Cut-Through Proxy for Network Access feature is used with HTTPS. Versions 7.0.x, 7.1.x, 7.2.x are not affected. Versions 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. SIP inspection is enabled by default. To check if SIP inspection is enabled, issue the "show service-policy | include sip" command and confirm that output, such as what is displayed in the following example, is returned. ciscoasa#show service-policy | include sip Inspect: sip , packet 0, drop 0, reset-drop 0 Alternatively, an appliance that has SIP inspection enabled has a configuration similar to the following: class-map inspection_default match default-inspection-traffic ! policy-map global_policy class inspection_default ... inspect sip ... ! service-policy global_policy global Note: The service policy could also be applied to a specific interface instead of a global configuration shown in the previous example. IKE is not enabled by default. If IKE is enabled, the "isakmp enable <interface name>" command appears in the configuration. For more information, refer to the End of Life announcement at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/vpndevc/ps5708/ps5709/ps2030/end_of_life_notice_cisco_pix_525_sec_app.html How to Determine the Running Software Version ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ To determine whether a vulnerable version of Cisco ASA Software is running on an appliance, administrators can issue the "show version" command. The following example shows a Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance that is running software version 8.3(1): ASA#show version | include Version Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Software Version 8.3(1) Device Manager Version 6.3(1) Customers who use Cisco ASDM to manage devices can locate the software version in the table that is displayed in the login window or upper-left corner of the Cisco ASDM window. Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable +-------------------------------- With the exception of the Cisco FWSM, no other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these vulnerabilities. It offers firewall, intrusion prevention system (IPS), anti-X, and VPN services. Sun RPC is used by Network File System (NFS) and Network Information Service (NIS). Sun RPC services can run on any port. When a client attempts to access a Sun RPC service on a server, it must learn the port that service is running on. The client does this by querying the port mapper process, usually rpcbind, on the well-known port of 111. Note: Only transit traffic can trigger these vulnerabilities; traffic that is destined to the appliance will not trigger the vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities can be triggered by using UDP packets, not TCP. These vulnerabilities are documented in Cisco bug IDs CSCtc77567, CSCtc79922, and CSCtc85753; and have been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) IDs CVE-2010-1578, CVE-2010-1579, and CVE-2010-1580, respectively. Transport Layer Security (TLS) Denial of Service Vulnerabilities ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ TLS and its predecessor, SSL, are cryptographic protocols that provide security for communications over IP data networks such as the Internet. A Cisco ASA device configured for SSL VPN, TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection, or configured to accept ASDM management connections is vulnerable. These vulnerabilities are documented in Cisco bug IDs CSCtd32627, CSCtf37506, and CSCtf55259; and have been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) IDs CVE-2010-1581, CVE-2010-2814, and CVE-2010-2815, respectively. Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SIP, as defined by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), enables call handling sessions, particularly two-party audio conferences, or "calls." SIP works with SDP for call signalling. SDP specifies the ports for the media stream. Using SIP, the Cisco ASA can support any SIP VoIP gateways and VoIP proxy servers. To support SIP calls through the Cisco ASA, signaling messages for the media connection addresses, media ports, and embryonic connections for the media must be inspected, because while the signaling is sent over a well-known destination port (UDP/TCP 5060), the media streams are dynamically allocated. Also, SIP embeds IP addresses in the user-data portion of the IP packet. SIP inspection applies NAT for these embedded IP addresses. SIP inspection is enabled by default. Note: Only transit traffic can trigger these vulnerabilities; traffic that is destined to the appliance will not trigger the vulnerabilities. Crafted Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Message Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ IPsec is an IP security feature that provides robust authentication and encryption of IP packets. IKE is a key management protocol standard that is used in conjunction with the IPsec standard. A DoS vulnerability exists in the IKE implementation of the Cisco ASA. Note: Only traffic that is destined to the appliance may trigger this vulnerability when the affected device is configured for IPsec remote access or site-to-site VPNs. Vulnerability Scoring Details ============================= Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at: http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss CSCtc77567, CSCtc79922 and CSCtc85753 - SunRPC Inspection DoS Vulnerabilities CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCtd32627, CSCtf37506, and CSCtf55259- Transport Layer Security (TLS) DoS Vulnerabilities CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCtd32106 - Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Inspection DoS Vulnerability CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCte46507 - Crafted Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Message DoS Vulnerability CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== Successful exploitation of any of the vulnerabilities described in this security advisory may cause the affected device to reload. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult: http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Vulnerability | Major | First Fixed | | | Release | Release | |----------------------------------------+---------+----------------| | | 7.0 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.1 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.2 | 7.2(5) | | SunRPC Inspection DoS Vulnerabilities |---------+----------------| | (CSCtc77567, CSCtc79922, and | 8.0 | 8.0(5.19) | | CSCtc85753) |---------+----------------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.46) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(2) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.3 | Not vulnerable | |----------------------------------------+---------+----------------| | | 7.0 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.1 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.2 | 7.2(5) | | TLS DoS Vulnerabilities (CSCtd32627, |---------+----------------| | CSCtf37506, and CSCtf55259) | 8.0 | 8.0(5.15) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.44) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(2.17) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.3 | 8.3(1.6) | |----------------------------------------+---------+----------------| | | 7.0 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.1 | Not vulnerable | | |---------+----------------| | | 7.2 | Not vulnerable | | SIP Inspection DoS Vulnerability |---------+----------------| | (CSCtd32106) | 8.0 | 8.0(5.17) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.45) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(2.13) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.3 | Not vulnerable | |----------------------------------------+---------+----------------| | | 7.0 | 7.0(8.11) | | |---------+----------------| | | | Vulnerable; | | | 7.1 | migrate to | | | | 7.2(5) | | |---------+----------------| | IKE Message DoS Vulnerability | 7.2 | 7.2(5) | | (CSCte46507) |---------+----------------| | | 8.0 | 8.0(5.15) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.44) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(2.10) | | |---------+----------------| | | 8.3 | 8.3(1.1) | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ Note: Cisco ASA Software versions 7.1.x are affected by some of the vulnerabilities in this advisory. However, no fixed 7.1.x software versions are planned because the 7.1.x major release has reached the End of Software Maintenance Releases milestone. Refer to the EOL/EOS for the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance Software v7.1 notice for further information: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/vpndevc/ps6032/ps6094/ps6120/end_of_life_notice_cisco_asa_5500_series_adaptive_sec_app_sw.html Recommended Releases ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The following table lists all recommended releases. These recommended releases contain the fixes for all vulnerabilities in this advisory. Cisco recommends upgrading to a release that is equal to or later than these recommended releases. +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Major Release | Recommended Release | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 7.0 | 7.0(8.11) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 7.1 | Vulnerable; migrate to 7.2(5) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 7.2 | 7.2(5) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 8.0 | 8.0(5.19) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 8.1 | 8.1(2.47) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 8.2 | 8.2(2.17) | |---------------------+---------------------------------------------| | 8.3 | 8.3(2) | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ Software Download ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Cisco ASA Software versions 7.0(8.11), 8.0(5.19), 8.1(2.46), and 8.2(2.17) can be downloaded from: http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/ASAPSIRT?psrtdcat20e2 Cisco ASA Software versions 7.2(5) and 8.3(2) can be downloaded from: http://tools.cisco.com/support/downloads/pub/Redirect.x?mdfid=279513386 Workarounds =========== This Security Advisory describes multiple distinct vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities and their respective workarounds are independent of each other. In addition to the recommendations described below, mitigation techniques that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin companion document for this advisory: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20100804-asa.shtml SunRPC Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ These vulnerabilities can be mitigated by disabling SunRPC inspection if it is not required. Administrators can disable SunRPC inspection by issuing the "no inspect sunrpc" command in class configuration sub-mode within policy-map configuration. Transport Layer Security (TLS) Denial of Service Vulnerabilities ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ If SSL VPN (clientless or client-based) is not needed, it can be disabled by issuing the "clear configure webvpn" command. Administrators should make sure that ASDM connections are only allowed from trusted hosts. To identify the IP addresses from which the security appliance accepts HTTPS connections for ASDM, configure the http command for each trusted host address or subnet. The following example, shows how a trusted host with IP address 192.168.1.100 is added to the configuration: hostname(config)# http 192.168.1.100 255.255.255.255 The TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection feature is affected by these vulnerabilities. This feature can be disabled if it is not needed. Temporarily disabling the feature will mitigate these vulnerabilities. The Cut-Through Proxy for Network Access feature, when configured for HTTPS, is affected by these vulnerabilities. The only workaround is to disable the feature if not needed. To disable HTTPS Cut-Through Proxy authentication use the "no aaa authentication listener https" command, as shown in the following example: ASA(config)# no aaa authentication listener https inside port 443 Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ This vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling SIP inspection if it is not required. Administrators can disable SIP inspection by issuing the "no inspect sip" command in class configuration sub-mode within policy-map configuration. Crafted Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Message Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ There are no workarounds for this vulnerability apart from disabling IKE on the affected device. The "no crypto isakmp enable <interface-name>" command can be used to disable IKE on a specific interface. Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at: http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory. One of the TLS DoS vulnerabilities was reported to Cisco by CERT-FI. All the other vulnerabilities described in this advisory were found during internal testing. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100804-asa.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +---------------------------------------+ | Revision | | Initial | | 1.0 | 2010-August-04 | public | | | | release. | +---------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at: http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iD8DBQFMWYoH86n/Gc8U/uARAg8JAJ0W8ZSUZ0ldj0ncoIfxVKVuVeieygCgkLs4 GGmQ+3yNpX0udKpkA2431fg= =yQWz -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Unspecified vulnerability in the SunRPC inspection feature on the Cisco Firewall Services Module (FWSM) with software 3.1 before 3.1(17.2), 3.2 before 3.2(16.1), 4.0 before 4.0(10.1), and 4.1 before 4.1(1.1) for Catalyst 6500 series switches and 7600 series routers allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device reload) via crafted SunRPC messages, aka Bug ID CSCte61710. The Cisco Firewall Services Module is a firewall service module used on multiple cisco products. The Cisco FWSM is affected by three vulnerabilities that can cause device reloads when handling specially crafted SunRPC messages when SunRPC detection is enabled. Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances and the FWSM for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers are prone to a denial-of-service vulnerability that affects the SunRPC inspection engine. An attacker can exploit this issue to cause affected devices to reload, triggering a denial-of-service condition. This issue is tracked by Cisco Bug IDs CSCtc77567 and CSCte61710. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- "From 2007 to 2009 vulnerabilities in a typical end-user PC almost doubled from about 220 to 420." Non-Microsoft software to blame for increase in vulnerabilities affecting typical Windows end-users, read more: http://secunia.com/gfx/pdf/Secunia_Half_Year_Report_2010.pdf ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: Cisco Firewall Services Module Multiple Denial of Service Vulnerabilities SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA40843 VERIFY ADVISORY: Secunia.com http://secunia.com/advisories/40843/ Customer Area (Credentials Required) https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=40843 RELEASE DATE: 2010-08-06 DISCUSS ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/40843/#comments AVAILABLE ON SITE AND IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Last Update * Popularity * Comments * Criticality Level * Impact * Where * Solution Status * Operating System / Software * CVE Reference(s) http://secunia.com/advisories/40843/ ONLY AVAILABLE IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Authentication Level * Report Reliability * Secunia PoC * Secunia Analysis * Systems Affected * Approve Distribution * Remediation Status * Secunia CVSS Score * CVSS https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=40843 ONLY AVAILABLE WITH SECUNIA CSI AND SECUNIA PSI: * AUTOMATED SCANNING http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/personal/ http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/corporate/wsus_sccm_3rd_third_party_patching/ DESCRIPTION: Some vulnerabilities have been reported in Cisco Firewall Services Module (FWSM), which can be exploited by malicious people to cause a DoS (Denial of Service). 1) Three errors exist in the SunRPC inspection engine while processing certain SunRPC messages. SOLUTION: Update to a fixed version. Please see the vendor's advisory for detailed patch information. PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: Reported by the vendor. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: cisco-sa-20100804-fwsm: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100804-fwsm.shtml OTHER REFERENCES: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ DEEP LINKS: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXTENDED DESCRIPTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXTENDED SOLUTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXPLOIT: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ---------------------------------------------------------------------- . Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Workarounds are available for the vulnerabilities disclosed in this advisory. Note: These vulnerabilities are independent of each other. A device may be affected by one vulnerability and not affected by another. Affected versions of Cisco FWSM Software vary depending on the specific vulnerability. SunRPC Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Cisco FWSM Software version 3.x and 4.x are affected by these vulnerabilities only if SunRPC inspection is enabled. SunRPC inspection is enabled by default. To check if SunRPC inspection is enabled, use the "show service-policy | include sunrpc" command and confirm that the command returns output, as shown in the following example: fwsm#show service-policy | include sunrpc Inspect: sunrpc , packet 0, drop 0, reset-drop 0 Alternatively, a device that has SunRPC inspection enabled has a configuration similar to the following: class-map inspection_default match default-inspection-traffic ! policy-map global_policy class inspection_default ... inspect sunrpc ... The advisory is available at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100804-asa.shtml TCP Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Cisco FWSM Software version 3.x and 4.x are affected by this vulnerability when configured in multi-mode (with virtual firewalls) and with any of the following features: * ASDM Administrative Access * Telnet * SSH To verify if the FWSM is running in multiple mode, use the "show mode" command, as shown in the following example: FWSM(config)#show mode Security context mode: multiple The flash mode is the SAME as the running mode. The following commands are used to enable the HTTPS server and allow only hosts on the inside interface with an address in the 192.168.1.0 /24 network to create ASDM, SSH or Telnet connections: asa(config)# http server enable asa(config)# http 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 inside asa(config)# telnet 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 inside asa(config)# ssh 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 inside Determining Software Versions ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ To determine the version of Cisco FWSM Software that is running, issue the "show module" command from Cisco IOS Software or Cisco Catalyst Operating System Software to identify what modules and sub modules are installed on the system. The following example shows a system with a Cisco FWSM (WS-SVC-FWM-1) installed in slot 2: switch>show module Mod Ports Card Type Model Serial No. --- ----- -------------------------------------- ------------------ ----------- 1 16 SFM-capable 16 port 1000mb GBIC WS-X6516-GBIC SAL06334NS9 2 6 Firewall Module WS-SVC-FWM-1 SAD10360485 3 8 Intrusion Detection System WS-SVC-IDSM-2 SAD0932089Z 4 4 SLB Application Processor Complex WS-X6066-SLB-APC SAD093004BD 5 2 Supervisor Engine 720 (Active) WS-SUP720-3B SAL0934888E Mod MAC addresses Hw Fw Sw Status --- ---------------------------------- ------ ------------ ------------ ------- 1 0009.11e3.ade8 to 0009.11e3.adf7 5.1 6.3(1) 8.5(0.46)RFW Ok 2 0018.ba41.5092 to 0018.ba41.5099 4.0 7.2(1) 3.2(2)10 Ok 3 0014.a90c.9956 to 0014.a90c.995d 5.0 7.2(1) 5.1(6)E1 Ok 4 0014.a90c.66e6 to 0014.a90c.66ed 1.7 4.2(3) Ok 5 0013.c42e.7fe0 to 0013.c42e.7fe3 4.4 8.1(3) 12.2(18)SXF1 Ok [...] After locating the correct slot, issue the "show module <slot number>" command to identify the software version that is running, as shown in the following example: switch>show module 2 Mod Ports Card Type Model Serial No. --- ----- -------------------------------------- ------------------ ----------- 2 6 Firewall Module WS-SVC-FWM-1 SAD10360485 Mod MAC addresses Hw Fw Sw Status --- ---------------------------------- ------ ------------ ------------ ------- 2 0018.ba41.5092 to 0018.ba41.5099 4.0 7.2(1) 3.2(2)10 Ok [...] The preceding example shows that the FWSM is running software version 3.2(2)10 as indicated by the column under "Sw." Note: Recent versions of Cisco IOS Software will show the software version of each module in the output from the "show module" command; therefore, executing the "show module <slot number>" command is not necessary. If a Virtual Switching System (VSS) is used to allow two physical Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Switches to operate as a single logical virtual switch, the "show module switch all" command can display the software version of all FWSMs that belong to switch 1 and switch 2. The output from this command will be similar to the output from the "show module <slot number>" but will include module information for the modules in each switch in the VSS. Alternatively, version information can be obtained directly from the FWSM through the show version command, as shown in the following example: FWSM> show version FWSM Firewall Version 3.2(2)10 [...] Customers who use the Cisco Adaptive Security Device Manager (ASDM) to manage their devices can find the version of the software displayed in the table in the login window or in the upper left corner of the ASDM window. The version notation is similar to the following example. The FWSM offers firewall services with stateful packet filtering and deep packet inspection. Note: These vulnerabilities are only triggered by transit traffic; traffic that is destined to the device does not trigger these vulnerabilities. TCP Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ You can partition a single FWSM into multiple virtual devices, known as security contexts. Each context has its own security policy, interfaces, and administrators. Multiple contexts are similar to multiple standalone devices. Many features are supported in multiple context mode, which includes routing tables, firewall features, and management. The Cisco FWSM is only affected by this vulnerability when is configured in multi-mode (with virtual firewalls) and configured to accept Telnet, SSH or ASDM connections. Note: A TCP three-way handshake is needed to exploit this vulnerability. This vulnerability is only triggered by traffic that is destined to the affected device; transit traffic does not trigger this vulnerability. This vulnerability is documented in Cisco bug ID CSCtg68694 and has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2010-2821. Vulnerability Scoring Details ============================= Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at: http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss CSCte61710, CSCte61622, CSCte61662 - Passthrough traffic crashes FWSM with SunRPC inspection CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCtg68694 - FWSM may crash with certain TCP sessions in multiple mode CVSS Base Score - 7.1 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Medium Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== Successful exploitation of all the vulnerabilities described in this security advisory may cause a reload of the affected appliance. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | | Major | First | | Vulnerability | Release | Fixed | | | | Release | |--------------------------------------------+---------+------------| | | 3.1 | 3.1(17.2) | | |---------+------------| | SunRPC Inspection Denial of Service | 3.2 | 3.2(16.1) | | Vulnerabilities (CSCte61710, CSCte61622, |---------+------------| | and CSCte61662) | 4.0 | 4.0(10.1) | | |---------+------------| | | 4.1 | 4.1(1.1) | |--------------------------------------------+---------+------------| | | 3.1 | Not | | | | vulnerable | | |---------+------------| | TCP Denial of Service Vulnerability | 3.2 | 3.2(17.2) | | (CSCtg68694) |---------+------------| | | 4.0 | 4.0(11.1) | | |---------+------------| | | 4.1 | 4.1(1.2) | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ Recommended Releases ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The following table lists all recommended releases. These recommended releases contain the fixes for all vulnerabilities in this advisory. Cisco recommends upgrading to a release that is equal to or later than these recommended releases. Administrators can disable SunRPC inspection by issuing the "no inspect sunrpc" command in class configuration sub-mode within policy-map configuration. The TCP DoS vulnerability can be mitigated by only allowing trusted hosts to communicate with the FWSM via HTTPs, SSH, or Telnet. For example, the following commands are used to enable the HTTPS server and allow only hosts on the inside interface with an address in the 192.168.1.0/24 network to create ASDM, SSH or Telnet connections: asa(config)# http server enable asa(config)# http 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 inside asa(config)# telnet 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 inside asa(config)# ssh 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 inside Additional mitigation techniques that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin companion document for this advisory: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20100804-fwsm.shtml Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at: http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory. These vulnerabilities were found during the troubleshooting of customer service requests and internal testing. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100804-fwsm.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +---------------------------------------+ | Revision | | Initial | | 1.0 | 2010-August-04 | public | | | | release. | +---------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at: http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iD8DBQFMWMiN86n/Gc8U/uARAvJgAJ0S+X3dxciSvVwJbXA8vWnsb9lqkQCfcOna 6FAY8ScwLN4d+dsW3tBl5LU= =lHQS -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Unspecified vulnerability in the SunRPC inspection feature on the Cisco Firewall Services Module (FWSM) with software 3.1 before 3.1(17.2), 3.2 before 3.2(16.1), 4.0 before 4.0(10.1), and 4.1 before 4.1(1.1) for Catalyst 6500 series switches and 7600 series routers allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device reload) via crafted SunRPC messages, aka Bug ID CSCte61622. The Cisco Firewall Services Module is a firewall service module used on multiple cisco products. The Cisco FWSM is affected by three vulnerabilities that can cause device reloads when handling specially crafted SunRPC messages when SunRPC detection is enabled. Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances and the FWSM for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers are prone to a denial-of-service vulnerability that affects the Sun RPC inspection engine. An attacker can exploit this issue to cause affected devices to reload, triggering a denial-of-service condition. This issue is tracked by Cisco Bug IDs CSCtc79922 and CSCte61622. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- "From 2007 to 2009 vulnerabilities in a typical end-user PC almost doubled from about 220 to 420." Non-Microsoft software to blame for increase in vulnerabilities affecting typical Windows end-users, read more: http://secunia.com/gfx/pdf/Secunia_Half_Year_Report_2010.pdf ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: Cisco Firewall Services Module Multiple Denial of Service Vulnerabilities SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA40843 VERIFY ADVISORY: Secunia.com http://secunia.com/advisories/40843/ Customer Area (Credentials Required) https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=40843 RELEASE DATE: 2010-08-06 DISCUSS ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/40843/#comments AVAILABLE ON SITE AND IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Last Update * Popularity * Comments * Criticality Level * Impact * Where * Solution Status * Operating System / Software * CVE Reference(s) http://secunia.com/advisories/40843/ ONLY AVAILABLE IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Authentication Level * Report Reliability * Secunia PoC * Secunia Analysis * Systems Affected * Approve Distribution * Remediation Status * Secunia CVSS Score * CVSS https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=40843 ONLY AVAILABLE WITH SECUNIA CSI AND SECUNIA PSI: * AUTOMATED SCANNING http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/personal/ http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/corporate/wsus_sccm_3rd_third_party_patching/ DESCRIPTION: Some vulnerabilities have been reported in Cisco Firewall Services Module (FWSM), which can be exploited by malicious people to cause a DoS (Denial of Service). 1) Three errors exist in the SunRPC inspection engine while processing certain SunRPC messages. SOLUTION: Update to a fixed version. Please see the vendor's advisory for detailed patch information. PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: Reported by the vendor. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: cisco-sa-20100804-fwsm: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100804-fwsm.shtml OTHER REFERENCES: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ DEEP LINKS: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXTENDED DESCRIPTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXTENDED SOLUTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXPLOIT: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ---------------------------------------------------------------------- . Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Workarounds are available for the vulnerabilities disclosed in this advisory. Note: These vulnerabilities are independent of each other. A device may be affected by one vulnerability and not affected by another. Affected versions of Cisco FWSM Software vary depending on the specific vulnerability. SunRPC Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Cisco FWSM Software version 3.x and 4.x are affected by these vulnerabilities only if SunRPC inspection is enabled. SunRPC inspection is enabled by default. To check if SunRPC inspection is enabled, use the "show service-policy | include sunrpc" command and confirm that the command returns output, as shown in the following example: fwsm#show service-policy | include sunrpc Inspect: sunrpc , packet 0, drop 0, reset-drop 0 Alternatively, a device that has SunRPC inspection enabled has a configuration similar to the following: class-map inspection_default match default-inspection-traffic ! policy-map global_policy class inspection_default ... inspect sunrpc ... The advisory is available at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100804-asa.shtml TCP Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Cisco FWSM Software version 3.x and 4.x are affected by this vulnerability when configured in multi-mode (with virtual firewalls) and with any of the following features: * ASDM Administrative Access * Telnet * SSH To verify if the FWSM is running in multiple mode, use the "show mode" command, as shown in the following example: FWSM(config)#show mode Security context mode: multiple The flash mode is the SAME as the running mode. The following commands are used to enable the HTTPS server and allow only hosts on the inside interface with an address in the 192.168.1.0 /24 network to create ASDM, SSH or Telnet connections: asa(config)# http server enable asa(config)# http 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 inside asa(config)# telnet 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 inside asa(config)# ssh 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 inside Determining Software Versions ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ To determine the version of Cisco FWSM Software that is running, issue the "show module" command from Cisco IOS Software or Cisco Catalyst Operating System Software to identify what modules and sub modules are installed on the system. The following example shows a system with a Cisco FWSM (WS-SVC-FWM-1) installed in slot 2: switch>show module Mod Ports Card Type Model Serial No. --- ----- -------------------------------------- ------------------ ----------- 1 16 SFM-capable 16 port 1000mb GBIC WS-X6516-GBIC SAL06334NS9 2 6 Firewall Module WS-SVC-FWM-1 SAD10360485 3 8 Intrusion Detection System WS-SVC-IDSM-2 SAD0932089Z 4 4 SLB Application Processor Complex WS-X6066-SLB-APC SAD093004BD 5 2 Supervisor Engine 720 (Active) WS-SUP720-3B SAL0934888E Mod MAC addresses Hw Fw Sw Status --- ---------------------------------- ------ ------------ ------------ ------- 1 0009.11e3.ade8 to 0009.11e3.adf7 5.1 6.3(1) 8.5(0.46)RFW Ok 2 0018.ba41.5092 to 0018.ba41.5099 4.0 7.2(1) 3.2(2)10 Ok 3 0014.a90c.9956 to 0014.a90c.995d 5.0 7.2(1) 5.1(6)E1 Ok 4 0014.a90c.66e6 to 0014.a90c.66ed 1.7 4.2(3) Ok 5 0013.c42e.7fe0 to 0013.c42e.7fe3 4.4 8.1(3) 12.2(18)SXF1 Ok [...] After locating the correct slot, issue the "show module <slot number>" command to identify the software version that is running, as shown in the following example: switch>show module 2 Mod Ports Card Type Model Serial No. --- ----- -------------------------------------- ------------------ ----------- 2 6 Firewall Module WS-SVC-FWM-1 SAD10360485 Mod MAC addresses Hw Fw Sw Status --- ---------------------------------- ------ ------------ ------------ ------- 2 0018.ba41.5092 to 0018.ba41.5099 4.0 7.2(1) 3.2(2)10 Ok [...] The preceding example shows that the FWSM is running software version 3.2(2)10 as indicated by the column under "Sw." Note: Recent versions of Cisco IOS Software will show the software version of each module in the output from the "show module" command; therefore, executing the "show module <slot number>" command is not necessary. If a Virtual Switching System (VSS) is used to allow two physical Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Switches to operate as a single logical virtual switch, the "show module switch all" command can display the software version of all FWSMs that belong to switch 1 and switch 2. The output from this command will be similar to the output from the "show module <slot number>" but will include module information for the modules in each switch in the VSS. Alternatively, version information can be obtained directly from the FWSM through the show version command, as shown in the following example: FWSM> show version FWSM Firewall Version 3.2(2)10 [...] Customers who use the Cisco Adaptive Security Device Manager (ASDM) to manage their devices can find the version of the software displayed in the table in the login window or in the upper left corner of the ASDM window. The version notation is similar to the following example. The FWSM offers firewall services with stateful packet filtering and deep packet inspection. Note: These vulnerabilities are only triggered by transit traffic; traffic that is destined to the device does not trigger these vulnerabilities. TCP Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ You can partition a single FWSM into multiple virtual devices, known as security contexts. Each context has its own security policy, interfaces, and administrators. Multiple contexts are similar to multiple standalone devices. Many features are supported in multiple context mode, which includes routing tables, firewall features, and management. The Cisco FWSM is only affected by this vulnerability when is configured in multi-mode (with virtual firewalls) and configured to accept Telnet, SSH or ASDM connections. Note: A TCP three-way handshake is needed to exploit this vulnerability. This vulnerability is only triggered by traffic that is destined to the affected device; transit traffic does not trigger this vulnerability. This vulnerability is documented in Cisco bug ID CSCtg68694 and has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2010-2821. Vulnerability Scoring Details ============================= Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at: http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss CSCte61710, CSCte61622, CSCte61662 - Passthrough traffic crashes FWSM with SunRPC inspection CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCtg68694 - FWSM may crash with certain TCP sessions in multiple mode CVSS Base Score - 7.1 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Medium Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== Successful exploitation of all the vulnerabilities described in this security advisory may cause a reload of the affected appliance. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | | Major | First | | Vulnerability | Release | Fixed | | | | Release | |--------------------------------------------+---------+------------| | | 3.1 | 3.1(17.2) | | |---------+------------| | SunRPC Inspection Denial of Service | 3.2 | 3.2(16.1) | | Vulnerabilities (CSCte61710, CSCte61622, |---------+------------| | and CSCte61662) | 4.0 | 4.0(10.1) | | |---------+------------| | | 4.1 | 4.1(1.1) | |--------------------------------------------+---------+------------| | | 3.1 | Not | | | | vulnerable | | |---------+------------| | TCP Denial of Service Vulnerability | 3.2 | 3.2(17.2) | | (CSCtg68694) |---------+------------| | | 4.0 | 4.0(11.1) | | |---------+------------| | | 4.1 | 4.1(1.2) | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ Recommended Releases ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The following table lists all recommended releases. These recommended releases contain the fixes for all vulnerabilities in this advisory. Cisco recommends upgrading to a release that is equal to or later than these recommended releases. Administrators can disable SunRPC inspection by issuing the "no inspect sunrpc" command in class configuration sub-mode within policy-map configuration. The TCP DoS vulnerability can be mitigated by only allowing trusted hosts to communicate with the FWSM via HTTPs, SSH, or Telnet. For example, the following commands are used to enable the HTTPS server and allow only hosts on the inside interface with an address in the 192.168.1.0/24 network to create ASDM, SSH or Telnet connections: asa(config)# http server enable asa(config)# http 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 inside asa(config)# telnet 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 inside asa(config)# ssh 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 inside Additional mitigation techniques that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin companion document for this advisory: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20100804-fwsm.shtml Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at: http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory. These vulnerabilities were found during the troubleshooting of customer service requests and internal testing. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100804-fwsm.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +---------------------------------------+ | Revision | | Initial | | 1.0 | 2010-August-04 | public | | | | release. | +---------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at: http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iD8DBQFMWMiN86n/Gc8U/uARAvJgAJ0S+X3dxciSvVwJbXA8vWnsb9lqkQCfcOna 6FAY8ScwLN4d+dsW3tBl5LU= =lHQS -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Unspecified vulnerability in the SunRPC inspection feature on the Cisco Firewall Services Module (FWSM) with software 3.1 before 3.1(17.2), 3.2 before 3.2(16.1), 4.0 before 4.0(10.1), and 4.1 before 4.1(1.1) for Catalyst 6500 series switches and 7600 series routers allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device reload) via crafted SunRPC messages, aka Bug ID CSCte61662. The Cisco Firewall Services Module is a firewall service module used on multiple cisco products. The Cisco FWSM is affected by three vulnerabilities that can cause device reloads when handling specially crafted SunRPC messages when SunRPC detection is enabled. Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances and the FWSM for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers are prone to a denial-of-service vulnerability that affects the Sun RPC inspection engine. An attacker can exploit this issue to cause affected devices to reload, triggering a denial-of-service condition. This issue is tracked by Cisco Bug IDs CSCtc85753 and CSCte61662. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- "From 2007 to 2009 vulnerabilities in a typical end-user PC almost doubled from about 220 to 420." Non-Microsoft software to blame for increase in vulnerabilities affecting typical Windows end-users, read more: http://secunia.com/gfx/pdf/Secunia_Half_Year_Report_2010.pdf ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: Cisco Firewall Services Module Multiple Denial of Service Vulnerabilities SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA40843 VERIFY ADVISORY: Secunia.com http://secunia.com/advisories/40843/ Customer Area (Credentials Required) https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=40843 RELEASE DATE: 2010-08-06 DISCUSS ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/40843/#comments AVAILABLE ON SITE AND IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Last Update * Popularity * Comments * Criticality Level * Impact * Where * Solution Status * Operating System / Software * CVE Reference(s) http://secunia.com/advisories/40843/ ONLY AVAILABLE IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Authentication Level * Report Reliability * Secunia PoC * Secunia Analysis * Systems Affected * Approve Distribution * Remediation Status * Secunia CVSS Score * CVSS https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=40843 ONLY AVAILABLE WITH SECUNIA CSI AND SECUNIA PSI: * AUTOMATED SCANNING http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/personal/ http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/corporate/wsus_sccm_3rd_third_party_patching/ DESCRIPTION: Some vulnerabilities have been reported in Cisco Firewall Services Module (FWSM), which can be exploited by malicious people to cause a DoS (Denial of Service). 1) Three errors exist in the SunRPC inspection engine while processing certain SunRPC messages. SOLUTION: Update to a fixed version. Please see the vendor's advisory for detailed patch information. PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: Reported by the vendor. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: cisco-sa-20100804-fwsm: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100804-fwsm.shtml OTHER REFERENCES: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ DEEP LINKS: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXTENDED DESCRIPTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXTENDED SOLUTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXPLOIT: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ---------------------------------------------------------------------- . Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Workarounds are available for the vulnerabilities disclosed in this advisory. Note: These vulnerabilities are independent of each other. A device may be affected by one vulnerability and not affected by another. Affected versions of Cisco FWSM Software vary depending on the specific vulnerability. SunRPC Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Cisco FWSM Software version 3.x and 4.x are affected by these vulnerabilities only if SunRPC inspection is enabled. SunRPC inspection is enabled by default. To check if SunRPC inspection is enabled, use the "show service-policy | include sunrpc" command and confirm that the command returns output, as shown in the following example: fwsm#show service-policy | include sunrpc Inspect: sunrpc , packet 0, drop 0, reset-drop 0 Alternatively, a device that has SunRPC inspection enabled has a configuration similar to the following: class-map inspection_default match default-inspection-traffic ! policy-map global_policy class inspection_default ... inspect sunrpc ... The advisory is available at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100804-asa.shtml TCP Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Cisco FWSM Software version 3.x and 4.x are affected by this vulnerability when configured in multi-mode (with virtual firewalls) and with any of the following features: * ASDM Administrative Access * Telnet * SSH To verify if the FWSM is running in multiple mode, use the "show mode" command, as shown in the following example: FWSM(config)#show mode Security context mode: multiple The flash mode is the SAME as the running mode. The following commands are used to enable the HTTPS server and allow only hosts on the inside interface with an address in the 192.168.1.0 /24 network to create ASDM, SSH or Telnet connections: asa(config)# http server enable asa(config)# http 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 inside asa(config)# telnet 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 inside asa(config)# ssh 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 inside Determining Software Versions ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ To determine the version of Cisco FWSM Software that is running, issue the "show module" command from Cisco IOS Software or Cisco Catalyst Operating System Software to identify what modules and sub modules are installed on the system. The following example shows a system with a Cisco FWSM (WS-SVC-FWM-1) installed in slot 2: switch>show module Mod Ports Card Type Model Serial No. --- ----- -------------------------------------- ------------------ ----------- 1 16 SFM-capable 16 port 1000mb GBIC WS-X6516-GBIC SAL06334NS9 2 6 Firewall Module WS-SVC-FWM-1 SAD10360485 3 8 Intrusion Detection System WS-SVC-IDSM-2 SAD0932089Z 4 4 SLB Application Processor Complex WS-X6066-SLB-APC SAD093004BD 5 2 Supervisor Engine 720 (Active) WS-SUP720-3B SAL0934888E Mod MAC addresses Hw Fw Sw Status --- ---------------------------------- ------ ------------ ------------ ------- 1 0009.11e3.ade8 to 0009.11e3.adf7 5.1 6.3(1) 8.5(0.46)RFW Ok 2 0018.ba41.5092 to 0018.ba41.5099 4.0 7.2(1) 3.2(2)10 Ok 3 0014.a90c.9956 to 0014.a90c.995d 5.0 7.2(1) 5.1(6)E1 Ok 4 0014.a90c.66e6 to 0014.a90c.66ed 1.7 4.2(3) Ok 5 0013.c42e.7fe0 to 0013.c42e.7fe3 4.4 8.1(3) 12.2(18)SXF1 Ok [...] After locating the correct slot, issue the "show module <slot number>" command to identify the software version that is running, as shown in the following example: switch>show module 2 Mod Ports Card Type Model Serial No. --- ----- -------------------------------------- ------------------ ----------- 2 6 Firewall Module WS-SVC-FWM-1 SAD10360485 Mod MAC addresses Hw Fw Sw Status --- ---------------------------------- ------ ------------ ------------ ------- 2 0018.ba41.5092 to 0018.ba41.5099 4.0 7.2(1) 3.2(2)10 Ok [...] The preceding example shows that the FWSM is running software version 3.2(2)10 as indicated by the column under "Sw." Note: Recent versions of Cisco IOS Software will show the software version of each module in the output from the "show module" command; therefore, executing the "show module <slot number>" command is not necessary. If a Virtual Switching System (VSS) is used to allow two physical Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Switches to operate as a single logical virtual switch, the "show module switch all" command can display the software version of all FWSMs that belong to switch 1 and switch 2. The output from this command will be similar to the output from the "show module <slot number>" but will include module information for the modules in each switch in the VSS. Alternatively, version information can be obtained directly from the FWSM through the show version command, as shown in the following example: FWSM> show version FWSM Firewall Version 3.2(2)10 [...] Customers who use the Cisco Adaptive Security Device Manager (ASDM) to manage their devices can find the version of the software displayed in the table in the login window or in the upper left corner of the ASDM window. The version notation is similar to the following example. The FWSM offers firewall services with stateful packet filtering and deep packet inspection. Note: These vulnerabilities are only triggered by transit traffic; traffic that is destined to the device does not trigger these vulnerabilities. TCP Denial of Service Vulnerability ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ You can partition a single FWSM into multiple virtual devices, known as security contexts. Each context has its own security policy, interfaces, and administrators. Multiple contexts are similar to multiple standalone devices. Many features are supported in multiple context mode, which includes routing tables, firewall features, and management. The Cisco FWSM is only affected by this vulnerability when is configured in multi-mode (with virtual firewalls) and configured to accept Telnet, SSH or ASDM connections. Note: A TCP three-way handshake is needed to exploit this vulnerability. This vulnerability is only triggered by traffic that is destined to the affected device; transit traffic does not trigger this vulnerability. This vulnerability is documented in Cisco bug ID CSCtg68694 and has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2010-2821. Vulnerability Scoring Details ============================= Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at: http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss CSCte61710, CSCte61622, CSCte61662 - Passthrough traffic crashes FWSM with SunRPC inspection CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCtg68694 - FWSM may crash with certain TCP sessions in multiple mode CVSS Base Score - 7.1 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Medium Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== Successful exploitation of all the vulnerabilities described in this security advisory may cause a reload of the affected appliance. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | | Major | First | | Vulnerability | Release | Fixed | | | | Release | |--------------------------------------------+---------+------------| | | 3.1 | 3.1(17.2) | | |---------+------------| | SunRPC Inspection Denial of Service | 3.2 | 3.2(16.1) | | Vulnerabilities (CSCte61710, CSCte61622, |---------+------------| | and CSCte61662) | 4.0 | 4.0(10.1) | | |---------+------------| | | 4.1 | 4.1(1.1) | |--------------------------------------------+---------+------------| | | 3.1 | Not | | | | vulnerable | | |---------+------------| | TCP Denial of Service Vulnerability | 3.2 | 3.2(17.2) | | (CSCtg68694) |---------+------------| | | 4.0 | 4.0(11.1) | | |---------+------------| | | 4.1 | 4.1(1.2) | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ Recommended Releases ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The following table lists all recommended releases. These recommended releases contain the fixes for all vulnerabilities in this advisory. Cisco recommends upgrading to a release that is equal to or later than these recommended releases. Administrators can disable SunRPC inspection by issuing the "no inspect sunrpc" command in class configuration sub-mode within policy-map configuration. The TCP DoS vulnerability can be mitigated by only allowing trusted hosts to communicate with the FWSM via HTTPs, SSH, or Telnet. For example, the following commands are used to enable the HTTPS server and allow only hosts on the inside interface with an address in the 192.168.1.0/24 network to create ASDM, SSH or Telnet connections: asa(config)# http server enable asa(config)# http 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 inside asa(config)# telnet 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 inside asa(config)# ssh 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 inside Additional mitigation techniques that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin companion document for this advisory: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20100804-fwsm.shtml Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at: http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory. These vulnerabilities were found during the troubleshooting of customer service requests and internal testing. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100804-fwsm.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +---------------------------------------+ | Revision | | Initial | | 1.0 | 2010-August-04 | public | | | | release. | +---------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at: http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iD8DBQFMWMiN86n/Gc8U/uARAvJgAJ0S+X3dxciSvVwJbXA8vWnsb9lqkQCfcOna 6FAY8ScwLN4d+dsW3tBl5LU= =lHQS -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable installations of Novell ZENWorks Remote Management. Access to a single node with Remote Management client installed and configured is required.The specific flaw exists within the storage of Remote Management authentication information on the client. The client utilizes a password stored in the registry that is common among all nodes. This can be exploited by an attacker to execute remote code on any target with the client installed. Novell ZENworks Configuration Management is a desktop management software that helps customers reduce their IT ownership costs. Novell ZENworks Server and desktop management have security vulnerabilities that allow malicious users to bypass some security restrictions. Novell ZENworks is prone to a security-bypass vulnerability. The following applications are vulnerable: Novell ZENworks for Servers 3.0.2 Novell ZENworks for Desktops 4 Novell ZENworks for Desktops 4.0.1 Novell ZENworks Server Management 7.ZSM7 SP1 Novell ZENworks Desktop Management 7.ZDM7 SP1. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- "From 2007 to 2009 vulnerabilities in a typical end-user PC almost doubled from about 220 to 420." Non-Microsoft software to blame for increase in vulnerabilities affecting typical Windows end-users, read more: http://secunia.com/gfx/pdf/Secunia_Half_Year_Report_2010.pdf ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: Novell ZENworks Remote Management Password Authentication Security Issue SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA40838 VERIFY ADVISORY: Secunia.com http://secunia.com/advisories/40838/ Customer Area (Credentials Required) https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=40838 RELEASE DATE: 2010-08-05 DISCUSS ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/40838/#comments AVAILABLE ON SITE AND IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Last Update * Popularity * Comments * Criticality Level * Impact * Where * Solution Status * Operating System / Software * CVE Reference(s) http://secunia.com/advisories/40838/ ONLY AVAILABLE IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Authentication Level * Report Reliability * Secunia PoC * Secunia Analysis * Systems Affected * Approve Distribution * Remediation Status * Secunia CVSS Score * CVSS https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=40838 ONLY AVAILABLE WITH SECUNIA CSI AND SECUNIA PSI: * AUTOMATED SCANNING http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/personal/ http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/corporate/wsus_sccm_3rd_third_party_patching/ DESCRIPTION: A security issue has been reported in Novell ZENworks Server and Desktop Management, which can be exploited by malicious people to bypass certain security restrictions. when a common password has been distributed via NAL or TED). SOLUTION: The vendor recommends disabling password mode of authentication in the Remote Management policy (disabled by default). Alternatively, the vendor suggests to only distribute a common password via NAL or TED in trusted environments. PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: The vendor credits TippingPoint ZDI. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: Novell: http://www.novell.com/support/viewContent.do?externalId=7006557&sliceId=1 OTHER REFERENCES: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ DEEP LINKS: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXTENDED DESCRIPTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXTENDED SOLUTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXPLOIT: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ---------------------------------------------------------------------- . -- Vendor Response: Novell has issued an update to correct this vulnerability. More details can be found at: http://www.novell.com/support/search.do?cmd=displayKC&amp;docType=kc&amp;externalId=7006557&amp;sliceId=1&amp;docTypeID=DT_TID_1_1&amp;dialogID=80488553&amp;stateId=1%200%2080486291 -- Disclosure Timeline: 2010-06-07 - Vulnerability reported to vendor 2010-08-09 - Coordinated public release of advisory -- Credit: This vulnerability was discovered by: * sb -- About the Zero Day Initiative (ZDI): Established by TippingPoint, The Zero Day Initiative (ZDI) represents a best-of-breed model for rewarding security researchers for responsibly disclosing discovered vulnerabilities. Researchers interested in getting paid for their security research through the ZDI can find more information and sign-up at: http://www.zerodayinitiative.com The ZDI is unique in how the acquired vulnerability information is used. TippingPoint does not re-sell the vulnerability details or any exploit code. Instead, upon notifying the affected product vendor, TippingPoint provides its customers with zero day protection through its intrusion prevention technology. Explicit details regarding the specifics of the vulnerability are not exposed to any parties until an official vendor patch is publicly available. Furthermore, with the altruistic aim of helping to secure a broader user base, TippingPoint provides this vulnerability information confidentially to security vendors (including competitors) who have a vulnerability protection or mitigation product. Our vulnerability disclosure policy is available online at: http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/disclosure_policy/ Follow the ZDI on Twitter: http://twitter.com/thezdi

D-Link WBR-2310 is a wireless router device. D-Link WBR-2310 Web Server incorrectly filters specially constructed GET requests. Remote attackers can use the vulnerability to perform denial of service attacks on service programs. D-Link WBR-2310 is prone to a remote buffer-overflow vulnerability because it fails to bounds-check user-supplied input before copying it into an insufficiently sized memory buffer. This issue occurs in the device's webserver. D-Link WBR-2310 firmware version 1.04 is vulnerable; other versions may also be affected