VARIoT IoT vulnerabilities database

Multiple Hitachi products are prone to a cross-site scripting vulnerability because they fail to properly sanitize user-supplied input. An attacker may leverage this issue to execute arbitrary script code in the browser of an unsuspecting user in the context of the affected site. This may help the attacker steal cookie-based authentication credentials and launch other attacks. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Use WSUS to deploy 3rd party patches Public BETA http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/corporate/wsus_3rd_third_party_patching/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: Hitachi Cosminexus Products uCosminexus Portal Framework Cross-Site Scripting SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA38737 VERIFY ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/38737/ DESCRIPTION: A vulnerability has been reported in Hitachi products, which can be exploited by malicious people to conduct cross-site scripting attacks. Unspecified input passed to the "uCosminexus Portal Framework" and "uCosminexus Portal Framework - Light" component is not properly sanitised before being returned to the user. Please see the vendor's advisory for a list of affected products and versions. SOLUTION: Please see the vendor's advisory for fix information. PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: Reported by the vendor. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: http://www.hitachi.co.jp/Prod/comp/soft1/global/security/info/vuls/HS10-001/index.html ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ----------------------------------------------------------------------

Stack consumption vulnerability in the WebCore::CSSSelector function in WebKit, as used in Apple Safari 4.0.4, Apple Safari on iPhone OS and iPhone OS for iPod touch, and Google Chrome 4.0.249, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a STYLE element composed of a large number of *> sequences. WebKit is prone to a remote denial-of-service vulnerability. An attacker can exploit this issue to cause the affected browser to crash, effectively denying service to legitimate users. Note: This BID was originally titled "Apple Safari Style Tag Remote Memory Corruption Vulnerability". Reports indicate that the underlying flaw affects the WebKit library. Update (March 5, 2010): This issue has been downgraded to a denial-of-service vulnerability. Arbitrary code execution is not possible. If the user includes a large number of \"* > \" characters in the STYLE element of the HTML page, the browser will crash. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Secure your corporate defenses and reduce complexity in handling vulnerability threats with the new Secunia Vulnerability Intelligence Manager (VIM). Request a free trial: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/vim/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: SUSE update for Multiple Packages SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA43068 VERIFY ADVISORY: Secunia.com http://secunia.com/advisories/43068/ Customer Area (Credentials Required) https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=43068 RELEASE DATE: 2011-01-25 DISCUSS ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/43068/#comments AVAILABLE ON SITE AND IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Last Update * Popularity * Comments * Criticality Level * Impact * Where * Solution Status * Operating System / Software * CVE Reference(s) http://secunia.com/advisories/43068/ ONLY AVAILABLE IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Authentication Level * Report Reliability * Secunia PoC * Secunia Analysis * Systems Affected * Approve Distribution * Remediation Status * Secunia CVSS Score * CVSS https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=43068 ONLY AVAILABLE WITH SECUNIA CSI AND SECUNIA PSI: * AUTOMATED SCANNING http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/personal/ http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/corporate/wsus_sccm_3rd_third_party_patching/ DESCRIPTION: SUSE has issued an update for multiple packages, which fixes multiple vulnerabilities. For more information: SA32349 SA33495 SA35095 SA35379 SA35411 SA35449 SA35758 SA36269 SA36677 SA37273 SA37346 SA37769 SA38061 SA38545 SA38932 SA39029 SA39091 SA39384 SA39661 SA39937 SA40002 SA40072 SA40105 SA40112 SA40148 SA40196 SA40257 SA40664 SA40783 SA41014 SA41085 SA41242 SA41328 SA41390 SA41443 SA41535 SA41841 SA41888 SA41968 SA42151 SA42264 SA42290 SA42312 SA42443 SA42461 SA42658 SA42769 SA42886 SA42956 SA43053 SOLUTION: Apply updated packages via YaST Online Update or the SUSE FTP server. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: SUSE-SR:2011:002: http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2011-01/msg00006.html OTHER REFERENCES: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ DEEP LINKS: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXTENDED DESCRIPTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXTENDED SOLUTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXPLOIT: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ----------------------------------------------------------------------

Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Portlet Palette in IBM WebSphere Portal 6.0.1.5 wp6015_008_01 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the search field. The IBM WebSphere Portal server is a commercial portal solution. is prone to a cross-site scripting vulnerability. Other versions may also be affected. SOLUTION: Apply APAR PM05829. PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: The vendor credits Sjoerd Resink, Fox-IT BV. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: http://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=swg1PM05829 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ----------------------------------------------------------------------

Huawei HG510 is a terminal device for home digital networks that provides ADSL connectivity. The Huawei HG510 has a security vulnerability that allows an attacker to bypass security restrictions and perform cross-site request forgery attacks: - The device does not perform any security checks to allow the user to perform some operations through HTTP requests, such as rebooting the device or changing settings (including passwords). - The device does not properly restrict access to the script rebootinfo.cgi, and can directly access the script to restart the device. Note that this also attacks through cross-site request forgery attacks. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Public Beta of CSI and WSUS Integration http://secunia.com/blog/74 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: Huawei HG510 Security Bypass and Cross-Site Request Forgery Vulnerabilities SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA38591 VERIFY ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/38591/ DESCRIPTION: Ivan Markovic has reported some vulnerabilities in Huawei HG510, which can be exploited by malicious people to bypass certain security restrictions and conduct cross-site request forgery attacks. This can be exploited to e.g. reboot the device or change certain settings (including passwords). Do not browse untrusted websites or follow untrusted links while logged in to the device. PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: Ivan Markovic, Network Security Solutions ORIGINAL ADVISORY: http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/bugtraq/2010-02/0155.html ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ----------------------------------------------------------------------

UplusFtp is a free green free installation FTP server. A stack overflow vulnerability exists in the UplusFTP server when processing user-submitted HTTP request parameters. A remote attacker can trigger this overflow by submitting an HTTP request containing a very long path parameter to the list.html page, causing arbitrary code to be executed. Easy FTP Server (also known as UplusFTP) is prone to a buffer-overflow vulnerability. Successful exploits may allow attackers to execute arbitrary code within the context of the application. Failed exploit attempts will likely result in a denial-of-service condition

WebCore/bindings/v8/custom/V8DOMWindowCustom.cpp in WebKit before r52401, as used in Google Chrome before 4.0.249.78, allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via vectors involving the window.open method. WebKit is prone to a cross-domain scripting vulnerability because it fails to properly enforce the same-origin policy. An attacker can exploit this issue to execute arbitrary code in the context of a different domain. Successful exploits may result in privilege escalation. Versions prior to WebKit r52401 are vulnerable. NOTE: This issue was previously documented in BID 37948 (Google Chrome prior to 4.0.249.78 Multiple Security Vulnerabilities) but has been assigned its own record to better document it. WebKit is an open source browser web page layout engine, and the corresponding engines are Gecko (the layout engine used by Mozilla, Firefox, etc.) and Trident (also known as MSHTML, the layout engine used by IE). Credit to Tokuji Akamine, Senior Consultant at Symantec Consulting Services (for Chromium) and Lostmon Lords (for Flock). References: https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32647 http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=30660 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.14 (Darwin) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJMj6tpAAoJEPzFtDWO6ceqVloP/19NsAyXYRvtQABv7ztHyOxd bGdsp0FMVp/fMbpDIwzStHbfnlYnFqDAzWb6Zy64jKuFzK8mKXYcoAqbz3EoX3Ux Y0IUyKDdfR1HvnttXRYnAw7M4UKN54MYLAOD80j8ztjt1sjMluWPUxlKSewR8SfM pnIxID3nD7R9DmhABtDKOnTCfrHBgHnKbl1/nMcyUj+x0MtCNktddcYLO3dtaop+ 8FdbKNyFkrKLjqyNqIIa0FNBk4VgDfggLRPHC3PpfBLTcxlXr1/kDLnzIP7PPBuM HpaM/IO/RotzBIDEvJR3tN9YnoTXxR++ExPg0nZuAi3CUS0Jr2jfrarkfs5VzZOs J4WbCWilqccwqzanNdBu6FncYn3R9IytpZiCznO/mpek4lIV6fZlx6LnX9ZFFWsL ExWZ7jqNPj81mifDVuTeMa0BkZ2SvFhOXU1kUmfZvb+/Bu5oQ5hhX5Cpkb0EXBz0 CkNLC7tIq5O4Szczrlt0jb5XiRvhAocinq3yDdPnK9zHKHf+ia1BWt86kxf+fxXJ kQA8hl8fUgN53uoxs6BrQCjo8HrrMxDXojNOtcrw5U7XOWMHm9P0kbJd4PXGjb+c NMSoAoXnXXwm5QKURVxbApZ8vvJiB2LQRvj5A1OMcbYkAUlhS6CJbh0cAET4AutW VugAZ6Q8Wnrk5d6Eoqbc =FVwj -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- . ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Secure your corporate defenses and reduce complexity in handling vulnerability threats with the new Secunia Vulnerability Intelligence Manager (VIM). Request a free trial: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/vim/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: SUSE update for Multiple Packages SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA43068 VERIFY ADVISORY: Secunia.com http://secunia.com/advisories/43068/ Customer Area (Credentials Required) https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=43068 RELEASE DATE: 2011-01-25 DISCUSS ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/43068/#comments AVAILABLE ON SITE AND IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Last Update * Popularity * Comments * Criticality Level * Impact * Where * Solution Status * Operating System / Software * CVE Reference(s) http://secunia.com/advisories/43068/ ONLY AVAILABLE IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Authentication Level * Report Reliability * Secunia PoC * Secunia Analysis * Systems Affected * Approve Distribution * Remediation Status * Secunia CVSS Score * CVSS https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=43068 ONLY AVAILABLE WITH SECUNIA CSI AND SECUNIA PSI: * AUTOMATED SCANNING http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/personal/ http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/corporate/wsus_sccm_3rd_third_party_patching/ DESCRIPTION: SUSE has issued an update for multiple packages, which fixes multiple vulnerabilities. For more information: SA32349 SA33495 SA35095 SA35379 SA35411 SA35449 SA35758 SA36269 SA36677 SA37273 SA37346 SA37769 SA38061 SA38545 SA38932 SA39029 SA39091 SA39384 SA39661 SA39937 SA40002 SA40072 SA40105 SA40112 SA40148 SA40196 SA40257 SA40664 SA40783 SA41014 SA41085 SA41242 SA41328 SA41390 SA41443 SA41535 SA41841 SA41888 SA41968 SA42151 SA42264 SA42290 SA42312 SA42443 SA42461 SA42658 SA42769 SA42886 SA42956 SA43053 SOLUTION: Apply updated packages via YaST Online Update or the SUSE FTP server. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: SUSE-SR:2011:002: http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2011-01/msg00006.html OTHER REFERENCES: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ DEEP LINKS: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXTENDED DESCRIPTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXTENDED SOLUTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXPLOIT: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ----------------------------------------------------------------------

Unspecified vulnerability in Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance 7.0 before 7.0(8.10), 7.2 before 7.2(4.45), 8.0 before 8.0(5.1), 8.1 before 8.1(2.37), and 8.2 before 8.2(1.15); and Cisco PIX 500 Series Security Appliance; allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (active IPsec tunnel loss and prevention of new tunnels) via a malformed IKE message through an existing tunnel to UDP port 4500, aka Bug ID CSCtc47782. The problem is Bug ID : CSCtc47782 It is a problem.By a third party UDP 4500 Illegal via the existing tunnel to port No. IKE Service disruption via message (DoS) There is a possibility of being put into a state. Attackers can exploit this issue to cause all IPsec tunnels to terminate. This issue is documented in Cisco bug ID CSCtc47782. 4) An error in WebVPN can be exploited to trigger an appliance reload via a specially crafted DTLS packet. 7) An error in the implementation of the NT LAN Manager version 1 (NTLMv1) protocol can be exploited to bypass authentication via a specially crafted username. SOLUTION: Update to a fixed version. Please see the vendor's advisory for detailed patch information. PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: Reported by the vendor. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-asa.shtml ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. There are workarounds for some of the vulnerabilities disclosed in this advisory. Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. This advisory is posted at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-asa.shtml. For specific version information, refer to the "Software Versions and Fixes" section of this advisory. Appliances that are running versions 7.1.x, 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected when they are configured for any of the following features: * SSL VPNs * Cisco Adaptive Security Device Manager (ASDM) Administrative Access * Telnet Access * SSH Access * Virtual Telnet * Virtual HTTP * Transport Layer Security (TLS) Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection SIP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities +----------------------------------------------- Two denial of service (DoS) vulnerabilities affect the SIP inspection feature of Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances. Versions 7.0.x, 7.1.x, 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. SIP inspection is enabled by default. To check if SIP inspection is enabled, issue the "show service-policy | include sip" command and confirm that some output is returned. Sample output is displayed in the following example: ciscoasa#show service-policy | include sip Inspect: sip , packet 0, drop 0, reset-drop 0 Alternatively, an appliance that has SIP inspection enabled has a configuration similar to the following: class-map inspection_default match default-inspection-traffic ! policy-map global_policy class inspection_default ... inspect sip ... Versions 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. SCCP inspection is enabled by default. To check if SCCP inspection is enabled, issue the "show service-policy | include skinny" command and confirm that some output is returned. Sample output is displayed in the following example: ciscoasa#show service-policy | include skinny Inspect: skinny , packet 0, drop 0, reset-drop 0 Alternatively, an appliance that has SCCP inspection enabled has a configuration similar to the following: class-map inspection_default match default-inspection-traffic ! policy-map global_policy class inspection_default ... inspect skinny ... Affected versions include 7.1.x, 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x. Administrators can enable WebVPN with the "enable <interface name>" command in "webvpn" configuration mode. DTLS can be enabled by issuing the "svc dtls enable" command in "group policy webvpn" configuration mode. The following configuration snippet provides an example of a WebVPN configuration that enables DTLS: webvpn enable outside svc enable ... ! group-policy <group name> internal group-policy <group name> attributes ... webvpn svc dtls enable ... Altough WebVPN is disabled by default, DTLS is enabled by default in recent software releases. This vulnerability only affects configurations that use the "nailed" option at the end of their static statement. Additionally, traffic that matches "static" statement must also be inspected by a Cisco AIP-SSM (an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) module) in inline mode. IPS inline operation mode is enabled by using the "ips inline {fail-close | fail-open}" command in "class" configuration mode. Versions 7.0.x, 7.1.x, 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. IKE is not enabled by default. If IKE is enabled, the "isakmp enable <interface name>" command appears in the configuration. Versions 7.0.x, 7.1.x, 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. Administrators can configure NTLMv1 authentication by defining an Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) server group that uses the NTLMv1 protocol with the "aaa-server <AAA server group tag> protocol nt" command and then configuring a service that requires authentication to use that AAA server group. To verify that NTLMv1 authentication is enabled and active, issue the "show aaa-server protocol nt" command. For more information, refer to the End of Life announcement at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/vpndevc/ps5708/ps5709/ps2030/end_of_life_notice_cisco_pix_525_sec_app.html. How To Determine The Running Software Version +-------------------------------------------- To determine whether a vulnerable version of Cisco ASA Software is running on an appliance, administrators can issue the "show version" command-line interface (CLI) command. The following example shows a Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance that is running software version 8.0(4): ASA#show version Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Software Version 8.0(4) Device Manager Version 6.0(1) <output truncated> Customers who use Cisco ASDM to manage devices can locate the software version in the table that is displayed in the login window or upper-left corner of the Cisco ASDM window. Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable +-------------------------------- The Cisco Firewall Services Module (FWSM) is affected by some of the vulnerabilities in this advisory. A separate Cisco Security Advisory has been published to disclose the vulnerabilities that affect the FWSM. This advisory is available at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-fwsm.shtml. With the exception of the Cisco FWSM, no other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these vulnerabilities. It offers firewall, intrusion prevention (IPS), anti-X, and VPN services. This vulnerability is triggered only when specific TCP segments are sent to certain TCP-based services that terminate on the affected appliance. Although exploitation of this vulnerability requires a TCP three-way handshake, authentication is not required. Appliances are only vulnerable when SIP inspection is enabled. Only transit traffic can trigger these vulnerabilities; traffic that is destined to the appliance will not trigger the vulnerabilities. Appliances are only vulnerable when SCCP inspection is enabled. Only transit traffic can trigger this vulnerability; traffic that is destined to the appliance will not trigger the vulnerabily. Appliances are only vulnerable when they are configured for WebVPN and DTLS transport. This vulnerability is only triggered by traffic that is destined to the appliance; transit traffic will not trigger the vulnerability. A malformed, transit TCP segment is received. 2. The TCP segment matches a static NAT translation that has the "nailed" option configured on it. 3. The TCP segment is also processed by the Cisco AIP-SSM, which is configured for inline mode of operation. A TCP three-way handshake is not necessary to exploit this vulnerability. The tunnels are not torn down immediately; IPsec traffic will continue to flow until the next rekey, at which time the rekey will fail and the tunnels will be torn down. Both site-to-site and remote access VPN tunnels are affected. The only way to recover and re-establish IPsec VPN tunnels is to reload the appliance. When this vulnerability is exploited, the security appliance will generate syslog messages 713903 and 713906, which will be followed by the loss of IPsec peers. NTLMv1 Authentication Bypass Vulnerability +----------------------------------------- Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances contain a vulnerability that could result in authentication bypass when the affected appliance is configured to authenticate users against Microsoft Windows servers using the NTLMv1 protocol. Users can bypass authentication by providing an an invalid, crafted username during an authentication request. Any services that use a AAA server group that is configured to use the NTLMv1 authentication protocol is affected. Affected services include: * Telnet access to the security appliance * SSH access to the security appliance * HTTPS access to the security appliance (including Cisco ASDM access) * Serial console access * Privileged (enable) mode access * Cut-through proxy for network access * VPN access This vulnerability is documented in Cisco bug ID CSCte21953 and has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2010-0568. Vulnerability Scoring Details ============================= Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at: http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss. TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------------- * CSCsz77717 ("TCP sessions remain in CLOSEWAIT indefinitely") CVSS Base Score - 7.1 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Medium Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 5.9 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed SIP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities +----------------------------------------------- * CSCsy91157 ("Watchdog when inspecting malformed SIP traffic") CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * CSCtc96018 ("ASA watchdog when inspecting malformed SIP traffic") CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed SCCP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability +---------------------------------------------- * CSCsz79757 ("Traceback - Thread Name: Dispatch Unit with skinny inspect enabled") CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed WebVPN DTLS Denial of Service Vulnerability +------------------------------------------ * CSCtb64913 ("WEBVPN: page fault in thread name dispath unit, eip udpmod_user_put") CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Crafted TCP Segment Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------- * CSCtb37219 ("Traceback in Dispatch Unit AIP-SSM Inline and nailed option on static") CVSS Base Score - 7.1 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Medium Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 5.9 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Crafted IKE Message Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------- * CSCtc47782 ("Malformed IKE traffic causes rekey to fail") CVSS Base Score - 5.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Partial CVSS Temporal Score - 4.1 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed NTLMv1 Authentication Bypass Vulnerability +----------------------------------------- * CSCte21953 ("ASA may allow authentication of an invalid username for NT auth") CVSS Base Score - 7.1 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Medium Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - None CVSS Temporal Score - 6.2 Exploitability - High Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------------- Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may lead to an exhaustion condition where the affected appliance cannot accept new TCP connections. A reload of the appliance is necessary to recover from the TCP connection exhaustion condition. If a TCP-based protocol is used for device management (like telnet, SSH, or HTTPS), a serial console connection may be needed to access to the appliance. SIP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities +----------------------------------------------- Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may cause a reload of the affected appliance. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. SCCP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability +---------------------------------------------- Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may cause a reload of the affected appliance. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. WebVPN DTLS Denial of Service Vulnerability +------------------------------------------ Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may cause a reload of the affected appliance. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. Crafted TCP Segment Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------- Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may cause a reload of the affected appliance. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. A manual reload of the appliance is required to re-establish all VPN tunnels. NTLMv1 Authentication Bypass Vulnerability +----------------------------------------- Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could result in unauthorized access to the network or appliance. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. The following table contains the first fixed software release of each vulnerability. A device running a version of the given release in a specific row (less than the First Fixed Release) is known to be vulnerable. +---------------------------------------+ | | Major | First | | Vulnerability | Release | Fixed | | | | Release | |-----------------+---------+-----------| | | 7.0 | Not | | | | affected | |TCP Connection |---------+-----------| | Exhaustion | 7.2 | 7.2(4.46) | |Denial of |---------+-----------| | Service | 8.0 | 8.0(4.38) | |Vulnerability ( |---------+-----------| | CSCsz77717) | 8.1 | 8.1(2.29) | | |---------+-----------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(1.5) | |-----------------+---------+-----------| | | 7.0 | 7.0(8.10) | |SIP Inspection |---------+-----------| | Denial of | 7.2 | 7.2(4.45) | |Service |---------+-----------| | Vulnerabilities | 8.0 | 8.0(5.2) | |(CSCsy91157 and |---------+-----------| | CSCtc96018) | 8.1 | 8.1(2.37) | | |---------+-----------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(1.16) | |-----------------+---------+-----------| | | 7.0 | Not | | | | affected | | |---------+-----------| | SCCP Inspection | 7.2 | Not | | Denial of | | affected | |Service |---------+-----------| | Vulnerability ( | 8.0 | 8.0(4.38) | |CSCsz79757) |---------+-----------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.29) | | |---------+-----------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(1.2) | |-----------------+---------+-----------| | | 7.0 | Not | | | | affected | |WebVPN DTLS |---------+-----------| | Denial of | 7.2 | 7.2(4.45) | |Service |---------+-----------| | Vulnerability ( | 8.0 | 8.0(4.44) | |CSCtb64913) |---------+-----------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.35) | | |---------+-----------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(1.10) | |-----------------+---------+-----------| | | 7.0 | 7.0(8.10) | | |---------+-----------| | Crafted TCP | 7.2 | 7.2(4.45) | |Segment Denial |---------+-----------| | of Service | 8.0 | 8.0(4.44) | |Vulnerability ( |---------+-----------| | CSCtb37219) | 8.1 | 8.1(2.35) | | |---------+-----------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(1.10) | |-----------------+---------+-----------| | | 7.0 | 7.0(8.10) | | |---------+-----------| | Crafted IKE | 7.2 | 7.2(4.45) | |Message Denial |---------+-----------| | of Service | 8.0 | 8.0(5.1) | |Vulnerability ( |---------+-----------| | CSCtc47782) | 8.1 | 8.1(2.37) | | |---------+-----------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(1.15) | |-----------------+---------+-----------| | | 7.0 | 7.0(8.10) | | |---------+-----------| | | 7.2 | 7.2(4.45) | | |---------+-----------| | NTLMv1 | 8.0 | 8.0(5.7) | |Authentication |---------+-----------| | Bypass | | 8.1 | | Vulnerability ( | | (2.40), | | CSCte21953) | 8.1 | available | | | | early | | | | March | | | | 2010 | | |---------+-----------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(2.1) | +---------------------------------------+ Note: Cisco ASA Software versions 7.1.x are affected by some of the vulnerabilities in this advisory. However, no fixed 7.1.x software versions are planned because the 7.1.x major release has reached the End of Software Maintenance Releases milestone. Fixed Cisco ASA Software can be downloaded from: http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/ASAPSIRT?psrtdcat20e2 Recommended Releases +------------------- Releases 7.0(8.10), 7.2(4.46), 8.0(5.9), 8.1(2.40) (available early March 2010), and 8.2(2.4) are recommended releases because they contain the fixes for all vulnerabilities in this advisory. Cisco recommends upgrading to a release that is equal to or later than these recommended releases. Workarounds =========== TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------------- It is possible to mitigate this vulnerability for TCP-based services that are offered to known clients. For example, it may be possible to restrict SSH, Cisco ASDM/HTTPS, and Telnet administrative access to known hosts or IP subnetworks. For other services like remote access SSL VPN, where clients connect from unknown hosts and networks, no mitigations exist. SIP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities +----------------------------------------------- These vulnerabilities can be mitigated by disabling SIP inspection if it is not required. Administrators can disable SIP inspection by issuing the "no inspect sip" command in class configuration sub-mode within policy-map configuration. SCCP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability +---------------------------------------------- This vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling SCCP inspection if it is not required. Administrators can disable SCCP inspection by issuing the "no inspect skinny" command in class configuration sub-mode within the policy-map configuration. WebVPN DTLS Denial of Service Vulnerability +------------------------------------------ This vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling DTLS transport for WebVPN. Administrators can disable DTLS by issuing the "no svc dtls enable" command under the "webvpn" attributes section of the corresponding group policy. Crafted TCP Segment Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------- Possible workarounds for this vulnerability are the following: * Migrate from "nailed" static NAT entries to TCP-state bypass. * Use the Cisco AIP-SSM in promiscuous mode. This mode can be configured by issuing the "ips promiscuous" command in "class" configuration mode. * Disable IPS inspection for "nailed" static NAT entries. * If possible, change "nailed" static NAT entries to standard static NAT entries. This may be feasible since in most cases there is no need for allowing IPsec tunnels inside IPsec tunnels. Filtering out UDP port 4500 traffic across an IPsec tunnel can be accomplished by using a VPN filter, as shown in the following example: !-- Deny only UDP port 4500 traffic and allow everything else access-list VPNFILTER extended deny udp any any eq 4500 access-list VPNFILTER extended permit ip any any !-- Create a group policy and specify a VPN filter that uses the !-- previous ACL group-policy VPNPOL internal group-policy VPNPOL attributes vpn-filter value VPNFILTER !-- Reference the group policy with the VPN filter from the tunnel group tunnel-group 172.16.0.1 type ipsec-l2l tunnel-group 172.16.0.1 general-attributes default-group-policy VPNPOL For this workaround to be effective, the group policy needs to be applied to all site-to-site (tunnel type "ipsec-l2l") and remote access (tunnel type "ipsec-ra") tunnel groups. Warning: In addition to filtering out IKE traffic on UDP port 4500, this workaround may also affect other procotols like DNS and SNMP that send traffic on UDP port 4500. For example, if a DNS resolver sends traffic from UDP port 4500 to a DNS server, the response from the DNS server will be destined to UDP port 4500, which then may be filtered out by the filter used in this workaround. NTLMv1 Authentication Bypass Vulnerability +----------------------------------------- If NTLMv1 authentication is required, there are no workarounds for this vulnerability. If NTLMv1 authentication can be substituted by other authentication protocols (LDAP, RADIUS, TACACS+, etc.), it is possible to mitigate the vulnerability. Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html, or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml. Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of any of the vulnerabilities described in this advisory. TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------------- This vulnerability was discovered during the resolution of a customer service request. SIP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities +----------------------------------------------- CSCsy91157 was discovered during internal testing. CSCtc96018 was discovered during the resolution of customer service requests. SCCP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability +---------------------------------------------- This vulnerability was discovered during the resolution of customer service requests. WebVPN DTLS Denial of Service Vulnerability +------------------------------------------ This vulnerability was discovered during the resolution of customer service requests. Crafted TCP Segment Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------- This vulnerability was discovered during internal testing. Crafted IKE Message Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------- This vulnerability was discovered during the resolution of customer service requests. NTLMv1 Authentication Bypass Vulnerability +----------------------------------------- This vulnerability was discovered during internal testing. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-asa.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +------------------------------------------------------------+ | Revision 1.0 | 2010-February-17 | Initial public release. | +------------------------------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html. This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt. +-------------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright 2008-2010 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. +-------------------------------------------------------------------- Updated: Feb 17, 2010 Document ID: 111485 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (GNU/Linux) iEYEARECAAYFAkt8GTYACgkQ86n/Gc8U/uBi6QCfYFKvAUdFrRvusqKoaFmMwfcH XOYAnRymbNOcRg5gmPFMO/zqgm2wOyKQ =JUg3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/

Unspecified vulnerability in Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance 7.0 before 7.0(8.10), 7.2 before 7.2(4.45), 8.0 before 8.0(5.7), 8.1 before 8.1(2.40), and 8.2 before 8.2(2.1); and Cisco PIX 500 Series Security Appliance; allows remote attackers to bypass NTLMv1 authentication via a crafted username, aka Bug ID CSCte21953. The problem is Bug ID : CSCte21953 It is a problem.Through a crafted username by a third party, NTLMv1 Authentication may be bypassed. Successful exploits allow remote attackers to gain access to vulnerable devices, without requiring successful authentication. This issue is being tracked by Cisco bug ID CSCte21953. 4) An error in WebVPN can be exploited to trigger an appliance reload via a specially crafted DTLS packet. 7) An error in the implementation of the NT LAN Manager version 1 (NTLMv1) protocol can be exploited to bypass authentication via a specially crafted username. SOLUTION: Update to a fixed version. Please see the vendor's advisory for detailed patch information. PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: Reported by the vendor. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-asa.shtml ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Cisco Security Advisory: Multiple Vulnerabilities in Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20100217-asa Revision 1.0 For Public Release 2010 February 17 1600 UTC (GMT) +--------------------------------------------------------------------- Summary ======= Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances are affected by the following vulnerabilities: * TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability * Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities * Skinny Client Control Protocol (SCCP) Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability * WebVPN Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Denial of Service Vulnerability * Crafted TCP Segment Denial of Service Vulnerability * Crafted Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Message Denial of Service Vulnerability * NT LAN Manager version 1 (NTLMv1) Authentication Bypass Vulnerability These vulnerabilities are not interdependent; a release that is affected by one vulnerability is not necessarily affected by the others. There are workarounds for some of the vulnerabilities disclosed in this advisory. Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. This advisory is posted at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-asa.shtml. For specific version information, refer to the "Software Versions and Fixes" section of this advisory. TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------------- Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances may experience a TCP connection exhaustion condition (no new TCP connections are accepted) that can be triggered through the receipt of specific TCP segments during the TCP connection termination phase. Appliances that are running versions 7.1.x, 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected when they are configured for any of the following features: * SSL VPNs * Cisco Adaptive Security Device Manager (ASDM) Administrative Access * Telnet Access * SSH Access * Virtual Telnet * Virtual HTTP * Transport Layer Security (TLS) Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection SIP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities +----------------------------------------------- Two denial of service (DoS) vulnerabilities affect the SIP inspection feature of Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances. Versions 7.0.x, 7.1.x, 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. SIP inspection is enabled by default. To check if SIP inspection is enabled, issue the "show service-policy | include sip" command and confirm that some output is returned. Sample output is displayed in the following example: ciscoasa#show service-policy | include sip Inspect: sip , packet 0, drop 0, reset-drop 0 Alternatively, an appliance that has SIP inspection enabled has a configuration similar to the following: class-map inspection_default match default-inspection-traffic ! policy-map global_policy class inspection_default ... inspect sip ... Versions 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. SCCP inspection is enabled by default. To check if SCCP inspection is enabled, issue the "show service-policy | include skinny" command and confirm that some output is returned. Sample output is displayed in the following example: ciscoasa#show service-policy | include skinny Inspect: skinny , packet 0, drop 0, reset-drop 0 Alternatively, an appliance that has SCCP inspection enabled has a configuration similar to the following: class-map inspection_default match default-inspection-traffic ! policy-map global_policy class inspection_default ... inspect skinny ... Affected versions include 7.1.x, 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x. Administrators can enable WebVPN with the "enable <interface name>" command in "webvpn" configuration mode. DTLS can be enabled by issuing the "svc dtls enable" command in "group policy webvpn" configuration mode. The following configuration snippet provides an example of a WebVPN configuration that enables DTLS: webvpn enable outside svc enable ... ! group-policy <group name> internal group-policy <group name> attributes ... webvpn svc dtls enable ... Altough WebVPN is disabled by default, DTLS is enabled by default in recent software releases. This vulnerability only affects configurations that use the "nailed" option at the end of their static statement. Additionally, traffic that matches "static" statement must also be inspected by a Cisco AIP-SSM (an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) module) in inline mode. IPS inline operation mode is enabled by using the "ips inline {fail-close | fail-open}" command in "class" configuration mode. Versions 7.0.x, 7.1.x, 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. IKE is not enabled by default. If IKE is enabled, the "isakmp enable <interface name>" command appears in the configuration. Versions 7.0.x, 7.1.x, 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. Administrators can configure NTLMv1 authentication by defining an Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) server group that uses the NTLMv1 protocol with the "aaa-server <AAA server group tag> protocol nt" command and then configuring a service that requires authentication to use that AAA server group. To verify that NTLMv1 authentication is enabled and active, issue the "show aaa-server protocol nt" command. Sample output is displayed in the following example: ciscoasa#show aaa-server protocol nt Server Group: test Server Protocol: nt Server Address: 192.168.10.11 Server port: 139 Server status: ACTIVE, Last transaction (success) at 11:10:08 UTC Fri Jan 29 <output truncated> Cisco PIX 500 Series Security Appliance Vulnerability Status +----------------------------------------------------------- Cisco PIX 500 Series Security Appliances are affected by the following vulnerabilities: * TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability * SIP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities * SCCP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability * Crafted IKE Message Denial of Service Vulnerability * NTLMv1 Authentication Bypass Vulnerability Because the Cisco PIX 500 Series Security Appliances reached End of Software Maintenance Releases on July 28, 2009, no further software releases will be available for the Cisco PIX 500 Series Security Appliances. For more information, refer to the End of Life announcement at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/vpndevc/ps5708/ps5709/ps2030/end_of_life_notice_cisco_pix_525_sec_app.html. How To Determine The Running Software Version +-------------------------------------------- To determine whether a vulnerable version of Cisco ASA Software is running on an appliance, administrators can issue the "show version" command-line interface (CLI) command. The following example shows a Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance that is running software version 8.0(4): ASA#show version Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Software Version 8.0(4) Device Manager Version 6.0(1) <output truncated> Customers who use Cisco ASDM to manage devices can locate the software version in the table that is displayed in the login window or upper-left corner of the Cisco ASDM window. Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable +-------------------------------- The Cisco Firewall Services Module (FWSM) is affected by some of the vulnerabilities in this advisory. A separate Cisco Security Advisory has been published to disclose the vulnerabilities that affect the FWSM. This advisory is available at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-fwsm.shtml. With the exception of the Cisco FWSM, no other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these vulnerabilities. It offers firewall, intrusion prevention (IPS), anti-X, and VPN services. Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances are affected by the following vulnerabilities: TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------------- Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances may experience a TCP connection exhaustion condition (no new TCP connections are accepted) when specific TCP segments are received during the TCP connection termination phase. This vulnerability is triggered only when specific TCP segments are sent to certain TCP-based services that terminate on the affected appliance. Although exploitation of this vulnerability requires a TCP three-way handshake, authentication is not required. SIP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities +----------------------------------------------- Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances are affected by two denial of service vulnerabilities that may cause an appliance to reload during the processing of SIP messages. Appliances are only vulnerable when SIP inspection is enabled. Only transit traffic can trigger these vulnerabilities; traffic that is destined to the appliance will not trigger the vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities are documented in Cisco bug IDs CSCsy91157, and CSCtc96018, and have been assigned CVE IDs CVE-2010-0150, and CVE-2010-0569 respectively. Appliances are only vulnerable when SCCP inspection is enabled. Only transit traffic can trigger this vulnerability; traffic that is destined to the appliance will not trigger the vulnerabily. Appliances are only vulnerable when they are configured for WebVPN and DTLS transport. This vulnerability is only triggered by traffic that is destined to the appliance; transit traffic will not trigger the vulnerability. A malformed, transit TCP segment is received. 2. The TCP segment matches a static NAT translation that has the "nailed" option configured on it. 3. The TCP segment is also processed by the Cisco AIP-SSM, which is configured for inline mode of operation. A TCP three-way handshake is not necessary to exploit this vulnerability. The tunnels are not torn down immediately; IPsec traffic will continue to flow until the next rekey, at which time the rekey will fail and the tunnels will be torn down. Both site-to-site and remote access VPN tunnels are affected. The vulnerability is triggered when the appliance processes a malformed IKE message on port UDP 4500 that traverses an existing IPsec tunnel. The only way to recover and re-establish IPsec VPN tunnels is to reload the appliance. When this vulnerability is exploited, the security appliance will generate syslog messages 713903 and 713906, which will be followed by the loss of IPsec peers. Any services that use a AAA server group that is configured to use the NTLMv1 authentication protocol is affected. Vulnerability Scoring Details ============================= Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at: http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss. TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------------- * CSCsz77717 ("TCP sessions remain in CLOSEWAIT indefinitely") CVSS Base Score - 7.1 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Medium Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 5.9 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed SIP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities +----------------------------------------------- * CSCsy91157 ("Watchdog when inspecting malformed SIP traffic") CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * CSCtc96018 ("ASA watchdog when inspecting malformed SIP traffic") CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed SCCP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability +---------------------------------------------- * CSCsz79757 ("Traceback - Thread Name: Dispatch Unit with skinny inspect enabled") CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed WebVPN DTLS Denial of Service Vulnerability +------------------------------------------ * CSCtb64913 ("WEBVPN: page fault in thread name dispath unit, eip udpmod_user_put") CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Crafted TCP Segment Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------- * CSCtb37219 ("Traceback in Dispatch Unit AIP-SSM Inline and nailed option on static") CVSS Base Score - 7.1 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Medium Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 5.9 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Crafted IKE Message Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------- * CSCtc47782 ("Malformed IKE traffic causes rekey to fail") CVSS Base Score - 5.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Partial CVSS Temporal Score - 4.1 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed NTLMv1 Authentication Bypass Vulnerability +----------------------------------------- * CSCte21953 ("ASA may allow authentication of an invalid username for NT auth") CVSS Base Score - 7.1 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Medium Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - None CVSS Temporal Score - 6.2 Exploitability - High Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------------- Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may lead to an exhaustion condition where the affected appliance cannot accept new TCP connections. A reload of the appliance is necessary to recover from the TCP connection exhaustion condition. If a TCP-based protocol is used for device management (like telnet, SSH, or HTTPS), a serial console connection may be needed to access to the appliance. SIP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities +----------------------------------------------- Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may cause a reload of the affected appliance. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. SCCP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability +---------------------------------------------- Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may cause a reload of the affected appliance. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. WebVPN DTLS Denial of Service Vulnerability +------------------------------------------ Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may cause a reload of the affected appliance. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. Crafted TCP Segment Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------- Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may cause a reload of the affected appliance. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. Crafted IKE Message Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------- Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could cause all IPsec VPN tunnels (LAN-to-LAN or remote) that terminate on the security appliance to be torn down and prevent new tunnels from being established. A manual reload of the appliance is required to re-establish all VPN tunnels. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. The following table contains the first fixed software release of each vulnerability. A device running a version of the given release in a specific row (less than the First Fixed Release) is known to be vulnerable. +---------------------------------------+ | | Major | First | | Vulnerability | Release | Fixed | | | | Release | |-----------------+---------+-----------| | | 7.0 | Not | | | | affected | |TCP Connection |---------+-----------| | Exhaustion | 7.2 | 7.2(4.46) | |Denial of |---------+-----------| | Service | 8.0 | 8.0(4.38) | |Vulnerability ( |---------+-----------| | CSCsz77717) | 8.1 | 8.1(2.29) | | |---------+-----------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(1.5) | |-----------------+---------+-----------| | | 7.0 | 7.0(8.10) | |SIP Inspection |---------+-----------| | Denial of | 7.2 | 7.2(4.45) | |Service |---------+-----------| | Vulnerabilities | 8.0 | 8.0(5.2) | |(CSCsy91157 and |---------+-----------| | CSCtc96018) | 8.1 | 8.1(2.37) | | |---------+-----------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(1.16) | |-----------------+---------+-----------| | | 7.0 | Not | | | | affected | | |---------+-----------| | SCCP Inspection | 7.2 | Not | | Denial of | | affected | |Service |---------+-----------| | Vulnerability ( | 8.0 | 8.0(4.38) | |CSCsz79757) |---------+-----------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.29) | | |---------+-----------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(1.2) | |-----------------+---------+-----------| | | 7.0 | Not | | | | affected | |WebVPN DTLS |---------+-----------| | Denial of | 7.2 | 7.2(4.45) | |Service |---------+-----------| | Vulnerability ( | 8.0 | 8.0(4.44) | |CSCtb64913) |---------+-----------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.35) | | |---------+-----------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(1.10) | |-----------------+---------+-----------| | | 7.0 | 7.0(8.10) | | |---------+-----------| | Crafted TCP | 7.2 | 7.2(4.45) | |Segment Denial |---------+-----------| | of Service | 8.0 | 8.0(4.44) | |Vulnerability ( |---------+-----------| | CSCtb37219) | 8.1 | 8.1(2.35) | | |---------+-----------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(1.10) | |-----------------+---------+-----------| | | 7.0 | 7.0(8.10) | | |---------+-----------| | Crafted IKE | 7.2 | 7.2(4.45) | |Message Denial |---------+-----------| | of Service | 8.0 | 8.0(5.1) | |Vulnerability ( |---------+-----------| | CSCtc47782) | 8.1 | 8.1(2.37) | | |---------+-----------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(1.15) | |-----------------+---------+-----------| | | 7.0 | 7.0(8.10) | | |---------+-----------| | | 7.2 | 7.2(4.45) | | |---------+-----------| | NTLMv1 | 8.0 | 8.0(5.7) | |Authentication |---------+-----------| | Bypass | | 8.1 | | Vulnerability ( | | (2.40), | | CSCte21953) | 8.1 | available | | | | early | | | | March | | | | 2010 | | |---------+-----------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(2.1) | +---------------------------------------+ Note: Cisco ASA Software versions 7.1.x are affected by some of the vulnerabilities in this advisory. However, no fixed 7.1.x software versions are planned because the 7.1.x major release has reached the End of Software Maintenance Releases milestone. Fixed Cisco ASA Software can be downloaded from: http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/ASAPSIRT?psrtdcat20e2 Recommended Releases +------------------- Releases 7.0(8.10), 7.2(4.46), 8.0(5.9), 8.1(2.40) (available early March 2010), and 8.2(2.4) are recommended releases because they contain the fixes for all vulnerabilities in this advisory. Cisco recommends upgrading to a release that is equal to or later than these recommended releases. Workarounds =========== TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------------- It is possible to mitigate this vulnerability for TCP-based services that are offered to known clients. For example, it may be possible to restrict SSH, Cisco ASDM/HTTPS, and Telnet administrative access to known hosts or IP subnetworks. For other services like remote access SSL VPN, where clients connect from unknown hosts and networks, no mitigations exist. SIP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities +----------------------------------------------- These vulnerabilities can be mitigated by disabling SIP inspection if it is not required. Administrators can disable SIP inspection by issuing the "no inspect sip" command in class configuration sub-mode within policy-map configuration. SCCP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability +---------------------------------------------- This vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling SCCP inspection if it is not required. Administrators can disable SCCP inspection by issuing the "no inspect skinny" command in class configuration sub-mode within the policy-map configuration. WebVPN DTLS Denial of Service Vulnerability +------------------------------------------ This vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling DTLS transport for WebVPN. Administrators can disable DTLS by issuing the "no svc dtls enable" command under the "webvpn" attributes section of the corresponding group policy. Crafted TCP Segment Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------- Possible workarounds for this vulnerability are the following: * Migrate from "nailed" static NAT entries to TCP-state bypass. * Use the Cisco AIP-SSM in promiscuous mode. This mode can be configured by issuing the "ips promiscuous" command in "class" configuration mode. * Disable IPS inspection for "nailed" static NAT entries. * If possible, change "nailed" static NAT entries to standard static NAT entries. This may be feasible since in most cases there is no need for allowing IPsec tunnels inside IPsec tunnels. Filtering out UDP port 4500 traffic across an IPsec tunnel can be accomplished by using a VPN filter, as shown in the following example: !-- Deny only UDP port 4500 traffic and allow everything else access-list VPNFILTER extended deny udp any any eq 4500 access-list VPNFILTER extended permit ip any any !-- Create a group policy and specify a VPN filter that uses the !-- previous ACL group-policy VPNPOL internal group-policy VPNPOL attributes vpn-filter value VPNFILTER !-- Reference the group policy with the VPN filter from the tunnel group tunnel-group 172.16.0.1 type ipsec-l2l tunnel-group 172.16.0.1 general-attributes default-group-policy VPNPOL For this workaround to be effective, the group policy needs to be applied to all site-to-site (tunnel type "ipsec-l2l") and remote access (tunnel type "ipsec-ra") tunnel groups. Warning: In addition to filtering out IKE traffic on UDP port 4500, this workaround may also affect other procotols like DNS and SNMP that send traffic on UDP port 4500. For example, if a DNS resolver sends traffic from UDP port 4500 to a DNS server, the response from the DNS server will be destined to UDP port 4500, which then may be filtered out by the filter used in this workaround. For a more comprehensive example of the VPN filter feature of the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances, refer to the whitepaper "PIX/ASA 7.x and Later: VPN Filter (Permit Specific Port or Protocol) Configuration Example for L2L and Remote Access" available at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/vpndevc/ps2030/products_configuration_example09186a00808c9a87.shtml In addition, if the security appliance does not terminate any tunnels, the vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling IKE by issuing the "no isakmp enable <interface name>" command. NTLMv1 Authentication Bypass Vulnerability +----------------------------------------- If NTLMv1 authentication is required, there are no workarounds for this vulnerability. If NTLMv1 authentication can be substituted by other authentication protocols (LDAP, RADIUS, TACACS+, etc.), it is possible to mitigate the vulnerability. Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html, or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml. Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of any of the vulnerabilities described in this advisory. TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------------- This vulnerability was discovered during the resolution of a customer service request. SIP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities +----------------------------------------------- CSCsy91157 was discovered during internal testing. CSCtc96018 was discovered during the resolution of customer service requests. SCCP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability +---------------------------------------------- This vulnerability was discovered during the resolution of customer service requests. WebVPN DTLS Denial of Service Vulnerability +------------------------------------------ This vulnerability was discovered during the resolution of customer service requests. Crafted TCP Segment Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------- This vulnerability was discovered during internal testing. Crafted IKE Message Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------- This vulnerability was discovered during the resolution of customer service requests. NTLMv1 Authentication Bypass Vulnerability +----------------------------------------- This vulnerability was discovered during internal testing. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-asa.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +------------------------------------------------------------+ | Revision 1.0 | 2010-February-17 | Initial public release. This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt. +-------------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright 2008-2010 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. +-------------------------------------------------------------------- Updated: Feb 17, 2010 Document ID: 111485 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (GNU/Linux) iEYEARECAAYFAkt8GTYACgkQ86n/Gc8U/uBi6QCfYFKvAUdFrRvusqKoaFmMwfcH XOYAnRymbNOcRg5gmPFMO/zqgm2wOyKQ =JUg3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/

Unspecified vulnerability in Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance 7.0 before 7.0(8.10), 7.2 before 7.2(4.45), 8.0 before 8.0(5.2), 8.1 before 8.1(2.37), and 8.2 before 8.2(1.16); and Cisco PIX 500 Series Security Appliance; allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device reload) via malformed SIP messages, aka Bug ID CSCtc96018. The problem is Bug ID : CSCtc96018 It is a problem.Unauthorized by a third party SIP Service disruption via message (DoS) There is a possibility of being put into a state. This issue is tracked by Cisco Bug ID CSCtc96018. An attacker can exploit this issue to cause a vulnerable device to crash, denying service to legitimate users. For more information see vulnerabilities #1, #2, #3, #6, and #7 in: SA38618 SOLUTION: Affected products have reached End of Software Maintenance Releases on July 28, 2009. 1) An error when receiving certain TCP segments while a connection is being terminated can be exploited to make a device unable to accept new TCP connections. 2) Two errors in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) inspection feature can be exploited to trigger an appliance reload. 3) An error in the Skinny Client Control Protocol (SCCP) inspection feature can be exploited to trigger an appliance reload. 4) An error in WebVPN can be exploited to trigger an appliance reload via a specially crafted DTLS packet. 5) An error when using the "nailed" option can be exploited to reload an appliance via a specially crafted TCP segment that transits the appliance. 6) An error when parsing Internet Key Exchange (IKE) messages can be exploited to disrupt all IPsec tunnels that terminate on an affected device. 7) An error in the implementation of the NT LAN Manager version 1 (NTLMv1) protocol can be exploited to bypass authentication via a specially crafted username. SOLUTION: Update to a fixed version. Please see the vendor's advisory for detailed patch information. PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: Reported by the vendor. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-asa.shtml ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ---------------------------------------------------------------------- . TPTI-11-05: Adobe Shockwave PFR1 Font Chunk Parsing Remote Code Execution Vulnerability http://dvlabs.tippingpoint.com/advisory/TPTI-11-05 February 8, 2011 -- CVE ID: CVE-2011-0569 -- CVSS: 9, (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:C) -- Affected Vendors: Adobe -- Affected Products: Adobe Shockwave Player -- TippingPoint(TM) IPS Customer Protection: TippingPoint IPS customers have been protected against this vulnerability by Digital Vaccine protection filter ID 10825. For further product information on the TippingPoint IPS, visit: http://www.tippingpoint.com -- Vulnerability Details: This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable installations of the Adobe Shockwave Player. User interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target must visit a malicious page or open a malicious file. The specific flaw exists within the code responsible for parsing font structures within Director files. While processing data within the PFR1 chunk, the process trusts a size value and compares a sign-extended counter against it within a copy loop. By providing a sufficiently large value, this flaw can be abused by a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code under the context of the user running the browser. -- Vendor Response: Adobe has issued an update to correct this vulnerability. More details can be found at: http://www.adobe.com/support/security/bulletins/apsb11-01.html -- Disclosure Timeline: 2011-01-24 - Vulnerability reported to vendor 2011-02-08 - Coordinated public release of advisory -- Credit: This vulnerability was discovered by: * Logan Brown and Aaron Portnoy, TippingPoint DVLabs * Luigi Auriemma

Buffer overflow in an ActiveX control (SYMLTCOM.dll) in Symantec N360 1.0 and 2.0; Norton Internet Security, AntiVirus, SystemWorks, and Confidential 2006 through 2008; and Symantec Client Security 3.0.x before 3.1 MR9, and 3.1.x before MR9; allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via unknown vectors. NOTE: this is only a vulnerability if the attacker can "masquerade as an authorized site.". Multiple Symantec products are prone to a stack-based buffer-overflow vulnerability because the applications utilize an ActiveX control that fails to adequately validate user-supplied input. An attacker can exploit this issue to execute arbitrary code in the context of the application using the ActiveX control (typically Internet Explorer). Failed attacks will likely cause denial-of-service conditions. Remote Attacker An attacker can pass an unidentified vector, causing a denial of service. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Public Beta of CSI and WSUS Integration http://secunia.com/blog/74 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: Symantec Products "SYMLTCOM.dll" ActiveX Control Buffer Overflow SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA38654 VERIFY ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/38654/ DESCRIPTION: A vulnerability has been reported in some Symantec products, which can be exploited by malicious people to compromise a user's system. The vulnerability is caused due to an input validation error in the SYMLTCOM.dll ActiveX control, which can be exploited to cause e.g. a stack-based buffer overflow when a user visits a specially crafted web page. Successful exploitation allows execution of arbitrary code, but is limited to a certain unspecified domain. Symantec Client Security 3.0.x: Update to SCS 3.1 MR9. Symantec Client Security 3.1.x: Update to MR9. PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: The vendor credits FrSIRT. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: Symantec SYM10-003: http://www.symantec.com/business/security_response/securityupdates/detail.jsp?fid=security_advisory&pvid=security_advisory&year=2010&suid=20100217_01 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ---------------------------------------------------------------------- . VUPEN Security Research - Symantec Products "SYMLTCOM.dll" Buffer Overflow Vulnerability http://www.vupen.com/english/research.php I. DESCRIPTION --------------------- VUPEN Vulnerability Research Team discovered a vulnerability in various Symantec security products. II. CREDIT -------------- The vulnerabilities were discovered by VUPEN Security V. ABOUT VUPEN Security --------------------------------- VUPEN is a leading IT security research company providing vulnerability management services to allow enterprises and organizations to eliminate vulnerabilities before they can be exploited, ensure security policy compliance and meaningfully measure and manage risks. VUPEN also provides research services for security vendors (antivirus, IDS, IPS,etc) to supplement their internal vulnerability research efforts and quickly develop vulnerability-based and exploit-based signatures, rules, and filters, and proactively protect their customers against potential threats. * VUPEN Vulnerability Notification Service: http://www.vupen.com/english/services * VUPEN Exploits and In-Depth Vulnerability Analysis: http://www.vupen.com/exploits VI. REFERENCES ---------------------- http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2010/0411 http://www.symantec.com/business/security_response/securityupdates/detail.jsp?fid=security_advisory&pvid=security_advisory&year=2010&suid=20100217_01 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2010-0107 VII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE ----------------------------------- 2008-04-07 - Vendor notified 2008-04-08 - Vendor response 2008-05-09 - Status update received 2008-06-10 - Status update received 2008-12-05 - Status update received 2010-02-18 - Patches available, public disclosure

Directory traversal vulnerability in the Management Center for Cisco Security Agents 6.0 allows remote authenticated users to read arbitrary files via unspecified vectors. Cisco Security Agent is prone to a directory-traversal vulnerability. This issue is tracked by Cisco BugID CSCtd73275. Cisco Security Agent adopts behavior-based evaluation criteria to identify and protect servers and terminal computers, instead of relying only on signature matching for analysis and identification, successfully solving the security risks brought by unknown viruses. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Cisco Security Advisory: Multiple Vulnerabilities in Cisco Security Agent Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20100217-csa Revision 1.0 For Public Release 2010 February 17 1600 UTC (GMT) +--------------------------------------------------------------------- Summary ======= The Management Center for Cisco Security Agents is affected by a directory traversal vulnerability and a SQL injection vulnerability. Successful exploitation of the SQL injection vulnerability may allow an authenticated attacker to execute SQL statements that can cause instability of the product or changes in the configuration. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. These vulnerabilities are independent of each other. Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. This advisory is posted at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-csa.shtml Affected Products ================= Vulnerable Products +------------------ Cisco Security Agent releases 5.1, 5.2 and 6.0 are affected by the SQL injection vulnerability. The agents installed on user end-points are not affected. Standalone agents are installed in the following products: * Cisco Unified Communications Manager (CallManager) * Cisco Conference Connection (CCC) * Emergency Responder * IPCC Express * IPCC Enterprise * IPCC Hosted * IP Interactive Voice Response (IP IVR) * IP Queue Manager * Intelligent Contact Management (ICM) * Cisco Voice Portal (CVP) * Cisco Unified Meeting Place * Cisco Personal Assistant (PA) * Cisco Unity * Cisco Unity Connection * Cisco Unity Bridge * Cisco Secure ACS Solution Engine * Cisco Internet Service Node (ISN) * Cisco Security Manager (CSM) Note: The Sun Solaris version of the Cisco Security Agent is not affected by these vulnerabilities. No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these vulnerabilities. This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCtd73275 and has been assigned the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifier CVE-2010-0146. These configuration changes may result in modifications to the security policies of the endpoints. This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCtd73290 and has been assigned the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifier CVE-2010-0147. This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCtb89870 and has been assigned the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifier CVE-2010-0148. Vulnerability Scoring Details ============================= Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at: http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss CSCtd73275 - Directory Traversal in the Management Center for Cisco Security Agents CVSS Base Score - 6.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - Single Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - None CVSS Temporal Score - 5.9 Exploitability - High Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCtd73290 - Management Center for Cisco Security Agents: SQL Injection CVSS Base Score - 9 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - Single Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCtb89870 - Kernel Panic When Receiving Certain TCP Packets CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== Successful exploitation of the directory traversal vulnerability may allow an authenticated attacker to view and download arbitrary files from the server that is hosting the Management Center for Cisco Security Agents. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. +-----------------------------------------------------+ | | Cisco | First | | | Vulnerability | Security | Fixed | Recommended | | | Agent | Version | Release | | | Release | | | |---------------+----------+------------+-------------| | | 5.1 | Not | Not | | | | vulnerable | vulnerable | |Directory |----------+------------+-------------| | Traversal | 5.2 | Not | Not | | Vulnerability | | vulnerable | vulnerable | | |----------+------------+-------------| | | 6.0 | 6.0.1.132 | 6.0.1.132 | |---------------+----------+------------+-------------| | | 5.1 | 5.1.0.117 | 5.1.0.117 | |SQL Injection |----------+------------+-------------| | Vulnerability | 5.2 | 5.2.0.296 | 5.2.0.296 | | |----------+------------+-------------| | | 6.0 | 6.0.1.132 | 6.0.1.132 | |---------------+----------+------------+-------------| | | 5.1 | Not | 5.1.0.117 | | | | vulnerable | | |Denial of |----------+------------+-------------| | Service | 5.2 | 5.2.0.285 | 5.2.0.296 | |Vulnerability |----------+------------+-------------| | | 6.0 | Not | 6.0.1.132 | | | | vulnerable | | +-----------------------------------------------------+ Cisco CSA software can be downloaded from the following link: http://tools.cisco.com/support/downloads/go/Redirect.x?mdfid=278065206 Workarounds =========== There are no workarounds available to mitigate these vulnerabilities. Additional mitigations that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied Intelligence companion document for this Advisory: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20100217-csa.shtml Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at: http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerabilities described in this advisory. The directory traversal and SQL injection vulnerabilities were discovered and reported to Cisco by Gabriele Giuseppini from Cigital. Cisco PSIRT appreciates the opportunity to work with researchers on security vulnerabilities and welcomes the opportunity to review and assist in product reports. The DoS vulnerability was found during internal testing. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-csa.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +----------------------------------------+ | Revision | | Initial | | 1.0 | 2010-February-17 | public | | | | release. | +----------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at: http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iD8DBQFLew9U86n/Gc8U/uARAifvAJ9oLuXJY6iy962givBVY7701k4ktACfa3wK O9O+Q4F1alHxm6CIbUIXkUs= =+hka -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ . This can be exploited to manipulate SQL queries by injecting arbitrary SQL code. NOTE: This vulnerability affects both managed and standalone versions. SOLUTION: Update to version 6.0.1.132, 5.1.0.117, or 5.2.0.296: http://tools.cisco.com/support/downloads/go/Redirect.x?mdfid=278065206 PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: 1, 2) The vendor credits Gabriele Giuseppini from Cigital. 3) Reported by the vendor. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-csa.shtml ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ----------------------------------------------------------------------

SQL injection vulnerability in the Management Center for Cisco Security Agents 5.1 before 5.1.0.117, 5.2 before 5.2.0.296, and 6.0 before 6.0.1.132 allows remote authenticated users to execute arbitrary SQL commands via unspecified vectors. Exploiting this issue could allow an attacker to compromise the application, access or modify data, or exploit latent vulnerabilities in the underlying database. This issue is tracked by Cisco Bug ID CSCtd73290. Cisco Security Agent 5.1, 5.2, and 6.0 are vulnerable. Successful exploitation of the directory traversal vulnerability may allow an authenticated attacker to view and download arbitrary files from the server hosting the Management Center. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. These vulnerabilities are independent of each other. Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. The agents installed on user end-points are not affected. Only Cisco Security Agent release 5.2 for Windows and Linux, either managed or standalone, are affected by the DoS vulnerability. Standalone agents are installed in the following products: * Cisco Unified Communications Manager (CallManager) * Cisco Conference Connection (CCC) * Emergency Responder * IPCC Express * IPCC Enterprise * IPCC Hosted * IP Interactive Voice Response (IP IVR) * IP Queue Manager * Intelligent Contact Management (ICM) * Cisco Voice Portal (CVP) * Cisco Unified Meeting Place * Cisco Personal Assistant (PA) * Cisco Unity * Cisco Unity Connection * Cisco Unity Bridge * Cisco Secure ACS Solution Engine * Cisco Internet Service Node (ISN) * Cisco Security Manager (CSM) Note: The Sun Solaris version of the Cisco Security Agent is not affected by these vulnerabilities. No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these vulnerabilities. These configuration changes may result in modifications to the security policies of the endpoints. Cisco Security Agent Denial of Service Vulnerability +--------------------------------------------------- Cisco Security Agent is affected by a DoS vulnerability that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to cause a system to crash by sending a series of TCP packets. Vulnerability Scoring Details ============================= Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at: http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss CSCtd73275 - Directory Traversal in the Management Center for Cisco Security Agents CVSS Base Score - 6.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - Single Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - None CVSS Temporal Score - 5.9 Exploitability - High Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCtd73290 - Management Center for Cisco Security Agents: SQL Injection CVSS Base Score - 9 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - Single Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCtb89870 - Kernel Panic When Receiving Certain TCP Packets CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== Successful exploitation of the directory traversal vulnerability may allow an authenticated attacker to view and download arbitrary files from the server that is hosting the Management Center for Cisco Security Agents. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. +-----------------------------------------------------+ | | Cisco | First | | | Vulnerability | Security | Fixed | Recommended | | | Agent | Version | Release | | | Release | | | |---------------+----------+------------+-------------| | | 5.1 | Not | Not | | | | vulnerable | vulnerable | |Directory |----------+------------+-------------| | Traversal | 5.2 | Not | Not | | Vulnerability | | vulnerable | vulnerable | | |----------+------------+-------------| | | 6.0 | 6.0.1.132 | 6.0.1.132 | |---------------+----------+------------+-------------| | | 5.1 | 5.1.0.117 | 5.1.0.117 | |SQL Injection |----------+------------+-------------| | Vulnerability | 5.2 | 5.2.0.296 | 5.2.0.296 | | |----------+------------+-------------| | | 6.0 | 6.0.1.132 | 6.0.1.132 | |---------------+----------+------------+-------------| | | 5.1 | Not | 5.1.0.117 | | | | vulnerable | | |Denial of |----------+------------+-------------| | Service | 5.2 | 5.2.0.285 | 5.2.0.296 | |Vulnerability |----------+------------+-------------| | | 6.0 | Not | 6.0.1.132 | | | | vulnerable | | +-----------------------------------------------------+ Cisco CSA software can be downloaded from the following link: http://tools.cisco.com/support/downloads/go/Redirect.x?mdfid=278065206 Workarounds =========== There are no workarounds available to mitigate these vulnerabilities. Additional mitigations that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied Intelligence companion document for this Advisory: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20100217-csa.shtml Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at: http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerabilities described in this advisory. The directory traversal and SQL injection vulnerabilities were discovered and reported to Cisco by Gabriele Giuseppini from Cigital. Cisco PSIRT appreciates the opportunity to work with researchers on security vulnerabilities and welcomes the opportunity to review and assist in product reports. The DoS vulnerability was found during internal testing. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-csa.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +----------------------------------------+ | Revision | | Initial | | 1.0 | 2010-February-17 | public | | | | release. | +----------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at: http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iD8DBQFLew9U86n/Gc8U/uARAifvAJ9oLuXJY6iy962givBVY7701k4ktACfa3wK O9O+Q4F1alHxm6CIbUIXkUs= =+hka -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ . This can be exploited to manipulate SQL queries by injecting arbitrary SQL code. NOTE: This vulnerability affects both managed and standalone versions. SOLUTION: Update to version 6.0.1.132, 5.1.0.117, or 5.2.0.296: http://tools.cisco.com/support/downloads/go/Redirect.x?mdfid=278065206 PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: 1, 2) The vendor credits Gabriele Giuseppini from Cigital. 3) Reported by the vendor. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-csa.shtml ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ----------------------------------------------------------------------

Unspecified vulnerability in Cisco Security Agent 5.2 before 5.2.0.285, when running on Linux, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (kernel panic) via "a series of TCP packets.". The Cisco Security Agent is prone to a denial-of-service vulnerability. This issue is tracked by Cisco Bug ID CSCtb89870. An attacker can exploit this issue to cause the vulnerable computer to crash, denying service to legitimate users. Cisco Security Agent 5.2 for Windows and Linux is vulnerable. Cisco Security Agent adopts behavior-based evaluation criteria to identify and protect servers and terminal computers, instead of relying only on signature matching for analysis and identification, successfully solving the security risks brought by unknown viruses. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Cisco Security Advisory: Multiple Vulnerabilities in Cisco Security Agent Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20100217-csa Revision 1.0 For Public Release 2010 February 17 1600 UTC (GMT) +--------------------------------------------------------------------- Summary ======= The Management Center for Cisco Security Agents is affected by a directory traversal vulnerability and a SQL injection vulnerability. Successful exploitation of the directory traversal vulnerability may allow an authenticated attacker to view and download arbitrary files from the server hosting the Management Center. Successful exploitation of the SQL injection vulnerability may allow an authenticated attacker to execute SQL statements that can cause instability of the product or changes in the configuration. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. These vulnerabilities are independent of each other. Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. This advisory is posted at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-csa.shtml Affected Products ================= Vulnerable Products +------------------ Cisco Security Agent releases 5.1, 5.2 and 6.0 are affected by the SQL injection vulnerability. Note: Only the Management Center for Cisco Security Agents is affected by the directory traversal and SQL injection vulnerabilities. The agents installed on user end-points are not affected. Standalone agents are installed in the following products: * Cisco Unified Communications Manager (CallManager) * Cisco Conference Connection (CCC) * Emergency Responder * IPCC Express * IPCC Enterprise * IPCC Hosted * IP Interactive Voice Response (IP IVR) * IP Queue Manager * Intelligent Contact Management (ICM) * Cisco Voice Portal (CVP) * Cisco Unified Meeting Place * Cisco Personal Assistant (PA) * Cisco Unity * Cisco Unity Connection * Cisco Unity Bridge * Cisco Secure ACS Solution Engine * Cisco Internet Service Node (ISN) * Cisco Security Manager (CSM) Note: The Sun Solaris version of the Cisco Security Agent is not affected by these vulnerabilities. No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these vulnerabilities. Management Center for Cisco Security Agents Directory Traversal Vulnerability +---------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Management Center for Cisco Security Agents is affected by a directory traversal vulnerability that may allow an authenticated attacker to view and download arbitrary files from the server that is hosting the Management Center for Cisco Security Agents. Management Center for Cisco Security Agents SQL Injection Vulnerability +---------------------------------------------------------------------- The Management Center for Cisco Security Agents is also affected by a SQL injection vulnerability that may allow an authenticated attacker to execute SQL statements that can cause the Management Center for Cisco Security Agents to become unstable or modify its configuration. These configuration changes may result in modifications to the security policies of the endpoints. Additionally, an attacker may create, delete, or modify management user accounts that are found in the Management Center for Cisco Security Agents. Vulnerability Scoring Details ============================= Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at: http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss CSCtd73275 - Directory Traversal in the Management Center for Cisco Security Agents CVSS Base Score - 6.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - Single Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - None CVSS Temporal Score - 5.9 Exploitability - High Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCtd73290 - Management Center for Cisco Security Agents: SQL Injection CVSS Base Score - 9 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - Single Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCtb89870 - Kernel Panic When Receiving Certain TCP Packets CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== Successful exploitation of the directory traversal vulnerability may allow an authenticated attacker to view and download arbitrary files from the server that is hosting the Management Center for Cisco Security Agents. Successful exploitation of the SQL injection vulnerability may allow an authenticated attacker to execute SQL statements that can cause the Management Center for Cisco Security Agents to become unstable or modify its configuration. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. +-----------------------------------------------------+ | | Cisco | First | | | Vulnerability | Security | Fixed | Recommended | | | Agent | Version | Release | | | Release | | | |---------------+----------+------------+-------------| | | 5.1 | Not | Not | | | | vulnerable | vulnerable | |Directory |----------+------------+-------------| | Traversal | 5.2 | Not | Not | | Vulnerability | | vulnerable | vulnerable | | |----------+------------+-------------| | | 6.0 | 6.0.1.132 | 6.0.1.132 | |---------------+----------+------------+-------------| | | 5.1 | 5.1.0.117 | 5.1.0.117 | |SQL Injection |----------+------------+-------------| | Vulnerability | 5.2 | 5.2.0.296 | 5.2.0.296 | | |----------+------------+-------------| | | 6.0 | 6.0.1.132 | 6.0.1.132 | |---------------+----------+------------+-------------| | | 5.1 | Not | 5.1.0.117 | | | | vulnerable | | |Denial of |----------+------------+-------------| | Service | 5.2 | 5.2.0.285 | 5.2.0.296 | |Vulnerability |----------+------------+-------------| | | 6.0 | Not | 6.0.1.132 | | | | vulnerable | | +-----------------------------------------------------+ Cisco CSA software can be downloaded from the following link: http://tools.cisco.com/support/downloads/go/Redirect.x?mdfid=278065206 Workarounds =========== There are no workarounds available to mitigate these vulnerabilities. Additional mitigations that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied Intelligence companion document for this Advisory: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20100217-csa.shtml Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at: http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerabilities described in this advisory. The directory traversal and SQL injection vulnerabilities were discovered and reported to Cisco by Gabriele Giuseppini from Cigital. Cisco PSIRT appreciates the opportunity to work with researchers on security vulnerabilities and welcomes the opportunity to review and assist in product reports. The DoS vulnerability was found during internal testing. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-csa.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +----------------------------------------+ | Revision | | Initial | | 1.0 | 2010-February-17 | public | | | | release. | +----------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at: http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iD8DBQFLew9U86n/Gc8U/uARAifvAJ9oLuXJY6iy962givBVY7701k4ktACfa3wK O9O+Q4F1alHxm6CIbUIXkUs= =+hka -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ . This can be exploited to manipulate SQL queries by injecting arbitrary SQL code. NOTE: This vulnerability affects both managed and standalone versions. SOLUTION: Update to version 6.0.1.132, 5.1.0.117, or 5.2.0.296: http://tools.cisco.com/support/downloads/go/Redirect.x?mdfid=278065206 PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: 1, 2) The vendor credits Gabriele Giuseppini from Cigital. 3) Reported by the vendor. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-csa.shtml ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ----------------------------------------------------------------------

Unspecified vulnerability in Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance 7.2 before 7.2(4.46), 8.0 before 8.0(4.38), 8.1 before 8.1(2.29), and 8.2 before 8.2(1.5); and Cisco PIX 500 Series Security Appliance; allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (prevention of new connections) via crafted TCP segments during termination of the TCP connection that cause the connection to remain in CLOSEWAIT status, aka "TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability.". Cisco ASA security appliances are prone to a remote denial-of-service vulnerability. Attackers can exploit this issue to exhaust available TCP connections, resulting in a denial-of-service condition. This issue is documented in Cisco bug ID CSCsz77717. 4) An error in WebVPN can be exploited to trigger an appliance reload via a specially crafted DTLS packet. 7) An error in the implementation of the NT LAN Manager version 1 (NTLMv1) protocol can be exploited to bypass authentication via a specially crafted username. SOLUTION: Update to a fixed version. Please see the vendor's advisory for detailed patch information. PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: Reported by the vendor. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-asa.shtml ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. There are workarounds for some of the vulnerabilities disclosed in this advisory. Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. This advisory is posted at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-asa.shtml. For specific version information, refer to the "Software Versions and Fixes" section of this advisory. Versions 7.0.x, 7.1.x, 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. SIP inspection is enabled by default. To check if SIP inspection is enabled, issue the "show service-policy | include sip" command and confirm that some output is returned. Sample output is displayed in the following example: ciscoasa#show service-policy | include sip Inspect: sip , packet 0, drop 0, reset-drop 0 Alternatively, an appliance that has SIP inspection enabled has a configuration similar to the following: class-map inspection_default match default-inspection-traffic ! policy-map global_policy class inspection_default ... inspect sip ... Versions 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. SCCP inspection is enabled by default. To check if SCCP inspection is enabled, issue the "show service-policy | include skinny" command and confirm that some output is returned. Sample output is displayed in the following example: ciscoasa#show service-policy | include skinny Inspect: skinny , packet 0, drop 0, reset-drop 0 Alternatively, an appliance that has SCCP inspection enabled has a configuration similar to the following: class-map inspection_default match default-inspection-traffic ! policy-map global_policy class inspection_default ... inspect skinny ... Affected versions include 7.1.x, 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x. Administrators can enable WebVPN with the "enable <interface name>" command in "webvpn" configuration mode. DTLS can be enabled by issuing the "svc dtls enable" command in "group policy webvpn" configuration mode. The following configuration snippet provides an example of a WebVPN configuration that enables DTLS: webvpn enable outside svc enable ... ! group-policy <group name> internal group-policy <group name> attributes ... webvpn svc dtls enable ... Altough WebVPN is disabled by default, DTLS is enabled by default in recent software releases. This vulnerability only affects configurations that use the "nailed" option at the end of their static statement. Additionally, traffic that matches "static" statement must also be inspected by a Cisco AIP-SSM (an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) module) in inline mode. IPS inline operation mode is enabled by using the "ips inline {fail-close | fail-open}" command in "class" configuration mode. Versions 7.0.x, 7.1.x, 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. IKE is not enabled by default. If IKE is enabled, the "isakmp enable <interface name>" command appears in the configuration. Versions 7.0.x, 7.1.x, 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. Administrators can configure NTLMv1 authentication by defining an Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) server group that uses the NTLMv1 protocol with the "aaa-server <AAA server group tag> protocol nt" command and then configuring a service that requires authentication to use that AAA server group. To verify that NTLMv1 authentication is enabled and active, issue the "show aaa-server protocol nt" command. For more information, refer to the End of Life announcement at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/vpndevc/ps5708/ps5709/ps2030/end_of_life_notice_cisco_pix_525_sec_app.html. How To Determine The Running Software Version +-------------------------------------------- To determine whether a vulnerable version of Cisco ASA Software is running on an appliance, administrators can issue the "show version" command-line interface (CLI) command. The following example shows a Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance that is running software version 8.0(4): ASA#show version Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Software Version 8.0(4) Device Manager Version 6.0(1) <output truncated> Customers who use Cisco ASDM to manage devices can locate the software version in the table that is displayed in the login window or upper-left corner of the Cisco ASDM window. Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable +-------------------------------- The Cisco Firewall Services Module (FWSM) is affected by some of the vulnerabilities in this advisory. A separate Cisco Security Advisory has been published to disclose the vulnerabilities that affect the FWSM. This advisory is available at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-fwsm.shtml. With the exception of the Cisco FWSM, no other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these vulnerabilities. It offers firewall, intrusion prevention (IPS), anti-X, and VPN services. This vulnerability is triggered only when specific TCP segments are sent to certain TCP-based services that terminate on the affected appliance. Although exploitation of this vulnerability requires a TCP three-way handshake, authentication is not required. Appliances are only vulnerable when SIP inspection is enabled. Only transit traffic can trigger these vulnerabilities; traffic that is destined to the appliance will not trigger the vulnerabilities. Appliances are only vulnerable when SCCP inspection is enabled. Only transit traffic can trigger this vulnerability; traffic that is destined to the appliance will not trigger the vulnerabily. Appliances are only vulnerable when they are configured for WebVPN and DTLS transport. This vulnerability is only triggered by traffic that is destined to the appliance; transit traffic will not trigger the vulnerability. A malformed, transit TCP segment is received. 2. The TCP segment matches a static NAT translation that has the "nailed" option configured on it. 3. The TCP segment is also processed by the Cisco AIP-SSM, which is configured for inline mode of operation. A TCP three-way handshake is not necessary to exploit this vulnerability. The tunnels are not torn down immediately; IPsec traffic will continue to flow until the next rekey, at which time the rekey will fail and the tunnels will be torn down. Both site-to-site and remote access VPN tunnels are affected. The vulnerability is triggered when the appliance processes a malformed IKE message on port UDP 4500 that traverses an existing IPsec tunnel. The only way to recover and re-establish IPsec VPN tunnels is to reload the appliance. When this vulnerability is exploited, the security appliance will generate syslog messages 713903 and 713906, which will be followed by the loss of IPsec peers. NTLMv1 Authentication Bypass Vulnerability +----------------------------------------- Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances contain a vulnerability that could result in authentication bypass when the affected appliance is configured to authenticate users against Microsoft Windows servers using the NTLMv1 protocol. Users can bypass authentication by providing an an invalid, crafted username during an authentication request. Any services that use a AAA server group that is configured to use the NTLMv1 authentication protocol is affected. Affected services include: * Telnet access to the security appliance * SSH access to the security appliance * HTTPS access to the security appliance (including Cisco ASDM access) * Serial console access * Privileged (enable) mode access * Cut-through proxy for network access * VPN access This vulnerability is documented in Cisco bug ID CSCte21953 and has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2010-0568. Vulnerability Scoring Details ============================= Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at: http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss. TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------------- * CSCsz77717 ("TCP sessions remain in CLOSEWAIT indefinitely") CVSS Base Score - 7.1 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Medium Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 5.9 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed SIP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities +----------------------------------------------- * CSCsy91157 ("Watchdog when inspecting malformed SIP traffic") CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * CSCtc96018 ("ASA watchdog when inspecting malformed SIP traffic") CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed SCCP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability +---------------------------------------------- * CSCsz79757 ("Traceback - Thread Name: Dispatch Unit with skinny inspect enabled") CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed WebVPN DTLS Denial of Service Vulnerability +------------------------------------------ * CSCtb64913 ("WEBVPN: page fault in thread name dispath unit, eip udpmod_user_put") CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Crafted TCP Segment Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------- * CSCtb37219 ("Traceback in Dispatch Unit AIP-SSM Inline and nailed option on static") CVSS Base Score - 7.1 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Medium Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 5.9 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Crafted IKE Message Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------- * CSCtc47782 ("Malformed IKE traffic causes rekey to fail") CVSS Base Score - 5.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Partial CVSS Temporal Score - 4.1 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed NTLMv1 Authentication Bypass Vulnerability +----------------------------------------- * CSCte21953 ("ASA may allow authentication of an invalid username for NT auth") CVSS Base Score - 7.1 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Medium Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - None CVSS Temporal Score - 6.2 Exploitability - High Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------------- Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may lead to an exhaustion condition where the affected appliance cannot accept new TCP connections. A reload of the appliance is necessary to recover from the TCP connection exhaustion condition. If a TCP-based protocol is used for device management (like telnet, SSH, or HTTPS), a serial console connection may be needed to access to the appliance. SIP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities +----------------------------------------------- Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may cause a reload of the affected appliance. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. SCCP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability +---------------------------------------------- Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may cause a reload of the affected appliance. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. WebVPN DTLS Denial of Service Vulnerability +------------------------------------------ Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may cause a reload of the affected appliance. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. A manual reload of the appliance is required to re-establish all VPN tunnels. NTLMv1 Authentication Bypass Vulnerability +----------------------------------------- Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could result in unauthorized access to the network or appliance. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. The following table contains the first fixed software release of each vulnerability. A device running a version of the given release in a specific row (less than the First Fixed Release) is known to be vulnerable. However, no fixed 7.1.x software versions are planned because the 7.1.x major release has reached the End of Software Maintenance Releases milestone. Fixed Cisco ASA Software can be downloaded from: http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/ASAPSIRT?psrtdcat20e2 Recommended Releases +------------------- Releases 7.0(8.10), 7.2(4.46), 8.0(5.9), 8.1(2.40) (available early March 2010), and 8.2(2.4) are recommended releases because they contain the fixes for all vulnerabilities in this advisory. Cisco recommends upgrading to a release that is equal to or later than these recommended releases. For example, it may be possible to restrict SSH, Cisco ASDM/HTTPS, and Telnet administrative access to known hosts or IP subnetworks. For other services like remote access SSL VPN, where clients connect from unknown hosts and networks, no mitigations exist. SIP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities +----------------------------------------------- These vulnerabilities can be mitigated by disabling SIP inspection if it is not required. Administrators can disable SIP inspection by issuing the "no inspect sip" command in class configuration sub-mode within policy-map configuration. SCCP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability +---------------------------------------------- This vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling SCCP inspection if it is not required. Administrators can disable SCCP inspection by issuing the "no inspect skinny" command in class configuration sub-mode within the policy-map configuration. WebVPN DTLS Denial of Service Vulnerability +------------------------------------------ This vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling DTLS transport for WebVPN. Administrators can disable DTLS by issuing the "no svc dtls enable" command under the "webvpn" attributes section of the corresponding group policy. Crafted TCP Segment Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------- Possible workarounds for this vulnerability are the following: * Migrate from "nailed" static NAT entries to TCP-state bypass. * Use the Cisco AIP-SSM in promiscuous mode. This mode can be configured by issuing the "ips promiscuous" command in "class" configuration mode. * Disable IPS inspection for "nailed" static NAT entries. * If possible, change "nailed" static NAT entries to standard static NAT entries. This may be feasible since in most cases there is no need for allowing IPsec tunnels inside IPsec tunnels. Filtering out UDP port 4500 traffic across an IPsec tunnel can be accomplished by using a VPN filter, as shown in the following example: !-- Deny only UDP port 4500 traffic and allow everything else access-list VPNFILTER extended deny udp any any eq 4500 access-list VPNFILTER extended permit ip any any !-- Create a group policy and specify a VPN filter that uses the !-- previous ACL group-policy VPNPOL internal group-policy VPNPOL attributes vpn-filter value VPNFILTER !-- Reference the group policy with the VPN filter from the tunnel group tunnel-group 172.16.0.1 type ipsec-l2l tunnel-group 172.16.0.1 general-attributes default-group-policy VPNPOL For this workaround to be effective, the group policy needs to be applied to all site-to-site (tunnel type "ipsec-l2l") and remote access (tunnel type "ipsec-ra") tunnel groups. Warning: In addition to filtering out IKE traffic on UDP port 4500, this workaround may also affect other procotols like DNS and SNMP that send traffic on UDP port 4500. For example, if a DNS resolver sends traffic from UDP port 4500 to a DNS server, the response from the DNS server will be destined to UDP port 4500, which then may be filtered out by the filter used in this workaround. For a more comprehensive example of the VPN filter feature of the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances, refer to the whitepaper "PIX/ASA 7.x and Later: VPN Filter (Permit Specific Port or Protocol) Configuration Example for L2L and Remote Access" available at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/vpndevc/ps2030/products_configuration_example09186a00808c9a87.shtml In addition, if the security appliance does not terminate any tunnels, the vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling IKE by issuing the "no isakmp enable <interface name>" command. NTLMv1 Authentication Bypass Vulnerability +----------------------------------------- If NTLMv1 authentication is required, there are no workarounds for this vulnerability. If NTLMv1 authentication can be substituted by other authentication protocols (LDAP, RADIUS, TACACS+, etc.), it is possible to mitigate the vulnerability. Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html, or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml. Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of any of the vulnerabilities described in this advisory. SIP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities +----------------------------------------------- CSCsy91157 was discovered during internal testing. CSCtc96018 was discovered during the resolution of customer service requests. SCCP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability +---------------------------------------------- This vulnerability was discovered during the resolution of customer service requests. WebVPN DTLS Denial of Service Vulnerability +------------------------------------------ This vulnerability was discovered during the resolution of customer service requests. Crafted TCP Segment Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------- This vulnerability was discovered during internal testing. Crafted IKE Message Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------- This vulnerability was discovered during the resolution of customer service requests. NTLMv1 Authentication Bypass Vulnerability +----------------------------------------- This vulnerability was discovered during internal testing. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-asa.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +------------------------------------------------------------+ | Revision 1.0 | 2010-February-17 | Initial public release. | +------------------------------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html. This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt. +-------------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright 2008-2010 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. +-------------------------------------------------------------------- Updated: Feb 17, 2010 Document ID: 111485 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (GNU/Linux) iEYEARECAAYFAkt8GTYACgkQ86n/Gc8U/uBi6QCfYFKvAUdFrRvusqKoaFmMwfcH XOYAnRymbNOcRg5gmPFMO/zqgm2wOyKQ =JUg3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/

Unspecified vulnerability in Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance 7.0 before 7.0(8.10), 7.2 before 7.2(4.45), 8.0 before 8.0(5.2), 8.1 before 8.1(2.37), and 8.2 before 8.2(1.16); and Cisco PIX 500 Series Security Appliance; allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device reload) via malformed SIP messages, aka Bug ID CSCsy91157. The problem is Bug ID : CSCsy91157 It is a problem.Unauthorized by a third party SIP Service disruption via message (DoS) There is a possibility of being put into a state. This issue is tracked by Cisco Bug ID CSCsy91157. An attacker can exploit this issue to cause the vulnerable device to crash, denying service to legitimate users. 4) An error in WebVPN can be exploited to trigger an appliance reload via a specially crafted DTLS packet. 7) An error in the implementation of the NT LAN Manager version 1 (NTLMv1) protocol can be exploited to bypass authentication via a specially crafted username. SOLUTION: Update to a fixed version. Please see the vendor's advisory for detailed patch information. PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: Reported by the vendor. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-asa.shtml ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Cisco Security Advisory: Multiple Vulnerabilities in Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20100217-asa Revision 1.0 For Public Release 2010 February 17 1600 UTC (GMT) +--------------------------------------------------------------------- Summary ======= Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances are affected by the following vulnerabilities: * TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability * Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities * Skinny Client Control Protocol (SCCP) Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability * WebVPN Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Denial of Service Vulnerability * Crafted TCP Segment Denial of Service Vulnerability * Crafted Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Message Denial of Service Vulnerability * NT LAN Manager version 1 (NTLMv1) Authentication Bypass Vulnerability These vulnerabilities are not interdependent; a release that is affected by one vulnerability is not necessarily affected by the others. There are workarounds for some of the vulnerabilities disclosed in this advisory. Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. This advisory is posted at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-asa.shtml. For specific version information, refer to the "Software Versions and Fixes" section of this advisory. TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------------- Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances may experience a TCP connection exhaustion condition (no new TCP connections are accepted) that can be triggered through the receipt of specific TCP segments during the TCP connection termination phase. Versions 7.0.x, 7.1.x, 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. SIP inspection is enabled by default. To check if SIP inspection is enabled, issue the "show service-policy | include sip" command and confirm that some output is returned. Sample output is displayed in the following example: ciscoasa#show service-policy | include sip Inspect: sip , packet 0, drop 0, reset-drop 0 Alternatively, an appliance that has SIP inspection enabled has a configuration similar to the following: class-map inspection_default match default-inspection-traffic ! policy-map global_policy class inspection_default ... inspect sip ... Versions 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. SCCP inspection is enabled by default. To check if SCCP inspection is enabled, issue the "show service-policy | include skinny" command and confirm that some output is returned. Sample output is displayed in the following example: ciscoasa#show service-policy | include skinny Inspect: skinny , packet 0, drop 0, reset-drop 0 Alternatively, an appliance that has SCCP inspection enabled has a configuration similar to the following: class-map inspection_default match default-inspection-traffic ! policy-map global_policy class inspection_default ... inspect skinny ... Affected versions include 7.1.x, 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x. Administrators can enable WebVPN with the "enable <interface name>" command in "webvpn" configuration mode. DTLS can be enabled by issuing the "svc dtls enable" command in "group policy webvpn" configuration mode. The following configuration snippet provides an example of a WebVPN configuration that enables DTLS: webvpn enable outside svc enable ... ! group-policy <group name> internal group-policy <group name> attributes ... webvpn svc dtls enable ... Altough WebVPN is disabled by default, DTLS is enabled by default in recent software releases. This vulnerability only affects configurations that use the "nailed" option at the end of their static statement. Additionally, traffic that matches "static" statement must also be inspected by a Cisco AIP-SSM (an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) module) in inline mode. IPS inline operation mode is enabled by using the "ips inline {fail-close | fail-open}" command in "class" configuration mode. Versions 7.0.x, 7.1.x, 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. IKE is not enabled by default. If IKE is enabled, the "isakmp enable <interface name>" command appears in the configuration. Versions 7.0.x, 7.1.x, 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. Administrators can configure NTLMv1 authentication by defining an Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) server group that uses the NTLMv1 protocol with the "aaa-server <AAA server group tag> protocol nt" command and then configuring a service that requires authentication to use that AAA server group. To verify that NTLMv1 authentication is enabled and active, issue the "show aaa-server protocol nt" command. For more information, refer to the End of Life announcement at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/vpndevc/ps5708/ps5709/ps2030/end_of_life_notice_cisco_pix_525_sec_app.html. How To Determine The Running Software Version +-------------------------------------------- To determine whether a vulnerable version of Cisco ASA Software is running on an appliance, administrators can issue the "show version" command-line interface (CLI) command. The following example shows a Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance that is running software version 8.0(4): ASA#show version Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Software Version 8.0(4) Device Manager Version 6.0(1) <output truncated> Customers who use Cisco ASDM to manage devices can locate the software version in the table that is displayed in the login window or upper-left corner of the Cisco ASDM window. Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable +-------------------------------- The Cisco Firewall Services Module (FWSM) is affected by some of the vulnerabilities in this advisory. A separate Cisco Security Advisory has been published to disclose the vulnerabilities that affect the FWSM. This advisory is available at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-fwsm.shtml. With the exception of the Cisco FWSM, no other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these vulnerabilities. It offers firewall, intrusion prevention (IPS), anti-X, and VPN services. This vulnerability is triggered only when specific TCP segments are sent to certain TCP-based services that terminate on the affected appliance. Although exploitation of this vulnerability requires a TCP three-way handshake, authentication is not required. Appliances are only vulnerable when SIP inspection is enabled. Only transit traffic can trigger these vulnerabilities; traffic that is destined to the appliance will not trigger the vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities are documented in Cisco bug IDs CSCsy91157, and CSCtc96018, and have been assigned CVE IDs CVE-2010-0150, and CVE-2010-0569 respectively. Appliances are only vulnerable when SCCP inspection is enabled. Only transit traffic can trigger this vulnerability; traffic that is destined to the appliance will not trigger the vulnerabily. Appliances are only vulnerable when they are configured for WebVPN and DTLS transport. This vulnerability is only triggered by traffic that is destined to the appliance; transit traffic will not trigger the vulnerability. A malformed, transit TCP segment is received. 2. The TCP segment matches a static NAT translation that has the "nailed" option configured on it. 3. The TCP segment is also processed by the Cisco AIP-SSM, which is configured for inline mode of operation. A TCP three-way handshake is not necessary to exploit this vulnerability. The tunnels are not torn down immediately; IPsec traffic will continue to flow until the next rekey, at which time the rekey will fail and the tunnels will be torn down. Both site-to-site and remote access VPN tunnels are affected. The vulnerability is triggered when the appliance processes a malformed IKE message on port UDP 4500 that traverses an existing IPsec tunnel. The only way to recover and re-establish IPsec VPN tunnels is to reload the appliance. When this vulnerability is exploited, the security appliance will generate syslog messages 713903 and 713906, which will be followed by the loss of IPsec peers. Users can bypass authentication by providing an an invalid, crafted username during an authentication request. Any services that use a AAA server group that is configured to use the NTLMv1 authentication protocol is affected. Vulnerability Scoring Details ============================= Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at: http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss. TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------------- * CSCsz77717 ("TCP sessions remain in CLOSEWAIT indefinitely") CVSS Base Score - 7.1 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Medium Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 5.9 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed SIP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities +----------------------------------------------- * CSCsy91157 ("Watchdog when inspecting malformed SIP traffic") CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * CSCtc96018 ("ASA watchdog when inspecting malformed SIP traffic") CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed SCCP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability +---------------------------------------------- * CSCsz79757 ("Traceback - Thread Name: Dispatch Unit with skinny inspect enabled") CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed WebVPN DTLS Denial of Service Vulnerability +------------------------------------------ * CSCtb64913 ("WEBVPN: page fault in thread name dispath unit, eip udpmod_user_put") CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Crafted TCP Segment Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------- * CSCtb37219 ("Traceback in Dispatch Unit AIP-SSM Inline and nailed option on static") CVSS Base Score - 7.1 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Medium Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 5.9 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Crafted IKE Message Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------- * CSCtc47782 ("Malformed IKE traffic causes rekey to fail") CVSS Base Score - 5.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Partial CVSS Temporal Score - 4.1 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed NTLMv1 Authentication Bypass Vulnerability +----------------------------------------- * CSCte21953 ("ASA may allow authentication of an invalid username for NT auth") CVSS Base Score - 7.1 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Medium Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - None CVSS Temporal Score - 6.2 Exploitability - High Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------------- Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may lead to an exhaustion condition where the affected appliance cannot accept new TCP connections. A reload of the appliance is necessary to recover from the TCP connection exhaustion condition. If a TCP-based protocol is used for device management (like telnet, SSH, or HTTPS), a serial console connection may be needed to access to the appliance. SIP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities +----------------------------------------------- Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may cause a reload of the affected appliance. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. SCCP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability +---------------------------------------------- Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may cause a reload of the affected appliance. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. WebVPN DTLS Denial of Service Vulnerability +------------------------------------------ Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may cause a reload of the affected appliance. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. Crafted TCP Segment Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------- Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may cause a reload of the affected appliance. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. Crafted IKE Message Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------- Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could cause all IPsec VPN tunnels (LAN-to-LAN or remote) that terminate on the security appliance to be torn down and prevent new tunnels from being established. A manual reload of the appliance is required to re-establish all VPN tunnels. NTLMv1 Authentication Bypass Vulnerability +----------------------------------------- Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could result in unauthorized access to the network or appliance. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. The following table contains the first fixed software release of each vulnerability. A device running a version of the given release in a specific row (less than the First Fixed Release) is known to be vulnerable. +---------------------------------------+ | | Major | First | | Vulnerability | Release | Fixed | | | | Release | |-----------------+---------+-----------| | | 7.0 | Not | | | | affected | |TCP Connection |---------+-----------| | Exhaustion | 7.2 | 7.2(4.46) | |Denial of |---------+-----------| | Service | 8.0 | 8.0(4.38) | |Vulnerability ( |---------+-----------| | CSCsz77717) | 8.1 | 8.1(2.29) | | |---------+-----------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(1.5) | |-----------------+---------+-----------| | | 7.0 | 7.0(8.10) | |SIP Inspection |---------+-----------| | Denial of | 7.2 | 7.2(4.45) | |Service |---------+-----------| | Vulnerabilities | 8.0 | 8.0(5.2) | |(CSCsy91157 and |---------+-----------| | CSCtc96018) | 8.1 | 8.1(2.37) | | |---------+-----------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(1.16) | |-----------------+---------+-----------| | | 7.0 | Not | | | | affected | | |---------+-----------| | SCCP Inspection | 7.2 | Not | | Denial of | | affected | |Service |---------+-----------| | Vulnerability ( | 8.0 | 8.0(4.38) | |CSCsz79757) |---------+-----------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.29) | | |---------+-----------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(1.2) | |-----------------+---------+-----------| | | 7.0 | Not | | | | affected | |WebVPN DTLS |---------+-----------| | Denial of | 7.2 | 7.2(4.45) | |Service |---------+-----------| | Vulnerability ( | 8.0 | 8.0(4.44) | |CSCtb64913) |---------+-----------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.35) | | |---------+-----------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(1.10) | |-----------------+---------+-----------| | | 7.0 | 7.0(8.10) | | |---------+-----------| | Crafted TCP | 7.2 | 7.2(4.45) | |Segment Denial |---------+-----------| | of Service | 8.0 | 8.0(4.44) | |Vulnerability ( |---------+-----------| | CSCtb37219) | 8.1 | 8.1(2.35) | | |---------+-----------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(1.10) | |-----------------+---------+-----------| | | 7.0 | 7.0(8.10) | | |---------+-----------| | Crafted IKE | 7.2 | 7.2(4.45) | |Message Denial |---------+-----------| | of Service | 8.0 | 8.0(5.1) | |Vulnerability ( |---------+-----------| | CSCtc47782) | 8.1 | 8.1(2.37) | | |---------+-----------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(1.15) | |-----------------+---------+-----------| | | 7.0 | 7.0(8.10) | | |---------+-----------| | | 7.2 | 7.2(4.45) | | |---------+-----------| | NTLMv1 | 8.0 | 8.0(5.7) | |Authentication |---------+-----------| | Bypass | | 8.1 | | Vulnerability ( | | (2.40), | | CSCte21953) | 8.1 | available | | | | early | | | | March | | | | 2010 | | |---------+-----------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(2.1) | +---------------------------------------+ Note: Cisco ASA Software versions 7.1.x are affected by some of the vulnerabilities in this advisory. However, no fixed 7.1.x software versions are planned because the 7.1.x major release has reached the End of Software Maintenance Releases milestone. Fixed Cisco ASA Software can be downloaded from: http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/ASAPSIRT?psrtdcat20e2 Recommended Releases +------------------- Releases 7.0(8.10), 7.2(4.46), 8.0(5.9), 8.1(2.40) (available early March 2010), and 8.2(2.4) are recommended releases because they contain the fixes for all vulnerabilities in this advisory. Cisco recommends upgrading to a release that is equal to or later than these recommended releases. Workarounds =========== TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------------- It is possible to mitigate this vulnerability for TCP-based services that are offered to known clients. For example, it may be possible to restrict SSH, Cisco ASDM/HTTPS, and Telnet administrative access to known hosts or IP subnetworks. For other services like remote access SSL VPN, where clients connect from unknown hosts and networks, no mitigations exist. SIP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities +----------------------------------------------- These vulnerabilities can be mitigated by disabling SIP inspection if it is not required. Administrators can disable SIP inspection by issuing the "no inspect sip" command in class configuration sub-mode within policy-map configuration. SCCP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability +---------------------------------------------- This vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling SCCP inspection if it is not required. Administrators can disable SCCP inspection by issuing the "no inspect skinny" command in class configuration sub-mode within the policy-map configuration. WebVPN DTLS Denial of Service Vulnerability +------------------------------------------ This vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling DTLS transport for WebVPN. Administrators can disable DTLS by issuing the "no svc dtls enable" command under the "webvpn" attributes section of the corresponding group policy. Crafted TCP Segment Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------- Possible workarounds for this vulnerability are the following: * Migrate from "nailed" static NAT entries to TCP-state bypass. * Use the Cisco AIP-SSM in promiscuous mode. This mode can be configured by issuing the "ips promiscuous" command in "class" configuration mode. * Disable IPS inspection for "nailed" static NAT entries. * If possible, change "nailed" static NAT entries to standard static NAT entries. This may be feasible since in most cases there is no need for allowing IPsec tunnels inside IPsec tunnels. Filtering out UDP port 4500 traffic across an IPsec tunnel can be accomplished by using a VPN filter, as shown in the following example: !-- Deny only UDP port 4500 traffic and allow everything else access-list VPNFILTER extended deny udp any any eq 4500 access-list VPNFILTER extended permit ip any any !-- Create a group policy and specify a VPN filter that uses the !-- previous ACL group-policy VPNPOL internal group-policy VPNPOL attributes vpn-filter value VPNFILTER !-- Reference the group policy with the VPN filter from the tunnel group tunnel-group 172.16.0.1 type ipsec-l2l tunnel-group 172.16.0.1 general-attributes default-group-policy VPNPOL For this workaround to be effective, the group policy needs to be applied to all site-to-site (tunnel type "ipsec-l2l") and remote access (tunnel type "ipsec-ra") tunnel groups. Warning: In addition to filtering out IKE traffic on UDP port 4500, this workaround may also affect other procotols like DNS and SNMP that send traffic on UDP port 4500. For example, if a DNS resolver sends traffic from UDP port 4500 to a DNS server, the response from the DNS server will be destined to UDP port 4500, which then may be filtered out by the filter used in this workaround. For a more comprehensive example of the VPN filter feature of the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances, refer to the whitepaper "PIX/ASA 7.x and Later: VPN Filter (Permit Specific Port or Protocol) Configuration Example for L2L and Remote Access" available at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/vpndevc/ps2030/products_configuration_example09186a00808c9a87.shtml In addition, if the security appliance does not terminate any tunnels, the vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling IKE by issuing the "no isakmp enable <interface name>" command. NTLMv1 Authentication Bypass Vulnerability +----------------------------------------- If NTLMv1 authentication is required, there are no workarounds for this vulnerability. If NTLMv1 authentication can be substituted by other authentication protocols (LDAP, RADIUS, TACACS+, etc.), it is possible to mitigate the vulnerability. Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html, or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml. Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of any of the vulnerabilities described in this advisory. TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------------- This vulnerability was discovered during the resolution of a customer service request. SIP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities +----------------------------------------------- CSCsy91157 was discovered during internal testing. CSCtc96018 was discovered during the resolution of customer service requests. SCCP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability +---------------------------------------------- This vulnerability was discovered during the resolution of customer service requests. WebVPN DTLS Denial of Service Vulnerability +------------------------------------------ This vulnerability was discovered during the resolution of customer service requests. Crafted TCP Segment Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------- This vulnerability was discovered during internal testing. Crafted IKE Message Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------- This vulnerability was discovered during the resolution of customer service requests. NTLMv1 Authentication Bypass Vulnerability +----------------------------------------- This vulnerability was discovered during internal testing. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-asa.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +------------------------------------------------------------+ | Revision 1.0 | 2010-February-17 | Initial public release. | +------------------------------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html. This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt. +-------------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright 2008-2010 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. +-------------------------------------------------------------------- Updated: Feb 17, 2010 Document ID: 111485 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (GNU/Linux) iEYEARECAAYFAkt8GTYACgkQ86n/Gc8U/uBi6QCfYFKvAUdFrRvusqKoaFmMwfcH XOYAnRymbNOcRg5gmPFMO/zqgm2wOyKQ =JUg3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/

The Cisco Firewall Services Module (FWSM) 4.0 before 4.0(8), as used in for the Cisco Catalyst 6500 switches, Cisco 7600 routers, and ASA 5500 Adaptive Security Appliances, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via a malformed Skinny Client Control Protocol (SCCP) message. An attacker can exploit this issue to cause a denial-of-service condition. This issue is being tracked by Cisco BugID CSCsz79757 and CSCtb60485. 4) An error in WebVPN can be exploited to trigger an appliance reload via a specially crafted DTLS packet. 7) An error in the implementation of the NT LAN Manager version 1 (NTLMv1) protocol can be exploited to bypass authentication via a specially crafted username. SOLUTION: Update to a fixed version. Please see the vendor's advisory for detailed patch information. PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: Reported by the vendor. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-asa.shtml ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. The following example shows a system with a Cisco FWSM (WS-SVC-FWM-1) installed in slot 2: switch>show module Mod Ports Card Type Model Serial No. --- ----- -------------------------------------- ------------------ ----------- 1 16 SFM-capable 16 port 1000mb GBIC WS-X6516-GBIC SAL06334NS9 2 6 Firewall Module WS-SVC-FWM-1 SAD10360485 3 8 Intrusion Detection System WS-SVC-IDSM-2 SAD0932089Z 4 4 SLB Application Processor Complex WS-X6066-SLB-APC SAD093004BD 5 2 Supervisor Engine 720 (Active) WS-SUP720-3B SAL0934888E Mod MAC addresses Hw Fw Sw Status --- ---------------------------------- ------ ------------ ------------ ------- 1 0009.11e3.ade8 to 0009.11e3.adf7 5.1 6.3(1) 8.5(0.46)RFW Ok 2 0018.ba41.5092 to 0018.ba41.5099 4.0 7.2(1) 3.2(2)10 Ok 3 0014.a90c.9956 to 0014.a90c.995d 5.0 7.2(1) 5.1(6)E1 Ok 4 0014.a90c.66e6 to 0014.a90c.66ed 1.7 4.2(3) Ok 5 0013.c42e.7fe0 to 0013.c42e.7fe3 4.4 8.1(3) 12.2(18)SXF1 Ok [...] After locating the correct slot, issue the "show module <slot number>" command to identify the software version that is running. Example output follows: switch>show module 2 Mod Ports Card Type Model Serial No. --- ----- -------------------------------------- ------------------ ----------- 2 6 Firewall Module WS-SVC-FWM-1 SAD10360485 Mod MAC addresses Hw Fw Sw Status --- ---------------------------------- ------ ------------ ------------ ------- 2 0018.ba41.5092 to 0018.ba41.5099 4.0 7.2(1) 3.2(2)10 Ok [...] The preceding example shows that the FWSM is running software version 3.2(2)10 as indicated by the column under "Sw." Note: Recent versions of Cisco IOS Software will show the software version of each module in the output from the "show module" command; therefore, executing the "show module <slot number>" command is not necessary. If a Virtual Switching System (VSS) is used to allow two physical Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Switches to operate as a single logical virtual switch, the "show module switch all" command can display the software version of all FWSMs that belong to switch 1 and switch 2. The output from this command will be similar to the output from the "show module <slot number>" but will include module information for the modules in each switch in the VSS. Alternatively, version information can be obtained directly from the FWSM through the "show version" command. The version notation is similar to the following example. The FWSM offers firewall services with stateful packet filtering and deep packet inspection. There are workarounds for some of the vulnerabilities disclosed in this advisory. Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. This advisory is posted at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-asa.shtml. Affected versions of Cisco ASA Software vary depending on the specific vulnerability. For specific version information, refer to the "Software Versions and Fixes" section of this advisory. TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------------- Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances may experience a TCP connection exhaustion condition (no new TCP connections are accepted) that can be triggered through the receipt of specific TCP segments during the TCP connection termination phase. Appliances that are running versions 7.1.x, 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected when they are configured for any of the following features: * SSL VPNs * Cisco Adaptive Security Device Manager (ASDM) Administrative Access * Telnet Access * SSH Access * Virtual Telnet * Virtual HTTP * Transport Layer Security (TLS) Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection SIP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities +----------------------------------------------- Two denial of service (DoS) vulnerabilities affect the SIP inspection feature of Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances. Versions 7.0.x, 7.1.x, 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. SIP inspection is enabled by default. To check if SIP inspection is enabled, issue the "show service-policy | include sip" command and confirm that some output is returned. Sample output is displayed in the following example: ciscoasa#show service-policy | include sip Inspect: sip , packet 0, drop 0, reset-drop 0 Alternatively, an appliance that has SIP inspection enabled has a configuration similar to the following: class-map inspection_default match default-inspection-traffic ! policy-map global_policy class inspection_default ... inspect sip ... Versions 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. SCCP inspection is enabled by default. To check if SCCP inspection is enabled, issue the "show service-policy | include skinny" command and confirm that some output is returned. Sample output is displayed in the following example: ciscoasa#show service-policy | include skinny Inspect: skinny , packet 0, drop 0, reset-drop 0 Alternatively, an appliance that has SCCP inspection enabled has a configuration similar to the following: class-map inspection_default match default-inspection-traffic ! policy-map global_policy class inspection_default ... inspect skinny ... Affected versions include 7.1.x, 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x. Administrators can enable WebVPN with the "enable <interface name>" command in "webvpn" configuration mode. DTLS can be enabled by issuing the "svc dtls enable" command in "group policy webvpn" configuration mode. The following configuration snippet provides an example of a WebVPN configuration that enables DTLS: webvpn enable outside svc enable ... ! group-policy <group name> internal group-policy <group name> attributes ... webvpn svc dtls enable ... Altough WebVPN is disabled by default, DTLS is enabled by default in recent software releases. This vulnerability only affects configurations that use the "nailed" option at the end of their static statement. Additionally, traffic that matches "static" statement must also be inspected by a Cisco AIP-SSM (an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) module) in inline mode. IPS inline operation mode is enabled by using the "ips inline {fail-close | fail-open}" command in "class" configuration mode. Versions 7.0.x, 7.1.x, 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. IKE is not enabled by default. If IKE is enabled, the "isakmp enable <interface name>" command appears in the configuration. Versions 7.0.x, 7.1.x, 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. Administrators can configure NTLMv1 authentication by defining an Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) server group that uses the NTLMv1 protocol with the "aaa-server <AAA server group tag> protocol nt" command and then configuring a service that requires authentication to use that AAA server group. To verify that NTLMv1 authentication is enabled and active, issue the "show aaa-server protocol nt" command. Sample output is displayed in the following example: ciscoasa#show aaa-server protocol nt Server Group: test Server Protocol: nt Server Address: 192.168.10.11 Server port: 139 Server status: ACTIVE, Last transaction (success) at 11:10:08 UTC Fri Jan 29 <output truncated> Cisco PIX 500 Series Security Appliance Vulnerability Status +----------------------------------------------------------- Cisco PIX 500 Series Security Appliances are affected by the following vulnerabilities: * TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability * SIP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities * SCCP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability * Crafted IKE Message Denial of Service Vulnerability * NTLMv1 Authentication Bypass Vulnerability Because the Cisco PIX 500 Series Security Appliances reached End of Software Maintenance Releases on July 28, 2009, no further software releases will be available for the Cisco PIX 500 Series Security Appliances. For more information, refer to the End of Life announcement at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/vpndevc/ps5708/ps5709/ps2030/end_of_life_notice_cisco_pix_525_sec_app.html. How To Determine The Running Software Version +-------------------------------------------- To determine whether a vulnerable version of Cisco ASA Software is running on an appliance, administrators can issue the "show version" command-line interface (CLI) command. The following example shows a Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance that is running software version 8.0(4): ASA#show version Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Software Version 8.0(4) Device Manager Version 6.0(1) <output truncated> Customers who use Cisco ASDM to manage devices can locate the software version in the table that is displayed in the login window or upper-left corner of the Cisco ASDM window. Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable +-------------------------------- The Cisco Firewall Services Module (FWSM) is affected by some of the vulnerabilities in this advisory. A separate Cisco Security Advisory has been published to disclose the vulnerabilities that affect the FWSM. This advisory is available at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-fwsm.shtml. With the exception of the Cisco FWSM, no other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these vulnerabilities. It offers firewall, intrusion prevention (IPS), anti-X, and VPN services. This vulnerability is triggered only when specific TCP segments are sent to certain TCP-based services that terminate on the affected appliance. Although exploitation of this vulnerability requires a TCP three-way handshake, authentication is not required. This vulnerability is documented in Cisco bug ID CSCsz77717 and has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2010-0149. Appliances are only vulnerable when SIP inspection is enabled. Only transit traffic can trigger these vulnerabilities; traffic that is destined to the appliance will not trigger the vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities are documented in Cisco bug IDs CSCsy91157, and CSCtc96018, and have been assigned CVE IDs CVE-2010-0150, and CVE-2010-0569 respectively. Appliances are only vulnerable when SCCP inspection is enabled. Only transit traffic can trigger this vulnerability; traffic that is destined to the appliance will not trigger the vulnerabily. This vulnerability is documented in Cisco bug ID CSCsz79757 and has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2010-0151. Appliances are only vulnerable when they are configured for WebVPN and DTLS transport. This vulnerability is only triggered by traffic that is destined to the appliance; transit traffic will not trigger the vulnerability. This vulnerability is documented in Cisco bug ID CSCtb64913 and has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2010-0565. A malformed, transit TCP segment is received. 2. The TCP segment matches a static NAT translation that has the "nailed" option configured on it. 3. The TCP segment is also processed by the Cisco AIP-SSM, which is configured for inline mode of operation. A TCP three-way handshake is not necessary to exploit this vulnerability. This vulnerability is documented in Cisco bug ID CSCtb37219 and has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2010-0566. The tunnels are not torn down immediately; IPsec traffic will continue to flow until the next rekey, at which time the rekey will fail and the tunnels will be torn down. Both site-to-site and remote access VPN tunnels are affected. The vulnerability is triggered when the appliance processes a malformed IKE message on port UDP 4500 that traverses an existing IPsec tunnel. The only way to recover and re-establish IPsec VPN tunnels is to reload the appliance. When this vulnerability is exploited, the security appliance will generate syslog messages 713903 and 713906, which will be followed by the loss of IPsec peers. This vulnerability is documented in Cisco bug ID CSCtc47782 and has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2010-0567. Users can bypass authentication by providing an an invalid, crafted username during an authentication request. Any services that use a AAA server group that is configured to use the NTLMv1 authentication protocol is affected. Affected services include: * Telnet access to the security appliance * SSH access to the security appliance * HTTPS access to the security appliance (including Cisco ASDM access) * Serial console access * Privileged (enable) mode access * Cut-through proxy for network access * VPN access This vulnerability is documented in Cisco bug ID CSCte21953 and has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2010-0568. Vulnerability Scoring Details ============================= Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at: http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss. TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------------- * CSCsz77717 ("TCP sessions remain in CLOSEWAIT indefinitely") CVSS Base Score - 7.1 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Medium Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 5.9 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed SIP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities +----------------------------------------------- * CSCsy91157 ("Watchdog when inspecting malformed SIP traffic") CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * CSCtc96018 ("ASA watchdog when inspecting malformed SIP traffic") CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed SCCP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability +---------------------------------------------- * CSCsz79757 ("Traceback - Thread Name: Dispatch Unit with skinny inspect enabled") CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed WebVPN DTLS Denial of Service Vulnerability +------------------------------------------ * CSCtb64913 ("WEBVPN: page fault in thread name dispath unit, eip udpmod_user_put") CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Crafted TCP Segment Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------- * CSCtb37219 ("Traceback in Dispatch Unit AIP-SSM Inline and nailed option on static") CVSS Base Score - 7.1 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Medium Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 5.9 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Crafted IKE Message Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------- * CSCtc47782 ("Malformed IKE traffic causes rekey to fail") CVSS Base Score - 5.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Partial CVSS Temporal Score - 4.1 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed NTLMv1 Authentication Bypass Vulnerability +----------------------------------------- * CSCte21953 ("ASA may allow authentication of an invalid username for NT auth") CVSS Base Score - 7.1 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Medium Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - None CVSS Temporal Score - 6.2 Exploitability - High Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------------- Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may lead to an exhaustion condition where the affected appliance cannot accept new TCP connections. A reload of the appliance is necessary to recover from the TCP connection exhaustion condition. If a TCP-based protocol is used for device management (like telnet, SSH, or HTTPS), a serial console connection may be needed to access to the appliance. SIP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities +----------------------------------------------- Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may cause a reload of the affected appliance. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. SCCP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability +---------------------------------------------- Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may cause a reload of the affected appliance. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. WebVPN DTLS Denial of Service Vulnerability +------------------------------------------ Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may cause a reload of the affected appliance. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. Crafted TCP Segment Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------- Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may cause a reload of the affected appliance. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. Crafted IKE Message Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------- Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could cause all IPsec VPN tunnels (LAN-to-LAN or remote) that terminate on the security appliance to be torn down and prevent new tunnels from being established. A manual reload of the appliance is required to re-establish all VPN tunnels. NTLMv1 Authentication Bypass Vulnerability +----------------------------------------- Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could result in unauthorized access to the network or appliance. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. The following table contains the first fixed software release of each vulnerability. A device running a version of the given release in a specific row (less than the First Fixed Release) is known to be vulnerable. +---------------------------------------+ | | Major | First | | Vulnerability | Release | Fixed | | | | Release | |-----------------+---------+-----------| | | 7.0 | Not | | | | affected | |TCP Connection |---------+-----------| | Exhaustion | 7.2 | 7.2(4.46) | |Denial of |---------+-----------| | Service | 8.0 | 8.0(4.38) | |Vulnerability ( |---------+-----------| | CSCsz77717) | 8.1 | 8.1(2.29) | | |---------+-----------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(1.5) | |-----------------+---------+-----------| | | 7.0 | 7.0(8.10) | |SIP Inspection |---------+-----------| | Denial of | 7.2 | 7.2(4.45) | |Service |---------+-----------| | Vulnerabilities | 8.0 | 8.0(5.2) | |(CSCsy91157 and |---------+-----------| | CSCtc96018) | 8.1 | 8.1(2.37) | | |---------+-----------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(1.16) | |-----------------+---------+-----------| | | 7.0 | Not | | | | affected | | |---------+-----------| | SCCP Inspection | 7.2 | Not | | Denial of | | affected | |Service |---------+-----------| | Vulnerability ( | 8.0 | 8.0(4.38) | |CSCsz79757) |---------+-----------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.29) | | |---------+-----------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(1.2) | |-----------------+---------+-----------| | | 7.0 | Not | | | | affected | |WebVPN DTLS |---------+-----------| | Denial of | 7.2 | 7.2(4.45) | |Service |---------+-----------| | Vulnerability ( | 8.0 | 8.0(4.44) | |CSCtb64913) |---------+-----------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.35) | | |---------+-----------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(1.10) | |-----------------+---------+-----------| | | 7.0 | 7.0(8.10) | | |---------+-----------| | Crafted TCP | 7.2 | 7.2(4.45) | |Segment Denial |---------+-----------| | of Service | 8.0 | 8.0(4.44) | |Vulnerability ( |---------+-----------| | CSCtb37219) | 8.1 | 8.1(2.35) | | |---------+-----------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(1.10) | |-----------------+---------+-----------| | | 7.0 | 7.0(8.10) | | |---------+-----------| | Crafted IKE | 7.2 | 7.2(4.45) | |Message Denial |---------+-----------| | of Service | 8.0 | 8.0(5.1) | |Vulnerability ( |---------+-----------| | CSCtc47782) | 8.1 | 8.1(2.37) | | |---------+-----------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(1.15) | |-----------------+---------+-----------| | | 7.0 | 7.0(8.10) | | |---------+-----------| | | 7.2 | 7.2(4.45) | | |---------+-----------| | NTLMv1 | 8.0 | 8.0(5.7) | |Authentication |---------+-----------| | Bypass | | 8.1 | | Vulnerability ( | | (2.40), | | CSCte21953) | 8.1 | available | | | | early | | | | March | | | | 2010 | | |---------+-----------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(2.1) | +---------------------------------------+ Note: Cisco ASA Software versions 7.1.x are affected by some of the vulnerabilities in this advisory. However, no fixed 7.1.x software versions are planned because the 7.1.x major release has reached the End of Software Maintenance Releases milestone. Fixed Cisco ASA Software can be downloaded from: http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/ASAPSIRT?psrtdcat20e2 Recommended Releases +------------------- Releases 7.0(8.10), 7.2(4.46), 8.0(5.9), 8.1(2.40) (available early March 2010), and 8.2(2.4) are recommended releases because they contain the fixes for all vulnerabilities in this advisory. Cisco recommends upgrading to a release that is equal to or later than these recommended releases. Workarounds =========== TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------------- It is possible to mitigate this vulnerability for TCP-based services that are offered to known clients. For example, it may be possible to restrict SSH, Cisco ASDM/HTTPS, and Telnet administrative access to known hosts or IP subnetworks. For other services like remote access SSL VPN, where clients connect from unknown hosts and networks, no mitigations exist. SIP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities +----------------------------------------------- These vulnerabilities can be mitigated by disabling SIP inspection if it is not required. Administrators can disable SIP inspection by issuing the "no inspect sip" command in class configuration sub-mode within policy-map configuration. SCCP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability +---------------------------------------------- This vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling SCCP inspection if it is not required. Administrators can disable SCCP inspection by issuing the "no inspect skinny" command in class configuration sub-mode within the policy-map configuration. WebVPN DTLS Denial of Service Vulnerability +------------------------------------------ This vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling DTLS transport for WebVPN. Administrators can disable DTLS by issuing the "no svc dtls enable" command under the "webvpn" attributes section of the corresponding group policy. Crafted TCP Segment Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------- Possible workarounds for this vulnerability are the following: * Migrate from "nailed" static NAT entries to TCP-state bypass. * Use the Cisco AIP-SSM in promiscuous mode. This mode can be configured by issuing the "ips promiscuous" command in "class" configuration mode. * Disable IPS inspection for "nailed" static NAT entries. * If possible, change "nailed" static NAT entries to standard static NAT entries. This may be feasible since in most cases there is no need for allowing IPsec tunnels inside IPsec tunnels. Filtering out UDP port 4500 traffic across an IPsec tunnel can be accomplished by using a VPN filter, as shown in the following example: !-- Deny only UDP port 4500 traffic and allow everything else access-list VPNFILTER extended deny udp any any eq 4500 access-list VPNFILTER extended permit ip any any !-- Create a group policy and specify a VPN filter that uses the !-- previous ACL group-policy VPNPOL internal group-policy VPNPOL attributes vpn-filter value VPNFILTER !-- Reference the group policy with the VPN filter from the tunnel group tunnel-group 172.16.0.1 type ipsec-l2l tunnel-group 172.16.0.1 general-attributes default-group-policy VPNPOL For this workaround to be effective, the group policy needs to be applied to all site-to-site (tunnel type "ipsec-l2l") and remote access (tunnel type "ipsec-ra") tunnel groups. Warning: In addition to filtering out IKE traffic on UDP port 4500, this workaround may also affect other procotols like DNS and SNMP that send traffic on UDP port 4500. For example, if a DNS resolver sends traffic from UDP port 4500 to a DNS server, the response from the DNS server will be destined to UDP port 4500, which then may be filtered out by the filter used in this workaround. For a more comprehensive example of the VPN filter feature of the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances, refer to the whitepaper "PIX/ASA 7.x and Later: VPN Filter (Permit Specific Port or Protocol) Configuration Example for L2L and Remote Access" available at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/vpndevc/ps2030/products_configuration_example09186a00808c9a87.shtml In addition, if the security appliance does not terminate any tunnels, the vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling IKE by issuing the "no isakmp enable <interface name>" command. NTLMv1 Authentication Bypass Vulnerability +----------------------------------------- If NTLMv1 authentication is required, there are no workarounds for this vulnerability. If NTLMv1 authentication can be substituted by other authentication protocols (LDAP, RADIUS, TACACS+, etc.), it is possible to mitigate the vulnerability. Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html, or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml. Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of any of the vulnerabilities described in this advisory. TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------------- This vulnerability was discovered during the resolution of a customer service request. SIP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities +----------------------------------------------- CSCsy91157 was discovered during internal testing. CSCtc96018 was discovered during the resolution of customer service requests. SCCP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability +---------------------------------------------- This vulnerability was discovered during the resolution of customer service requests. WebVPN DTLS Denial of Service Vulnerability +------------------------------------------ This vulnerability was discovered during the resolution of customer service requests. Crafted TCP Segment Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------- This vulnerability was discovered during internal testing. Crafted IKE Message Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------- This vulnerability was discovered during the resolution of customer service requests. NTLMv1 Authentication Bypass Vulnerability +----------------------------------------- This vulnerability was discovered during internal testing. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-asa.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +------------------------------------------------------------+ | Revision 1.0 | 2010-February-17 | Initial public release. | +------------------------------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html. This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt. All rights reserved. +-------------------------------------------------------------------- Updated: Feb 17, 2010 Document ID: 111485 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (GNU/Linux) iEYEARECAAYFAkt8GTYACgkQ86n/Gc8U/uBi6QCfYFKvAUdFrRvusqKoaFmMwfcH XOYAnRymbNOcRg5gmPFMO/zqgm2wOyKQ =JUg3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/

Unspecified vulnerability in Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance 7.2 before 7.2(4.45), 8.0 before 8.0(4.44), 8.1 before 8.1(2.35), and 8.2 before 8.2(1.10), allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (page fault and device reload) via a malformed DTLS message, aka Bug ID CSCtb64913 and "WebVPN DTLS Denial of Service Vulnerability.". Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance There is a service disruption (DoS) There is a vulnerability that becomes a condition. The problem is Bug ID : CSCtb64913 It is a problem.Unauthorized by a third party DTLS Service disruption via message (DoS) There is a possibility of being put into a state. Attackers can exploit this issue to cause the device to reload, denying service to legitimate users. This issue is documented in Cisco bug ID CSCtb64913. 4) An error in WebVPN can be exploited to trigger an appliance reload via a specially crafted DTLS packet. 7) An error in the implementation of the NT LAN Manager version 1 (NTLMv1) protocol can be exploited to bypass authentication via a specially crafted username. SOLUTION: Update to a fixed version. Please see the vendor's advisory for detailed patch information. PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: Reported by the vendor. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-asa.shtml ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. There are workarounds for some of the vulnerabilities disclosed in this advisory. Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. This advisory is posted at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-asa.shtml. For specific version information, refer to the "Software Versions and Fixes" section of this advisory. TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------------- Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances may experience a TCP connection exhaustion condition (no new TCP connections are accepted) that can be triggered through the receipt of specific TCP segments during the TCP connection termination phase. Appliances that are running versions 7.1.x, 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected when they are configured for any of the following features: * SSL VPNs * Cisco Adaptive Security Device Manager (ASDM) Administrative Access * Telnet Access * SSH Access * Virtual Telnet * Virtual HTTP * Transport Layer Security (TLS) Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection SIP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities +----------------------------------------------- Two denial of service (DoS) vulnerabilities affect the SIP inspection feature of Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances. Versions 7.0.x, 7.1.x, 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. SIP inspection is enabled by default. To check if SIP inspection is enabled, issue the "show service-policy | include sip" command and confirm that some output is returned. Sample output is displayed in the following example: ciscoasa#show service-policy | include sip Inspect: sip , packet 0, drop 0, reset-drop 0 Alternatively, an appliance that has SIP inspection enabled has a configuration similar to the following: class-map inspection_default match default-inspection-traffic ! policy-map global_policy class inspection_default ... inspect sip ... Versions 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. SCCP inspection is enabled by default. To check if SCCP inspection is enabled, issue the "show service-policy | include skinny" command and confirm that some output is returned. Sample output is displayed in the following example: ciscoasa#show service-policy | include skinny Inspect: skinny , packet 0, drop 0, reset-drop 0 Alternatively, an appliance that has SCCP inspection enabled has a configuration similar to the following: class-map inspection_default match default-inspection-traffic ! policy-map global_policy class inspection_default ... inspect skinny ... Affected versions include 7.1.x, 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x. Administrators can enable WebVPN with the "enable <interface name>" command in "webvpn" configuration mode. DTLS can be enabled by issuing the "svc dtls enable" command in "group policy webvpn" configuration mode. The following configuration snippet provides an example of a WebVPN configuration that enables DTLS: webvpn enable outside svc enable ... ! group-policy <group name> internal group-policy <group name> attributes ... webvpn svc dtls enable ... Altough WebVPN is disabled by default, DTLS is enabled by default in recent software releases. This vulnerability only affects configurations that use the "nailed" option at the end of their static statement. Additionally, traffic that matches "static" statement must also be inspected by a Cisco AIP-SSM (an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) module) in inline mode. IPS inline operation mode is enabled by using the "ips inline {fail-close | fail-open}" command in "class" configuration mode. Versions 7.0.x, 7.1.x, 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. IKE is not enabled by default. If IKE is enabled, the "isakmp enable <interface name>" command appears in the configuration. Versions 7.0.x, 7.1.x, 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. Administrators can configure NTLMv1 authentication by defining an Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) server group that uses the NTLMv1 protocol with the "aaa-server <AAA server group tag> protocol nt" command and then configuring a service that requires authentication to use that AAA server group. To verify that NTLMv1 authentication is enabled and active, issue the "show aaa-server protocol nt" command. Cisco PIX 500 Series Security Appliances customers are encouraged to migrate to Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances or to implement any applicable workarounds that are listed in the "Workarounds" section of this advisory. For more information, refer to the End of Life announcement at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/vpndevc/ps5708/ps5709/ps2030/end_of_life_notice_cisco_pix_525_sec_app.html. How To Determine The Running Software Version +-------------------------------------------- To determine whether a vulnerable version of Cisco ASA Software is running on an appliance, administrators can issue the "show version" command-line interface (CLI) command. The following example shows a Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance that is running software version 8.0(4): ASA#show version Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Software Version 8.0(4) Device Manager Version 6.0(1) <output truncated> Customers who use Cisco ASDM to manage devices can locate the software version in the table that is displayed in the login window or upper-left corner of the Cisco ASDM window. Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable +-------------------------------- The Cisco Firewall Services Module (FWSM) is affected by some of the vulnerabilities in this advisory. A separate Cisco Security Advisory has been published to disclose the vulnerabilities that affect the FWSM. This advisory is available at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-fwsm.shtml. With the exception of the Cisco FWSM, no other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these vulnerabilities. It offers firewall, intrusion prevention (IPS), anti-X, and VPN services. Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances are affected by the following vulnerabilities: TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------------- Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances may experience a TCP connection exhaustion condition (no new TCP connections are accepted) when specific TCP segments are received during the TCP connection termination phase. This vulnerability is triggered only when specific TCP segments are sent to certain TCP-based services that terminate on the affected appliance. Although exploitation of this vulnerability requires a TCP three-way handshake, authentication is not required. Appliances are only vulnerable when SIP inspection is enabled. Only transit traffic can trigger these vulnerabilities; traffic that is destined to the appliance will not trigger the vulnerabilities. Appliances are only vulnerable when SCCP inspection is enabled. Only transit traffic can trigger this vulnerability; traffic that is destined to the appliance will not trigger the vulnerabily. Appliances are only vulnerable when they are configured for WebVPN and DTLS transport. This vulnerability is only triggered by traffic that is destined to the appliance; transit traffic will not trigger the vulnerability. A malformed, transit TCP segment is received. 2. The TCP segment matches a static NAT translation that has the "nailed" option configured on it. 3. The TCP segment is also processed by the Cisco AIP-SSM, which is configured for inline mode of operation. A TCP three-way handshake is not necessary to exploit this vulnerability. The tunnels are not torn down immediately; IPsec traffic will continue to flow until the next rekey, at which time the rekey will fail and the tunnels will be torn down. Both site-to-site and remote access VPN tunnels are affected. The vulnerability is triggered when the appliance processes a malformed IKE message on port UDP 4500 that traverses an existing IPsec tunnel. The only way to recover and re-establish IPsec VPN tunnels is to reload the appliance. When this vulnerability is exploited, the security appliance will generate syslog messages 713903 and 713906, which will be followed by the loss of IPsec peers. Users can bypass authentication by providing an an invalid, crafted username during an authentication request. Any services that use a AAA server group that is configured to use the NTLMv1 authentication protocol is affected. Affected services include: * Telnet access to the security appliance * SSH access to the security appliance * HTTPS access to the security appliance (including Cisco ASDM access) * Serial console access * Privileged (enable) mode access * Cut-through proxy for network access * VPN access This vulnerability is documented in Cisco bug ID CSCte21953 and has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2010-0568. Vulnerability Scoring Details ============================= Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at: http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss. TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------------- * CSCsz77717 ("TCP sessions remain in CLOSEWAIT indefinitely") CVSS Base Score - 7.1 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Medium Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 5.9 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed SIP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities +----------------------------------------------- * CSCsy91157 ("Watchdog when inspecting malformed SIP traffic") CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * CSCtc96018 ("ASA watchdog when inspecting malformed SIP traffic") CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed SCCP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability +---------------------------------------------- * CSCsz79757 ("Traceback - Thread Name: Dispatch Unit with skinny inspect enabled") CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed WebVPN DTLS Denial of Service Vulnerability +------------------------------------------ * CSCtb64913 ("WEBVPN: page fault in thread name dispath unit, eip udpmod_user_put") CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Crafted TCP Segment Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------- * CSCtb37219 ("Traceback in Dispatch Unit AIP-SSM Inline and nailed option on static") CVSS Base Score - 7.1 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Medium Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 5.9 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Crafted IKE Message Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------- * CSCtc47782 ("Malformed IKE traffic causes rekey to fail") CVSS Base Score - 5.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Partial CVSS Temporal Score - 4.1 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed NTLMv1 Authentication Bypass Vulnerability +----------------------------------------- * CSCte21953 ("ASA may allow authentication of an invalid username for NT auth") CVSS Base Score - 7.1 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Medium Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - None CVSS Temporal Score - 6.2 Exploitability - High Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------------- Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may lead to an exhaustion condition where the affected appliance cannot accept new TCP connections. A reload of the appliance is necessary to recover from the TCP connection exhaustion condition. If a TCP-based protocol is used for device management (like telnet, SSH, or HTTPS), a serial console connection may be needed to access to the appliance. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. A manual reload of the appliance is required to re-establish all VPN tunnels. NTLMv1 Authentication Bypass Vulnerability +----------------------------------------- Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could result in unauthorized access to the network or appliance. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. The following table contains the first fixed software release of each vulnerability. A device running a version of the given release in a specific row (less than the First Fixed Release) is known to be vulnerable. However, no fixed 7.1.x software versions are planned because the 7.1.x major release has reached the End of Software Maintenance Releases milestone. Fixed Cisco ASA Software can be downloaded from: http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/ASAPSIRT?psrtdcat20e2 Recommended Releases +------------------- Releases 7.0(8.10), 7.2(4.46), 8.0(5.9), 8.1(2.40) (available early March 2010), and 8.2(2.4) are recommended releases because they contain the fixes for all vulnerabilities in this advisory. Cisco recommends upgrading to a release that is equal to or later than these recommended releases. Workarounds =========== TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------------- It is possible to mitigate this vulnerability for TCP-based services that are offered to known clients. For example, it may be possible to restrict SSH, Cisco ASDM/HTTPS, and Telnet administrative access to known hosts or IP subnetworks. For other services like remote access SSL VPN, where clients connect from unknown hosts and networks, no mitigations exist. SIP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities +----------------------------------------------- These vulnerabilities can be mitigated by disabling SIP inspection if it is not required. Administrators can disable SIP inspection by issuing the "no inspect sip" command in class configuration sub-mode within policy-map configuration. SCCP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability +---------------------------------------------- This vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling SCCP inspection if it is not required. Administrators can disable SCCP inspection by issuing the "no inspect skinny" command in class configuration sub-mode within the policy-map configuration. WebVPN DTLS Denial of Service Vulnerability +------------------------------------------ This vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling DTLS transport for WebVPN. Administrators can disable DTLS by issuing the "no svc dtls enable" command under the "webvpn" attributes section of the corresponding group policy. Crafted TCP Segment Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------- Possible workarounds for this vulnerability are the following: * Migrate from "nailed" static NAT entries to TCP-state bypass. * Use the Cisco AIP-SSM in promiscuous mode. This mode can be configured by issuing the "ips promiscuous" command in "class" configuration mode. * Disable IPS inspection for "nailed" static NAT entries. * If possible, change "nailed" static NAT entries to standard static NAT entries. This may be feasible since in most cases there is no need for allowing IPsec tunnels inside IPsec tunnels. Filtering out UDP port 4500 traffic across an IPsec tunnel can be accomplished by using a VPN filter, as shown in the following example: !-- Deny only UDP port 4500 traffic and allow everything else access-list VPNFILTER extended deny udp any any eq 4500 access-list VPNFILTER extended permit ip any any !-- Create a group policy and specify a VPN filter that uses the !-- previous ACL group-policy VPNPOL internal group-policy VPNPOL attributes vpn-filter value VPNFILTER !-- Reference the group policy with the VPN filter from the tunnel group tunnel-group 172.16.0.1 type ipsec-l2l tunnel-group 172.16.0.1 general-attributes default-group-policy VPNPOL For this workaround to be effective, the group policy needs to be applied to all site-to-site (tunnel type "ipsec-l2l") and remote access (tunnel type "ipsec-ra") tunnel groups. Warning: In addition to filtering out IKE traffic on UDP port 4500, this workaround may also affect other procotols like DNS and SNMP that send traffic on UDP port 4500. For example, if a DNS resolver sends traffic from UDP port 4500 to a DNS server, the response from the DNS server will be destined to UDP port 4500, which then may be filtered out by the filter used in this workaround. For a more comprehensive example of the VPN filter feature of the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances, refer to the whitepaper "PIX/ASA 7.x and Later: VPN Filter (Permit Specific Port or Protocol) Configuration Example for L2L and Remote Access" available at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/vpndevc/ps2030/products_configuration_example09186a00808c9a87.shtml In addition, if the security appliance does not terminate any tunnels, the vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling IKE by issuing the "no isakmp enable <interface name>" command. NTLMv1 Authentication Bypass Vulnerability +----------------------------------------- If NTLMv1 authentication is required, there are no workarounds for this vulnerability. If NTLMv1 authentication can be substituted by other authentication protocols (LDAP, RADIUS, TACACS+, etc.), it is possible to mitigate the vulnerability. Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html, or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml. Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of any of the vulnerabilities described in this advisory. TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------------- This vulnerability was discovered during the resolution of a customer service request. SIP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities +----------------------------------------------- CSCsy91157 was discovered during internal testing. CSCtc96018 was discovered during the resolution of customer service requests. SCCP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability +---------------------------------------------- This vulnerability was discovered during the resolution of customer service requests. WebVPN DTLS Denial of Service Vulnerability +------------------------------------------ This vulnerability was discovered during the resolution of customer service requests. Crafted TCP Segment Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------- This vulnerability was discovered during internal testing. Crafted IKE Message Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------- This vulnerability was discovered during the resolution of customer service requests. NTLMv1 Authentication Bypass Vulnerability +----------------------------------------- This vulnerability was discovered during internal testing. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-asa.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +------------------------------------------------------------+ | Revision 1.0 | 2010-February-17 | Initial public release. | +------------------------------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html. This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt. +-------------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright 2008-2010 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. +-------------------------------------------------------------------- Updated: Feb 17, 2010 Document ID: 111485 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (GNU/Linux) iEYEARECAAYFAkt8GTYACgkQ86n/Gc8U/uBi6QCfYFKvAUdFrRvusqKoaFmMwfcH XOYAnRymbNOcRg5gmPFMO/zqgm2wOyKQ =JUg3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/

Unspecified vulnerability in Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance 7.0 before 7.0(8.10), 7.2 before 7.2(4.45), 8.0 before 8.0(4.44), 8.1 before 8.1(2.35), and 8.2 before 8.2(1.10) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device reload) via a malformed TCP segment when certain NAT translation and Cisco AIP-SSM configurations are used, aka Bug ID CSCtb37219. Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance There is a service disruption (DoS) There is a vulnerability that becomes a condition. The problem is Bug ID : CSCtb37219 It is a problem.specific NAT Or Cisco AIP-SSM Incorrect settings are used TCP Service disruption through segments (DoS) There is a possibility of being put into a state. Cisco ASA 5500 devices are prone to a denial-of-service vulnerability. An attacker can exploit this issue to cause an affected device to restart, denying service to legitimate users. This issue is tracked by Cisco Bug ID CSCtb37219. 4) An error in WebVPN can be exploited to trigger an appliance reload via a specially crafted DTLS packet. 7) An error in the implementation of the NT LAN Manager version 1 (NTLMv1) protocol can be exploited to bypass authentication via a specially crafted username. SOLUTION: Update to a fixed version. Please see the vendor's advisory for detailed patch information. PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: Reported by the vendor. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-asa.shtml ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. There are workarounds for some of the vulnerabilities disclosed in this advisory. Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. This advisory is posted at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-asa.shtml. For specific version information, refer to the "Software Versions and Fixes" section of this advisory. Appliances that are running versions 7.1.x, 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected when they are configured for any of the following features: * SSL VPNs * Cisco Adaptive Security Device Manager (ASDM) Administrative Access * Telnet Access * SSH Access * Virtual Telnet * Virtual HTTP * Transport Layer Security (TLS) Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection SIP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities +----------------------------------------------- Two denial of service (DoS) vulnerabilities affect the SIP inspection feature of Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances. Versions 7.0.x, 7.1.x, 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. SIP inspection is enabled by default. To check if SIP inspection is enabled, issue the "show service-policy | include sip" command and confirm that some output is returned. Sample output is displayed in the following example: ciscoasa#show service-policy | include sip Inspect: sip , packet 0, drop 0, reset-drop 0 Alternatively, an appliance that has SIP inspection enabled has a configuration similar to the following: class-map inspection_default match default-inspection-traffic ! policy-map global_policy class inspection_default ... inspect sip ... Versions 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. SCCP inspection is enabled by default. To check if SCCP inspection is enabled, issue the "show service-policy | include skinny" command and confirm that some output is returned. Sample output is displayed in the following example: ciscoasa#show service-policy | include skinny Inspect: skinny , packet 0, drop 0, reset-drop 0 Alternatively, an appliance that has SCCP inspection enabled has a configuration similar to the following: class-map inspection_default match default-inspection-traffic ! policy-map global_policy class inspection_default ... inspect skinny ... Affected versions include 7.1.x, 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x. Administrators can enable WebVPN with the "enable <interface name>" command in "webvpn" configuration mode. DTLS can be enabled by issuing the "svc dtls enable" command in "group policy webvpn" configuration mode. The following configuration snippet provides an example of a WebVPN configuration that enables DTLS: webvpn enable outside svc enable ... ! group-policy <group name> internal group-policy <group name> attributes ... webvpn svc dtls enable ... Altough WebVPN is disabled by default, DTLS is enabled by default in recent software releases. This vulnerability only affects configurations that use the "nailed" option at the end of their static statement. Additionally, traffic that matches "static" statement must also be inspected by a Cisco AIP-SSM (an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) module) in inline mode. IPS inline operation mode is enabled by using the "ips inline {fail-close | fail-open}" command in "class" configuration mode. Versions 7.0.x, 7.1.x, 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. IKE is not enabled by default. If IKE is enabled, the "isakmp enable <interface name>" command appears in the configuration. Versions 7.0.x, 7.1.x, 7.2.x, 8.0.x, 8.1.x, and 8.2.x are affected. Administrators can configure NTLMv1 authentication by defining an Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) server group that uses the NTLMv1 protocol with the "aaa-server <AAA server group tag> protocol nt" command and then configuring a service that requires authentication to use that AAA server group. To verify that NTLMv1 authentication is enabled and active, issue the "show aaa-server protocol nt" command. Sample output is displayed in the following example: ciscoasa#show aaa-server protocol nt Server Group: test Server Protocol: nt Server Address: 192.168.10.11 Server port: 139 Server status: ACTIVE, Last transaction (success) at 11:10:08 UTC Fri Jan 29 <output truncated> Cisco PIX 500 Series Security Appliance Vulnerability Status +----------------------------------------------------------- Cisco PIX 500 Series Security Appliances are affected by the following vulnerabilities: * TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability * SIP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities * SCCP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability * Crafted IKE Message Denial of Service Vulnerability * NTLMv1 Authentication Bypass Vulnerability Because the Cisco PIX 500 Series Security Appliances reached End of Software Maintenance Releases on July 28, 2009, no further software releases will be available for the Cisco PIX 500 Series Security Appliances. Cisco PIX 500 Series Security Appliances customers are encouraged to migrate to Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances or to implement any applicable workarounds that are listed in the "Workarounds" section of this advisory. For more information, refer to the End of Life announcement at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/vpndevc/ps5708/ps5709/ps2030/end_of_life_notice_cisco_pix_525_sec_app.html. How To Determine The Running Software Version +-------------------------------------------- To determine whether a vulnerable version of Cisco ASA Software is running on an appliance, administrators can issue the "show version" command-line interface (CLI) command. The following example shows a Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance that is running software version 8.0(4): ASA#show version Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Software Version 8.0(4) Device Manager Version 6.0(1) <output truncated> Customers who use Cisco ASDM to manage devices can locate the software version in the table that is displayed in the login window or upper-left corner of the Cisco ASDM window. Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable +-------------------------------- The Cisco Firewall Services Module (FWSM) is affected by some of the vulnerabilities in this advisory. A separate Cisco Security Advisory has been published to disclose the vulnerabilities that affect the FWSM. This advisory is available at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-fwsm.shtml. With the exception of the Cisco FWSM, no other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these vulnerabilities. It offers firewall, intrusion prevention (IPS), anti-X, and VPN services. This vulnerability is triggered only when specific TCP segments are sent to certain TCP-based services that terminate on the affected appliance. Although exploitation of this vulnerability requires a TCP three-way handshake, authentication is not required. Appliances are only vulnerable when SIP inspection is enabled. Only transit traffic can trigger these vulnerabilities; traffic that is destined to the appliance will not trigger the vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities are documented in Cisco bug IDs CSCsy91157, and CSCtc96018, and have been assigned CVE IDs CVE-2010-0150, and CVE-2010-0569 respectively. Appliances are only vulnerable when SCCP inspection is enabled. Only transit traffic can trigger this vulnerability; traffic that is destined to the appliance will not trigger the vulnerabily. Appliances are only vulnerable when they are configured for WebVPN and DTLS transport. This vulnerability is only triggered by traffic that is destined to the appliance; transit traffic will not trigger the vulnerability. A malformed, transit TCP segment is received. 2. The TCP segment matches a static NAT translation that has the "nailed" option configured on it. 3. The TCP segment is also processed by the Cisco AIP-SSM, which is configured for inline mode of operation. A TCP three-way handshake is not necessary to exploit this vulnerability. The tunnels are not torn down immediately; IPsec traffic will continue to flow until the next rekey, at which time the rekey will fail and the tunnels will be torn down. Both site-to-site and remote access VPN tunnels are affected. The vulnerability is triggered when the appliance processes a malformed IKE message on port UDP 4500 that traverses an existing IPsec tunnel. The only way to recover and re-establish IPsec VPN tunnels is to reload the appliance. When this vulnerability is exploited, the security appliance will generate syslog messages 713903 and 713906, which will be followed by the loss of IPsec peers. NTLMv1 Authentication Bypass Vulnerability +----------------------------------------- Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances contain a vulnerability that could result in authentication bypass when the affected appliance is configured to authenticate users against Microsoft Windows servers using the NTLMv1 protocol. Users can bypass authentication by providing an an invalid, crafted username during an authentication request. Any services that use a AAA server group that is configured to use the NTLMv1 authentication protocol is affected. Affected services include: * Telnet access to the security appliance * SSH access to the security appliance * HTTPS access to the security appliance (including Cisco ASDM access) * Serial console access * Privileged (enable) mode access * Cut-through proxy for network access * VPN access This vulnerability is documented in Cisco bug ID CSCte21953 and has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2010-0568. Vulnerability Scoring Details ============================= Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at: http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss. TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------------- * CSCsz77717 ("TCP sessions remain in CLOSEWAIT indefinitely") CVSS Base Score - 7.1 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Medium Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 5.9 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed SIP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities +----------------------------------------------- * CSCsy91157 ("Watchdog when inspecting malformed SIP traffic") CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * CSCtc96018 ("ASA watchdog when inspecting malformed SIP traffic") CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed SCCP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability +---------------------------------------------- * CSCsz79757 ("Traceback - Thread Name: Dispatch Unit with skinny inspect enabled") CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed WebVPN DTLS Denial of Service Vulnerability +------------------------------------------ * CSCtb64913 ("WEBVPN: page fault in thread name dispath unit, eip udpmod_user_put") CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Crafted TCP Segment Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------- * CSCtb37219 ("Traceback in Dispatch Unit AIP-SSM Inline and nailed option on static") CVSS Base Score - 7.1 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Medium Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 5.9 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Crafted IKE Message Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------- * CSCtc47782 ("Malformed IKE traffic causes rekey to fail") CVSS Base Score - 5.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Partial CVSS Temporal Score - 4.1 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed NTLMv1 Authentication Bypass Vulnerability +----------------------------------------- * CSCte21953 ("ASA may allow authentication of an invalid username for NT auth") CVSS Base Score - 7.1 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Medium Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - None CVSS Temporal Score - 6.2 Exploitability - High Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------------- Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may lead to an exhaustion condition where the affected appliance cannot accept new TCP connections. A reload of the appliance is necessary to recover from the TCP connection exhaustion condition. If a TCP-based protocol is used for device management (like telnet, SSH, or HTTPS), a serial console connection may be needed to access to the appliance. SIP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities +----------------------------------------------- Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may cause a reload of the affected appliance. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. Crafted TCP Segment Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------- Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may cause a reload of the affected appliance. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. Crafted IKE Message Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------- Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could cause all IPsec VPN tunnels (LAN-to-LAN or remote) that terminate on the security appliance to be torn down and prevent new tunnels from being established. A manual reload of the appliance is required to re-establish all VPN tunnels. NTLMv1 Authentication Bypass Vulnerability +----------------------------------------- Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could result in unauthorized access to the network or appliance. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. The following table contains the first fixed software release of each vulnerability. A device running a version of the given release in a specific row (less than the First Fixed Release) is known to be vulnerable. +---------------------------------------+ | | Major | First | | Vulnerability | Release | Fixed | | | | Release | |-----------------+---------+-----------| | | 7.0 | Not | | | | affected | |TCP Connection |---------+-----------| | Exhaustion | 7.2 | 7.2(4.46) | |Denial of |---------+-----------| | Service | 8.0 | 8.0(4.38) | |Vulnerability ( |---------+-----------| | CSCsz77717) | 8.1 | 8.1(2.29) | | |---------+-----------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(1.5) | |-----------------+---------+-----------| | | 7.0 | 7.0(8.10) | |SIP Inspection |---------+-----------| | Denial of | 7.2 | 7.2(4.45) | |Service |---------+-----------| | Vulnerabilities | 8.0 | 8.0(5.2) | |(CSCsy91157 and |---------+-----------| | CSCtc96018) | 8.1 | 8.1(2.37) | | |---------+-----------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(1.16) | |-----------------+---------+-----------| | | 7.0 | Not | | | | affected | | |---------+-----------| | SCCP Inspection | 7.2 | Not | | Denial of | | affected | |Service |---------+-----------| | Vulnerability ( | 8.0 | 8.0(4.38) | |CSCsz79757) |---------+-----------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.29) | | |---------+-----------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(1.2) | |-----------------+---------+-----------| | | 7.0 | Not | | | | affected | |WebVPN DTLS |---------+-----------| | Denial of | 7.2 | 7.2(4.45) | |Service |---------+-----------| | Vulnerability ( | 8.0 | 8.0(4.44) | |CSCtb64913) |---------+-----------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(2.35) | | |---------+-----------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(1.10) | |-----------------+---------+-----------| | | 7.0 | 7.0(8.10) | | |---------+-----------| | Crafted TCP | 7.2 | 7.2(4.45) | |Segment Denial |---------+-----------| | of Service | 8.0 | 8.0(4.44) | |Vulnerability ( |---------+-----------| | CSCtb37219) | 8.1 | 8.1(2.35) | | |---------+-----------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(1.10) | |-----------------+---------+-----------| | | 7.0 | 7.0(8.10) | | |---------+-----------| | Crafted IKE | 7.2 | 7.2(4.45) | |Message Denial |---------+-----------| | of Service | 8.0 | 8.0(5.1) | |Vulnerability ( |---------+-----------| | CSCtc47782) | 8.1 | 8.1(2.37) | | |---------+-----------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(1.15) | |-----------------+---------+-----------| | | 7.0 | 7.0(8.10) | | |---------+-----------| | | 7.2 | 7.2(4.45) | | |---------+-----------| | NTLMv1 | 8.0 | 8.0(5.7) | |Authentication |---------+-----------| | Bypass | | 8.1 | | Vulnerability ( | | (2.40), | | CSCte21953) | 8.1 | available | | | | early | | | | March | | | | 2010 | | |---------+-----------| | | 8.2 | 8.2(2.1) | +---------------------------------------+ Note: Cisco ASA Software versions 7.1.x are affected by some of the vulnerabilities in this advisory. However, no fixed 7.1.x software versions are planned because the 7.1.x major release has reached the End of Software Maintenance Releases milestone. Fixed Cisco ASA Software can be downloaded from: http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/ASAPSIRT?psrtdcat20e2 Recommended Releases +------------------- Releases 7.0(8.10), 7.2(4.46), 8.0(5.9), 8.1(2.40) (available early March 2010), and 8.2(2.4) are recommended releases because they contain the fixes for all vulnerabilities in this advisory. Cisco recommends upgrading to a release that is equal to or later than these recommended releases. Workarounds =========== TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------------- It is possible to mitigate this vulnerability for TCP-based services that are offered to known clients. For example, it may be possible to restrict SSH, Cisco ASDM/HTTPS, and Telnet administrative access to known hosts or IP subnetworks. For other services like remote access SSL VPN, where clients connect from unknown hosts and networks, no mitigations exist. SIP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities +----------------------------------------------- These vulnerabilities can be mitigated by disabling SIP inspection if it is not required. Administrators can disable SIP inspection by issuing the "no inspect sip" command in class configuration sub-mode within policy-map configuration. SCCP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability +---------------------------------------------- This vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling SCCP inspection if it is not required. Administrators can disable SCCP inspection by issuing the "no inspect skinny" command in class configuration sub-mode within the policy-map configuration. WebVPN DTLS Denial of Service Vulnerability +------------------------------------------ This vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling DTLS transport for WebVPN. Administrators can disable DTLS by issuing the "no svc dtls enable" command under the "webvpn" attributes section of the corresponding group policy. Crafted TCP Segment Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------- Possible workarounds for this vulnerability are the following: * Migrate from "nailed" static NAT entries to TCP-state bypass. * Use the Cisco AIP-SSM in promiscuous mode. This mode can be configured by issuing the "ips promiscuous" command in "class" configuration mode. * Disable IPS inspection for "nailed" static NAT entries. * If possible, change "nailed" static NAT entries to standard static NAT entries. This may be feasible since in most cases there is no need for allowing IPsec tunnels inside IPsec tunnels. Filtering out UDP port 4500 traffic across an IPsec tunnel can be accomplished by using a VPN filter, as shown in the following example: !-- Deny only UDP port 4500 traffic and allow everything else access-list VPNFILTER extended deny udp any any eq 4500 access-list VPNFILTER extended permit ip any any !-- Create a group policy and specify a VPN filter that uses the !-- previous ACL group-policy VPNPOL internal group-policy VPNPOL attributes vpn-filter value VPNFILTER !-- Reference the group policy with the VPN filter from the tunnel group tunnel-group 172.16.0.1 type ipsec-l2l tunnel-group 172.16.0.1 general-attributes default-group-policy VPNPOL For this workaround to be effective, the group policy needs to be applied to all site-to-site (tunnel type "ipsec-l2l") and remote access (tunnel type "ipsec-ra") tunnel groups. Warning: In addition to filtering out IKE traffic on UDP port 4500, this workaround may also affect other procotols like DNS and SNMP that send traffic on UDP port 4500. For example, if a DNS resolver sends traffic from UDP port 4500 to a DNS server, the response from the DNS server will be destined to UDP port 4500, which then may be filtered out by the filter used in this workaround. For a more comprehensive example of the VPN filter feature of the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances, refer to the whitepaper "PIX/ASA 7.x and Later: VPN Filter (Permit Specific Port or Protocol) Configuration Example for L2L and Remote Access" available at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/vpndevc/ps2030/products_configuration_example09186a00808c9a87.shtml In addition, if the security appliance does not terminate any tunnels, the vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling IKE by issuing the "no isakmp enable <interface name>" command. NTLMv1 Authentication Bypass Vulnerability +----------------------------------------- If NTLMv1 authentication is required, there are no workarounds for this vulnerability. If NTLMv1 authentication can be substituted by other authentication protocols (LDAP, RADIUS, TACACS+, etc.), it is possible to mitigate the vulnerability. Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html, or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml. Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of any of the vulnerabilities described in this advisory. TCP Connection Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------------- This vulnerability was discovered during the resolution of a customer service request. SIP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerabilities +----------------------------------------------- CSCsy91157 was discovered during internal testing. CSCtc96018 was discovered during the resolution of customer service requests. SCCP Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability +---------------------------------------------- This vulnerability was discovered during the resolution of customer service requests. WebVPN DTLS Denial of Service Vulnerability +------------------------------------------ This vulnerability was discovered during the resolution of customer service requests. Crafted TCP Segment Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------- This vulnerability was discovered during internal testing. Crafted IKE Message Denial of Service Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------- This vulnerability was discovered during the resolution of customer service requests. NTLMv1 Authentication Bypass Vulnerability +----------------------------------------- This vulnerability was discovered during internal testing. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100217-asa.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +------------------------------------------------------------+ | Revision 1.0 | 2010-February-17 | Initial public release. | +------------------------------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html. This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt. +-------------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright 2008-2010 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. +-------------------------------------------------------------------- Updated: Feb 17, 2010 Document ID: 111485 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (GNU/Linux) iEYEARECAAYFAkt8GTYACgkQ86n/Gc8U/uBi6QCfYFKvAUdFrRvusqKoaFmMwfcH XOYAnRymbNOcRg5gmPFMO/zqgm2wOyKQ =JUg3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/

Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in SAP NetWeaver 2004 before SP21 and 2004s before SP13 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via unspecified vectors. NetWeaver is prone to a cross-site scripting vulnerability. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Secunia integrated with Microsoft WSUS http://secunia.com/blog/71/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: SAP NetWeaver WebDynpro Runtime Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA38629 VERIFY ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/38629/ DESCRIPTION: Mariano Nu\xf1ez Di Croce has reported a vulnerability in SAP NetWeaver, which can be exploited by malicious people to conduct cross-site scripting attacks. Certain unspecified input passed to the WebDynpro Runtime is not properly sanitised before being returned to the user. This can be exploited to execute arbitrary HTML and script code in a user's browser session in context of an affected site. The vulnerability is reported in SAP NetWeaver 2004 prior to SP21 and SAP NetWeaver 2004s prior to SP13. SOLUTION: Patches are available via SAP Note 1424863. https://service.sap.com/sap/support/notes/1424863 PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: Mariano Nu\xf1ez Di Croce, Onapsis ORIGINAL ADVISORY: Onapsis: http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/fulldisclosure/2010-02/0216.html SAP Note 1424863: https://service.sap.com/sap/support/notes/1424863 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ----------------------------------------------------------------------

Stack-based buffer overflow in dsInstallerService.dll in the Juniper Installer Service, as used in Juniper Odyssey Access Client 4.72.11421.0 and other products, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a long string in a malformed DSSETUPSERVICE_CMD_UNINSTALL command to the NeoterisSetupService named pipe. Odyssey Access Client is prone to a stack-based buffer-overflow vulnerability. Attackers can exploit these issues to execute arbitrary code within the context of the affected application. Failed exploits will result in denial-of-service condition