VARIoT IoT vulnerabilities database

Directory traversal vulnerability in the FTP server in Rhino Software Serv-U File Server 7.0.0.1 through 7.4.0.1 allows remote attackers to create arbitrary directories via a \.. (backslash dot dot) in an MKD request. RhinoSoft Serv-U FTP Server is prone to a directory-traversal vulnerability because the application fails to sufficiently sanitize user-supplied input. Serv-U FTP Server 7.4.0.1 is vulnerable; other versions may also be affected. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Did you know? Our assessment and impact rating along with detailed information such as exploit code availability, or if an updated patch is released by the vendor, is not part of this mailing-list? Click here to learn more about our commercial solutions: http://secunia.com/advisories/business_solutions/ Click here to trial our solutions: http://secunia.com/advisories/try_vi/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: Serv-U "MKD" Directory Traversal Vulnerability SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA34329 VERIFY ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/34329/ DESCRIPTION: A vulnerability has been discovered in Serv-U, which can be exploited by malicious users to bypass certain security restrictions. The vulnerability is caused due to an error when processing "MKD" commands. The vulnerability is confirmed in version 7.4.0.1. SOLUTION: Restrict access to trusted users only. PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: Jonathan Salwan ORIGINAL ADVISORY: http://milw0rm.com/exploits/8211 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help everybody keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ----------------------------------------------------------------------

The FTP server in Serv-U 7.0.0.1 through 7.4.0.1 allows remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (service hang) via a large number of SMNT commands without an argument. RhinoSoft Serv-U is prone to a remote denial-of-service vulnerability. Successfully exploiting this issue will allow attackers to deny service to legitimate users. Given the nature of this issue, attackers may also be able to run arbitrary code, but this has not been confirmed. Serv-U 7.4.0.1 is vulnerable; other versions may also be affected

The IAX2 protocol implementation in Asterisk Open Source 1.2.x before 1.2.35, 1.4.x before 1.4.26.2, 1.6.0.x before 1.6.0.15, and 1.6.1.x before 1.6.1.6; Business Edition B.x.x before B.2.5.10, C.2.x before C.2.4.3, and C.3.x before C.3.1.1; and s800i 1.3.x before 1.3.0.3 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (call-number exhaustion) by initiating many IAX2 message exchanges, a related issue to CVE-2008-3263. The problem is CVE-2008-3263 Related toBy a third party IAX2 Service operation disruption by starting message exchange ( Call number exhaustion ) There is a possibility of being put into a state. Asterisk is prone to a remote denial-of-service vulnerability because it fails to properly handle an excessive amount of call numbers. Successful exploits can cause the application to stop accepting connections, resulting in denial-of-service conditions for legitimate users. The vulnerabilities are caused due to NULL-pointer dereference errors in the "sip_uri_params_cmp()" and "sip_uri_headers_cmp()" functions. This can be exploited to crash the application via a SIP message lacking certain headers. Successful exploitation requires that the SIP channel driver is configured with the "pedantic" option enabled. PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: The vendor credits bugs.digium.com user klaus3000. Asterisk Project Security Advisory - AST-2009-006 +------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Product | Asterisk | |--------------------+---------------------------------------------------| | Summary | IAX2 Call Number Resource Exhaustion | |--------------------+---------------------------------------------------| | Nature of Advisory | Denial of Service | |--------------------+---------------------------------------------------| | Susceptibility | Remote unauthenticated sessions | |--------------------+---------------------------------------------------| | Severity | Major | |--------------------+---------------------------------------------------| | Exploits Known | Yes - Published by Blake Cornell < blake AT | | | remoteorigin DOT com > on voip0day.com | |--------------------+---------------------------------------------------| | Reported On | June 22, 2008 | |--------------------+---------------------------------------------------| | Reported By | Noam Rathaus < noamr AT beyondsecurity DOT com >, | | | with his SSD program, also by Blake Cornell | |--------------------+---------------------------------------------------| | Posted On | September 3, 2009 | |--------------------+---------------------------------------------------| | Last Updated On | September 3, 2009 | |--------------------+---------------------------------------------------| | Advisory Contact | Russell Bryant < russell AT digium DOT com > | |--------------------+---------------------------------------------------| | CVE Name | CVE-2009-2346 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Description | The IAX2 protocol uses a call number to associate | | | messages with the call that they belong to. However, the | | | protocol defines the call number field in messages as a | | | fixed size 15 bit field. So, if all call numbers are in | | | use, no additional sessions can be handled. | | | | | | A call number gets created at the start of an IAX2 | | | message exchange. So, an attacker can send a large | | | number of messages and consume the call number space. | | | The attack is also possible using spoofed source IP | | | addresses as no handshake is required before a call | | | number is assigned. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Resolution | Upgrade to a version of Asterisk listed in this document | | | as containing the IAX2 protocol security enhancements. In | | | addition to upgrading, administrators should consult the | | | users guide section of the IAX2 Security document | | | (IAX2-security.pdf), as well as the sample configuration | | | file for chan_iax2 that have been distributed with those | | | releases for assistance with new options that have been | | | provided. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Discussion | A lot of time was spent trying to come up with a way to | | | resolve this issue in a way that was completely backwards | | | compatible. However, the final resolution ended up | | | requiring a modification to the IAX2 protocol. This | | | modification is referred to as call token validation. | | | Call token validation is used as a handshake before call | | | numbers are assigned to IAX2 connections. | | | | | | Call token validation by itself does not resolve the | | | issue. However, it does allow an IAX2 server to validate | | | that the source of the messages has not been spoofed. In | | | addition to call token validation, Asterisk now also has | | | the ability to limit the amount of call numbers assigned | | | to a given remote IP address. | | | | | | The combination of call token validation and call number | | | allocation limits is used to mitigate this denial of | | | service issue. | | | | | | An alternative approach to securing IAX2 would be to use | | | a security layer on top of IAX2, such as DTLS [RFC4347] | | | or IPsec [RFC4301]. All Rights Reserved. Permission is hereby granted to distribute and publish this advisory in its original, unaltered form. _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ . This fixes some vulnerabilities, which can be exploited by malicious people to cause a DoS (Denial of Service). - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Gentoo Linux Security Advisory GLSA 201006-20 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - http://security.gentoo.org/ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Severity: Normal Title: Asterisk: Multiple vulnerabilities Date: June 04, 2010 Bugs: #281107, #283624, #284892, #295270 ID: 201006-20 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Synopsis ======== Multiple vulnerabilities in Asterisk might allow remote attackers to cause a Denial of Service condition, or conduct other attacks. Affected packages ================= ------------------------------------------------------------------- Package / Vulnerable / Unaffected ------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 net-misc/asterisk < 1.2.37 >= 1.2.37 Description =========== Multiple vulnerabilities have been reported in Asterisk: * Nick Baggott reported that Asterisk does not properly process overly long ASCII strings in various packets (CVE-2009-2726). * Noam Rathaus and Blake Cornell reported a flaw in the IAX2 protocol implementation (CVE-2009-2346). * amorsen reported an input processing error in the RTP protocol implementation (CVE-2009-4055). * Patrik Karlsson reported an information disclosure flaw related to the REGISTER message (CVE-2009-3727). * A vulnerability was found in the bundled Prototype JavaScript library, related to AJAX calls (CVE-2008-7220). Impact ====== A remote attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities by sending a specially crafted package, possibly causing a Denial of Service condition, or resulting in information disclosure. Workaround ========== There is no known workaround at this time. Resolution ========== All Asterisk users should upgrade to the latest version: # emerge --sync # emerge --ask --oneshot --verbose ">=net-misc/asterisk-1.2.37" NOTE: This is a legacy GLSA. Updates for all affected architectures are available since January 5, 2010. It is likely that your system is already no longer affected by this issue. References ========== [ 1 ] CVE-2009-2726 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2009-2726 [ 2 ] CVE-2009-2346 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2009-2346 [ 3 ] CVE-2009-4055 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2009-4055 [ 4 ] CVE-2009-3727 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2009-3727 [ 5 ] CVE-2008-7220 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2008-7220 Availability ============ This GLSA and any updates to it are available for viewing at the Gentoo Security Website: http://security.gentoo.org/glsa/glsa-201006-20.xml Concerns? ========= Security is a primary focus of Gentoo Linux and ensuring the confidentiality and security of our users machines is of utmost importance to us. Any security concerns should be addressed to security@gentoo.org or alternatively, you may file a bug at https://bugs.gentoo.org. License ======= Copyright 2010 Gentoo Foundation, Inc; referenced text belongs to its owner(s). The contents of this document are licensed under the Creative Commons - Attribution / Share Alike license. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5 . ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Do you have VARM strategy implemented? (Vulnerability Assessment Remediation Management) If not, then implement it through the most reliable vulnerability intelligence source on the market. Implement it through Secunia. For more information visit: http://secunia.com/advisories/business_solutions/ Alternatively request a call from a Secunia representative today to discuss how we can help you with our capabilities contact us at: sales@secunia.com ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: Asterisk IAX2 Call Number Exhaustion Denial of Service SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA36593 VERIFY ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/36593/ DESCRIPTION: A vulnerability has been reported in Asterisk, which can be exploited by malicious people to cause a DoS (Denial of Service). S800i (Asterisk Appliance): Update to version 1.3.0.3. PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: The vendor credits: * Noam Rathaus * Blake Cornell ORIGINAL ADVISORY: http://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/security/AST-2009-006.html ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help everybody keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ---------------------------------------------------------------------- . The vulnerabilities are caused due to "sscanf()" being invoked without specifying a maximum width e.g. when processing SIP messages. This can be exploited to exhaust stack memory in the SIP stack network thread via overly long numeric strings in various fields of a message. NOTE: According to the vendor this is only potentially exploitable in 1.6.1 and above

perl-MDK-Common 1.1.11 and 1.1.24, 1.2.9 through 1.2.14, and possibly other versions, in Mandriva Linux does not properly handle strings when writing them to configuration files, which allows attackers to gain privileges via "special characters" in unspecified vectors. Mandriva perl-MDK-Common is prone to an unspecified privilege-escalation vulnerability because the software fails to properly validate user-supplied input. An attacker may exploit this issue to gain elevated privileges

The IP Phone Personal Address Book (PAB) Synchronizer feature in Cisco Unified Communications Manager (aka CUCM, formerly CallManager) 4.1, 4.2 before 4.2(3)SR4b, 4.3 before 4.3(2)SR1b, 5.x before 5.1(3e), 6.x before 6.1(3), and 7.0 before 7.0(2) sends privileged directory-service account credentials to the client in cleartext, which allows remote attackers to modify the CUCM configuration and perform other privileged actions by intercepting these credentials, and then using them in requests unrelated to the intended synchronization task, as demonstrated by (1) DC Directory account credentials in CUCM 4.x and (2) TabSyncSysUser account credentials in CUCM 5.x through 7.x. Cisco Unified Communications Manager is prone to a remote privilege-escalation vulnerability. Attackers can exploit this issue to gain administrative access to the affected device and completely compromise it. This issue is tracked by Cisco Bug ID CSCso76587 and CSCso78528. PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: The vendor credits Olivier Grosjeanne of Dimension Data France and Oliver Dewdney of LBI. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ---------------------------------------------------------------------- . Cisco has released free software updates that address this vulnerability. Workarounds that mitigate this vulnerability are available. The software version can also be determined by running the command show version active via the command line interface (CLI). No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by this vulnerability. If an attacker is able to intercept the credentials, they can perform unauthorized modifications to the Cisco Unified Communications Manager configuration and extend their privileges. Cisco Unified Communications Manager 4.x +--------------------------------------- Cisco Unified Communications Manager software version 4.x by default stores user information using an internal Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) server called DC Directory. Depending on how a Cisco Unified Communications Manager is configured, an attacker may obtain different privilege levels using the intercepted credentials. By default, Cisco Unified Communications Manager software version 4.x administrator accounts are created as part of an underlying Microsoft Windows operating system. If an attacker obtains the DC Directory credentials and MLA is enabled, the attacker can add an existing account to the Cisco Unified Communications Manager super-user group. If MLA is not enabled, the attacker cannot escalate their privileges; however, they can modify any user settings in the directory. The DC Directory credentials are passed in the clear over the network and are vulnerable to being sniffed by an attacker. If using the DC Directory internal LDAP server, the IP Phone PAB Synchronizer client communicates to Cisco Unified Communications Manager on TCP ports 8404 and 8405. The IP Phone PAB Synchronizer client uses the AXL application programming interface (API) to perform address book synchronization. After a client successfully authenticates, the Cisco Unified Communications Manager returns credentials for a database user account named TabSyncSysUser that will be used by the client to synchronize an user's address book. Using the TabSyncSysUser credentials via the AXL API, an attacker can modify any parameter in the database including creating new administrator accounts. Directory Service Integration +---------------------------- Cisco Unified Communications Manager software versions 4.x, 5.x, 6.x, and 7.x can be integrated with Microsoft Active Directory and several non-Microsoft LDAP servers to perform user authentication. In order to function properly, the integration process requires that appropriate user credentials for the directory service are provided to Cisco Unified Communications Manager. Administrators should ensure that any directory service credentials used for the Cisco Unified Communications Manager integration process are configured to follow the principle of least privilege. The credentials should be configured with only the privileges necessary to access the directory service data needed for the integration process to function properly. The use of overly privileged administrator accounts is discouraged. This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug IDs CSCso76587 and CSCso78528 and has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifier CVE-2009-0632. Vulnerability Scoring Details ============================= Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerability in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at: http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss CSCso76587 - Directory Manager password sent in clear from client CVSS Base Score - 9 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - Single Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCso78528 - TabSyncSysUser (axl user) password sent in clear from client CVSS Base Score - 9 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - Single Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may allow an attacker to intercept user credentials that allow the attacker to escalate their privilege level and obtain complete administrative access to a vulnerable Cisco Unified Communications Manager system. If integrated with an external directory service, the intercepted user credentials may allow an attacker to gain access to additional systems configured to use the directory service for authentication. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. Version 7.0(2) can be downloaded at the following link: http://tools.cisco.com/support/downloads/go/ReleaseType.x?optPlat=&isPlatform=Y&mdfid=281941895&sftType=Unified+Communications+Manager+Updates&treeName=Voice+and+Unified+Communications&modelName=Cisco+Unified+Communications+Manager+Version+7.0&mdfLevel=Software%20Version/Option&treeMdfId=278875240&modifmdfid=null&imname=&hybrid=Y&imst=N Workarounds =========== It is possible to mitigate against this vulnerability using the following workarounds. Employing this workaround will prevent address book synchronization; however, the PAB application will continue to function. The ASP script can be moved using the following command: C:\> move c:\CiscoWebs\User\LDAPDetails.asp c:\temp It is also possible to mitigate this vulnerability by implementing filtering on screening devices or using the Windows firewall. Administrators are advised to permit access to TCP ports 8404 and 8405 only from trusted networks. Cisco Unified Communications Manager 5.x, 6.x, 7.x +------------------------------------------------- It is possible to mitigate this vulnerability by restricting the permissions of the TabSyncSysUser database user account. Remove all groups from the account and change the password. Employing this workaround will prevent address book synchronization; however, the PAB application will continue to function. The whitepaper can be downloaded here: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/sw/voicesw/ps556/products_tech_note09186a0080a83435.shtml Additional mitigation techniques that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin companion document for this advisory: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20090311-cucmpab.shtml Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/prod_warranties_item09186a008088e31f.html, or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center sw-usingswc.shtml. Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090311-cucmpab.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +---------------------------------------+ | Revision | | Initial | | 1.0 | 2009-March-11 | public | | | | release. | +---------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at: http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.5 (SunOS) iD8DBQFJt9DF86n/Gc8U/uARAtjqAJ9eE9ETbc4lyUJV8GrCEmiaJeS1NACdExbB dLmiSiaPCdGHpVKTKvZj78k= =C3h7 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/

Apple iTunes before 8.1 does not properly inform the user about the origin of an authentication request, which makes it easier for remote podcast servers to trick a user into providing a username and password when subscribing to a crafted podcast. Apple iTunes is prone to an information-disclosure vulnerability and a denial-of-service vulnerability. Successfully exploiting these issues may allow an attacker to obtain sensitive information or cause the affected application to crash, denying service to legitimate users. Versions prior to Apple iTunes 8.1 are vulnerable. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Did you know? Our assessment and impact rating along with detailed information such as exploit code availability, or if an updated patch is released by the vendor, is not part of this mailing-list? Click here to learn more about our commercial solutions: http://secunia.com/advisories/business_solutions/ Click here to trial our solutions: http://secunia.com/advisories/try_vi/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: Apple iTunes Information Disclosure and Denial of Service SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA34254 VERIFY ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/34254/ DESCRIPTION: A vulnerability and a security issue have been reported in Apple iTunes, which can be exploited by malicious people to cause a DoS (Denial of Service) or to potentially disclose sensitive information. 1) An error in the processing of Digital Audio Access Protocol (DAAP) messages can be exploited to trigger the execution of an infinite loop via a specially crafted "Content-Length" parameter contained in the header of a DAAP message. NOTE: The vulnerability does not affect Mac OS X systems. The vulnerability and security issue are reported in version 8. SOLUTION: Update to version 8.1. PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: The vendor credits: 1) Xiaopeng Zhang, Zhenhua Liu, and Junfeng Jia of Fortinet's FortiGuard Global Security Research Team 2) Simon Bellwood ORIGINAL ADVISORY: http://support.apple.com/kb/HT3487 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help everybody keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ----------------------------------------------------------------------

Apple iTunes before 8.1 on Windows allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (infinite loop) via a Digital Audio Access Protocol (DAAP) message with a crafted Content-Length header. Apple iTunes is prone to an information-disclosure vulnerability and a denial-of-service vulnerability. Successfully exploiting these issues may allow an attacker to obtain sensitive information or cause the affected application to crash, denying service to legitimate users. Versions prior to Apple iTunes 8.1 are vulnerable.  Impact: ======= Denial of service.   Risk:  ===== Medium   Affected Software:  ================== Apple iTunes 8 for Windows, other versions may be affected  This issue does not affect Mac OS X systems References:  ===========  FortiGuard Advisory: http://www.fortiguardcenter.com/advisory/FGA-2009-11.html Apple Security Bulletin: http://support.apple.com/kb/HT3487  Apple Security Updates: http://support.apple.com/kb/ht1222  CVE ID: CVE-2009-0016  http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2009-0016  Acknowledgments:   ================ Xiaopeng Zhang, Zhenhua Liu, and Junfeng Jia of Fortinet's FortiGuard Global Security Research Team *** This email and any attachments thereto may contain private, confidential, and privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient. Any review, copying, or distribution of this email (or any attachments thereto) by others is strictly prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender immediately and permanently delete the original and any copies of this email and any attachments thereto. *** . ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Did you know? Our assessment and impact rating along with detailed information such as exploit code availability, or if an updated patch is released by the vendor, is not part of this mailing-list? Click here to learn more about our commercial solutions: http://secunia.com/advisories/business_solutions/ Click here to trial our solutions: http://secunia.com/advisories/try_vi/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: Apple iTunes Information Disclosure and Denial of Service SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA34254 VERIFY ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/34254/ DESCRIPTION: A vulnerability and a security issue have been reported in Apple iTunes, which can be exploited by malicious people to cause a DoS (Denial of Service) or to potentially disclose sensitive information. NOTE: The vulnerability does not affect Mac OS X systems. 2) An error in the implementation of the iTunes podcast feature can be exploited to entice a user into sending iTunes credentials to a podcast server via an authentication dialog presented when subscribing to a malicious podcast. The vulnerability and security issue are reported in version 8. SOLUTION: Update to version 8.1. PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: The vendor credits: 1) Xiaopeng Zhang, Zhenhua Liu, and Junfeng Jia of Fortinet's FortiGuard Global Security Research Team 2) Simon Bellwood ORIGINAL ADVISORY: http://support.apple.com/kb/HT3487 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help everybody keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ----------------------------------------------------------------------

Unspecified vulnerability in the Session Border Controller (SBC) before 3.0(2) for Cisco 7600 series routers allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (SBC card reload) via crafted packets to TCP port 2000. A remote attacker may exploit this issue to cause the affected device to reload. Repeated attacks can result in a denial-of-service condition. This issue is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCsq18958. Versions prior to Cisco SBC software 3.0(2) are vulnerable. This issue affects SBC for Cisco 7600 series routers. Cisco has released free software updates that address this vulnerability. Workarounds that mitigate this vulnerability are available. To determine the version of the Cisco SBC software running on a system, log in to the device and issue the show version command to display the system banner. card_A/Admin# show version system image file: [LCP] disk0:c76-sbck9-mzg.3.0.1_AS3_0_00.bin <output truncated> Cisco SBC software version 3.0.1 is running in the device used in this example. Additionally, the Cisco ACE Module, Cisco ACE 4710 Application Control Engine, Cisco ACE XML Gateway, Cisco ACE Web Application Firewall, and the Cisco ACE GSS (Global Site Selector) 4400 Series are not affected by this vulnerability. No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by this vulnerability. Details ======= The Session Border Controller (SBC) enables direct IP-to-IP interconnect between multiple administrative domains for session-based services providing protocol interworking, security, and admission control and management. The SBC is a multimedia device that sits on the border of a network and controls call admission to that network. Note: Only the Cisco SBC module reloads after successful exploitation. Note: TCP port 2000 is typically used by Skinny Call Control Protocol (SCCP) applications. However, the Cisco SBC module uses TCP port 2000 for high availability (redundancy) communication, but does not use the SCCP for this purpose. This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug IDs CSCsq18958 ( registered customers only) ; and has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) IDs CVE-2009-0619. Vulnerability Scoring Details ============================= Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerability in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== Successful exploitation of the vulnerability may cause a reload of the affected device. Cisco SBC software can be downloaded from: http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/sbc-7600-crypto When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. Workarounds =========== As a workaround, configure an access control list (ACL) in the signaling / media VLAN on the Route Processor (RP). The following examples show how VLAN 140 is configured as the signaling / media VLAN. A separate VLAN (VLAN 77) is configured as Fault Tolerance (FT). An ACL is added to the signaling/media VLAN on the RP filtering all TCP port 2000 packets to the alias IP address. Cisco SBC configuration interface vlan 140 ip address 10.140.1.90 255.255.255.0 alias 10.140.1.100 255.255.255.0 peer ip address 10.140.1.8 255.255.255.0 ! ft interface vlan 77 ip address 192.168.1.1 255.255.255.0 peer ip address 192.168.1. 255.255.255.0 RP Configuration !- ACL blocking all TCP port 2000 traffic to the 10.140.1.0 internal network ! access-list 100 deny tcp any host 10.140.1.100 eq 2000 access-list 100 permit ip any any ! interface Vlan140 ip address 10.140.1.1 255.255.255.0 !- ACL is applied to the VLAN interface to egress traffic ip access-group 100 out ! The alias command under VLAN 140 is configured with an IP address that floats between active and standby modules when using high availability. Only TCP port 2000 traffic destined to this IP address may trigger this vulnerability. An access control list (ACL) is configured to deny TCP port 2000 destined to the alias IP address (10.140.1.100). The ACL is applied egress in the RP. Note: TCP port 2000 is used by Skinny Call Control Protocol (SCCP) applications; however, in this case it is used by the SBC for internal communications. The previous ACL only blocks TCP port 2000 traffic to the alias IP address. TCP port 2000 is not used by the alias IP address. This ACL should not cause any collateral damage. Additional mitigations that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied Intelligence companion document for this Advisory: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20090304-sbc.shtml Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address this vulnerability. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/prod_warranties_item09186a008088e31f.html or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory. This vulnerability was found during internal testing. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at : http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090304-sbc.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +---------------------------------------+ | Revision | | Initial | | 1.0 | 2009-March-04 | public | | | | release | +---------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.8 (Darwin) iEYEARECAAYFAkmurgEACgkQ86n/Gc8U/uBrwwCfbQxCcSz4S4X3UpH4Mccg0Df1 KMoAn11BqKmRhw5mUuJOl3D/RrVxVrc7 =m2di -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

A vulnerability in JP1/Cm2/Network Node Manager (NNM) could cause a denial of service (DoS) condition when using the Shared Trace Service.A remote attacker could cause a denial of service (DoS) condition.

uCosminexus Portal Framework contains multiple vulnerabilities.A remote attacker could perform malicious acts, such as information leaking, identity spoofing and updating data with wrong values.

The username command in Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Module for Catalyst 6500 Switches and 7600 Routers and Cisco ACE 4710 Application Control Engine Appliance stores a cleartext password by default, which allows context-dependent attackers to obtain sensitive information. Ace 4710 is prone to a information disclosure vulnerability

Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the edit account page in the Web Server in Cisco Unified MeetingPlace Web Conferencing 6.0 before 6.0(517.0) (aka 6.0 MR4) and 7.0 before 7.0(2) (aka 7.0 MR1) allows remote authenticated users to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the E-mail Address field. Cisco Unified MeetingPlace Web Conferencing is prone to an HTML-injection vulnerability because it fails to sufficiently sanitize user-supplied data. Attacker-supplied HTML or JavaScript code could run in the context of the affected site, potentially allowing the attacker to steal cookie-based authentication credentials and to control how the site is rendered to the user; other attacks are also possible. Cisco Unified MeetingPlace is a set of multimedia conferencing solutions of Cisco (Cisco). This solution provides a user environment that integrates voice, video and Web conferencing. Unified MeetingPlace allows users to modify their own account settings, such as name, telephone extension, email address, etc. If the user sets a specially crafted E-mail Address field on the configuration file page, other users will cause cross-site scripting attacks when viewing the user's configuration file or the details of the meeting created by the user, in the browser session Execute the embedded malicious code

Unspecified vulnerability in the SNMPv2c implementation in Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Module for Catalyst 6500 Switches and 7600 Routers before A2(1.3) and Cisco ACE 4710 Application Control Engine Appliance before A3(2.1) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device reload) via a crafted SNMPv1 packet. Other attacks are also possible. Remote authentication users can cause denial of service by constructing SNMPv1 packets

Unspecified vulnerability in Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Module for Catalyst 6500 Switches and 7600 Routers before A2(1.2) and Cisco ACE 4710 Application Control Engine Appliance before A1(8.0) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device reload) via a crafted SNMPv3 packet. Other attacks are also possible

Unspecified vulnerability in the Web Server in Cisco Unified MeetingPlace Web Conferencing 6.0 before 6.0(517.0) (aka 6.0 MR4) and 7.0 before 7.0(2) (aka 7.0 MR1) allows remote attackers to bypass authentication and obtain administrative access via a crafted URL. An attacker can exploit this issue to gain administrative access to the affected application. This may allow the attacker to compromise the application and the underlying system; other attacks are also possible. This issue is tracked by Cisco Bug ID CSCsv65815. Unified MeetingPlace Web Conferencing 6.0 and 7.0 are vulnerable. Cisco has released free software updates that address this vulnerability. This advisory is posted at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-mtgplace.shtml Affected Products ================= Cisco Unified MeetingPlace conferencing solution provides functionality that allows organizations to host integrated voice, video, and web conferencing. The solution is deployed on-network, behind the firewall and integrated directly into an organization's private voice/data networks and enterprise applications. Cisco Unified MeetingPlace servers can be deployed so that the server is accessible from the Internet, allowing external parties to participate in meetings. No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by this vulnerability. Vulnerability Scoring Details ============================= Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at: http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss CSCsv65815 - Authentication Bypass in MeetingPlace Web Server CVSS Base Score - 9 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Partial Integrity Impact - Partial Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== Successful exploitation of the vulnerability may result in unauthorized access to the administrative functions of the Cisco Unified MeetingPlace application. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== This vulnerability is fixed in Cisco Unified MeetingPlace Web Conferencing software version 6.0(517.0) also known as Maintenance Release 4 (MR4) for the 6.0 release, and version 7.0(2) also known as Maintenance Release 1 (MR1) for the 7.0 release. The latest versions of Cisco MeetingPlace software can be downloaded from: http://tools.cisco.com/support/downloads/go/Redirect.x?mdfid=278875240 The Cisco Unified MeetingPlace Web Server software is available at: http://tools.cisco.com/support/downloads/go/Model.x?mdfid=278816725&mdfLevel=Software%20Version/Option&treeName=Voice%20and%20Unified%20Communications&modelName=Cisco%20Unified%20MeetingPlace%20Web%20Conferencing&treeMdfId=278875240 When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. Workarounds =========== There are no workarounds for this vulnerability. Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/prod_warranties_item09186a008088e31f.html or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at: http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== This vulnerability was reported to Cisco by National Australia Bank's Security Assurance team. Cisco would like to thank the National Australia Bank's Security Assurance team for the discovery and reporting of the vulnerability. The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-mtgplace.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +---------------------------------------+ | Revision | | Initial | | 1.0 | 2008-February-25 | public | | | | release | +---------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at: http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.5 (SunOS) iD8DBQFJpWeb86n/Gc8U/uARAty+AKCIt9MQ0A+BzIMX+MBZHjiod59WBACeMUgH rPsjG9qKmCDQlA6XlaLFMr0= =6x6Q -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/

Directory traversal vulnerability in Cisco Application Networking Manager (ANM) before 2.0 and Application Control Engine (ACE) Device Manager before A3(2.1) allows remote authenticated users to read or modify arbitrary files via unspecified vectors, related to "invalid directory permissions.". A successful exploit may allow attackers to obtain sensitive information, view or modify files, cause denial-of-service conditions, or gain unauthorized access to the affected application. This may aid in the complete compromise of the underlying computer. These vulnerabilities are independent of each other. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities may result in unauthorized system or host operating system access. A workaround that mitigates one of the issues is available. This advisory is posted at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-anm.shtml. Note: This advisory is being released simultaneously with a multiple vulnerabilities advisory impacting the ACE appliance and module software, which is posted at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-ace.shtml. Affected Products ================= Vulnerable Products - ------------------- The following are the products and versions affected by each vulnerability described within this advisory. +---------------------------------------+ | Vulnerability | Product | Version | | | Affected | Affected | |---------------+----------+------------| | Invalid | ACE | All | | Directory | Device | versions | | Permissions | Manager | prior to | | | | A3(2.1) | |---------------+----------+------------| | Invalid | | All | | Directory | ANM | versions | | Permissions | | prior to | | | | ANM 2.0 | |---------------+----------+------------| | | | All | | Default User | ANM | versions | | Credentials | | prior to | | | | ANM 2.0 | |---------------+----------+------------| | | | All | | MySQL Default | ANM | versions | | Credentials | | prior to | | | | ANM 2.0 | |---------------+----------+------------| | | | All | | Java Agent | | versions | | Privilege | ANM | prior to | | Escalation | | ANM 2.0 | | | | Update A | +---------------------------------------+ Determining ACE Device Manager Software Version +---------------------------------------------- The ACE Device Manager is embedded with the ACE appliance software. To display the version of system software that is currently running on the device, use the "show version" command. The following example includes the output of the "show version" command on a Cisco ACE appliance running software version A3(2.1): ACE-4710/Admin# show version Cisco Application Control Software (ACSW) TAC support: http://www.cisco.com/tac Copyright (c) 1985-2008 by Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. The copyrights to certain works contained herein are owned by other third parties and are used and distributed under license. Some parts of this software are covered under the GNU Public License. A copy of the license is available at http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html. Software loader: Version 0.95 system: Version A3(2.1) [build 3.0(0)A3(2.1) adbuild_14:33:29-2008/11/19_/auto/adbu-rel4/rel_a3_2_1_throttle_build/REL_3_0_0_A3_2_1] system image file: (nd)/192.168.65.32/scimitar.bin Device Manager version 1.1 (0) 20081113:2052 --- Determining ANM Software Version +------------------------------- To display the version of ANM software that is currently installed, login to the ANM server and select the "About" keyword in the upper right. An informational pop up window will be displayed. ANM Version 2.0 Update A is indicated in the example output below. Version: 2.0(0), Update: A Build Number: 709 Build Timestamp: 20081031:1226 Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable - --------------------------------- The Cisco ACE XML Gateway, Cisco ACE GSS (Global Site Selector) 4400 Series and Cisco ACE Web Application Firewall are not affected by any of these vulnerabilities. No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these vulnerabilities. Details ======= ANM is a network management application that manages Cisco ACE modules or appliances. ANM is installed on customer provided servers with a Red Hat Enterprise Linux operating system. The ACE Device Manager provides a browser-based interface for configuring and managing a single ACE appliance. The ACE Device Manager resides in flash memory on the ACE appliance. The following details are provided for each vulnerability addressed in this security advisory. These vulnerabilities could allow unauthorized access to ACE operating system and host operating system files. To exploit these vulnerabilities authentication is required to initially access either product. This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug IDs: * CSCsv66063 * CSCsv70130 This vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0615. Default User Credentials +----------------------- Versions of Cisco ANM prior to software version ANM 2.0 do not force credential changes during installation. This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug ID: * CSCsu52724 This vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0616. MySQL Default Credentials +------------------------ ANM versions prior to ANM 2.0 use a default MySQL root user password during installation. The MySQL database is installed by default when ANM is initially installed. This vulnerability can be exploited remotely with default credential authentication and without end-user interaction. Unauthorized access to the database may allow modification of system files that could impact the function of ANM or allow execution of commands on the underlying host operating system. The ACE appliance and module device configuration files in the MySQL database are encrypted. This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug ID: * CSCsu52632 This vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0617. Java Agent Privilege Escalation +------------------------------ ANM versions prior to ANM 2.0 Update A contain a remotely exploitable vulnerability that could allow an attacker to view configuration files and modify ANM processes including the capability to stop services. Exploitation of this issue could result in system information disclosure or denial of services. This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug ID: * CSCsu73001 This vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0618. Vulnerability Scoring Details +---------------------------- Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at: http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss * ACE Device Manager invalid directory permissions (CSCsv66063) CVSS Base Score - 9.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - Single Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * ANM invalid directory permissions (CSCsv70130) CVSS Base Score - 9.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - Single Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * ANM default user credentials during installation (CSCsu52724) CVSS Base Score - 10.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 8.7 Exploitability - High Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * ANM embedded MySQL default credentials (CSCsu52632) CVSS Base Score - 10.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 8.7 Exploitability - High Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * ANM Java agent privilege escalation (CSCsu73001) CVSS Base Score - 8.5 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Partial Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4 Exploitability - High Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== Successful exploitation of the ACE Device Manager and ANM invalid directory permission vulnerabilities may allow unauthorized access to view or modify the ACE Device Manager or ANM file system, including host operating system files. Modification of some system files could result in a denial of service condition. Exploitation of the ANM default user credential and ANM MySQL database default credential vulnerabilities may allow an attacker to gain unauthorized system access. Modification of ANM settings with the default user credentials could result in a denial of service condition. Unauthorized access to the MySQL database may allow modification of system files that could impact the function of ANM or allow execution of commands on the underlying host operating system. Successful exploitation of the ANM privilege escalation vulnerability may result in unauthorized remote access to system processes and services with the ability to modify. Modification of these services could result in a denial of service condition. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. Each row of the following software table identifies the earliest possible software release that contains the fix listed in the "First Fixed Release" column of the table. The "Recommended Release" column indicates the release which have fixes for all the published vulnerabilities at the time of this Advisory. +---------------------------------------+ | | First | Recommended | | Vulnerability | Fixed | Release | | | Release | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ACE Device | | | | Manager | | | | Invalid | A3(2.1) | A3(2.1) | | Directory | | | | Permissions | | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ANM Invalid | | ANM 2.0 | | Directory | ANM 2.0 | Update A | | Permissions | | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ANM Default | | ANM 2.0 | | User | ANM 2.0 | Update A | | Credentials | | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ANM MySQL | | ANM 2.0 | | Default | ANM 2.0 | Update A | | Credentials | | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ANM Java | ANM 2.0 | | | Agent | Update | ANM 2.0 | | Privilege | A | Update A | | Escalation | | | +---------------------------------------+ ANM 2.0 Update A can be downloaded from: http://www.cisco.com/cgi-bin/Software/Tablebuild/doftp.pl?ftpfile=/cisco/crypto/3DES/netmgmt/anm/1.2/anm2.0-update-A.bin ACE Device Manager A3(2.1) can be downloaded from: http://www.cisco.com/cgi-bin/Software/Tablebuild/doftp.pl?ftpfile=/cisco/crypto/3DES/ans/DNSS/ace4710/c4710ace-mz.A3_2_1.bin Workarounds =========== While this Security Advisory describes multiple distinct vulnerabilities, a workaround exists for only the following vulnerability. ANM Default User Credentials +--------------------------- The ANM user "admin" account password may be modified after installation by following the procedures documented for "Changing the Admin Password" located in the ANM User Guide at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/net_mgmt/application_networking_manager/2.0/user/guide/UG_admin.html#wp1053216 Applied Mitigation Bulletin +-------------------------- Additional mitigation techniques that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin companion document for this advisory: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20090225-anm.shtml Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/prod_warranties_item09186a008088e31f.html, or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml. Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts - -------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations - ------------------------------------------------- Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts - ----------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerabilities described in this advisory. Acknowledgement to the National Australia Bank's Security Assurance team for the discovery and reporting of the ACE Device Manager directory permissions vulnerability. The remaining vulnerabilities were identified through internal testing. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-anm.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +------------------------------------------------------------+ | Revision 1.0 | 2009 February 25 | Initial public release | +------------------------------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html. This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt. +-------------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright 2008 - 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. +-------------------------------------------------------------------- Updated: Feb 25, 2009 Document ID: 109451 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (GNU/Linux) iEYEARECAAYFAkmlezoACgkQ86n/Gc8U/uAexwCfYI7DnCQWq4XF2Id8o6bO4+zJ a6IAn0r51YyfdsXPFgYII7OPUWLzJHLU =xUPr -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/

Cisco Application Networking Manager (ANM) before 2.0 uses default usernames and passwords, which makes it easier for remote attackers to access the application, or cause a denial of service via configuration changes, related to "default user credentials during installation.". A successful exploit may allow attackers to obtain sensitive information, view or modify files, cause denial-of-service conditions, or gain unauthorized access to the affected application. This may aid in the complete compromise of the underlying computer. These vulnerabilities are independent of each other. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities may result in unauthorized system or host operating system access. A workaround that mitigates one of the issues is available. This advisory is posted at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-anm.shtml. Note: This advisory is being released simultaneously with a multiple vulnerabilities advisory impacting the ACE appliance and module software, which is posted at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-ace.shtml. Affected Products ================= Vulnerable Products - ------------------- The following are the products and versions affected by each vulnerability described within this advisory. +---------------------------------------+ | Vulnerability | Product | Version | | | Affected | Affected | |---------------+----------+------------| | Invalid | ACE | All | | Directory | Device | versions | | Permissions | Manager | prior to | | | | A3(2.1) | |---------------+----------+------------| | Invalid | | All | | Directory | ANM | versions | | Permissions | | prior to | | | | ANM 2.0 | |---------------+----------+------------| | | | All | | Default User | ANM | versions | | Credentials | | prior to | | | | ANM 2.0 | |---------------+----------+------------| | | | All | | MySQL Default | ANM | versions | | Credentials | | prior to | | | | ANM 2.0 | |---------------+----------+------------| | | | All | | Java Agent | | versions | | Privilege | ANM | prior to | | Escalation | | ANM 2.0 | | | | Update A | +---------------------------------------+ Determining ACE Device Manager Software Version +---------------------------------------------- The ACE Device Manager is embedded with the ACE appliance software. To display the version of system software that is currently running on the device, use the "show version" command. The following example includes the output of the "show version" command on a Cisco ACE appliance running software version A3(2.1): ACE-4710/Admin# show version Cisco Application Control Software (ACSW) TAC support: http://www.cisco.com/tac Copyright (c) 1985-2008 by Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. The copyrights to certain works contained herein are owned by other third parties and are used and distributed under license. Some parts of this software are covered under the GNU Public License. A copy of the license is available at http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html. Software loader: Version 0.95 system: Version A3(2.1) [build 3.0(0)A3(2.1) adbuild_14:33:29-2008/11/19_/auto/adbu-rel4/rel_a3_2_1_throttle_build/REL_3_0_0_A3_2_1] system image file: (nd)/192.168.65.32/scimitar.bin Device Manager version 1.1 (0) 20081113:2052 --- Determining ANM Software Version +------------------------------- To display the version of ANM software that is currently installed, login to the ANM server and select the "About" keyword in the upper right. An informational pop up window will be displayed. ANM Version 2.0 Update A is indicated in the example output below. Version: 2.0(0), Update: A Build Number: 709 Build Timestamp: 20081031:1226 Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable - --------------------------------- The Cisco ACE XML Gateway, Cisco ACE GSS (Global Site Selector) 4400 Series and Cisco ACE Web Application Firewall are not affected by any of these vulnerabilities. No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these vulnerabilities. Details ======= ANM is a network management application that manages Cisco ACE modules or appliances. ANM is installed on customer provided servers with a Red Hat Enterprise Linux operating system. The ACE Device Manager provides a browser-based interface for configuring and managing a single ACE appliance. The ACE Device Manager resides in flash memory on the ACE appliance. The following details are provided for each vulnerability addressed in this security advisory. Invalid Directory Permissions +---------------------------- Versions of the Cisco ACE Device Manager prior to software version A3(2.1) and Cisco ANM prior software version ANM 2.0 contain directory traversal vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities could allow unauthorized access to ACE operating system and host operating system files. To exploit these vulnerabilities authentication is required to initially access either product. This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug IDs: * CSCsv66063 * CSCsv70130 This vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0615. This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug ID: * CSCsu52724 This vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0616. MySQL Default Credentials +------------------------ ANM versions prior to ANM 2.0 use a default MySQL root user password during installation. The MySQL database is installed by default when ANM is initially installed. This vulnerability can be exploited remotely with default credential authentication and without end-user interaction. Unauthorized access to the database may allow modification of system files that could impact the function of ANM or allow execution of commands on the underlying host operating system. The ACE appliance and module device configuration files in the MySQL database are encrypted. This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug ID: * CSCsu52632 This vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0617. Java Agent Privilege Escalation +------------------------------ ANM versions prior to ANM 2.0 Update A contain a remotely exploitable vulnerability that could allow an attacker to view configuration files and modify ANM processes including the capability to stop services. Exploitation of this issue could result in system information disclosure or denial of services. This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug ID: * CSCsu73001 This vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0618. Vulnerability Scoring Details +---------------------------- Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at: http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss * ACE Device Manager invalid directory permissions (CSCsv66063) CVSS Base Score - 9.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - Single Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * ANM invalid directory permissions (CSCsv70130) CVSS Base Score - 9.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - Single Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * ANM default user credentials during installation (CSCsu52724) CVSS Base Score - 10.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 8.7 Exploitability - High Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * ANM embedded MySQL default credentials (CSCsu52632) CVSS Base Score - 10.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 8.7 Exploitability - High Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * ANM Java agent privilege escalation (CSCsu73001) CVSS Base Score - 8.5 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Partial Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4 Exploitability - High Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== Successful exploitation of the ACE Device Manager and ANM invalid directory permission vulnerabilities may allow unauthorized access to view or modify the ACE Device Manager or ANM file system, including host operating system files. Modification of some system files could result in a denial of service condition. Exploitation of the ANM default user credential and ANM MySQL database default credential vulnerabilities may allow an attacker to gain unauthorized system access. Unauthorized access to the MySQL database may allow modification of system files that could impact the function of ANM or allow execution of commands on the underlying host operating system. Successful exploitation of the ANM privilege escalation vulnerability may result in unauthorized remote access to system processes and services with the ability to modify. Modification of these services could result in a denial of service condition. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. Each row of the following software table identifies the earliest possible software release that contains the fix listed in the "First Fixed Release" column of the table. The "Recommended Release" column indicates the release which have fixes for all the published vulnerabilities at the time of this Advisory. +---------------------------------------+ | | First | Recommended | | Vulnerability | Fixed | Release | | | Release | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ACE Device | | | | Manager | | | | Invalid | A3(2.1) | A3(2.1) | | Directory | | | | Permissions | | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ANM Invalid | | ANM 2.0 | | Directory | ANM 2.0 | Update A | | Permissions | | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ANM Default | | ANM 2.0 | | User | ANM 2.0 | Update A | | Credentials | | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ANM MySQL | | ANM 2.0 | | Default | ANM 2.0 | Update A | | Credentials | | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ANM Java | ANM 2.0 | | | Agent | Update | ANM 2.0 | | Privilege | A | Update A | | Escalation | | | +---------------------------------------+ ANM 2.0 Update A can be downloaded from: http://www.cisco.com/cgi-bin/Software/Tablebuild/doftp.pl?ftpfile=/cisco/crypto/3DES/netmgmt/anm/1.2/anm2.0-update-A.bin ACE Device Manager A3(2.1) can be downloaded from: http://www.cisco.com/cgi-bin/Software/Tablebuild/doftp.pl?ftpfile=/cisco/crypto/3DES/ans/DNSS/ace4710/c4710ace-mz.A3_2_1.bin Workarounds =========== While this Security Advisory describes multiple distinct vulnerabilities, a workaround exists for only the following vulnerability. ANM Default User Credentials +--------------------------- The ANM user "admin" account password may be modified after installation by following the procedures documented for "Changing the Admin Password" located in the ANM User Guide at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/net_mgmt/application_networking_manager/2.0/user/guide/UG_admin.html#wp1053216 Applied Mitigation Bulletin +-------------------------- Additional mitigation techniques that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin companion document for this advisory: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20090225-anm.shtml Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/prod_warranties_item09186a008088e31f.html, or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml. Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts - -------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations - ------------------------------------------------- Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts - ----------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerabilities described in this advisory. Acknowledgement to the National Australia Bank's Security Assurance team for the discovery and reporting of the ACE Device Manager directory permissions vulnerability. The remaining vulnerabilities were identified through internal testing. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-anm.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +------------------------------------------------------------+ | Revision 1.0 | 2009 February 25 | Initial public release | +------------------------------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html. This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt. +-------------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright 2008 - 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. +-------------------------------------------------------------------- Updated: Feb 25, 2009 Document ID: 109451 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (GNU/Linux) iEYEARECAAYFAkmlezoACgkQ86n/Gc8U/uAexwCfYI7DnCQWq4XF2Id8o6bO4+zJ a6IAn0r51YyfdsXPFgYII7OPUWLzJHLU =xUPr -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/

Cisco Application Networking Manager (ANM) before 2.0 uses a default MySQL root password, which makes it easier for remote attackers to execute arbitrary operating-system commands or change system files. Cisco Application Network Manager (ANM) and Application Control Engine (ACE) Device Manager are prone to multiple security vulnerabilities, including directory-traversal issues, unauthorized access via default credentials, and a privilege-escalation issue. A successful exploit may allow attackers to obtain sensitive information, view or modify files, cause denial-of-service conditions, or gain unauthorized access to the affected application. This may aid in the complete compromise of the underlying computer. These vulnerabilities are independent of each other. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities may result in unauthorized system or host operating system access. A workaround that mitigates one of the issues is available. This advisory is posted at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-anm.shtml. Note: This advisory is being released simultaneously with a multiple vulnerabilities advisory impacting the ACE appliance and module software, which is posted at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-ace.shtml. Affected Products ================= Vulnerable Products - ------------------- The following are the products and versions affected by each vulnerability described within this advisory. +---------------------------------------+ | Vulnerability | Product | Version | | | Affected | Affected | |---------------+----------+------------| | Invalid | ACE | All | | Directory | Device | versions | | Permissions | Manager | prior to | | | | A3(2.1) | |---------------+----------+------------| | Invalid | | All | | Directory | ANM | versions | | Permissions | | prior to | | | | ANM 2.0 | |---------------+----------+------------| | | | All | | Default User | ANM | versions | | Credentials | | prior to | | | | ANM 2.0 | |---------------+----------+------------| | | | All | | MySQL Default | ANM | versions | | Credentials | | prior to | | | | ANM 2.0 | |---------------+----------+------------| | | | All | | Java Agent | | versions | | Privilege | ANM | prior to | | Escalation | | ANM 2.0 | | | | Update A | +---------------------------------------+ Determining ACE Device Manager Software Version +---------------------------------------------- The ACE Device Manager is embedded with the ACE appliance software. To display the version of system software that is currently running on the device, use the "show version" command. The following example includes the output of the "show version" command on a Cisco ACE appliance running software version A3(2.1): ACE-4710/Admin# show version Cisco Application Control Software (ACSW) TAC support: http://www.cisco.com/tac Copyright (c) 1985-2008 by Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. The copyrights to certain works contained herein are owned by other third parties and are used and distributed under license. Some parts of this software are covered under the GNU Public License. A copy of the license is available at http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html. Software loader: Version 0.95 system: Version A3(2.1) [build 3.0(0)A3(2.1) adbuild_14:33:29-2008/11/19_/auto/adbu-rel4/rel_a3_2_1_throttle_build/REL_3_0_0_A3_2_1] system image file: (nd)/192.168.65.32/scimitar.bin Device Manager version 1.1 (0) 20081113:2052 --- Determining ANM Software Version +------------------------------- To display the version of ANM software that is currently installed, login to the ANM server and select the "About" keyword in the upper right. An informational pop up window will be displayed. ANM Version 2.0 Update A is indicated in the example output below. Version: 2.0(0), Update: A Build Number: 709 Build Timestamp: 20081031:1226 Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable - --------------------------------- The Cisco ACE XML Gateway, Cisco ACE GSS (Global Site Selector) 4400 Series and Cisco ACE Web Application Firewall are not affected by any of these vulnerabilities. No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these vulnerabilities. Details ======= ANM is a network management application that manages Cisco ACE modules or appliances. ANM is installed on customer provided servers with a Red Hat Enterprise Linux operating system. The ACE Device Manager provides a browser-based interface for configuring and managing a single ACE appliance. The ACE Device Manager resides in flash memory on the ACE appliance. The following details are provided for each vulnerability addressed in this security advisory. Invalid Directory Permissions +---------------------------- Versions of the Cisco ACE Device Manager prior to software version A3(2.1) and Cisco ANM prior software version ANM 2.0 contain directory traversal vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities could allow unauthorized access to ACE operating system and host operating system files. To exploit these vulnerabilities authentication is required to initially access either product. This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug IDs: * CSCsv66063 * CSCsv70130 This vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0615. Default User Credentials +----------------------- Versions of Cisco ANM prior to software version ANM 2.0 do not force credential changes during installation. This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug ID: * CSCsu52724 This vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0616. MySQL Default Credentials +------------------------ ANM versions prior to ANM 2.0 use a default MySQL root user password during installation. The MySQL database is installed by default when ANM is initially installed. This vulnerability can be exploited remotely with default credential authentication and without end-user interaction. The ACE appliance and module device configuration files in the MySQL database are encrypted. This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug ID: * CSCsu52632 This vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0617. Java Agent Privilege Escalation +------------------------------ ANM versions prior to ANM 2.0 Update A contain a remotely exploitable vulnerability that could allow an attacker to view configuration files and modify ANM processes including the capability to stop services. Exploitation of this issue could result in system information disclosure or denial of services. This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug ID: * CSCsu73001 This vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0618. Vulnerability Scoring Details +---------------------------- Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at: http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss * ACE Device Manager invalid directory permissions (CSCsv66063) CVSS Base Score - 9.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - Single Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * ANM invalid directory permissions (CSCsv70130) CVSS Base Score - 9.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - Single Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * ANM default user credentials during installation (CSCsu52724) CVSS Base Score - 10.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 8.7 Exploitability - High Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * ANM embedded MySQL default credentials (CSCsu52632) CVSS Base Score - 10.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 8.7 Exploitability - High Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * ANM Java agent privilege escalation (CSCsu73001) CVSS Base Score - 8.5 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Partial Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4 Exploitability - High Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== Successful exploitation of the ACE Device Manager and ANM invalid directory permission vulnerabilities may allow unauthorized access to view or modify the ACE Device Manager or ANM file system, including host operating system files. Modification of some system files could result in a denial of service condition. Exploitation of the ANM default user credential and ANM MySQL database default credential vulnerabilities may allow an attacker to gain unauthorized system access. Modification of ANM settings with the default user credentials could result in a denial of service condition. Successful exploitation of the ANM privilege escalation vulnerability may result in unauthorized remote access to system processes and services with the ability to modify. Modification of these services could result in a denial of service condition. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. Each row of the following software table identifies the earliest possible software release that contains the fix listed in the "First Fixed Release" column of the table. The "Recommended Release" column indicates the release which have fixes for all the published vulnerabilities at the time of this Advisory. +---------------------------------------+ | | First | Recommended | | Vulnerability | Fixed | Release | | | Release | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ACE Device | | | | Manager | | | | Invalid | A3(2.1) | A3(2.1) | | Directory | | | | Permissions | | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ANM Invalid | | ANM 2.0 | | Directory | ANM 2.0 | Update A | | Permissions | | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ANM Default | | ANM 2.0 | | User | ANM 2.0 | Update A | | Credentials | | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ANM MySQL | | ANM 2.0 | | Default | ANM 2.0 | Update A | | Credentials | | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ANM Java | ANM 2.0 | | | Agent | Update | ANM 2.0 | | Privilege | A | Update A | | Escalation | | | +---------------------------------------+ ANM 2.0 Update A can be downloaded from: http://www.cisco.com/cgi-bin/Software/Tablebuild/doftp.pl?ftpfile=/cisco/crypto/3DES/netmgmt/anm/1.2/anm2.0-update-A.bin ACE Device Manager A3(2.1) can be downloaded from: http://www.cisco.com/cgi-bin/Software/Tablebuild/doftp.pl?ftpfile=/cisco/crypto/3DES/ans/DNSS/ace4710/c4710ace-mz.A3_2_1.bin Workarounds =========== While this Security Advisory describes multiple distinct vulnerabilities, a workaround exists for only the following vulnerability. ANM Default User Credentials +--------------------------- The ANM user "admin" account password may be modified after installation by following the procedures documented for "Changing the Admin Password" located in the ANM User Guide at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/net_mgmt/application_networking_manager/2.0/user/guide/UG_admin.html#wp1053216 Applied Mitigation Bulletin +-------------------------- Additional mitigation techniques that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin companion document for this advisory: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20090225-anm.shtml Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/prod_warranties_item09186a008088e31f.html, or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml. Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts - -------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations - ------------------------------------------------- Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts - ----------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerabilities described in this advisory. Acknowledgement to the National Australia Bank's Security Assurance team for the discovery and reporting of the ACE Device Manager directory permissions vulnerability. The remaining vulnerabilities were identified through internal testing. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-anm.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +------------------------------------------------------------+ | Revision 1.0 | 2009 February 25 | Initial public release | +------------------------------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html. This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt. +-------------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright 2008 - 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. +-------------------------------------------------------------------- Updated: Feb 25, 2009 Document ID: 109451 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (GNU/Linux) iEYEARECAAYFAkmlezoACgkQ86n/Gc8U/uAexwCfYI7DnCQWq4XF2Id8o6bO4+zJ a6IAn0r51YyfdsXPFgYII7OPUWLzJHLU =xUPr -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/

Unspecified vulnerability in the Java agent in Cisco Application Networking Manager (ANM) before 2.0 Update A allows remote attackers to gain privileges, and cause a denial of service (service outage) by stopping processes, or obtain sensitive information by reading configuration files. Cisco Application Network Manager (ANM) and Application Control Engine (ACE) Device Manager are prone to multiple security vulnerabilities, including directory-traversal issues, unauthorized access via default credentials, and a privilege-escalation issue. This may aid in the complete compromise of the underlying computer. These vulnerabilities are independent of each other. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities may result in unauthorized system or host operating system access. A workaround that mitigates one of the issues is available. This advisory is posted at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-anm.shtml. Note: This advisory is being released simultaneously with a multiple vulnerabilities advisory impacting the ACE appliance and module software, which is posted at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-ace.shtml. Affected Products ================= Vulnerable Products - ------------------- The following are the products and versions affected by each vulnerability described within this advisory. +---------------------------------------+ | Vulnerability | Product | Version | | | Affected | Affected | |---------------+----------+------------| | Invalid | ACE | All | | Directory | Device | versions | | Permissions | Manager | prior to | | | | A3(2.1) | |---------------+----------+------------| | Invalid | | All | | Directory | ANM | versions | | Permissions | | prior to | | | | ANM 2.0 | |---------------+----------+------------| | | | All | | Default User | ANM | versions | | Credentials | | prior to | | | | ANM 2.0 | |---------------+----------+------------| | | | All | | MySQL Default | ANM | versions | | Credentials | | prior to | | | | ANM 2.0 | |---------------+----------+------------| | | | All | | Java Agent | | versions | | Privilege | ANM | prior to | | Escalation | | ANM 2.0 | | | | Update A | +---------------------------------------+ Determining ACE Device Manager Software Version +---------------------------------------------- The ACE Device Manager is embedded with the ACE appliance software. To display the version of system software that is currently running on the device, use the "show version" command. The following example includes the output of the "show version" command on a Cisco ACE appliance running software version A3(2.1): ACE-4710/Admin# show version Cisco Application Control Software (ACSW) TAC support: http://www.cisco.com/tac Copyright (c) 1985-2008 by Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. The copyrights to certain works contained herein are owned by other third parties and are used and distributed under license. Some parts of this software are covered under the GNU Public License. A copy of the license is available at http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html. Software loader: Version 0.95 system: Version A3(2.1) [build 3.0(0)A3(2.1) adbuild_14:33:29-2008/11/19_/auto/adbu-rel4/rel_a3_2_1_throttle_build/REL_3_0_0_A3_2_1] system image file: (nd)/192.168.65.32/scimitar.bin Device Manager version 1.1 (0) 20081113:2052 --- Determining ANM Software Version +------------------------------- To display the version of ANM software that is currently installed, login to the ANM server and select the "About" keyword in the upper right. An informational pop up window will be displayed. ANM Version 2.0 Update A is indicated in the example output below. Version: 2.0(0), Update: A Build Number: 709 Build Timestamp: 20081031:1226 Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable - --------------------------------- The Cisco ACE XML Gateway, Cisco ACE GSS (Global Site Selector) 4400 Series and Cisco ACE Web Application Firewall are not affected by any of these vulnerabilities. No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these vulnerabilities. Details ======= ANM is a network management application that manages Cisco ACE modules or appliances. ANM is installed on customer provided servers with a Red Hat Enterprise Linux operating system. The ACE Device Manager provides a browser-based interface for configuring and managing a single ACE appliance. The ACE Device Manager resides in flash memory on the ACE appliance. The following details are provided for each vulnerability addressed in this security advisory. Invalid Directory Permissions +---------------------------- Versions of the Cisco ACE Device Manager prior to software version A3(2.1) and Cisco ANM prior software version ANM 2.0 contain directory traversal vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities could allow unauthorized access to ACE operating system and host operating system files. To exploit these vulnerabilities authentication is required to initially access either product. This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug IDs: * CSCsv66063 * CSCsv70130 This vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0615. Default User Credentials +----------------------- Versions of Cisco ANM prior to software version ANM 2.0 do not force credential changes during installation. This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug ID: * CSCsu52724 This vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0616. MySQL Default Credentials +------------------------ ANM versions prior to ANM 2.0 use a default MySQL root user password during installation. The MySQL database is installed by default when ANM is initially installed. This vulnerability can be exploited remotely with default credential authentication and without end-user interaction. Unauthorized access to the database may allow modification of system files that could impact the function of ANM or allow execution of commands on the underlying host operating system. The ACE appliance and module device configuration files in the MySQL database are encrypted. This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug ID: * CSCsu52632 This vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0617. Exploitation of this issue could result in system information disclosure or denial of services. This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug ID: * CSCsu73001 This vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0618. Vulnerability Scoring Details +---------------------------- Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at: http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss * ACE Device Manager invalid directory permissions (CSCsv66063) CVSS Base Score - 9.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - Single Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * ANM invalid directory permissions (CSCsv70130) CVSS Base Score - 9.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - Single Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * ANM default user credentials during installation (CSCsu52724) CVSS Base Score - 10.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 8.7 Exploitability - High Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * ANM embedded MySQL default credentials (CSCsu52632) CVSS Base Score - 10.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 8.7 Exploitability - High Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * ANM Java agent privilege escalation (CSCsu73001) CVSS Base Score - 8.5 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Partial Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4 Exploitability - High Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== Successful exploitation of the ACE Device Manager and ANM invalid directory permission vulnerabilities may allow unauthorized access to view or modify the ACE Device Manager or ANM file system, including host operating system files. Modification of some system files could result in a denial of service condition. Exploitation of the ANM default user credential and ANM MySQL database default credential vulnerabilities may allow an attacker to gain unauthorized system access. Modification of ANM settings with the default user credentials could result in a denial of service condition. Unauthorized access to the MySQL database may allow modification of system files that could impact the function of ANM or allow execution of commands on the underlying host operating system. Successful exploitation of the ANM privilege escalation vulnerability may result in unauthorized remote access to system processes and services with the ability to modify. Modification of these services could result in a denial of service condition. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. Each row of the following software table identifies the earliest possible software release that contains the fix listed in the "First Fixed Release" column of the table. The "Recommended Release" column indicates the release which have fixes for all the published vulnerabilities at the time of this Advisory. +---------------------------------------+ | | First | Recommended | | Vulnerability | Fixed | Release | | | Release | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ACE Device | | | | Manager | | | | Invalid | A3(2.1) | A3(2.1) | | Directory | | | | Permissions | | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ANM Invalid | | ANM 2.0 | | Directory | ANM 2.0 | Update A | | Permissions | | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ANM Default | | ANM 2.0 | | User | ANM 2.0 | Update A | | Credentials | | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ANM MySQL | | ANM 2.0 | | Default | ANM 2.0 | Update A | | Credentials | | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ANM Java | ANM 2.0 | | | Agent | Update | ANM 2.0 | | Privilege | A | Update A | | Escalation | | | +---------------------------------------+ ANM 2.0 Update A can be downloaded from: http://www.cisco.com/cgi-bin/Software/Tablebuild/doftp.pl?ftpfile=/cisco/crypto/3DES/netmgmt/anm/1.2/anm2.0-update-A.bin ACE Device Manager A3(2.1) can be downloaded from: http://www.cisco.com/cgi-bin/Software/Tablebuild/doftp.pl?ftpfile=/cisco/crypto/3DES/ans/DNSS/ace4710/c4710ace-mz.A3_2_1.bin Workarounds =========== While this Security Advisory describes multiple distinct vulnerabilities, a workaround exists for only the following vulnerability. ANM Default User Credentials +--------------------------- The ANM user "admin" account password may be modified after installation by following the procedures documented for "Changing the Admin Password" located in the ANM User Guide at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/net_mgmt/application_networking_manager/2.0/user/guide/UG_admin.html#wp1053216 Applied Mitigation Bulletin +-------------------------- Additional mitigation techniques that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin companion document for this advisory: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20090225-anm.shtml Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/prod_warranties_item09186a008088e31f.html, or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml. Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts - -------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations - ------------------------------------------------- Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts - ----------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerabilities described in this advisory. Acknowledgement to the National Australia Bank's Security Assurance team for the discovery and reporting of the ACE Device Manager directory permissions vulnerability. The remaining vulnerabilities were identified through internal testing. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-anm.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +------------------------------------------------------------+ | Revision 1.0 | 2009 February 25 | Initial public release | +------------------------------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html. This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt. +-------------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright 2008 - 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. +-------------------------------------------------------------------- Updated: Feb 25, 2009 Document ID: 109451 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (GNU/Linux) iEYEARECAAYFAkmlezoACgkQ86n/Gc8U/uAexwCfYI7DnCQWq4XF2Id8o6bO4+zJ a6IAn0r51YyfdsXPFgYII7OPUWLzJHLU =xUPr -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/

Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Module for Catalyst 6500 Switches and 7600 Routers before A2(1.1) uses default (1) usernames and (2) passwords for (a) the administrator and (b) web management, which makes it easier for remote attackers to perform configuration changes or obtain operating-system access. Other attacks are also possible. Workarounds that mitigate some of the vulnerabilities are available. Note: These vulnerabilities are independent of each other. A device may be affected by one vulnerability and not affected by another. This advisory is posted at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-ace.shtml Note: This advisory is being released simultaneously with a multiple vulnerability disclosure advisory that impacts the Cisco 4700 Series Application Control Engine Device Manager and Application Networking Manager module software. This advisory is posted at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-anm.shtml Affected Products ================= Vulnerable Products +------------------ The following table displays the products that are affected by each vulnerability that is described within this advisory. +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | | Products and Versions | | | Affected | |Vulnerability |-----------------------------| | | Cisco ACE | Cisco ACE | | | 4710 | Module | | | Appliance | | |-------------------------------------+--------------+--------------| | | All versions | All versions | | Default Usernames and Passwords | prior to A1 | prior to A2 | | | (8a) | (1.1) | |-------------------------------------+--------------+--------------| | | All versions | All versions | | Privilege Escalation Vulnerability | prior to A1 | prior to A2 | | | (8a) | (1.2) | |-------------------------------------+--------------+--------------| | | All versions | All versions | | Crafted SSH Packet Vulnerability | prior to A3 | prior to A2 | | | (2.1) | (1.3) | |-------------------------------------+--------------+--------------| | Crafted Simple Network Management | All versions | All versions | | Protocol version 2 (SNMPv2) Packet | prior to A3 | prior to A2 | | Vulnerability | (2.1) | (1.3) | |-------------------------------------+--------------+--------------| | | All versions | All versions | | Crafted SNMPv3 Packet Vulnerability | prior to A1 | prior to A2 | | | (8.0) | (1.2) | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ Determining Software Versions +---------------------------- To display the version of system software that is currently running on Cisco ACE Application Control Engine, use the show version command. The following example displays the output of the show version command on the Cisco ACE Application Control Engine software version A3(1.0): ACE-4710/Admin# show version Cisco Application Control Software (ACSW) TAC support: http://www.cisco.com/tac Copyright (c) 1985-2008 by Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. The copyrights to certain works contained herein are owned by other third parties and are used and distributed under license. Some parts of this software are covered under the GNU Public License. A copy of the license is available at http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html Software loader: Version 0.95 system: Version A3(1.0) [build 3.0(0)A3(0.0.148) adbuild_03:31:25-2008/08/06_/auto/adbure_nightly2/nightly_rel_a3_1_0_throttle/REL_3_0_0_A3_0_0 system image file: (nd)/192.168.65.31/scimitar.bin Device Manager version 1.1 (0) 20080805:0415 ... <output truncated> The following example displays the output of the show version command on a Cisco ACE Application Control Engine module software version A1(1): ACE-mod/Admin# show version Cisco Application Control Software (ACSW) TAC support: http://www.cisco.com/tac Copyright (c) 2002-2006, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. The copyrights to certain works contained herein are owned by other third parties and are used and distributed under license. Some parts of this software are covered under the GNU Public License. A copy of the license is available at http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html Software loader: Version 12.2[117] system: Version 3.0(0)A1(1) [build 3.0(0)A1(1) _01:26:21-2006/03/13_/auto/adbu-rel/ws/REL_3_0_0_A1_1] system image file: [LCP] disk0:c6ace-t1k9-mzg.3.0.0_A1_1.bin licensed features: no feature license is installed ... <output truncated> Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable +-------------------------------- The Cisco ACE XML Gateway, the Cisco ACE Web Application Firewall, and the Cisco ACE GSS 4400 Series Global Site Selector Appliances are not affected by any of the vulnerabilities that are described in this advisory. No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these vulnerabilities. Multiple vulnerabilities exist in both products. The following information provides the details about each of the vulnerabilities that are addressed in this advisory. The appliance and module do not prompt users to modify system account passwords during the initial configuration process. An attacker with knowledge of these accounts could modify the application configuration and, in certain instances, gain user access to the host operating system. This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCsq32379 ( registered customers only) and has also been assigned the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0621. An authenticated user could exploit this vulnerability to invoke administrative commands via the device command line interface (CLI). An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to cause the device to reload by sending a crafted SSH packet to it. Note: SSH access must be configured on the affected device for it to be vulnerable. SSH access is not enabled by default. A full TCP three-way handshake is not necessary to trigger the effects of this vulnerability. An authenticated attacker could send a crafted SNMPv1 packet to an affected device to cause it to reload. Note: SNMPv2c must be explicitly configured in an affected device in order to process any SNMPv2c transactions. SNMPv2c is not enabled by default. An where an attacker may could cause the a device to reload by sending a crafted SNMPv3 packet to it. Note: SNMPv3 must be explicitly configured in an affected device in order to process any SNMPv3 transactions. SNMPv3 is not enabled by default. Vulnerability Scoring Details ============================= Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss CSCsq43828 and CSCsq43229 - Default users and passwords on ACE module and appliance CVSS Base Score - 10 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 8.7 Exploitability - High Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCsq32379 - DM Default Account Credentials CVSS Base Score - 10 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 8.7 Exploitability - High Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCsq48546 and CSCsq09839 - Privilege escalation issue on ACE Module and ACE Appliance CVSS Base Score - 9 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - Single Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCsv01877 and CSCsv01738 - Crafted SSH packet may cause ACE module or appliance to reload CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCsu36038 and CSCsu47876 - Crafted SNMPv2c packet may crash ACE module and appliance CVSS Base Score - 6.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Single Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 5.6 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCso83126 and CSCsq45432 - Crafted SNMPv3 packet may crash ACE appliance CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== An attacker with knowledge of the Default Usernames and Passwords Vulnerability accounts could modify the device configuration and, in certain instances, gain user access to the host operating system. An exploit of the Privilege Escalation Vulnerability could allow an authenticated attacker to execute host operating system administrative commands. Successful exploitation of the Crafted SSH Packet Vulnerability, Crafted SNMPv2 Packet Vulnerability, and Crafted SNMPv3 Packet Vulnerability may cause a reload of the affected device. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. Each row of the software table (below) describes the earliest possible releases that contain the fix (along with the anticipated date of availability for each, if applicable) are listed in the "First Fixed Release" column of the table. The "Recommended Release" column indicates the releases which have fixes for all the published vulnerabilities at the time of this Advisory. A device running a release in the given train that is earlier than the release in a specific column (less than the First Fixed Release) is known to be vulnerable. Cisco recommends upgrading to a release equal to or later than the release in the "Recommended Releases" column of the table. +----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | | Products and Versions Affected | | |---------------------------------------------------------------------| | | Cisco ACE 4710 Appliance | Cisco ACE Module | |Vulnerability |----------------------------------+----------------------------------| | | First Fixed | Recommended | First | | | | Release | Release | Fixed | Recommended Release | | | | | Release | | |------------------------------------+---------------+------------------+------------+---------------------| | Default Usernames and Passwords | A1(8a) | A3(2.1) | A2(1.1) | A2(1.3) | |------------------------------------+---------------+------------------+------------+---------------------| | Privilege Escalation Vulnerability | A1(8a) | A3(2.1) | A2(1.2) | A2(1.3) | |------------------------------------+---------------+------------------+------------+---------------------| | Crafted SSH Packet Vulnerability | A3(2.1) | A3(2.1) | A2(1.3) | A2(1.3) | |------------------------------------+---------------+------------------+------------+---------------------| | Crafted SNMPv2 Packet | A3(2.1) | A3(2.1) | A2(1.3) | A2(1.3) | | Vulnerability | | | | | |------------------------------------+---------------+------------------+------------+---------------------| | Crafted SNMPv2 Packet | A1(8.0) | A3(2.1) | A2(1.2) | A2(1.3) | | Vulnerability | | | | | +----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ Cisco ACE module software can be downloaded from: http://tools.cisco.com/support/downloads/go/Redirect.x?mdfid=280557289 Cisco ACE 4710 Application Control Engine appliance software can be downloaded from: http://tools.cisco.com/support/downloads/go/Redirect.x?mdfid=281222179 Workarounds =========== This Security Advisory describes multiple distinct vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities and their respective workarounds are independent of each other. Default Usernames and Passwords +------------------------------ To change the default administrative password, use the username command in configuration mode. The syntax of this command is as follows: username admin [password [0 | 5] {password}] The keywords, arguments, and options are: admin--Specifies the default administrative user name. password--(Optional) Keyword that indicates that a password follows. 0--(Optional) Specifies a clear text password. 5--(Optional) Specifies an MD5-hashed strong encryption password. password--The password in clear text, encrypted text, or MD5 strong encryption, depending on the numbered option (0 or 5) that you enter. If you do not enter a numbered option, the password is in clear text by default. Enter a password as an unquoted text string with a maximum of 64 characters. For example, to create a user named admin that uses the clear text password my_super_secret_88312, enter the following command: ACE(config)# username admin password 0 my_super_secret_88312 Note: This process can also be followed to change the www user account credentials. The dm user is for accessing the Device Manager GUI and cannot be modified or deleted. The dm user is an internal user required by the Device Manager GUI; it is hidden on the ACE CLI. For more information refer to: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/app_ntwk_services/data_center_app_services/ace_appliances/vA3_1_0/configuration/virtualization/guide/config.html Privilege Escalation Vulnerability +--------------------------------- There are no workarounds for this vulnerability. Crafted SSH Packet Vulnerability +------------------------------- SSH management traffic that can be received by the ACE is controlled through the use of class maps, policy maps, and service policies. This Management Traffic Service example denies unauthorized SSH packets that are sent to an affected device. In the following example, 192.168.100.1 is considered a trusted source that requires SSH access to the affected device. Care should be taken to allow all required management access to the affected device. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability using spoofed packets. This workaround cannot provide complete protection against this vulnerability when the attack comes from a trusted source address. The following example demonstrates how SSH access to the ACE is only allowed from the 192.168.100.1 host: !-- Configure a class to allow SSH from the trusted source ! class-map type management match-all Permit_SSH_Class description Allow SSH from trusted sources Class match protocol ssh source-address 192.168.100.1 255.255.255.255 ! !-- Configure a management policy that allows ssh from the !--trusted source configured in the above class ! policy-map type management first-match Permit_SSH_Policy description Allow SSH from trusted sources Policy class Permit_SSH_Class permit ! !-- Apply the management policy globally ! service-policy input Permit_SSH_Policy Additional information about "Configuring SSH Management Sessions" is available at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/interfaces_modules/services_modules/ace/v3.00_A1/configuration/administration/guide/access.html#wp1049450 Additional information about "Configuring Class Maps and Policy Maps" is available at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/interfaces_modules/services_modules/ace/v3.00_A1/configuration/administration/guide/mapolcy.html warning Warning: It is possible to easily spoof the sender's IP address, which may defeat class maps and access control lists (ACLs) that permit communication to the device from trusted IP addresses. Crafted SNMPv2 and SNMPv3 Packet Vulnerabilities +----------------------------------------------- SNMP management traffic that can be received by the ACE is controlled through the use of class maps, policy maps, and service policies. This Management Traffic Service example denies unauthorized SNMP packets on UDP port 161 that are sent to an affected device. In the following example, 192.168.100.1 is considered a trusted source that requires SNMP access to the affected device. Care should be taken to allow all required management access to the affected device. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability using spoofed packets. This workaround cannot provide complete protection against this vulnerability when the attack comes from a trusted source address. !-- Configure a class to allow SNMP from the trusted source ! class-map type management match-all Permit_SNMP_Class description Allow SNMP from trusted sources Class 2 match protocol snmp source-address 192.168.100.1 255.255.255.255 ! !-- Configure a management policy that allows snmp from the !--trusted source configured in the above class ! policy-map type management first-match Permit_SNMP_Policy description Allow SNMP from trusted sources Policy class Permit_SNMP_Class permit !-- Apply the management policy globally ! service-policy input Permit_SNMP_Policy Additional information about "SNMP Management Traffic Services" is available at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/interfaces_modules/services_modules/ace/v3.00_A1/configuration/administration/guide/snmp.html#wp1034011 Additional information about "Configuring Class Maps and Policy Maps" is available at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/interfaces_modules/services_modules/ace/v3.00_A1/configuration/administration/guide/mapolcy.html Additional mitigation techniques that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin companion document for this advisory: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20090225-ace.shtml Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/prod_warranties_item09186a008088e31f.html or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory. These vulnerabilities were found during internal testing. Status of this Notice: FINAL THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at : http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-ace.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Revision 1.0 | 2009-February-25 | Initial public release | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.8 (Darwin) iEYEARECAAYFAkmlbsoACgkQ86n/Gc8U/uA9egCgiM1YYI9hZhS8iZ5kbEw6vxaq gM8AnjpFAJaZ/RK593w/5j/mRHxjkLVo =rWBu -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/