VARIoT IoT vulnerabilities database

service.exe in Measuresoft ScadaPro 4.0.0 and earlier allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands via shell metacharacters in the (1) BF, (2) OF, or (3) EF command. Service.exe has multiple boundary errors when processing messages, and sending a specially crafted command to TCP port 11234 can trigger a stack-based buffer overflow. Measuresoft ScadaPro provides integrated data phone, monitoring, logging, report generation and more. Measuresoft ScadaPro has a security vulnerability. The \"xF\" command can be used to call any function in any DLL, such as executing the application via the \"system()\" function in msvcrt.dll. Measuresoft ScadaPro has a security vulnerability and sends a special \"RF\" command to TCP port 11234 to get arbitrary file content. Exploiting these issues could allow remote attackers to perform unauthorized actions using directory traversal strings or to execute arbitrary code or commands within the context of the affected application. Failed attempts will likely cause denial-of-service conditions

Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in service.exe in Measuresoft ScadaPro 4.0.0 and earlier allow remote attackers to read, modify, or delete arbitrary files via the (1) RF, (2) wF, (3) UF, or (4) NF command. Service.exe has multiple boundary errors when processing messages, and sending a specially crafted command to TCP port 11234 can trigger a stack-based buffer overflow. Measuresoft ScadaPro provides integrated data phone, monitoring, logging, report generation and more. Measuresoft ScadaPro has a security vulnerability. The \"xF\" command can be used to call any function in any DLL, such as executing the application via the \"system()\" function in msvcrt.dll. Measuresoft ScadaPro has a security vulnerability and sends a special \"RF\" command to TCP port 11234 to get arbitrary file content. Failed attempts will likely cause denial-of-service conditions

Directory traversal vulnerability in pure-FTPd 1.0.22 and possibly other versions, when running on SUSE Linux Enterprise Server and possibly other operating systems, when the Netware OES remote server feature is enabled, allows local users to overwrite arbitrary files via unknown vectors. Pure-FTPd is prone to a local file-overwrite vulnerability. A local attacker can exploit this issue overwrite certain files. This may aid in further attacks. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- The new Secunia Corporate Software Inspector (CSI) 5.0 Integrates with Microsoft WSUS & SCCM and supports Apple Mac OS X. Get a free trial now and qualify for a special discount: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/corporate/trial/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: SUSE update for pure-ftpd SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA45943 VERIFY ADVISORY: Secunia.com http://secunia.com/advisories/45943/ Customer Area (Credentials Required) https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=45943 RELEASE DATE: 2011-09-10 DISCUSS ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/45943/#comments AVAILABLE ON SITE AND IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Last Update * Popularity * Comments * Criticality Level * Impact * Where * Solution Status * Operating System / Software * CVE Reference(s) http://secunia.com/advisories/45943/ ONLY AVAILABLE IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Authentication Level * Report Reliability * Secunia PoC * Secunia Analysis * Systems Affected * Approve Distribution * Remediation Status * Secunia CVSS Score * CVSS https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=45943 ONLY AVAILABLE WITH SECUNIA CSI AND SECUNIA PSI: * AUTOMATED SCANNING http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/personal/ http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/corporate/wsus_sccm_3rd_third_party_patching/ DESCRIPTION: SUSE has issued an update for pure-ftpd. This fixes a vulnerability, which can be exploited by malicious, local users and malicious people to manipulate certain data. Input passed via the username during the authentication process is not properly sanitised before being used and can be exploited to create arbitrary directories via directory traversal sequences. SOLUTION: Apply updated packages via the zypper package manager. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: SUSE-SU-2011:1028-1: http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2011-09/msg00015.html SUSE-SU-2011:1029-1: http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2011-09/msg00016.html OTHER REFERENCES: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ DEEP LINKS: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ EXTENDED DESCRIPTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ EXTENDED SOLUTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ EXPLOIT: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ----------------------------------------------------------------------

Core Server HMI Service (Coreservice.exe) in Scadatec Limited Procyon SCADA 1.06, and other versions before 1.14, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via a long password to the Telnet (TCP/23) port, which triggers an out-of-bounds read or write, leading to a stack-based buffer overflow. Scadatec Procyon is an HMI/SCADA software. A failed attack attempt could result in a denial of service. Scadatec Procyon is prone to a remote buffer-overflow vulnerability. Versions prior to Procyon 1.14 are vulnerable. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- The Secunia CSI 5.0 Beta - now available for testing Find out more, take a free test drive, and share your opinion with us: http://secunia.com/blog/242 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: Procyon SCADA Core Service Buffer Overflow Vulnerability SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA45866 VERIFY ADVISORY: Secunia.com http://secunia.com/advisories/45866/ Customer Area (Credentials Required) https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=45866 RELEASE DATE: 2011-09-09 DISCUSS ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/45866/#comments AVAILABLE ON SITE AND IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Last Update * Popularity * Comments * Criticality Level * Impact * Where * Solution Status * Operating System / Software * CVE Reference(s) http://secunia.com/advisories/45866/ ONLY AVAILABLE IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Authentication Level * Report Reliability * Secunia PoC * Secunia Analysis * Systems Affected * Approve Distribution * Remediation Status * Secunia CVSS Score * CVSS https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=45866 ONLY AVAILABLE WITH SECUNIA CSI AND SECUNIA PSI: * AUTOMATED SCANNING http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/personal/ http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/corporate/wsus_sccm_3rd_third_party_patching/ DESCRIPTION: A vulnerability has been discovered in Procyon SCADA, which can be exploited by malicious people to compromise a vulnerable system. The vulnerability is caused due to a boundary error within the Core service (Coreservice.exe) when handling "LOGON" requests. This can be exploited to cause a stack-based buffer overflow via an overly long string sent to TCP port 23. Successful exploitation allows execution of arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges. The vulnerability is confirmed in version 1.06. SOLUTION: Update to version 1.14. PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: Knud H\xf8jgaard, nSense via ICS-CERT and Steven Seeley, stratsec. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: ICS-CERT: http://www.uscert.gov/control_systems/pdf/ICSA-11-216-01.pdf stratsec: http://www.stratsec.net/Research/Advisories/Procyon-Core-Server-HMI-Remote-Stack-Overflow OTHER REFERENCES: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ DEEP LINKS: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ EXTENDED DESCRIPTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ EXTENDED SOLUTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ EXPLOIT: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ----------------------------------------------------------------------

The SSL protocol, as used in certain configurations in Microsoft Windows and Microsoft Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome, Opera, and other products, encrypts data by using CBC mode with chained initialization vectors, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to obtain plaintext HTTP headers via a blockwise chosen-boundary attack (BCBA) on an HTTPS session, in conjunction with JavaScript code that uses (1) the HTML5 WebSocket API, (2) the Java URLConnection API, or (3) the Silverlight WebClient API, aka a "BEAST" attack. A vulnerability in the specification of the SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 protocols could allow an attacker to decrypt encrypted traffic. SSL Protocol and TLS The protocol includes CBC There are vulnerabilities that are subject to selective plaintext attacks in mode. SSL Protocol and TLS Protocol is CBC Initialization vector when operating in mode (IV) There is a problem in the determination method, and there is a vulnerability that is subject to selective plaintext attacks. Attack methods using this vulnerability have been released.Encrypted communication is a man-in-the-middle attack (man-in-the-middle attack) If they are intercepted by you, their content may be decrypted. This will result in a false sense of security, and potentially result in the disclosure of sensitive information. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Note: the current version of the following document is available here: https://h20564.www2.hp.com/portal/site/hpsc/public/kb/ docDisplay?docId=emr_na-c03839862 SUPPORT COMMUNICATION - SECURITY BULLETIN Document ID: c03839862 Version: 1 HPSBMU02900 rev.1 - HP System Management Homepage (SMH) running on Linux and Windows, Multiple Remote and Local Vulnerabilities NOTICE: The information in this Security Bulletin should be acted upon as soon as possible. Release Date: 2013-07-18 Last Updated: 2013-07-18 Potential Security Impact: Local Denial of Service (DoS), remote Denial of Service (DoS), execution of arbitrary code, gain extended privileges, disclosure of information, unauthorized access, XSS Source: Hewlett-Packard Company, HP Software Security Response Team VULNERABILITY SUMMARY Potential security vulnerabilities have been identified with HP System Management Homepage (SMH) running on Linux and Windows. The vulnerabilities could be exploited remotely resulting in Local Denial of Service (DoS), remote Denial of Service (DoS), execution of arbitrary code, gain privileges, disclosure of information, unauthorized access, or XSS. References: CVE-2011-3389 (SSRT100740) Remote disclosure of information CVE-2012-0883 (SSRT101209) Remote gain extended privileges CVE-2012-2110 (SSRT101210) Remote Denial of Service (DoS) CVE-2012-2311 (SSRT100992) Remote execution of arbitrary code CVE-2012-2329 (SSRT100992) Remote Denial of Service (DoS) CVE-2012-2335 (SSRT100992) Remote execution of arbitrary code CVE-2012-2336 (SSRT100992) Remote Denial of Service (DoS) CVE-2013-2355 (SSRT100696) Remote unauthorized Access CVE-2013-2356 (SSRT100835) Remote disclosure of information CVE-2013-2357 (SSRT100907) Remote Denial of Service (DoS) CVE-2013-2358 (SSRT100907) Remote Denial of Service (DoS) CVE-2013-2359 (SSRT100907) Remote Denial of Service (DoS) CVE-2013-2360 (SSRT100907) Remote Denial of Service (DoS) CVE-2013-2361 (SSRT101007) XSS CVE-2013-2362 (SSRT101076, ZDI-CAN-1676) Local Denial of Service (DoS) CVE-2013-2363 (SSRT101150) Remote disclosure of information CVE-2013-2364 (SSRT101151) XSS CVE-2013-5217 (SSRT101137) Remote unauthorized access SUPPORTED SOFTWARE VERSIONS*: ONLY impacted versions are listed. HP System Management Homepage (SMH) v7.2.0 and earlier running on Linux and Windows. BACKGROUND CVSS 2.0 Base Metrics =========================================================== Reference Base Vector Base Score CVE-2011-3389 (AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N) 4.3 CVE-2012-0883 (AV:L/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C) 6.9 CVE-2012-2110 (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P) 7.5 CVE-2012-2311 (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P) 7.5 CVE-2012-2329 (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P) 5.0 CVE-2012-2335 (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P) 7.5 CVE-2012-2336 (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P) 5.0 CVE-2013-2355 (AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N) 4.3 CVE-2013-2356 (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:N/A:N) 7.8 CVE-2013-2357 (AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C) 6.3 CVE-2013-2358 (AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C) 6.3 CVE-2013-2359 (AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:P) 3.5 CVE-2013-2360 (AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:P) 3.5 CVE-2013-2361 (AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:N) 4.3 CVE-2013-2362 (AV:L/AC:H/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:P) 1.0 CVE-2013-2363 (AV:N/AC:H/Au:N/C:C/I:N/A:P) 6.1 CVE-2013-2364 (AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:P) 4.0 CVE-2013-5217 (AV:N/AC:H/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N) 2.6 =========================================================== Information on CVSS is documented in HP Customer Notice: HPSN-2008-002 The Hewlett-Packard Company thanks agix for working with the TippingPoint Zero Day Initiative to report vulnerability CVE-2013-2362 to security-alert@hp.com RESOLUTION HP has made System Management Homepage (SMH) v7.2.1 or subsequent available for Windows and Linux to resolve the vulnerabilities. Information and updates for SMH can be found at the following location: http://h18013.www1.hp.com/products/servers/management/agents/index.html HISTORY Version:1 (rev.1) - 18 July 2013 Initial release Third Party Security Patches: Third party security patches that are to be installed on systems running HP software products should be applied in accordance with the customer's patch management policy. Support: For issues about implementing the recommendations of this Security Bulletin, contact normal HP Services support channel. For other issues about the content of this Security Bulletin, send e-mail to security-alert@hp.com. Report: To report a potential security vulnerability with any HP supported product, send Email to: security-alert@hp.com Subscribe: To initiate a subscription to receive future HP Security Bulletin alerts via Email: http://h41183.www4.hp.com/signup_alerts.php?jumpid=hpsc_secbulletins Security Bulletin Archive: A list of recently released Security Bulletins is available here: https://h20564.www2.hp.com/portal/site/hpsc/public/kb/secBullArchive/ Software Product Category: The Software Product Category is represented in the title by the two characters following HPSB. 3C = 3COM 3P = 3rd Party Software GN = HP General Software HF = HP Hardware and Firmware MP = MPE/iX MU = Multi-Platform Software NS = NonStop Servers OV = OpenVMS PI = Printing and Imaging PV = ProCurve ST = Storage Software TU = Tru64 UNIX UX = HP-UX Copyright 2013 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. Hewlett-Packard Company shall not be liable for technical or editorial errors or omissions contained herein. The information in this document is subject to change without notice. Hewlett-Packard Company and the names of Hewlett-Packard products referenced herein are trademarks of Hewlett-Packard Company in the United States and other countries. Other product and company names mentioned herein may be trademarks of their respective owners. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- SC World Congress, New York, USA, 16 November 2011 Visit the Secunia booth (#203) and discover how you can improve your handling of third party programs: http://secunia.com/resources/events/sc_2011/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: IBM Lotus Domino SSL/TLS Initialization Vector Selection Weakness SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA46791 VERIFY ADVISORY: Secunia.com http://secunia.com/advisories/46791/ Customer Area (Credentials Required) https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=46791 RELEASE DATE: 2011-11-11 DISCUSS ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/46791/#comments AVAILABLE ON SITE AND IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Last Update * Popularity * Comments * Criticality Level * Impact * Where * Solution Status * Operating System / Software * CVE Reference(s) http://secunia.com/advisories/46791/ ONLY AVAILABLE IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Authentication Level * Report Reliability * Secunia PoC * Secunia Analysis * Systems Affected * Approve Distribution * Remediation Status * Secunia CVSS Score * CVSS https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=46791 ONLY AVAILABLE WITH SECUNIA CSI AND SECUNIA PSI: * AUTOMATED SCANNING http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/personal/ http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/corporate/wsus_sccm_3rd_third_party_patching/ DESCRIPTION: A weakness has been reported in IBM Lotus Domino, which can be exploited by malicious people to disclose potentially sensitive information and hijack a user's session. For more information: SA46168 The vulnerability is reported in versions 8.0, 8.5, 8.5.1, 8.5.2, and 8.5.3. SOLUTION: As a workaround enable RC4 encryption (please see the vendor's advisory for details). PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: Thai Duong and Juliano Rizzo ORIGINAL ADVISORY: IBM: http://www.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=swg21568229 IBM ISS X-Force: http://xforce.iss.net/xforce/xfdb/70069 OTHER REFERENCES: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ DEEP LINKS: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ EXTENDED DESCRIPTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ EXTENDED SOLUTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ EXPLOIT: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ---------------------------------------------------------------------- . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Gentoo Linux Security Advisory GLSA 201406-32 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - http://security.gentoo.org/ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Severity: High Title: IcedTea JDK: Multiple vulnerabilities Date: June 29, 2014 Bugs: #312297, #330205, #340819, #346799, #352035, #353418, #354231, #355127, #370787, #387637, #404095, #421031, #429522, #433389, #438750, #442478, #457206, #458410, #461714, #466822, #477210, #489570, #508270 ID: 201406-32 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Synopsis ======== Multiple vulnerabilities have been found in the IcedTea JDK, the worst of which could lead to arbitrary code execution. Background ========== IcedTea is a distribution of the Java OpenJDK source code built with free build tools. Affected packages ================= ------------------------------------------------------------------- Package / Vulnerable / Unaffected ------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 dev-java/icedtea-bin < 6.1.13.3 >= 6.1.13.3 Description =========== Multiple vulnerabilities have been discovered in the IcedTea JDK. Workaround ========== There is no known workaround at this time. Resolution ========== All IcedTea JDK users should upgrade to the latest version: # emerge --sync # emerge --ask --oneshot --verbose ">=dev-java/icedtea-bin-6.1.13.3" References ========== [ 1 ] CVE-2009-3555 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2009-3555 [ 2 ] CVE-2010-2548 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2010-2548 [ 3 ] CVE-2010-2783 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2010-2783 [ 4 ] CVE-2010-3541 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2010-3541 [ 5 ] CVE-2010-3548 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2010-3548 [ 6 ] CVE-2010-3549 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2010-3549 [ 7 ] CVE-2010-3551 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2010-3551 [ 8 ] CVE-2010-3553 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2010-3553 [ 9 ] CVE-2010-3554 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2010-3554 [ 10 ] CVE-2010-3557 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2010-3557 [ 11 ] CVE-2010-3561 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2010-3561 [ 12 ] CVE-2010-3562 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2010-3562 [ 13 ] CVE-2010-3564 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2010-3564 [ 14 ] CVE-2010-3565 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2010-3565 [ 15 ] CVE-2010-3566 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2010-3566 [ 16 ] CVE-2010-3567 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2010-3567 [ 17 ] CVE-2010-3568 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2010-3568 [ 18 ] CVE-2010-3569 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2010-3569 [ 19 ] CVE-2010-3573 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2010-3573 [ 20 ] CVE-2010-3574 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2010-3574 [ 21 ] CVE-2010-3860 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2010-3860 [ 22 ] CVE-2010-4351 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2010-4351 [ 23 ] CVE-2010-4448 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2010-4448 [ 24 ] CVE-2010-4450 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2010-4450 [ 25 ] CVE-2010-4465 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2010-4465 [ 26 ] CVE-2010-4467 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2010-4467 [ 27 ] CVE-2010-4469 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2010-4469 [ 28 ] CVE-2010-4470 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2010-4470 [ 29 ] CVE-2010-4471 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2010-4471 [ 30 ] CVE-2010-4472 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2010-4472 [ 31 ] CVE-2010-4476 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2010-4476 [ 32 ] CVE-2011-0025 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2011-0025 [ 33 ] CVE-2011-0706 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2011-0706 [ 34 ] CVE-2011-0815 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2011-0815 [ 35 ] CVE-2011-0822 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2011-0822 [ 36 ] CVE-2011-0862 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2011-0862 [ 37 ] CVE-2011-0864 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2011-0864 [ 38 ] CVE-2011-0865 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2011-0865 [ 39 ] CVE-2011-0868 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2011-0868 [ 40 ] CVE-2011-0869 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2011-0869 [ 41 ] CVE-2011-0870 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2011-0870 [ 42 ] CVE-2011-0871 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2011-0871 [ 43 ] CVE-2011-0872 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2011-0872 [ 44 ] CVE-2011-3389 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2011-3389 [ 45 ] CVE-2011-3521 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2011-3521 [ 46 ] CVE-2011-3544 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2011-3544 [ 47 ] CVE-2011-3547 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2011-3547 [ 48 ] CVE-2011-3548 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2011-3548 [ 49 ] CVE-2011-3551 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2011-3551 [ 50 ] CVE-2011-3552 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2011-3552 [ 51 ] CVE-2011-3553 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2011-3553 [ 52 ] CVE-2011-3554 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2011-3554 [ 53 ] CVE-2011-3556 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2011-3556 [ 54 ] CVE-2011-3557 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2011-3557 [ 55 ] CVE-2011-3558 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2011-3558 [ 56 ] CVE-2011-3560 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2011-3560 [ 57 ] CVE-2011-3563 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2011-3563 [ 58 ] CVE-2011-3571 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2011-3571 [ 59 ] CVE-2011-5035 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2011-5035 [ 60 ] CVE-2012-0497 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2012-0497 [ 61 ] CVE-2012-0501 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2012-0501 [ 62 ] CVE-2012-0502 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2012-0502 [ 63 ] CVE-2012-0503 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2012-0503 [ 64 ] CVE-2012-0505 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2012-0505 [ 65 ] CVE-2012-0506 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2012-0506 [ 66 ] CVE-2012-0547 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2012-0547 [ 67 ] CVE-2012-1711 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2012-1711 [ 68 ] CVE-2012-1713 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2012-1713 [ 69 ] CVE-2012-1716 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2012-1716 [ 70 ] CVE-2012-1717 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2012-1717 [ 71 ] CVE-2012-1718 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2012-1718 [ 72 ] CVE-2012-1719 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2012-1719 [ 73 ] CVE-2012-1723 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2012-1723 [ 74 ] CVE-2012-1724 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2012-1724 [ 75 ] CVE-2012-1725 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2012-1725 [ 76 ] CVE-2012-1726 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2012-1726 [ 77 ] CVE-2012-3216 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2012-3216 [ 78 ] CVE-2012-3422 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2012-3422 [ 79 ] CVE-2012-3423 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2012-3423 [ 80 ] CVE-2012-4416 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2012-4416 [ 81 ] CVE-2012-4540 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2012-4540 [ 82 ] CVE-2012-5068 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2012-5068 [ 83 ] CVE-2012-5069 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2012-5069 [ 84 ] CVE-2012-5070 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2012-5070 [ 85 ] CVE-2012-5071 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2012-5071 [ 86 ] CVE-2012-5072 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2012-5072 [ 87 ] CVE-2012-5073 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2012-5073 [ 88 ] CVE-2012-5074 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2012-5074 [ 89 ] CVE-2012-5075 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2012-5075 [ 90 ] CVE-2012-5076 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2012-5076 [ 91 ] CVE-2012-5077 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2012-5077 [ 92 ] CVE-2012-5081 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2012-5081 [ 93 ] CVE-2012-5084 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2012-5084 [ 94 ] CVE-2012-5085 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2012-5085 [ 95 ] CVE-2012-5086 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2012-5086 [ 96 ] CVE-2012-5087 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2012-5087 [ 97 ] CVE-2012-5089 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2012-5089 [ 98 ] CVE-2012-5979 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2012-5979 [ 99 ] CVE-2013-0169 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-0169 [ 100 ] CVE-2013-0401 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-0401 [ 101 ] CVE-2013-0424 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2012-0424 [ 102 ] CVE-2013-0425 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-0425 [ 103 ] CVE-2013-0426 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-0426 [ 104 ] CVE-2013-0427 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-0427 [ 105 ] CVE-2013-0428 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-0428 [ 106 ] CVE-2013-0429 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-0429 [ 107 ] CVE-2013-0431 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-0431 [ 108 ] CVE-2013-0432 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-0432 [ 109 ] CVE-2013-0433 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-0433 [ 110 ] CVE-2013-0434 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-0434 [ 111 ] CVE-2013-0435 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-0435 [ 112 ] CVE-2013-0440 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-0440 [ 113 ] CVE-2013-0441 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-0441 [ 114 ] CVE-2013-0442 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-0442 [ 115 ] CVE-2013-0443 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-0443 [ 116 ] CVE-2013-0444 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-0444 [ 117 ] CVE-2013-0450 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-0450 [ 118 ] CVE-2013-0809 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-0809 [ 119 ] CVE-2013-1475 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-1475 [ 120 ] CVE-2013-1476 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-1476 [ 121 ] CVE-2013-1478 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-1478 [ 122 ] CVE-2013-1480 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-1480 [ 123 ] CVE-2013-1484 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-1484 [ 124 ] CVE-2013-1485 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-1485 [ 125 ] CVE-2013-1486 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-1486 [ 126 ] CVE-2013-1488 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-1488 [ 127 ] CVE-2013-1493 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-1493 [ 128 ] CVE-2013-1500 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-1500 [ 129 ] CVE-2013-1518 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-1518 [ 130 ] CVE-2013-1537 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-1537 [ 131 ] CVE-2013-1557 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-1557 [ 132 ] CVE-2013-1569 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-1569 [ 133 ] CVE-2013-1571 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-1571 [ 134 ] CVE-2013-2383 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-2383 [ 135 ] CVE-2013-2384 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-2384 [ 136 ] CVE-2013-2407 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-2407 [ 137 ] CVE-2013-2412 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-2412 [ 138 ] CVE-2013-2415 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-2415 [ 139 ] CVE-2013-2417 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-2417 [ 140 ] CVE-2013-2419 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-2419 [ 141 ] CVE-2013-2420 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-2420 [ 142 ] CVE-2013-2421 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-2421 [ 143 ] CVE-2013-2422 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-2422 [ 144 ] CVE-2013-2423 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-2423 [ 145 ] CVE-2013-2424 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-2424 [ 146 ] CVE-2013-2426 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-2426 [ 147 ] CVE-2013-2429 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-2429 [ 148 ] CVE-2013-2430 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-2430 [ 149 ] CVE-2013-2431 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-2431 [ 150 ] CVE-2013-2436 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-2436 [ 151 ] CVE-2013-2443 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-2443 [ 152 ] CVE-2013-2444 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-2444 [ 153 ] CVE-2013-2445 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-2445 [ 154 ] CVE-2013-2446 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-2446 [ 155 ] CVE-2013-2447 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-2447 [ 156 ] CVE-2013-2448 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-2448 [ 157 ] CVE-2013-2449 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-2449 [ 158 ] CVE-2013-2450 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-2450 [ 159 ] CVE-2013-2451 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-2451 [ 160 ] CVE-2013-2452 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-2452 [ 161 ] CVE-2013-2453 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-2453 [ 162 ] CVE-2013-2454 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-2454 [ 163 ] CVE-2013-2455 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-2455 [ 164 ] CVE-2013-2456 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-2456 [ 165 ] CVE-2013-2457 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-2457 [ 166 ] CVE-2013-2458 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-2458 [ 167 ] CVE-2013-2459 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-2459 [ 168 ] CVE-2013-2460 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-2460 [ 169 ] CVE-2013-2461 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-2461 [ 170 ] CVE-2013-2463 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-2463 [ 171 ] CVE-2013-2465 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-2465 [ 172 ] CVE-2013-2469 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-2469 [ 173 ] CVE-2013-2470 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-2470 [ 174 ] CVE-2013-2471 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-2471 [ 175 ] CVE-2013-2472 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-2472 [ 176 ] CVE-2013-2473 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-2473 [ 177 ] CVE-2013-3829 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-3829 [ 178 ] CVE-2013-4002 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-4002 [ 179 ] CVE-2013-5772 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-5772 [ 180 ] CVE-2013-5774 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-5774 [ 181 ] CVE-2013-5778 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-5778 [ 182 ] CVE-2013-5780 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-5780 [ 183 ] CVE-2013-5782 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-5782 [ 184 ] CVE-2013-5783 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-5783 [ 185 ] CVE-2013-5784 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-5784 [ 186 ] CVE-2013-5790 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-5790 [ 187 ] CVE-2013-5797 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-5797 [ 188 ] CVE-2013-5800 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-5800 [ 189 ] CVE-2013-5802 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-5802 [ 190 ] CVE-2013-5803 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-5803 [ 191 ] CVE-2013-5804 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-5804 [ 192 ] CVE-2013-5805 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-5805 [ 193 ] CVE-2013-5806 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-5806 [ 194 ] CVE-2013-5809 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-5809 [ 195 ] CVE-2013-5814 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-5814 [ 196 ] CVE-2013-5817 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-5817 [ 197 ] CVE-2013-5820 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-5820 [ 198 ] CVE-2013-5823 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-5823 [ 199 ] CVE-2013-5825 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-5825 [ 200 ] CVE-2013-5829 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-5829 [ 201 ] CVE-2013-5830 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-5830 [ 202 ] CVE-2013-5840 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-5840 [ 203 ] CVE-2013-5842 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-5842 [ 204 ] CVE-2013-5849 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-5849 [ 205 ] CVE-2013-5850 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-5850 [ 206 ] CVE-2013-5851 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-5851 [ 207 ] CVE-2013-6629 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-6629 [ 208 ] CVE-2013-6954 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-6954 [ 209 ] CVE-2014-0429 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2014-0429 [ 210 ] CVE-2014-0446 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2014-0446 [ 211 ] CVE-2014-0451 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2014-0451 [ 212 ] CVE-2014-0452 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2014-0452 [ 213 ] CVE-2014-0453 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2014-0453 [ 214 ] CVE-2014-0456 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2014-0456 [ 215 ] CVE-2014-0457 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2014-0457 [ 216 ] CVE-2014-0458 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2014-0458 [ 217 ] CVE-2014-0459 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2014-0459 [ 218 ] CVE-2014-0460 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2014-0460 [ 219 ] CVE-2014-0461 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2014-0461 [ 220 ] CVE-2014-1876 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2014-1876 [ 221 ] CVE-2014-2397 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2014-2397 [ 222 ] CVE-2014-2398 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2014-2398 [ 223 ] CVE-2014-2403 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2014-2403 [ 224 ] CVE-2014-2412 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2014-2412 [ 225 ] CVE-2014-2414 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2014-2414 [ 226 ] CVE-2014-2421 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2014-2421 [ 227 ] CVE-2014-2423 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2014-2423 [ 228 ] CVE-2014-2427 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2014-2427 Availability ============ This GLSA and any updates to it are available for viewing at the Gentoo Security Website: http://security.gentoo.org/glsa/glsa-201406-32.xml Concerns? ========= Security is a primary focus of Gentoo Linux and ensuring the confidentiality and security of our users' machines is of utmost importance to us. Any security concerns should be addressed to security@gentoo.org or alternatively, you may file a bug at https://bugs.gentoo.org. License ======= Copyright 2014 Gentoo Foundation, Inc; referenced text belongs to its owner(s). The contents of this document are licensed under the Creative Commons - Attribution / Share Alike license. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5 . -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ESA-2012-032: RSA BSAFE\xae Micro Edition Suite Security Update for BEAST (Browser Exploit Against SSL/TLS) attacks EMC Identifier: ESA-2012-032 CVE Identifier: CVE-2011-3389 Severity Rating: CVSS v2 Base Score: 4.3 (AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N) Affected Products: All versions of RSA BSAFE Micro Edition Suite prior to 4.0, all platforms Unaffected Products: RSA BSAFE Micro Edition Suite 4.0 and higher Summary: RSA BSAFE Micro Edition Suite contains updates designed to prevent BEAST attacks (CVE-2011-3389) Details: There is a known vulnerability in SSLv3 and TLS v1.0 to do with how the Initialization Vector (IV) is generated. For symmetric key algorithms in CBC mode, the IV for the first record is generated using keys and secrets set during the SSL or TLS handshake. All subsequent records are encrypted using the ciphertext block from the previous record as the IV. With symmetric key encryption in CBC mode, plain text encrypted with the same IV and key generates the same cipher text, which is why having a variable IV is important. The BEAST exploit uses this SSLv3 and TLS v1.0 vulnerability by allowing an attacker to observe the last ciphertext block, which is the IV, then replace this with an IV of their choice, inject some of their own plain text data, and when this new IV is used to encrypt the data, the attacker can guess the plain text data one byte at a time. Recommendation: The best way to help prevent this attack is to use TLS v1.1 or higher. The vulnerability to do with IV generation was fixed in TLS v1.1 (released in 2006) so implementations using only TLS v1.1 or v1.2 are engineered to be secure against the BEAST exploit. However, support for these higher level protocols is limited to a smaller number of applications, so supporting only TLS v1.1 or v1.2 might cause interoperability issues. A second solution is to limit the negotiated cipher suites to exclude those that do not require symmetric key algorithms in CBC mode. However, this substantially restricts the number of cipher suites that can be negotiated. That is, only cipher suites with NULL encryption or cipher suites with streaming encryption algorithms (the RC4 algorithm) could be negotiated, which might result in reduced security. For customers who cannot or should not implement either of these two methods, RSA BSAFE Micro Edition Suite 4.0 introduces a new feature called first block splitting. First block splitting prevents the BEAST exploit by introducing unknown data into the encryption scheme prior to the attackers inserted plain text data. This is done as follows: \x951. The first plain text block to be encrypted is split into two blocks. The first block contains the first byte of the data, the second block contains the rest. \x952. A MAC is generated from the one byte of data, the MAC key, and an increasing counter. This MAC is included in the first block. \x953. The one byte of data, along with the MAC, is encrypted and becomes the IV for the next block. Because the IV is now essentially random data, it is impossible for an attacker to predict it and replace it with one of their own. To implement first block splitting in RSA BSAFE Micro Edition Suite 4.0, either for an SSL context or SSL object, call R_SSL_CTX_set_options_by_type() or R_SSL_set_options_by_type() respectively, with the SSL_OP_TYPE_SECURITY option type and the SSL_OP_SPLIT_FIRST_FRAGMENT identifier. For more information about these functions and identifiers, see the RSA BSAFE Micro Edition Suite API Reference Guide. RSA recommends all customers take into account both the base score and any relevant temporal and environmental scores which may impact the potential severity associated with particular security vulnerability. Obtaining Documentation: To obtain RSA documentation, log on to RSA SecurCare Online at https://knowledge.rsasecurity.com and click Products in the top navigation menu. Select the specific product whose documentation you want to obtain. Scroll to the section for the product version that you want and click the set link. Obtaining More Information: For more information about RSA BSAFE, visit the RSA web site at http://www.rsa.com/node.aspx?id=1204. Getting Support and Service: For customers with current maintenance contracts, contact your local RSA Customer Support center with any additional questions regarding this RSA SecurCare Note. For contact telephone numbers or e-mail addresses, log on to RSA SecurCare Online at https://knowledge.rsasecurity.com, click Help & Contact, and then click the Contact Us - Phone tab or the Contact Us - Email tab. General Customer Support Information: http://www.rsa.com/node.aspx?id=1264 RSA SecurCare Online: https://knowledge.rsasecurity.com EOPS Policy: RSA has a defined End of Primary Support policy associated with all major versions. Please refer to the link below for additional details. http://www.rsa.com/node.aspx?id=2575 SecurCare Online Security Advisories RSA, The Security Division of EMC, distributes SCOL Security Advisories in order to bring to the attention of users of the affected RSA products important security information. RSA recommends that all users determine the applicability of this information to their individual situations and take appropriate action. The information set forth herein is provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. RSA disclaim all warranties, either express or implied, including the warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, title and non-infringement. In no event shall RSA or its suppliers be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages, even if RSA or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. About RSA SecurCare Notes & Security Advisories Subscription RSA SecurCare Notes & Security Advisories are targeted e-mail messages that RSA sends you based on the RSA product family you currently use. If you\x92d like to stop receiving RSA SecurCare Notes & Security Advisories, or if you\x92d like to change which RSA product family Notes & Security Advisories you currently receive, log on to RSA SecurCare Online at https://knowledge.rsasecurity.com/scolcms/help.aspx?_v=view3. Following the instructions on the page, remove the check mark next to the RSA product family whose Notes & Security Advisories you no longer want to receive. Click the Submit button to save your selection. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 APPLE-SA-2011-10-12-2 Apple TV Software Update 4.4 Apple TV Software Update 4.4 is now available and addresses the following: Apple TV Available for: Apple TV 4.0 through 4.3 Impact: An attacker with a privileged network position may intercept user credentials or other sensitive information Description: Fraudulent certificates were issued by multiple certificate authorities operated by DigiNotar. This issue is addressed by removing DigiNotar from the list of trusted root certificates, from the list of Extended Validation (EV) certificate authorities, and by configuring default system trust settings so that DigiNotar's certificates, including those issued by other authorities, are not trusted. Apple TV Available for: Apple TV 4.0 through 4.3 Impact: Support for X.509 certificates with MD5 hashes may expose users to spoofing and information disclosure as attacks improve Description: Certificates signed using the MD5 hash algorithm were accepted by iOS. This algorithm has known cryptographic weaknesses. Further research or a misconfigured certificate authority could have allowed the creation of X.509 certificates with attacker controlled values that would have been trusted by the system. This would have exposed X.509 based protocols to spoofing, man in the middle attacks, and information disclosure. This update disables support for an X.509 certificate with an MD5 hash for any use other than as a trusted root certificate. CVE-ID CVE-2011-3427 Apple TV Available for: Apple TV 4.0 through 4.3 Impact: An attacker could decrypt part of a SSL connection Description: Only the SSLv3 and TLS 1.0 versions of SSL were supported. These versions are subject to a protocol weakness when using block ciphers. A man-in-the-middle attacker could have injected invalid data, causing the connection to close but revealing some information about the previous data. This issue is addressed by adding support for TLS 1.2. CVE-ID CVE-2011-3389 Apple TV Available for: Apple TV 4.0 through 4.3 Impact: Viewing a maliciously crafted TIFF image may result in an unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution Description: A buffer overflow existed in libTIFF's handling of CCITT Group 4 encoded TIFF images. CVE-ID CVE-2011-0192 : Apple Apple TV Available for: Apple TV 4.0 through 4.3 Impact: Viewing a maliciously crafted TIFF image may lead to an unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution Description: A heap buffer overflow existed in ImageIO's handling of CCITT Group 4 encoded TIFF images. CVE-ID CVE-2011-0241 : Cyril CATTIAUX of Tessi Technologies Apple TV Available for: Apple TV 4.0 through 4.3 Impact: A remote attacker may cause a device reset Description: The kernel failed to promptly reclaim memory from incomplete TCP connections. An attacker with the ability to connect to a listening service on an iOS device could exhaust system resources. CVE-ID CVE-2011-3259 : Wouter van der Veer of Topicus I&I, and Josh Enders Apple TV Available for: Apple TV 4.0 through 4.3 Impact: An attacker with a privileged network position may cause an unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution Description: A one-byte heap buffer overflow existed in libxml's handling of XML data. CVE-ID CVE-2011-0216 : Billy Rios of the Google Security Team Apple TV Available for: Apple TV 4.0 through 4.3 Impact: An attacker with a privileged network position may cause an unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution Description: A memory corruption issue existed in JavaScriptCore. CVE-ID CVE-2011-3232 : Aki Helin of OUSPG Installation note: Apple TV will periodically check for software updates. Alternatively, you may manually check for software updates by selecting "Settings -> General -> Update Software". To check the current version of software, select "Settings -> General -> About". -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ===================================================================== Red Hat Security Advisory Synopsis: Critical: java-1.6.0-openjdk security update Advisory ID: RHSA-2011:1380-01 Product: Red Hat Enterprise Linux Advisory URL: https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2011-1380.html Issue date: 2011-10-18 CVE Names: CVE-2011-3389 CVE-2011-3521 CVE-2011-3544 CVE-2011-3547 CVE-2011-3548 CVE-2011-3551 CVE-2011-3552 CVE-2011-3553 CVE-2011-3554 CVE-2011-3556 CVE-2011-3557 CVE-2011-3558 CVE-2011-3560 ===================================================================== 1. Summary: Updated java-1.6.0-openjdk packages that fix several security issues are now available for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 and 6. The Red Hat Security Response Team has rated this update as having critical security impact. Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base scores, which give detailed severity ratings, are available for each vulnerability from the CVE links in the References section. 2. Relevant releases/architectures: Red Hat Enterprise Linux (v. 5 server) - i386, x86_64 Red Hat Enterprise Linux Desktop (v. 5 client) - i386, x86_64 Red Hat Enterprise Linux Desktop (v. 6) - i386, x86_64 Red Hat Enterprise Linux Desktop Optional (v. 6) - i386, x86_64 Red Hat Enterprise Linux HPC Node (v. 6) - x86_64 Red Hat Enterprise Linux HPC Node Optional (v. 6) - x86_64 Red Hat Enterprise Linux Server (v. 6) - i386, x86_64 Red Hat Enterprise Linux Server Optional (v. 6) - i386, x86_64 Red Hat Enterprise Linux Workstation (v. 6) - i386, x86_64 Red Hat Enterprise Linux Workstation Optional (v. 6) - i386, x86_64 3. Description: These packages provide the OpenJDK 6 Java Runtime Environment and the OpenJDK 6 Software Development Kit. A flaw was found in the Java RMI (Remote Method Invocation) registry implementation. A remote RMI client could use this flaw to execute arbitrary code on the RMI server running the registry. (CVE-2011-3556) A flaw was found in the Java RMI registry implementation. A remote RMI client could use this flaw to execute code on the RMI server with unrestricted privileges. (CVE-2011-3557) A flaw was found in the IIOP (Internet Inter-Orb Protocol) deserialization code. An untrusted Java application or applet running in a sandbox could use this flaw to bypass sandbox restrictions by deserializing specially-crafted input. (CVE-2011-3521) It was found that the Java ScriptingEngine did not properly restrict the privileges of sandboxed applications. An untrusted Java application or applet running in a sandbox could use this flaw to bypass sandbox restrictions. (CVE-2011-3544) A flaw was found in the AWTKeyStroke implementation. An untrusted Java application or applet running in a sandbox could use this flaw to bypass sandbox restrictions. (CVE-2011-3548) An integer overflow flaw, leading to a heap-based buffer overflow, was found in the Java2D code used to perform transformations of graphic shapes and images. An untrusted Java application or applet running in a sandbox could use this flaw to bypass sandbox restrictions. (CVE-2011-3551) An insufficient error checking flaw was found in the unpacker for JAR files in pack200 format. A specially-crafted JAR file could use this flaw to crash the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) or, possibly, execute arbitrary code with JVM privileges. (CVE-2011-3554) It was found that HttpsURLConnection did not perform SecurityManager checks in the setSSLSocketFactory method. An untrusted Java application or applet running in a sandbox could use this flaw to bypass connection restrictions defined in the policy. An attacker able to perform a chosen plain text attack against a connection mixing trusted and untrusted data could use this flaw to recover portions of the trusted data sent over the connection. (CVE-2011-3389) Note: This update mitigates the CVE-2011-3389 issue by splitting the first application data record byte to a separate SSL/TLS protocol record. This mitigation may cause compatibility issues with some SSL/TLS implementations and can be disabled using the jsse.enableCBCProtection boolean property. This can be done on the command line by appending the flag "-Djsse.enableCBCProtection=false" to the java command. An information leak flaw was found in the InputStream.skip implementation. An untrusted Java application or applet could possibly use this flaw to obtain bytes skipped by other threads. (CVE-2011-3547) A flaw was found in the Java HotSpot virtual machine. An untrusted Java application or applet could use this flaw to disclose portions of the VM memory, or cause it to crash. (CVE-2011-3558) The Java API for XML Web Services (JAX-WS) implementation in OpenJDK was configured to include the stack trace in error messages sent to clients. A remote client could possibly use this flaw to obtain sensitive information. (CVE-2011-3553) It was found that Java applications running with SecurityManager restrictions were allowed to use too many UDP sockets by default. If multiple instances of a malicious application were started at the same time, they could exhaust all available UDP sockets on the system. (CVE-2011-3552) This erratum also upgrades the OpenJDK package to IcedTea6 1.9.10. Refer to the NEWS file, linked to in the References, for further information. All users of java-1.6.0-openjdk are advised to upgrade to these updated packages, which resolve these issues. All running instances of OpenJDK Java must be restarted for the update to take effect. 4. Solution: Before applying this update, make sure all previously-released errata relevant to your system have been applied. This update is available via the Red Hat Network. Details on how to use the Red Hat Network to apply this update are available at https://access.redhat.com/kb/docs/DOC-11259 5. Bugs fixed (http://bugzilla.redhat.com/): 737506 - CVE-2011-3389 HTTPS: block-wise chosen-plaintext attack against SSL/TLS (BEAST) 745379 - CVE-2011-3560 OpenJDK: missing checkSetFactory calls in HttpsURLConnection (JSSE, 7096936) 745387 - CVE-2011-3547 OpenJDK: InputStream skip() information leak (Networking/IO, 7000600) 745391 - CVE-2011-3551 OpenJDK: Java2D TransformHelper integer overflow (2D, 7023640) 745397 - CVE-2011-3552 OpenJDK: excessive default UDP socket limit under SecurityManager (Networking, 7032417) 745399 - CVE-2011-3544 OpenJDK: missing SecurityManager checks in scripting engine (Scripting, 7046823) 745442 - CVE-2011-3521 OpenJDK: IIOP deserialization code execution (Deserialization, 7055902) 745447 - CVE-2011-3554 OpenJDK: insufficient pack200 JAR files uncompress error checks (Runtime, 7057857) 745459 - CVE-2011-3556 OpenJDK: RMI DGC server remote code execution (RMI, 7077466) 745464 - CVE-2011-3557 OpenJDK: RMI registry privileged code execution (RMI, 7083012) 745473 - CVE-2011-3548 OpenJDK: mutable static AWTKeyStroke.ctor (AWT, 7019773) 745476 - CVE-2011-3553 OpenJDK: JAX-WS stack-traces information leak (JAX-WS, 7046794) 745492 - CVE-2011-3558 OpenJDK: Hotspot unspecified issue (Hotspot, 7070134) 6. Package List: Red Hat Enterprise Linux Desktop (v. 5 client): Source: ftp://ftp.redhat.com/pub/redhat/linux/enterprise/5Client/en/os/SRPMS/java-1.6.0-openjdk-1.6.0.0-1.23.1.9.10.el5_7.src.rpm i386: java-1.6.0-openjdk-1.6.0.0-1.23.1.9.10.el5_7.i386.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-debuginfo-1.6.0.0-1.23.1.9.10.el5_7.i386.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-demo-1.6.0.0-1.23.1.9.10.el5_7.i386.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-devel-1.6.0.0-1.23.1.9.10.el5_7.i386.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-javadoc-1.6.0.0-1.23.1.9.10.el5_7.i386.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-src-1.6.0.0-1.23.1.9.10.el5_7.i386.rpm x86_64: java-1.6.0-openjdk-1.6.0.0-1.23.1.9.10.el5_7.x86_64.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-debuginfo-1.6.0.0-1.23.1.9.10.el5_7.x86_64.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-demo-1.6.0.0-1.23.1.9.10.el5_7.x86_64.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-devel-1.6.0.0-1.23.1.9.10.el5_7.x86_64.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-javadoc-1.6.0.0-1.23.1.9.10.el5_7.x86_64.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-src-1.6.0.0-1.23.1.9.10.el5_7.x86_64.rpm Red Hat Enterprise Linux (v. 5 server): Source: ftp://ftp.redhat.com/pub/redhat/linux/enterprise/5Server/en/os/SRPMS/java-1.6.0-openjdk-1.6.0.0-1.23.1.9.10.el5_7.src.rpm i386: java-1.6.0-openjdk-1.6.0.0-1.23.1.9.10.el5_7.i386.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-debuginfo-1.6.0.0-1.23.1.9.10.el5_7.i386.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-demo-1.6.0.0-1.23.1.9.10.el5_7.i386.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-devel-1.6.0.0-1.23.1.9.10.el5_7.i386.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-javadoc-1.6.0.0-1.23.1.9.10.el5_7.i386.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-src-1.6.0.0-1.23.1.9.10.el5_7.i386.rpm x86_64: java-1.6.0-openjdk-1.6.0.0-1.23.1.9.10.el5_7.x86_64.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-debuginfo-1.6.0.0-1.23.1.9.10.el5_7.x86_64.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-demo-1.6.0.0-1.23.1.9.10.el5_7.x86_64.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-devel-1.6.0.0-1.23.1.9.10.el5_7.x86_64.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-javadoc-1.6.0.0-1.23.1.9.10.el5_7.x86_64.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-src-1.6.0.0-1.23.1.9.10.el5_7.x86_64.rpm Red Hat Enterprise Linux Desktop (v. 6): Source: ftp://ftp.redhat.com/pub/redhat/linux/enterprise/6Client/en/os/SRPMS/java-1.6.0-openjdk-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.src.rpm i386: java-1.6.0-openjdk-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.i686.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-debuginfo-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.i686.rpm x86_64: java-1.6.0-openjdk-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.x86_64.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-debuginfo-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.x86_64.rpm Red Hat Enterprise Linux Desktop Optional (v. 6): Source: ftp://ftp.redhat.com/pub/redhat/linux/enterprise/6Client/en/os/SRPMS/java-1.6.0-openjdk-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.src.rpm i386: java-1.6.0-openjdk-debuginfo-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.i686.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-demo-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.i686.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-devel-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.i686.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-javadoc-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.i686.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-src-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.i686.rpm x86_64: java-1.6.0-openjdk-debuginfo-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.x86_64.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-demo-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.x86_64.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-devel-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.x86_64.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-javadoc-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.x86_64.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-src-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.x86_64.rpm Red Hat Enterprise Linux HPC Node (v. 6): Source: ftp://ftp.redhat.com/pub/redhat/linux/enterprise/6ComputeNode/en/os/SRPMS/java-1.6.0-openjdk-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.src.rpm x86_64: java-1.6.0-openjdk-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.x86_64.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-debuginfo-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.x86_64.rpm Red Hat Enterprise Linux HPC Node Optional (v. 6): Source: ftp://ftp.redhat.com/pub/redhat/linux/enterprise/6ComputeNode/en/os/SRPMS/java-1.6.0-openjdk-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.src.rpm x86_64: java-1.6.0-openjdk-debuginfo-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.x86_64.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-demo-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.x86_64.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-devel-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.x86_64.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-javadoc-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.x86_64.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-src-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.x86_64.rpm Red Hat Enterprise Linux Server (v. 6): Source: ftp://ftp.redhat.com/pub/redhat/linux/enterprise/6Server/en/os/SRPMS/java-1.6.0-openjdk-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.src.rpm i386: java-1.6.0-openjdk-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.i686.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-debuginfo-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.i686.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-devel-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.i686.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-javadoc-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.i686.rpm x86_64: java-1.6.0-openjdk-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.x86_64.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-debuginfo-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.x86_64.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-devel-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.x86_64.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-javadoc-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.x86_64.rpm Red Hat Enterprise Linux Server Optional (v. 6): Source: ftp://ftp.redhat.com/pub/redhat/linux/enterprise/6Server/en/os/SRPMS/java-1.6.0-openjdk-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.src.rpm i386: java-1.6.0-openjdk-debuginfo-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.i686.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-demo-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.i686.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-src-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.i686.rpm x86_64: java-1.6.0-openjdk-debuginfo-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.x86_64.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-demo-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.x86_64.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-src-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.x86_64.rpm Red Hat Enterprise Linux Workstation (v. 6): Source: ftp://ftp.redhat.com/pub/redhat/linux/enterprise/6Workstation/en/os/SRPMS/java-1.6.0-openjdk-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.src.rpm i386: java-1.6.0-openjdk-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.i686.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-debuginfo-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.i686.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-devel-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.i686.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-javadoc-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.i686.rpm x86_64: java-1.6.0-openjdk-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.x86_64.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-debuginfo-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.x86_64.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-devel-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.x86_64.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-javadoc-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.x86_64.rpm Red Hat Enterprise Linux Workstation Optional (v. 6): Source: ftp://ftp.redhat.com/pub/redhat/linux/enterprise/6Workstation/en/os/SRPMS/java-1.6.0-openjdk-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.src.rpm i386: java-1.6.0-openjdk-debuginfo-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.i686.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-demo-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.i686.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-src-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.i686.rpm x86_64: java-1.6.0-openjdk-debuginfo-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.x86_64.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-demo-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.x86_64.rpm java-1.6.0-openjdk-src-1.6.0.0-1.40.1.9.10.el6_1.x86_64.rpm These packages are GPG signed by Red Hat for security. Our key and details on how to verify the signature are available from https://access.redhat.com/security/team/key/#package 7. References: https://www.redhat.com/security/data/cve/CVE-2011-3389.html https://www.redhat.com/security/data/cve/CVE-2011-3521.html https://www.redhat.com/security/data/cve/CVE-2011-3544.html https://www.redhat.com/security/data/cve/CVE-2011-3547.html https://www.redhat.com/security/data/cve/CVE-2011-3548.html https://www.redhat.com/security/data/cve/CVE-2011-3551.html https://www.redhat.com/security/data/cve/CVE-2011-3552.html https://www.redhat.com/security/data/cve/CVE-2011-3553.html https://www.redhat.com/security/data/cve/CVE-2011-3554.html https://www.redhat.com/security/data/cve/CVE-2011-3556.html https://www.redhat.com/security/data/cve/CVE-2011-3557.html https://www.redhat.com/security/data/cve/CVE-2011-3558.html https://www.redhat.com/security/data/cve/CVE-2011-3560.html https://access.redhat.com/security/updates/classification/#critical http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/topics/security/javacpuoct2011-443431.html http://icedtea.classpath.org/hg/release/icedtea6-1.9/file/328afd896e3e/NEWS 8. Contact: The Red Hat security contact is <secalert@redhat.com>. More contact details at https://access.redhat.com/security/team/contact/ Copyright 2011 Red Hat, Inc. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.4 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQFOngvzXlSAg2UNWIIRArb8AKCaS923HYBco1E2eOOedT1aefjmyACgherU 1E1DMZpv3ExBmKhD4Emi2no= =sMXo -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- RHSA-announce mailing list RHSA-announce@redhat.com https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/rhsa-announce

Unspecified vulnerability in Medtronic Paradigm wireless insulin pump 512, 522, 712, and 722 allows remote attackers to modify the delivery of an insulin bolus dose and cause a denial of service (adverse human health effects) via unspecified vectors involving wireless communications and knowledge of the device's serial number, as demonstrated by Jerome Radcliffe at the Black Hat USA conference in August 2011. NOTE: the vendor has disputed the severity of this issue, saying "we believe the risk of deliberate, malicious, or unauthorized manipulation of medical devices is extremely low... we strongly believe it would be extremely difficult for a third-party to wirelessly tamper with your insulin pump... you would be able to detect tones on the insulin pump that weren't intentionally programmed and could intervene accordingly.". " Would also be possible. "Service disruption by a third party ( Harmful effects on human health ) There is a possibility of being put into a state. Successful exploits will cause the device to crash, denying service to legitimate users. Medtronic Paradigm wireless insulin pump: 512 522 712 722. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 [slackware-security] libpng (SSA:2012-206-01) New libpng packages are available for Slackware 8.1, 9.0, 9.1, 10.0, 10.1, 10.2, 11.0, 12.0, 12.1, 12.2, 13.0, 13.1, 13.37, and -current to fix security issues. Here are the details from the Slackware 13.37 ChangeLog: +--------------------------+ patches/packages/libpng-1.4.12-i486-1_slack13.37.txz: Upgraded. Fixed incorrect type (int copy should be png_size_t copy) in png_inflate() (fixes CVE-2011-3045). Revised png_set_text_2() to avoid potential memory corruption (fixes CVE-2011-3048). Changed "a+w" to "u+w" in Makefile.in to fix CVE-2012-3386. For more information, see: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2011-3045 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2011-3048 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2012-3386 (* Security fix *) +--------------------------+ Where to find the new packages: +-----------------------------+ Thanks to the friendly folks at the OSU Open Source Lab (http://osuosl.org) for donating FTP and rsync hosting to the Slackware project! :-) Also see the "Get Slack" section on http://slackware.com for additional mirror sites near you. Updated package for Slackware 8.1: ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware-8.1/patches/packages/libpng-1.2.50-i386-1_slack8.1.tgz Updated package for Slackware 9.0: ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware-9.0/patches/packages/libpng-1.2.50-i386-1_slack9.0.tgz Updated package for Slackware 9.1: ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware-9.1/patches/packages/libpng-1.2.50-i486-1_slack9.1.tgz Updated package for Slackware 10.0: ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware-10.0/patches/packages/libpng-1.2.50-i486-1_slack10.0.tgz Updated package for Slackware 10.1: ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware-10.1/patches/packages/libpng-1.2.50-i486-1_slack10.1.tgz Updated package for Slackware 10.2: ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware-10.2/patches/packages/libpng-1.2.50-i486-1_slack10.2.tgz Updated package for Slackware 11.0: ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware-11.0/patches/packages/libpng-1.2.50-i486-1_slack11.0.tgz Updated package for Slackware 12.0: ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware-12.0/patches/packages/libpng-1.2.50-i486-1_slack12.0.tgz Updated package for Slackware 12.1: ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware-12.1/patches/packages/libpng-1.2.50-i486-1_slack12.1.tgz Updated package for Slackware 12.2: ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware-12.2/patches/packages/libpng-1.2.50-i486-1_slack12.2.tgz Updated package for Slackware 13.0: ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware-13.0/patches/packages/libpng-1.2.50-i486-1_slack13.0.txz Updated package for Slackware x86_64 13.0: ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware64-13.0/patches/packages/libpng-1.2.50-x86_64-1_slack13.0.txz Updated package for Slackware 13.1: ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware-13.1/patches/packages/libpng-1.4.12-i486-1_slack13.1.txz Updated package for Slackware x86_64 13.1: ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware64-13.1/patches/packages/libpng-1.4.12-x86_64-1_slack13.1.txz Updated package for Slackware 13.37: ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware-13.37/patches/packages/libpng-1.4.12-i486-1_slack13.37.txz Updated package for Slackware x86_64 13.37: ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware64-13.37/patches/packages/libpng-1.4.12-x86_64-1_slack13.37.txz Updated package for Slackware -current: ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware-current/slackware/l/libpng-1.4.12-i486-1.txz Updated package for Slackware x86_64 -current: ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware64-current/slackware64/l/libpng-1.4.12-x86_64-1.txz MD5 signatures: +-------------+ Slackware 8.1 package: 284b6e6cbd863a3dcfedeb3f7ada3d13 libpng-1.2.50-i386-1_slack8.1.tgz Slackware 9.0 package: 27933d103db0ec5d2e32469e5073d408 libpng-1.2.50-i386-1_slack9.0.tgz Slackware 9.1 package: d7b029366f0f70c218b49101df56cafb libpng-1.2.50-i486-1_slack9.1.tgz Slackware 10.0 package: 3de3405777a72d3a7d72991c4489853e libpng-1.2.50-i486-1_slack10.0.tgz Slackware 10.1 package: e6d10a03b279b2138cab9383e638b621 libpng-1.2.50-i486-1_slack10.1.tgz Slackware 10.2 package: 524e3febb22566c2b3131ca1eee7a385 libpng-1.2.50-i486-1_slack10.2.tgz Slackware 11.0 package: 189f441d29495f927143a7c47ec77afb libpng-1.2.50-i486-1_slack11.0.tgz Slackware 12.0 package: 1e21c28ed8dea4db2d4f8cfc00b858d9 libpng-1.2.50-i486-1_slack12.0.tgz Slackware 12.1 package: 608b1c9f6426159a60722cd23ece3980 libpng-1.2.50-i486-1_slack12.1.tgz Slackware 12.2 package: b1e9950108aa9d2800d639002e6b77a6 libpng-1.2.50-i486-1_slack12.2.tgz Slackware 13.0 package: ae6b82cf5487bdc46422650ba374ff41 libpng-1.2.50-i486-1_slack13.0.txz Slackware x86_64 13.0 package: 409da0ddfd159dd970cccf1c9dee251b libpng-1.2.50-x86_64-1_slack13.0.txz Slackware 13.1 package: 3462a6eb530d084afcd20837b23d0ac7 libpng-1.4.12-i486-1_slack13.1.txz Slackware x86_64 13.1 package: c3058ef9d075ef9083ee7d7a977e6582 libpng-1.4.12-x86_64-1_slack13.1.txz Slackware 13.37 package: e9191494e871534e11ec5020f8e72593 libpng-1.4.12-i486-1_slack13.37.txz Slackware x86_64 13.37 package: 0fea01d53de95669592e9a037c3dc4b9 libpng-1.4.12-x86_64-1_slack13.37.txz Slackware -current package: 29b9148f5beb384e944e34184d24ce59 l/libpng-1.4.12-i486-1.txz Slackware x86_64 -current package: 1b546573b17ac7df03773856cc081692 l/libpng-1.4.12-x86_64-1.txz Installation instructions: +------------------------+ Upgrade the package as root: # upgradepkg libpng-1.4.12-i486-1_slack13.37.txz +-----+ Slackware Linux Security Team http://slackware.com/gpg-key security@slackware.com +------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | To leave the slackware-security mailing list: | +------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Send an email to majordomo@slackware.com with this text in the body of | | the email message: | | | | unsubscribe slackware-security | | | | You will get a confirmation message back containing instructions to | | complete the process. Please do not reply to this email address. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------+ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux) iEYEARECAAYFAlAPVhYACgkQakRjwEAQIjPiGQCfULwZEqcoTlCayAoSYnntgenl fqEAn2hCQqztZMMfLufIVoqDRky/os6w =m4TX -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Multiple buffer overflows in the InduSoft ISSymbol ActiveX control in ISSymbol.ocx 301.1104.601.0 in InduSoft Web Studio 7.0B2 hotfix 7.0.01.04 allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a long parameter to the (1) Open, (2) Close, or (3) SetCurrentLanguage method. InduSoft ISSymbol ActiveX Control has a buffer overflow vulnerability. Due to boundary condition errors when processing 'Open()', 'Close()' and 'SetCurrentLanguage()' methods, it can be exploited by an attacker to cause a buffer overflow. Failed exploit attempts will likely result in denial-of-service conditions. ====================================================================== 2) Severity Rating: Highly critical Impact: System access Where: Remote ====================================================================== 3) Vendor's Description of Software "InduSoft Web Studio is a powerful collection of automation tools that provide all the automation building blocks to develop HMIs, SCADA systems and embedded instrumentation solutions. Utilize InduSoft integrated Web technologies to take advantage of Internet/intranet connectivity." Link: http://www.indusoft.com/indusoftart.php?catid=1&name=IWS/webstudio ====================================================================== 4) Description of Vulnerability Secunia Research has discovered multiple vulnerabilities in InduSoft ISSymbol ActiveX control, which can be exploited by malicious people to compromise a user's system. Successful exploitation of the vulnerabilities allows execution of arbitrary code. ====================================================================== 5) Solution Install Service Pack 1. ====================================================================== 6) Time Table 09/06/2011 - Vendor notified 15/06/2011 - Vendor response. 30/08/2011 - Vendor releases a hotfix. 01/09/2011 - Public disclosure. ====================================================================== 7) Credits Discovered by Dmitriy Pletnev, Secunia Research. ====================================================================== 8) References The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned CVE-2011-0342 for the vulnerabilities. ====================================================================== 9) About Secunia Secunia offers vulnerability management solutions to corporate customers with verified and reliable vulnerability intelligence relevant to their specific system configuration: http://secunia.com/advisories/business_solutions/ Secunia also provides a publicly accessible and comprehensive advisory database as a service to the security community and private individuals, who are interested in or concerned about IT-security. http://secunia.com/advisories/ Secunia believes that it is important to support the community and to do active vulnerability research in order to aid improving the security and reliability of software in general: http://secunia.com/secunia_research/ Secunia regularly hires new skilled team members. Check the URL below to see currently vacant positions: http://secunia.com/corporate/jobs/ Secunia offers a FREE mailing list called Secunia Security Advisories: http://secunia.com/advisories/mailing_lists/ ====================================================================== 10) Verification Please verify this advisory by visiting the Secunia website: http://secunia.com/secunia_research/2011-61/ Complete list of vulnerability reports published by Secunia Research: http://secunia.com/secunia_research/ ====================================================================== . ---------------------------------------------------------------------- The Secunia CSI 5.0 Beta - now available for testing Find out more, take a free test drive, and share your opinion with us: http://secunia.com/blog/242 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: InduSoft ISSymbol ActiveX Control Multiple Buffer Overflow Vulnerabilities SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA44875 VERIFY ADVISORY: Secunia.com http://secunia.com/advisories/44875/ Customer Area (Credentials Required) https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=44875 RELEASE DATE: 2011-09-02 DISCUSS ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/44875/#comments AVAILABLE ON SITE AND IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Last Update * Popularity * Comments * Criticality Level * Impact * Where * Solution Status * Operating System / Software * CVE Reference(s) http://secunia.com/advisories/44875/ ONLY AVAILABLE IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Authentication Level * Report Reliability * Secunia PoC * Secunia Analysis * Systems Affected * Approve Distribution * Remediation Status * Secunia CVSS Score * CVSS https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=44875 ONLY AVAILABLE WITH SECUNIA CSI AND SECUNIA PSI: * AUTOMATED SCANNING http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/personal/ http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/corporate/wsus_sccm_3rd_third_party_patching/ DESCRIPTION: Secunia Research has discovered multiple vulnerabilities in InduSoft ISSymbol ActiveX control, which can be exploited by malicious people to compromise a user's system. The vulnerabilities are confirmed in ISSymbol.ocx version 301.1104.601.0 included in InduSoft Web Studio version 7.0B2 hotfix 7.0.01.04. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: Secunia Research: http://secunia.com/secunia_research/2011-61/ InduSoft: http://www.indusoft.com/hotfixes/hotfixes.php OTHER REFERENCES: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ DEEP LINKS: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ EXTENDED DESCRIPTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ EXTENDED SOLUTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ EXPLOIT: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ----------------------------------------------------------------------

Unspecified vulnerability in Cisco TelePresence C Series Endpoints, E/EX Personal Video units, and MXP Series Codecs, when using software versions before TC 4.0.0 or F9.1, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via a crafted SIP packet to port 5060 or 5061, aka Bug ID CSCtq46500. The problem is Bug ID CSCtq46500 It is a problem.By a third party 5060 and 5061 Crafted against the port SIP Service disruption via packets ( crash ) There is a possibility of being put into a state. Cisco TelePresence Codecs are prone to a denial-of-service vulnerability. An attacker can exploit this issue to cause the device to crash, denying service to legitimate users. This issue is documented by Cisco Bug ID CSCtq46500. Cisco has released free software updates that address this vulnerability. Users can determine the software version of a Cisco TelePresence unit by entering the IP address of the codec in a web browser, authenticating (if the device is configured for authentication), and then selecting the system info menu option. The version number will follow the Software Version text in the System Info window. Alternatively, users can determine the software version by issuing the "xStatus SystemUnit" command from a device's application programmer interface. The software version that is running on the codec is displayed following the SystemUnit Software Version text. The following example displays "xStatus SystemUnit" output from a system that is running software version TC4.0: xStatus SystemUnit *s SystemUnit ProductType: "Cisco TelePresence Codec" *s SystemUnit ProductId: "Cisco TelePresence Codec C90" *s SystemUnit ProductPlatform: "C90" *s SystemUnit Uptime: 597095 *s SystemUnit Software Application: "Endpoint" *s SystemUnit Software Version: "TC4.0" *s SystemUnit Software Name: "s52000" *s SystemUnit Software ReleaseDate: "2010-11-01" *s SystemUnit Software MaxVideoCalls: 3 *s SystemUnit Software MaxAudioCalls: 4 *s SystemUnit Software ReleaseKey: "true" *s SystemUnit Software OptionKeys NaturalPresenter: "true" *s SystemUnit Software OptionKeys MultiSite: "true" *s SystemUnit Software OptionKeys PremiumResolution: "true" *s SystemUnit Hardware Module SerialNumber: "B1AD25A00003" *s SystemUnit Hardware Module Identifier: "0" *s SystemUnit Hardware MainBoard SerialNumber: "PH0497201" *s SystemUnit Hardware MainBoard Identifier: "101401-3 [04]" *s SystemUnit Hardware VideoBoard SerialNumber: "PH0497874" *s SystemUnit Hardware VideoBoard Identifier: "101560-1 [02]" *s SystemUnit Hardware AudioBoard SerialNumber: "N/A" *s SystemUnit Hardware AudioBoard Identifier: "" *s SystemUnit Hardware BootSoftware: "U-Boot 2009.03-65" *s SystemUnit State System: Initialized *s SystemUnit State MaxNumberOfCalls: 3 *s SystemUnit State MaxNumberOfActiveCalls: 3 *s SystemUnit State NumberOfActiveCalls: 1 *s SystemUnit State NumberOfSuspendedCalls: 0 *s SystemUnit State NumberOfInProgressCalls: 0 *s SystemUnit State Subsystem Application: Initialized *s SystemUnit ContactInfo: "helpdesk@company.com" ** end Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable +-------------------------------- No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by this vulnerability. Details ======= Affected devices are part systems that provide Cisco TelePresence Endpoints for immersive environments, conference rooms, individual desktops, and home offices. This vulnerability is triggered by a crafted Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) packet that is sent to an affected device on port 5060 or 5061. Vulnerability Scoring Details ============================= Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerability in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at: http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss * CSCtq46500 ("Specifically crafted SIP packet may crash the device") CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could result in a system crash that may lead to a denial of service condition. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. Workarounds =========== There are no workarounds available that mitigate this vulnerability. However, there is an Applied Mitigations Bulletin available at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20110831-tandberg.shtml that describes how to filter SIP packets sent to the device. Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that addresses this vulnerability. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html, or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml. Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory. This vulnerability was reported to Cisco by David Klein of Sense of Security. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20110831-tandberg.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +------------------------------------------------------------+ | Revision 1.0 | 2011-Aug-31 | Initial public release. | +------------------------------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html. This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt. +-------------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright 2010-2011 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. +-------------------------------------------------------------------- Updated: Aug 11, 2011 Document ID: 113098 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (GNU/Linux) iF4EAREIAAYFAk5eWDwACgkQQXnnBKKRMNAFAQD7Bf8+G0VKbE37nc95p1vOhAvh DKCbu0g+YxMlo6+Iua8A/0qgCKk47eCVVO97ejvRkbAHxjOzVu9GBG4uTuQLoqK8 =WGqM -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ . 19-Sep-2011 Last Update. - Vendor Notification Date. 21-Feb-2011 Product. Cisco TelePresence Series Platform. C <= TC4.1.2, MXP <= F9.1 Severity Rating. Low - Medium Impact. Cookie/credential theft, impersonation, loss of confidentiality, client-side code execution, denial of service. Solution Status. Vendor patch References. 1. CVE-2011-2544 (CSCtq46488) 2. CVE-2011-2543 (CSCtq46496) 3. CVE-2011-2577 (CSCtq46500) Details. The C & MXP Series are the Endpoints used on desks or in boardrooms to provide users with a termination point for Video Conferencing. 1. Post-authentication HTML Injection - CVE-2011-2544 (CSCtq46488): Cisco TelePresence Endpoints have a web interface (HTTP or HTTPS) for managing, configuring and reporting. It is possible to set the Call ID (with H.323 or SIP) to a HTML value. If a call is made to another endpoint and an authenticated user browses to the web interface on the endpoint receiving the call (e.g. to view call statistics), the HTML will render locally within the context of the logged in user. From this point it is possible to make changes to the system as the authenticated user. The flaw is due to the flexibility of the H.323 ID or SIP Display Name fields and failure to correctly validate user input. Examples (MXP): Rebooting the system: <IMG SRC="/reboot&Yes=please"> The attacker may also choose to change passwords in the system, disable encryption or enable telnet: <IMG SRC=/html_select_status?reload=other.ssi&telnet=On> <IMG SRC=/html_select_status?reload=security.ssi&/Configuration/ Conference/Encryption/Mode=Off&/Configuration/SystemUnit/Password=test> 2. Post-authentication Memory Corruption - CVE-2011-2543 (CSCtq46496): Cisco TelePresence systems (Endpoints and Infrastructure) use XPath for setting and getting configuration. Example syntax is: http://ip/getxml?location=/Configuration/Video The request is sent to a locally listening shell (tshell). This is the case for all requests relating to performing an action on the system (e.g. config get or set). The shell then sends the input to the "main" application (/app/main, id=0), and the data is passed as a parameter. It was discovered that the getXML handle does not properly perform length checking on the user supplied input before passing it to the tshell. Furthermore, there is no length checking performed in the tshell and no bounds checking performed in the main application where the parameter is consumed. As such, it is possible to send input that exceeds the size of the receiving buffer, subsequently causing an invalid address to be read. This causes a reboot on the Endpoints. The VCS will not reboot, the process will crash by SIGSEGV (or sigabrt) but it will restart the process itself which drops all calls. Proof of Concept: GET /wsgi/getxml?location="+("A"*5200)+("\x60"*4)+("X"*4)+"HTTP/1.1\r\n Host: 192.168.6.99\r\n\r\n" Received signal SIGSEGV (11) in thread 0x129e8480, TID 2670 Illegal memory access at: 0x5858585c Registers: GPR00: 00f2c908 129e5960 129ef920 00000005 00000040 0000000c 00000037 0f315580 GPR08: 00000005 129e5a70 129e5a80 58585858 0f3272d4 11589858 129e6896 0000000b GPR16: 129e6084 11164a1c 00000000 129e6894 00000037 1299ca18 00000005 00000002 GPR24: 129e59a8 00000002 0f3ea3a4 129e5a64 00000037 00000005 0f410bac 129e5960 GPR24: 129e59a8 00000002 0f3ea3a4 129e5a64 00000037 00000005 0f410bac 129e5960 NIP: 0f39abc8 MSR: 0000d032 OGPR3: 00000002 As you can see, the crash string is passed as a parameter in GPR 8. The severity of this issue is compounded by the fact that the main application runs as root, this could potentially lead to arbitrary code execution. 3. Pre-authentication SIP Denial of Service - CVE-2011-2577 (CSCtq46500): Cisco TelePresence Endpoints utilise SIP for the call setup protocol. Sending a SIP INVITE with a 4x8 a"s in the MAC Address field and the receive field causes the system to reboot. Proof of Concept: MXP: Exception 0x1100 : Data TLB load miss Active task FsmMain FSM process : SipTrnsp(0) FSM message : SipTrnsp_Send_Msg_Req from SipTrnsp(0) Data TLB miss (DMISS) : 0x00000000 (illegal addr. accessed) Solution. Upgrade to TC4.2 for the C series to fix validation issues. Discovered by. About us. Sense of Security is a leading provider of information security and risk management solutions. Our team has expert skills in assessment and assurance, strategy and architecture, and deployment through to ongoing management. We are Australia's premier application penetration testing firm and trusted IT security advisor to many of the countries largest organisations. Sense of Security Pty Ltd Level 8, 66 King St Sydney NSW 2000 AUSTRALIA T: +61 (0)2 9290 4444 F: +61 (0)2 9290 4455 W: http://www.senseofsecurity.com.au E: info@senseofsecurity.com.au Twitter: @ITsecurityAU The latest version of this advisory can be found at: http://www.senseofsecurity.com.au/advisories/SOS-11-010.pdf Other Sense of Security advisories can be found at: http://www.senseofsecurity.com.au/research/it-security-advisories.php

Ingres Database is prone to an unspecified vulnerability that can be exploited to overflow data. The impact is currently unknown; however, this class of vulnerability may allow attackers to gain access to sensitive information, corrupt memory or cause a denial-of-service condition. Ingres Database versions 2.6, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, and 10.0 for Windows are vulnerable.

SAP NetWeaver is the technical foundation for SAP Business Suite solutions, SAP xApps composite applications, partner solutions, and custom applications. The \"EPS_DELETE_FILE\" function has an input validation error, and an attacker submits a directory traversal sequence request to delete any file. To successfully exploit the vulnerability you need access to the default SAP account TMSADM or SAPCPIC. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- The Secunia CSI 5.0 Beta - now available for testing Find out more, take a free test drive, and share your opinion with us: http://secunia.com/blog/242 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: SAP NetWeaver "EPS_DELETE_FILE" Arbitrary File Deletion Vulnerability SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA45715 VERIFY ADVISORY: Secunia.com http://secunia.com/advisories/45715/ Customer Area (Credentials Required) https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=45715 RELEASE DATE: 2011-08-27 DISCUSS ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/45715/#comments AVAILABLE ON SITE AND IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Last Update * Popularity * Comments * Criticality Level * Impact * Where * Solution Status * Operating System / Software * CVE Reference(s) http://secunia.com/advisories/45715/ ONLY AVAILABLE IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Authentication Level * Report Reliability * Secunia PoC * Secunia Analysis * Systems Affected * Approve Distribution * Remediation Status * Secunia CVSS Score * CVSS https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=45715 ONLY AVAILABLE WITH SECUNIA CSI AND SECUNIA PSI: * AUTOMATED SCANNING http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/personal/ http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/corporate/wsus_sccm_3rd_third_party_patching/ DESCRIPTION: Alexey Sintsov has reported a vulnerability in SAP NetWeaver, which can be exploited by malicious users to manipulate certain data. TMSADM or SAPCPIC. SOLUTION: Apply fixes. Please see the vendor's advisory for details. PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: Alexey Sintsov, Digital Security Research Group (DSecRG). ORIGINAL ADVISORY: SAP: https://service.sap.com/sap/support/notes/1554030 Digital Security Research Group: http://dsecrg.com/pages/vul/show.php?id=331 OTHER REFERENCES: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ DEEP LINKS: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ EXTENDED DESCRIPTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ EXTENDED SOLUTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ EXPLOIT: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ----------------------------------------------------------------------

The web interface on the LifeSize Room appliance LS_RM1_3.5.3 (11) and 4.7.18 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands via a modified request to the LSRoom_Remoting.doCommand function in gateway.php. LifeSize Room appliance contains an authentication bypass and arbitrary code injection vulnerability when failing to sanitize input from unauthenticated clients. LifeSize Room is a high definition video conferencing device. LifeSize Room is prone to a security-bypass vulnerability and a command-injection vulnerability. LifeSize Room versions 3.5.3 and 4.7.18 are affected; other versions may also be vulnerable. Discovered: 07-13-11 By: Spencer McIntyre (zeroSteiner) SecureState R&D Team www.securestate.com Background: ----------- Multiple vulnerabilities within the LifeSize Room appliance. Vulnerability Summaries: ------------------------ Login page can be bypassed, granting administrative access to the web interface. Unauthenticated OS command injection is possible through the web interface. The easiest way to perform these attacks is using a web proxy. Authentication By Pass: ----------------------- Following the request to /gateway.php that references the LSRoom_Remoting.authenticate function, modify the AMF data in the response from the server to change "false" to "true" Example: Original False AMF: "\x0d\x0a\x0d\x0a\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x0c\x2f\x35\x37\x2f\x6f\x6e\x52\x65\x73\x75\x6c\x74\x00\x04\x6e\x75\x6c\x6c\x00\x00\x00\x02\x01\x00" Modified True AMF: "\x0d\x0a\x0d\x0a\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x0c\x2f\x35\x37\x2f\x6f\x6e\x52\x65\x73\x75\x6c\x74\x00\x04\x6e\x75\x6c\x6c\xff\xff\xff\xff\x01\x01" Command Injection: ------------------ The request to /gateway.php references a vulnerable function LSRoom_Remoting.doCommand within the encoded AMF data. The original parameter for the vulnerable function is "pref -l /var/system/upgrade/status" Replace this part with the command to be executed. Authentication to the web application is not necessary however a valid PHP session ID must be passed within the request. References: ----------- CVE-2011-2762 - authentication bypass CVE-2011-2763 - OS command injection

The web interface on the LifeSize Room appliance LS_RM1_3.5.3 (11) allows remote attackers to bypass authentication via unspecified data associated with a "true" authentication status, related to AMF data and the LSRoom_Remoting.authenticate function in gateway.php. LifeSize Room is a high definition video conferencing device. LifeSize Room is prone to a security-bypass vulnerability and a command-injection vulnerability. Exploiting these issues could allow an attacker to bypass authentication or execute arbitrary commands in the context of the application. LifeSize Room versions 3.5.3 and 4.7.18 are affected; other versions may also be vulnerable. Unauthenticated OS command injection is possible through the web interface. The easiest way to perform these attacks is using a web proxy. Authentication By Pass: ----------------------- Following the request to /gateway.php that references the LSRoom_Remoting.authenticate function, modify the AMF data in the response from the server to change "false" to "true" Example: Original False AMF: "\x0d\x0a\x0d\x0a\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x0c\x2f\x35\x37\x2f\x6f\x6e\x52\x65\x73\x75\x6c\x74\x00\x04\x6e\x75\x6c\x6c\x00\x00\x00\x02\x01\x00" Modified True AMF: "\x0d\x0a\x0d\x0a\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x0c\x2f\x35\x37\x2f\x6f\x6e\x52\x65\x73\x75\x6c\x74\x00\x04\x6e\x75\x6c\x6c\xff\xff\xff\xff\x01\x01" Command Injection: ------------------ The request to /gateway.php references a vulnerable function LSRoom_Remoting.doCommand within the encoded AMF data. The original parameter for the vulnerable function is "pref -l /var/system/upgrade/status" Replace this part with the command to be executed. Authentication to the web application is not necessary however a valid PHP session ID must be passed within the request. References: ----------- CVE-2011-2762 - authentication bypass CVE-2011-2763 - OS command injection

The byterange filter in the Apache HTTP Server 1.3.x, 2.0.x through 2.0.64, and 2.2.x through 2.2.19 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory and CPU consumption) via a Range header that expresses multiple overlapping ranges, as exploited in the wild in August 2011, a different vulnerability than CVE-2007-0086. Both the 'Range' header and the 'Range-Request' header are vulnerable. The attack tool causes a significant increase in CPU and memory usage on the server. Apache HTTPD The server has a service disruption (DoS) Vulnerabilities exist. Apache HTTPD The server Range Header and Request-Range There is a problem with header processing, and service operation is interrupted. (DoS) Vulnerabilities exist. Attacks using this vulnerability have been observed. Also, "Apache Killer" The attack tool called is released. Apache The advisory states that: "Background and the 2007 report There are two aspects to this vulnerability. One is new, is Apache specific; and resolved with this server side fix. The other issue is fundamentally a protocol design issue dating back to 2007: http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2007/Jan/83 The contemporary interpretation of the HTTP protocol (currently) requires a server to return multiple (overlapping) ranges; in the order requested. This means that one can request a very large range (e.g. from byte 0- to the end) 100's of times in a single request. Being able to do so is an issue for (probably all) webservers and currently subject of an IETF discussion to change the protocol: http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/311 This advisory details a problem with how Apache httpd and its so called internal 'bucket brigades' deal with serving such "valid" request. The problem is that currently such requests internally explode into 100's of large fetches, all of which are kept in memory in an inefficient way. This is being addressed in two ways. By making things more efficient. And by weeding out or simplifying requests deemed too unwieldy."Service disruption by a remote third party (DoS) There is a possibility of being attacked. ========================================================================== Ubuntu Security Notice USN-1199-1 September 01, 2011 apache2 vulnerability ========================================================================== A security issue affects these releases of Ubuntu and its derivatives: - Ubuntu 11.04 - Ubuntu 10.10 - Ubuntu 10.04 LTS - Ubuntu 8.04 LTS Summary: A remote attacker could send crafted input to Apache and cause it to crash. Update instructions: The problem can be corrected by updating your system to the following package versions: Ubuntu 11.04: apache2.2-bin 2.2.17-1ubuntu1.2 Ubuntu 10.10: apache2.2-bin 2.2.16-1ubuntu3.3 Ubuntu 10.04 LTS: apache2.2-bin 2.2.14-5ubuntu8.6 Ubuntu 8.04 LTS: apache2-mpm-event 2.2.8-1ubuntu0.21 apache2-mpm-perchild 2.2.8-1ubuntu0.21 apache2-mpm-prefork 2.2.8-1ubuntu0.21 apache2-mpm-worker 2.2.8-1ubuntu0.21 In general, a standard system update will make all the necessary changes. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- The Secunia CSI 5.0 Beta - now available for testing Find out more, take a free test drive, and share your opinion with us: http://secunia.com/blog/242 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: Hitachi Web Server ByteRange Filter Denial of Service Vulnerability SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA45865 VERIFY ADVISORY: Secunia.com http://secunia.com/advisories/45865/ Customer Area (Credentials Required) https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=45865 RELEASE DATE: 2011-09-05 DISCUSS ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/45865/#comments AVAILABLE ON SITE AND IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Last Update * Popularity * Comments * Criticality Level * Impact * Where * Solution Status * Operating System / Software * CVE Reference(s) http://secunia.com/advisories/45865/ ONLY AVAILABLE IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Authentication Level * Report Reliability * Secunia PoC * Secunia Analysis * Systems Affected * Approve Distribution * Remediation Status * Secunia CVSS Score * CVSS https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=45865 ONLY AVAILABLE WITH SECUNIA CSI AND SECUNIA PSI: * AUTOMATED SCANNING http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/personal/ http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/corporate/wsus_sccm_3rd_third_party_patching/ DESCRIPTION: Hitachi has acknowledged a vulnerability in Hitachi Web Server, which can be exploited by malicious people to cause a DoS (Denial of Service). ORIGINAL ADVISORY: Hitachi (Japanese): http://www.hitachi.co.jp/Prod/comp/soft1/security/info/./vuls/HS11-019/index.html OTHER REFERENCES: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ DEEP LINKS: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ EXTENDED DESCRIPTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ EXTENDED SOLUTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ EXPLOIT: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ---------------------------------------------------------------------- . Please review the CVE identifiers referenced below for details. Impact ====== A remote attacker might obtain sensitive information, gain privileges, send requests to unintended servers behind proxies, bypass certain security restrictions, obtain the values of HTTPOnly cookies, or cause a Denial of Service in various ways. A local attacker could gain escalated privileges. Workaround ========== There is no known workaround at this time. Resolution ========== All Apache HTTP Server users should upgrade to the latest version: # emerge --sync # emerge --ask --oneshot --verbose ">=www-servers/apache-2.2.22-r1" References ========== [ 1 ] CVE-2010-0408 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2010-0408 [ 2 ] CVE-2010-0434 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2010-0434 [ 3 ] CVE-2010-1452 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2010-1452 [ 4 ] CVE-2010-2791 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2010-2791 [ 5 ] CVE-2011-3192 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2011-3192 [ 6 ] CVE-2011-3348 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2011-3348 [ 7 ] CVE-2011-3368 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2011-3368 [ 8 ] CVE-2011-3607 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2011-3607 [ 9 ] CVE-2011-4317 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2011-4317 [ 10 ] CVE-2012-0021 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2012-0021 [ 11 ] CVE-2012-0031 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2012-0031 [ 12 ] CVE-2012-0053 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2012-0053 [ 13 ] CVE-2012-0883 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2012-0883 Availability ============ This GLSA and any updates to it are available for viewing at the Gentoo Security Website: http://security.gentoo.org/glsa/glsa-201206-25.xml Concerns? ========= Security is a primary focus of Gentoo Linux and ensuring the confidentiality and security of our users' machines is of utmost importance to us. Any security concerns should be addressed to security@gentoo.org or alternatively, you may file a bug at https://bugs.gentoo.org. License ======= Copyright 2012 Gentoo Foundation, Inc; referenced text belongs to its owner(s). The contents of this document are licensed under the Creative Commons - Attribution / Share Alike license. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5 . Packages for 2009.0 are provided as of the Extended Maintenance Program. The verification of md5 checksums and GPG signatures is performed automatically for you. All packages are signed by Mandriva for security. You can obtain the GPG public key of the Mandriva Security Team by executing: gpg --recv-keys --keyserver pgp.mit.edu 0x22458A98 You can view other update advisories for Mandriva Linux at: http://www.mandriva.com/security/advisories If you want to report vulnerabilities, please contact security_(at)_mandriva.com _______________________________________________________________________ Type Bits/KeyID Date User ID pub 1024D/22458A98 2000-07-10 Mandriva Security Team <security*mandriva.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQFOY4ZemqjQ0CJFipgRAqbCAJ9v2n0eNDDc2DYK3WqOifUDtsN+JACgkx4s 4pin0XPWifvtN+m/Z38bY+U= =IhYU -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ . -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 SUPPORT COMMUNICATION - SECURITY BULLETIN Document ID: c02997184 Version: 2 HPSBUX02702 SSRT100606 rev.2 - HP-UX Apache Web Server, Remote Denial of Service (DoS) NOTICE: The information in this Security Bulletin should be acted upon as soon as possible. Release Date: 2011-09-08 Last Updated: 2011-09-08 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Potential Security Impact: Remote Denial of Service (DoS) Source: Hewlett-Packard Company, HP Software Security Response Team VULNERABILITY SUMMARY Potential security vulnerabilities have been identified with HP-UX Apache Web Server. References: CVE-2011-3192, CVE-2011-0419 SUPPORTED SOFTWARE VERSIONS*: ONLY impacted versions are listed. HP-UX B.11.23, B.11.31 running HP-UX Apache Web Server Suite v3.17 containing Apache v2.2.15.07 or earlier HP-UX B.11.11 running HP-UX Apache Web Server Suite v2.33 containing Apache v2.0.64.01 or earlier BACKGROUND CVSS 2.0 Base Metrics =========================================================== Reference Base Vector Base Score CVE-2011-3192 (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C) 7.8 CVE-2011-0419 (AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P) 4.3 =========================================================== Information on CVSS is documented in HP Customer Notice: HPSN-2008-002 RESOLUTION This bulletin will be revised when additional information becomes available. HP has provided the following software update to resolve these vulnerabilities. The update is available for download from the following location ftp://srt10606:P2xg=AD5@ftp.usa.hp.com or https://ftp.usa.hp.com/hprc/home with username srt10606 and password P2xg=AD5 HP-UX Web Server Suite (WSS) v.3.18 containing Apache v2.2.15.08 HP-UX 11i Release / Apache Depot name B.11.23 (32-bit) / Apache-CVE-2011-3192-Fix-IA-PA-32.depot B.11.23 (64-bit) / Apache-CVE-2011-3192-Fix-IA-PA-64.depot B.11.31 (32-bit) / Apache-CVE-2011-3192-Fix-IA-PA-32.depot B.11.31 (64-bit) / Apache-CVE-2011-3192-Fix-IA-PA-64.depot HP-UX Web Server Suite (WSS) v.2.33 containing Apache v2.0.64.01 and earlier HP-UX 11i Release / Apache Depot name B.11.11 / Use work around suggested below B.11.23 (32 & 64-bit) / No longer supported. Upgrade to WSS v 3.18 B.11.31 (32 & 64-bit) / No longer supported. Upgrade to WSS v 3.18 Alternatives to Installing the Preliminary Patch The Apache Software Foundation has documented work arounds. For customers not wanting to install the preliminary patch, the following are recommended. Note: that no patch is available for Apache 2.0.64.01. 2) Limit the size of the request field to a few hundred bytes. 3) Use mod_headers to completely disallow the use of Range headers. Please refer to the Apache advisory for details. http://mail-archives.apache.org/mod_mbox/httpd-announce/201108.mbox/%3c20110826103531.998348F82@minotaur.apache.org%3e MANUAL ACTIONS: Yes - Update Install HP-UX Web Server Suite v3.18 or subsequent. PRODUCT SPECIFIC INFORMATION HP-UX Software Assistant: HP-UX Software Assistant is an enhanced application that replaces HP-UX Security Patch Check. It analyzes all Security Bulletins issued by HP and lists recommended actions that may apply to a specific HP-UX system. It can also download patches and create a depot automatically. For more information see https://www.hp.com/go/swa The following text is for use by the HP-UX Software Assistant. AFFECTED VERSIONS HP-UX Web Server Suite v3.18 HP-UX B.11.23 HP-UX B.11.31 ================== hpuxws22APCH32.APACHE hpuxws22APCH32.APACHE2 hpuxws22APCH32.AUTH_LDAP hpuxws22APCH32.AUTH_LDAP2 hpuxws22APCH32.MOD_JK hpuxws22APCH32.MOD_JK2 hpuxws22APCH32.MOD_PERL hpuxws22APCH32.MOD_PERL2 hpuxws22APCH32.PHP hpuxws22APCH32.PHP2 hpuxws22APCH32.WEBPROXY hpuxws22APCH32.WEBPROXY2 hpuxws22APACHE.APACHE hpuxws22APACHE.APACHE2 hpuxws22APACHE.AUTH_LDAP hpuxws22APACHE.AUTH_LDAP2 hpuxws22APACHE.MOD_JK hpuxws22APACHE.MOD_JK2 hpuxws22APACHE.MOD_PERL hpuxws22APACHE.MOD_PERL2 hpuxws22APACHE.PHP hpuxws22APACHE.PHP2 hpuxws22APACHE.WEBPROXY hpuxws22APACHE.WEBPROXY2 action: install revision B.2.2.15.08 or subsequent END AFFECTED VERSIONS HISTORY Version:1 (rev.1) - 8 September 2011 Initial release Version:2 (rev.2) - 8 September 2011 Updated affectivity, recommendations, typos Third Party Security Patches: Third party security patches that are to be installed on systems running HP software products should be applied in accordance with the customer's patch management policy. Support: For further information, contact normal HP Services support channel. Report: To report a potential security vulnerability with any HP supported product, send Email to: security-alert@hp.com Subscribe: To initiate a subscription to receive future HP Security Bulletin alerts via Email: http://h41183.www4.hp.com/signup_alerts.php?jumpid=hpsc_secbulletins Security Bulletin List: A list of HP Security Bulletins, updated periodically, is contained in HP Security Notice HPSN-2011-001: https://h20566.www2.hp.com/portal/site/hpsc/public/kb/docDisplay/?docId=emr_na-c02964430 3C = 3COM 3P = 3rd Party Software GN = HP General Software HF = HP Hardware and Firmware MP = MPE/iX MU = Multi-Platform Software NS = NonStop Servers OV = OpenVMS PI = Printing and Imaging PV = ProCurve ST = Storage Software TU = Tru64 UNIX UX = HP-UX Copyright 2011 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. Hewlett-Packard Company shall not be liable for technical or editorial errors or omissions contained herein. The information provided is provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. To the extent permitted by law, neither HP or its affiliates, subcontractors or suppliers will be liable for incidental,special or consequential damages including downtime cost; lost profits;damages relating to the procurement of substitute products or services; or damages for loss of data, or software restoration. The information in this document is subject to change without notice. Hewlett-Packard Company and the names of Hewlett-Packard products referenced herein are trademarks of Hewlett-Packard Company in the United States and other countries. Other product and company names mentioned herein may be trademarks of their respective owners. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (GNU/Linux) iEYEARECAAYFAk5pPZoACgkQ4B86/C0qfVn5nwCg/w2MOkbP7d5Xp4fAyX4zAOdp aWQAoJoKZs8qDHYIVa41KgH1ANkNQI3C =MTc6 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- . For other issues about the content of this Security Bulletin, send e-mail to security-alert@hp.com. Summary: Updated httpd and httpd22 packages that fix one security issue are now available for JBoss Enterprise Web Server 1.0.2 for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4, 5, and 6. The Red Hat Security Response Team has rated this update as having important security impact. A Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base score, which gives a detailed severity rating, is available from the CVE link in the References section. 2. (CVE-2011-3192) All users of JBoss Enterprise Web Server 1.0.2 should upgrade to these updated packages, which contain a backported patch to correct this issue. After installing the updated packages, Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4 users must restart the httpd22 service, and Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 and 6 users must restart the httpd service, for the update to take effect. 4. Solution: Before applying this update, make sure all previously-released errata relevant to your system have been applied. This update is available via the Red Hat Network. Details on how to use the Red Hat Network to apply this update are available at https://access.redhat.com/kb/docs/DOC-11259 5. Bugs fixed (http://bugzilla.redhat.com/): 732928 - CVE-2011-3192 httpd: multiple ranges DoS 6. Package List: JBoss Enterprise Web Server 1.0 for RHEL 4 AS: Source: httpd22-2.2.17-16.ep5.el4.src.rpm i386: httpd22-2.2.17-16.ep5.el4.i386.rpm httpd22-apr-2.2.17-16.ep5.el4.i386.rpm httpd22-apr-devel-2.2.17-16.ep5.el4.i386.rpm httpd22-apr-util-2.2.17-16.ep5.el4.i386.rpm httpd22-apr-util-devel-2.2.17-16.ep5.el4.i386.rpm httpd22-debuginfo-2.2.17-16.ep5.el4.i386.rpm httpd22-devel-2.2.17-16.ep5.el4.i386.rpm httpd22-manual-2.2.17-16.ep5.el4.i386.rpm mod_ssl22-2.2.17-16.ep5.el4.i386.rpm x86_64: httpd22-2.2.17-16.ep5.el4.x86_64.rpm httpd22-apr-2.2.17-16.ep5.el4.x86_64.rpm httpd22-apr-devel-2.2.17-16.ep5.el4.x86_64.rpm httpd22-apr-util-2.2.17-16.ep5.el4.x86_64.rpm httpd22-apr-util-devel-2.2.17-16.ep5.el4.x86_64.rpm httpd22-debuginfo-2.2.17-16.ep5.el4.x86_64.rpm httpd22-devel-2.2.17-16.ep5.el4.x86_64.rpm httpd22-manual-2.2.17-16.ep5.el4.x86_64.rpm mod_ssl22-2.2.17-16.ep5.el4.x86_64.rpm JBoss Enterprise Web Server 1.0 for RHEL 4 ES: Source: httpd22-2.2.17-16.ep5.el4.src.rpm i386: httpd22-2.2.17-16.ep5.el4.i386.rpm httpd22-apr-2.2.17-16.ep5.el4.i386.rpm httpd22-apr-devel-2.2.17-16.ep5.el4.i386.rpm httpd22-apr-util-2.2.17-16.ep5.el4.i386.rpm httpd22-apr-util-devel-2.2.17-16.ep5.el4.i386.rpm httpd22-debuginfo-2.2.17-16.ep5.el4.i386.rpm httpd22-devel-2.2.17-16.ep5.el4.i386.rpm httpd22-manual-2.2.17-16.ep5.el4.i386.rpm mod_ssl22-2.2.17-16.ep5.el4.i386.rpm x86_64: httpd22-2.2.17-16.ep5.el4.x86_64.rpm httpd22-apr-2.2.17-16.ep5.el4.x86_64.rpm httpd22-apr-devel-2.2.17-16.ep5.el4.x86_64.rpm httpd22-apr-util-2.2.17-16.ep5.el4.x86_64.rpm httpd22-apr-util-devel-2.2.17-16.ep5.el4.x86_64.rpm httpd22-debuginfo-2.2.17-16.ep5.el4.x86_64.rpm httpd22-devel-2.2.17-16.ep5.el4.x86_64.rpm httpd22-manual-2.2.17-16.ep5.el4.x86_64.rpm mod_ssl22-2.2.17-16.ep5.el4.x86_64.rpm JBoss Enterprise Web Server 1.0 for RHEL 5 Server: Source: httpd-2.2.17-14.1.ep5.el5.src.rpm i386: httpd-2.2.17-14.1.ep5.el5.i386.rpm httpd-debuginfo-2.2.17-14.1.ep5.el5.i386.rpm httpd-devel-2.2.17-14.1.ep5.el5.i386.rpm httpd-manual-2.2.17-14.1.ep5.el5.i386.rpm mod_ssl-2.2.17-14.1.ep5.el5.i386.rpm x86_64: httpd-2.2.17-14.1.ep5.el5.x86_64.rpm httpd-debuginfo-2.2.17-14.1.ep5.el5.x86_64.rpm httpd-devel-2.2.17-14.1.ep5.el5.x86_64.rpm httpd-manual-2.2.17-14.1.ep5.el5.x86_64.rpm mod_ssl-2.2.17-14.1.ep5.el5.x86_64.rpm JBoss Enterprise Web Server 1.0 for RHEL 6 Server: Source: httpd-2.2.17-13.2.ep5.el6.src.rpm i386: httpd-2.2.17-13.2.ep5.el6.i386.rpm httpd-debuginfo-2.2.17-13.2.ep5.el6.i386.rpm httpd-devel-2.2.17-13.2.ep5.el6.i386.rpm httpd-manual-2.2.17-13.2.ep5.el6.i386.rpm httpd-tools-2.2.17-13.2.ep5.el6.i386.rpm mod_ssl-2.2.17-13.2.ep5.el6.i386.rpm x86_64: httpd-2.2.17-13.2.ep5.el6.x86_64.rpm httpd-debuginfo-2.2.17-13.2.ep5.el6.x86_64.rpm httpd-devel-2.2.17-13.2.ep5.el6.x86_64.rpm httpd-manual-2.2.17-13.2.ep5.el6.x86_64.rpm httpd-tools-2.2.17-13.2.ep5.el6.x86_64.rpm mod_ssl-2.2.17-13.2.ep5.el6.x86_64.rpm These packages are GPG signed by Red Hat for security. Our key and details on how to verify the signature are available from https://access.redhat.com/security/team/key/#package 7. References: https://www.redhat.com/security/data/cve/CVE-2011-3192.html https://access.redhat.com/security/updates/classification/#important 8. Contact: The Red Hat security contact is <secalert@redhat.com>. More contact details at https://access.redhat.com/security/team/contact/ Copyright 2011 Red Hat, Inc. New packages are available for Slackware 12.0, 12.1, 12.2, 13.0, 13.1, 13.37, and -current. Here are the details from the Slackware 13.37 ChangeLog: +--------------------------+ patches/packages/httpd-2.2.20-i486-1_slack13.37.txz: Upgraded. SECURITY: CVE-2011-3192 (cve.mitre.org) core: Fix handling of byte-range requests to use less memory, to avoid denial of service. PR 51714. [Stefan Fritsch, Jim Jagielski, Ruediger Pluem, Eric Covener] For more information, see: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2011-3192 (* Security fix *) +--------------------------+ Where to find the new packages: +-----------------------------+ Thanks to the friendly folks at the OSU Open Source Lab (http://osuosl.org) for donating FTP and rsync hosting to the Slackware project! :-) Also see the "Get Slack" section on http://slackware.com for additional mirror sites near you. ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware-12.0/patches/packages/httpd-2.2.20-i486-1_slack12.0.tgz Updated package for Slackware 12.1: ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware-12.1/patches/packages/httpd-2.2.20-i486-1_slack12.1.tgz Updated package for Slackware 12.2: ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware-12.2/patches/packages/httpd-2.2.20-i486-1_slack12.2.tgz Updated package for Slackware 13.0: ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware-13.0/patches/packages/httpd-2.2.20-i486-1_slack13.0.txz Updated package for Slackware x86_64 13.0: ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware64-13.0/patches/packages/httpd-2.2.20-x86_64-1_slack13.0.txz Updated package for Slackware 13.1: ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware-13.1/patches/packages/httpd-2.2.20-i486-1_slack13.1.txz Updated package for Slackware x86_64 13.1: ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware64-13.1/patches/packages/httpd-2.2.20-x86_64-1_slack13.1.txz Updated package for Slackware 13.37: ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware-13.37/patches/packages/httpd-2.2.20-i486-1_slack13.37.txz Updated package for Slackware x86_64 13.37: ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware64-13.37/patches/packages/httpd-2.2.20-x86_64-1_slack13.37.txz Updated package for Slackware -current: ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware-current/slackware/n/httpd-2.2.20-i486-1.txz Updated package for Slackware x86_64 -current: ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware64-current/slackware64/n/httpd-2.2.20-x86_64-1.txz MD5 signatures: +-------------+ Slackware 12.0 package: 1c5d2923bf5ee56ea5b26a14f4bef750 httpd-2.2.20-i486-1_slack12.0.tgz Slackware 12.1 package: 1afa27da8d2d897f871fb5fe91832f04 httpd-2.2.20-i486-1_slack12.1.tgz Slackware 12.2 package: 883d978f2eb2fa09e0094096860995ef httpd-2.2.20-i486-1_slack12.2.tgz Slackware 13.0 package: db6935f7ce78acd0cf63bfed97497334 httpd-2.2.20-i486-1_slack13.0.txz Slackware x86_64 13.0 package: 8c976a586a885b33c910c71a4cb655c9 httpd-2.2.20-x86_64-1_slack13.0.txz Slackware 13.1 package: eab2ada5def61d8734a80e887b10edc7 httpd-2.2.20-i486-1_slack13.1.txz Slackware x86_64 13.1 package: 378da86cc706426c68cb3404bceb146c httpd-2.2.20-x86_64-1_slack13.1.txz Slackware 13.37 package: ac06dfbefebd419d7bebf3f18ddd1304 httpd-2.2.20-i486-1_slack13.37.txz Slackware x86_64 13.37 package: c650ee26fde72c7e6524784fa63ff8b8 httpd-2.2.20-x86_64-1_slack13.37.txz Slackware -current package: 7afbbaae7ed7605620ad76dc9ae1146b n/httpd-2.2.20-i486-1.txz Slackware x86_64 -current package: 5ef29bd575c49645496cbfc4fe657c84 n/httpd-2.2.20-x86_64-1.txz Installation instructions: +------------------------+ Upgrade the package as root: # upgradepkg httpd-2.2.20-i486-1_slack13.37.txz Then, restart the httpd daemon. +-----+ Slackware Linux Security Team http://slackware.com/gpg-key security@slackware.com +------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | To leave the slackware-security mailing list: | +------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Send an email to majordomo@slackware.com with this text in the body of | | the email message: | | | | unsubscribe slackware-security | | | | You will get a confirmation message back containing instructions to | | complete the process. 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Apple QuickTime before 7.7 on Windows allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption and application crash) via a crafted image description associated with an mp4v tag in a movie file. User interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target must visit a malicious page or open a malicious file.The specific flaw exists within the way Quicktime handles 'mp4v' codec information. When parsing the video description table it will read the size field preceding the 'mp4v' tag and use that size to create an allocation to hold the data. It will then copy the correct amount of data into that buffer, but then does some endian changes on a fixed portion of the buffer without checking its size. The resulting memory corruption could result in remote code execution under the context of the current user. Apple QuickTime is prone to a buffer-overflow vulnerability because of a failure to properly bounds check user-supplied data. Successful exploits will allow attackers to execute arbitrary code in the context of the currently logged-in user; failed exploit attempts may cause denial-of-service conditions. Versions prior to QuickTime 7.7 are vulnerable. Apple QuickTime is a multimedia playback software developed by Apple (Apple). The software is capable of handling multiple sources such as digital video, media segments, and more. -- Vendor Response: Apple has issued an update to correct this vulnerability. More details can be found at: http://support.apple.com/kb/HT4826 -- Disclosure Timeline: 2011-06-03 - Vulnerability reported to vendor 2011-08-31 - Coordinated public release of advisory -- Credit: This vulnerability was discovered by: * Damian Put -- About the Zero Day Initiative (ZDI): Established by TippingPoint, The Zero Day Initiative (ZDI) represents a best-of-breed model for rewarding security researchers for responsibly disclosing discovered vulnerabilities. Researchers interested in getting paid for their security research through the ZDI can find more information and sign-up at: http://www.zerodayinitiative.com The ZDI is unique in how the acquired vulnerability information is used. TippingPoint does not re-sell the vulnerability details or any exploit code. Instead, upon notifying the affected product vendor, TippingPoint provides its customers with zero day protection through its intrusion prevention technology. Explicit details regarding the specifics of the vulnerability are not exposed to any parties until an official vendor patch is publicly available. Furthermore, with the altruistic aim of helping to secure a broader user base, TippingPoint provides this vulnerability information confidentially to security vendors (including competitors) who have a vulnerability protection or mitigation product. Our vulnerability disclosure policy is available online at: http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/disclosure_policy/ Follow the ZDI on Twitter: http://twitter.com/thezdi _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/

The SIP process in Cisco Unified Communications Manager (aka CUCM, formerly CallManager) 7.x before 7.1(5b)su4 and 8.x before 8.0(1) does not properly handle SDP data within a SIP call in certain situations related to use of the g729ar8 codec for a Media Termination Point (MTP), which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (service outage) via a crafted call, aka Bug ID CSCtc61990. The problem is Bug ID CSCtc61990 It is a problem.Denial of service via a crafted call by a third party ( Service stop ) There is a possibility of being put into a state. Cisco Unified Communications Manager is a call processing component in the Cisco IP Telephony solution. Single channel audio may occur when configuring MTP with g729ar8 codec. Under certain conditions, service interruptions may occur. The SIP process generates a stack trace when processing the session description protocol SDP portion of a SIP call. An attacker can exploit these issues to cause denial-of-service conditions in the affected application. These issues are documented by these Cisco bug IDs: CSCtf97162 CSCtc61990 CSCth43256. A workaround exists for the SIP and Packet Capture Service DoS vulnerabilities. This advisory is posted at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20110824-cucm.shtml Two of the vulnerabilities described in this advisory also affect the Cisco Intercompany Media Engine. A separate Cisco Security Advisory has been published to disclose the vulnerabilities that affect the Cisco Intercompany Media Engine. The first DoS vulnerability involves the Packet Capture Service which is enabled by default. The Packet Capture Service fails to timeout or close idle TCP connections. The Packet Capture Service should be disabled in the Cisco Unified Communications Manager Administration Interface by setting the service parameter to False. This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCtf97162 ( registered customers only) and has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifier CVE-2011-2560. The second DoS vulnerability involves certain configurations of Media Termination Points (MTP). This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCtc61990 ( registered customers only) and has been assigned CVE identifier CVE-2011-2561. The third DoS vulnerability involves a coredump when processing certain SIP INVITE messages. This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCth43256 ( registered customers only) and has been assigned CVE identifier CVE-2011-2562. The remaining two DoS vulnerabilities involve the Service Advertisement Framework (SAF). Successful exploitation could cause the device to reload. These vulnerabilities are documented in Cisco Bug IDs CSCth26669 ( registered customers only) and CSCth19417 ( registered customers only) and have been assigned CVE identifiers CVE-2011-2563 and CVE-2011-2564, respectively. Cisco Intercompany Media Engine Release 8.x is also affected by these vulnerabilities. A separate Cisco Security Advisory has been published to disclose the vulnerabilities that affect the Cisco Intercompany Media Engine. That advisory is available at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20110824-ime.shtml Note: An established TCP connection with a three-way handshake is required to trigger the SAF vulnerabilities. Vulnerability Scoring Details +---------------------------- Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss * CSCtf97162 - CCM Application Restarts During TCP Flood CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * CSCtc61990 - Coredump may be experienced when processing certain SIP packets CVSS Base Score - 7.1 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Medium Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 5.9 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * CSCth43256 - Coredump may be experienced when processing certain SIP packets CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * CSCth26669 - CUCM may experience a reload when receiving certain UCM client msgs CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * CSCth19417 - CUCM may experience a reload when receiving certain UCM client msgs CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== Successful exploitation of the vulnerabilities that are described in this advisory could result in the interruption of voice services. In certain instances, the affected Cisco Unified Communications Manager processes will restart, but repeated attacks may result in a sustained DoS condition. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. Cisco recommends upgrading to a release equal to or later than the release in the Recommended Releases column of the table. +---------------------------------------+ | Cisco Unified | Recommended | | Communications Manager | Releases | | Version | | |-------------------------+-------------| | 6.x | 6.1(5)SU3 | |-------------------------+-------------| | 7.x | 7.1(5b)SU4 | |-------------------------+-------------| | 8.0 | 8.0(3a)SU2 | |-------------------------+-------------| | 8.5 | 8.5(1)SU2, | | | 8.6(1) | +---------------------------------------+ Workarounds =========== A workaround exists for the SIP DoS vulnerabilities. SIP processing is enabled by default. * Step 3: Change the SIP Interoperability Enabled parameter to False, and click Save. Note: For a SIP processing change to take effect, the Cisco CallManager service must be restarted. For information on how to restart the service, refer to the "Restarting the Cisco CallManager Service" section of the document at the following location: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/voice_ip_comm/cucm/admin/7_1_2/ccmcfg/b03dpi.html#wp1075124 It is possible to mitigate these vulnerabilities by implementing filtering on screening devices and only permitting access to TCP ports 5060 and 5061 and UDP ports 5060 and 5061 from networks that require SIP access to Cisco Unified Communications Manager servers. A workaround exists for the DoS vulnerabilities involving the Packet Capture Service in Cisco Communications Manager version 4.x. Customers who do not require the Packet Capture Service for troubleshooting can use the following instructions to disable this process: * Step 1: Log into the Cisco Unified Communications Manager Administration web interface. * Step 3: Change the Packet Capture Enabled parameter to False, and click Save. Note: For the Packet Capture Service change to take effect, the Cisco CallManager service must be restarted. For information on how to restart the service, refer to the "Restarting the Cisco CallManager Service" section of the document at the following location: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/voice_ip_comm/cucm/admin/7_1_2/ccmcfg/b03dpi.html#wp1075124 Additional mitigations that can be deployed on Cisco devices in the network are available in the companion document "Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin: Identifying and Mitigating Exploitation of the Multiple Vulnerabilities in Cisco Unified Communications Manager" which is available at the following location: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20110824-cucm-ime.shtml Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at: http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerabilities described in this advisory. These vulnerabilities were found during internal testing and during the troubleshooting of customer service requests. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20110824-cucm.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +---------------------------------------+ | Revision | | Initial | | 1.0 | 2011-August-24 | public | | | | release. | +---------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at: http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt +-------------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright 2010-2011 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. +-------------------------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.5 (SunOS) iFcDBQFOVFpYQXnnBKKRMNARCOCeAPwP66zH85V+OOW8YRl94JMDc+UpiRzqoqUl 6C0WGFrBJgD/eR7bXF71he/ByVHVpfpY3qaX8M45+MqcqzIDrM6hbCY= =kz9x -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ . ---------------------------------------------------------------------- The Secunia CSI 5.0 Beta - now available for testing Find out more, take a free test drive, and share your opinion with us: http://secunia.com/blog/242 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: Cisco Unified Communications Manager Multiple Denial of Service Vulnerabilities SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA45738 VERIFY ADVISORY: Secunia.com http://secunia.com/advisories/45738/ Customer Area (Credentials Required) https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=45738 RELEASE DATE: 2011-08-25 DISCUSS ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/45738/#comments AVAILABLE ON SITE AND IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Last Update * Popularity * Comments * Criticality Level * Impact * Where * Solution Status * Operating System / Software * CVE Reference(s) http://secunia.com/advisories/45738/ ONLY AVAILABLE IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Authentication Level * Report Reliability * Secunia PoC * Secunia Analysis * Systems Affected * Approve Distribution * Remediation Status * Secunia CVSS Score * CVSS https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=45738 ONLY AVAILABLE WITH SECUNIA CSI AND SECUNIA PSI: * AUTOMATED SCANNING http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/personal/ http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/corporate/wsus_sccm_3rd_third_party_patching/ DESCRIPTION: Multiple vulnerabilities have been reported in Cisco Unified Communications Manager, which can be exploited by malicious people to cause a DoS (Denial of Service). Note: This vulnerability only affects version 7.0.x and later. The vulnerabilities are reported in versions 6.x, 7.x, and 8.x. SOLUTION: Update to version 6.1(5)SU3, 7.1(5b)SU4, 8.0(3a)SU2, 8.5(1)SU2, or 8.6(1). PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: Reported by the vendor. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20110824-cucm.shtml OTHER REFERENCES: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ DEEP LINKS: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ EXTENDED DESCRIPTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ EXTENDED SOLUTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ EXPLOIT: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ----------------------------------------------------------------------

Unspecified vulnerability in Cisco Unified Communications Manager (aka CUCM, formerly CallManager) 6.x before 6.1(5)su2, 7.x before 7.1(5b)su3, 8.x before 8.0(3a)su1, and 8.5 before 8.5(1) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (service outage) via a SIP INVITE message, aka Bug ID CSCth43256. Cisco Unified Communications Manager There is a service disruption ( Service stop ) There is a vulnerability that becomes a condition. The problem is Bug ID CSCth43256 It is a problem.By a third party SIP INVITE Service disruption via message ( Service stop ) There is a possibility of being put into a state. An attacker can exploit these issues to cause denial-of-service conditions in the affected application. These issues are documented by these Cisco bug IDs: CSCtf97162 CSCtc61990 CSCth43256. A workaround exists for the SIP and Packet Capture Service DoS vulnerabilities. This advisory is posted at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20110824-cucm.shtml Two of the vulnerabilities described in this advisory also affect the Cisco Intercompany Media Engine. A separate Cisco Security Advisory has been published to disclose the vulnerabilities that affect the Cisco Intercompany Media Engine. The first DoS vulnerability involves the Packet Capture Service which is enabled by default. The Packet Capture Service fails to timeout or close idle TCP connections. This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCtf97162 ( registered customers only) and has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifier CVE-2011-2560. The second DoS vulnerability involves certain configurations of Media Termination Points (MTP). One-way audio may be observed when an MTP is configured with the g729ar8 codec only. In certain situations, an interruption in service may occur and a stack trace will be generated by the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) process when processing the Session Description Protocol SDP portion of a SIP call. This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCtc61990 ( registered customers only) and has been assigned CVE identifier CVE-2011-2561. This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCth43256 ( registered customers only) and has been assigned CVE identifier CVE-2011-2562. The remaining two DoS vulnerabilities involve the Service Advertisement Framework (SAF). Successful exploitation could cause the device to reload. These vulnerabilities are documented in Cisco Bug IDs CSCth26669 ( registered customers only) and CSCth19417 ( registered customers only) and have been assigned CVE identifiers CVE-2011-2563 and CVE-2011-2564, respectively. Cisco Intercompany Media Engine Release 8.x is also affected by these vulnerabilities. A separate Cisco Security Advisory has been published to disclose the vulnerabilities that affect the Cisco Intercompany Media Engine. That advisory is available at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20110824-ime.shtml Note: An established TCP connection with a three-way handshake is required to trigger the SAF vulnerabilities. Vulnerability Scoring Details +---------------------------- Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss * CSCtf97162 - CCM Application Restarts During TCP Flood CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * CSCtc61990 - Coredump may be experienced when processing certain SIP packets CVSS Base Score - 7.1 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Medium Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 5.9 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * CSCth43256 - Coredump may be experienced when processing certain SIP packets CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * CSCth26669 - CUCM may experience a reload when receiving certain UCM client msgs CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * CSCth19417 - CUCM may experience a reload when receiving certain UCM client msgs CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== Successful exploitation of the vulnerabilities that are described in this advisory could result in the interruption of voice services. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. Cisco recommends upgrading to a release equal to or later than the release in the Recommended Releases column of the table. SIP processing is enabled by default. * Step 3: Change the SIP Interoperability Enabled parameter to False, and click Save. For information on how to restart the service, refer to the "Restarting the Cisco CallManager Service" section of the document at the following location: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/voice_ip_comm/cucm/admin/7_1_2/ccmcfg/b03dpi.html#wp1075124 It is possible to mitigate these vulnerabilities by implementing filtering on screening devices and only permitting access to TCP ports 5060 and 5061 and UDP ports 5060 and 5061 from networks that require SIP access to Cisco Unified Communications Manager servers. Customers who do not require the Packet Capture Service for troubleshooting can use the following instructions to disable this process: * Step 1: Log into the Cisco Unified Communications Manager Administration web interface. * Step 3: Change the Packet Capture Enabled parameter to False, and click Save. For information on how to restart the service, refer to the "Restarting the Cisco CallManager Service" section of the document at the following location: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/voice_ip_comm/cucm/admin/7_1_2/ccmcfg/b03dpi.html#wp1075124 Additional mitigations that can be deployed on Cisco devices in the network are available in the companion document "Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin: Identifying and Mitigating Exploitation of the Multiple Vulnerabilities in Cisco Unified Communications Manager" which is available at the following location: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20110824-cucm-ime.shtml Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at: http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerabilities described in this advisory. These vulnerabilities were found during internal testing and during the troubleshooting of customer service requests. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20110824-cucm.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +---------------------------------------+ | Revision | | Initial | | 1.0 | 2011-August-24 | public | | | | release. | +---------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at: http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt +-------------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright 2010-2011 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. +-------------------------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.5 (SunOS) iFcDBQFOVFpYQXnnBKKRMNARCOCeAPwP66zH85V+OOW8YRl94JMDc+UpiRzqoqUl 6C0WGFrBJgD/eR7bXF71he/ByVHVpfpY3qaX8M45+MqcqzIDrM6hbCY= =kz9x -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ . ---------------------------------------------------------------------- The Secunia CSI 5.0 Beta - now available for testing Find out more, take a free test drive, and share your opinion with us: http://secunia.com/blog/242 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: Cisco Unified Communications Manager Multiple Denial of Service Vulnerabilities SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA45738 VERIFY ADVISORY: Secunia.com http://secunia.com/advisories/45738/ Customer Area (Credentials Required) https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=45738 RELEASE DATE: 2011-08-25 DISCUSS ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/45738/#comments AVAILABLE ON SITE AND IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Last Update * Popularity * Comments * Criticality Level * Impact * Where * Solution Status * Operating System / Software * CVE Reference(s) http://secunia.com/advisories/45738/ ONLY AVAILABLE IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Authentication Level * Report Reliability * Secunia PoC * Secunia Analysis * Systems Affected * Approve Distribution * Remediation Status * Secunia CVSS Score * CVSS https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=45738 ONLY AVAILABLE WITH SECUNIA CSI AND SECUNIA PSI: * AUTOMATED SCANNING http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/personal/ http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/corporate/wsus_sccm_3rd_third_party_patching/ DESCRIPTION: Multiple vulnerabilities have been reported in Cisco Unified Communications Manager, which can be exploited by malicious people to cause a DoS (Denial of Service). Note: This vulnerability only affects version 7.0.x and later. The vulnerabilities are reported in versions 6.x, 7.x, and 8.x. SOLUTION: Update to version 6.1(5)SU3, 7.1(5b)SU4, 8.0(3a)SU2, 8.5(1)SU2, or 8.6(1). PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: Reported by the vendor. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20110824-cucm.shtml OTHER REFERENCES: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ DEEP LINKS: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ EXTENDED DESCRIPTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ EXTENDED SOLUTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ EXPLOIT: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ----------------------------------------------------------------------

The Packet Capture Service in Cisco Unified Communications Manager (aka CUCM, formerly CallManager) 4.x does not properly handle idle TCP connections, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption and restart) by making many connections, aka Bug ID CSCtf97162. The problem is Bug ID CSCtf97162 It is a problem.Service operation disruption by establishing many connections by a third party ( Memory corruption and restart ) There is a possibility of being put into a state. Cisco Unified Communications Manager is a call processing component in the Cisco IP Telephony solution. An attacker can exploit these issues to cause denial-of-service conditions in the affected application. These issues are documented by these Cisco bug IDs: CSCtf97162 CSCtc61990 CSCth43256. A workaround exists for the SIP and Packet Capture Service DoS vulnerabilities. This advisory is posted at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20110824-cucm.shtml Two of the vulnerabilities described in this advisory also affect the Cisco Intercompany Media Engine. A separate Cisco Security Advisory has been published to disclose the vulnerabilities that affect the Cisco Intercompany Media Engine. This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCtf97162 ( registered customers only) and has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifier CVE-2011-2560. The second DoS vulnerability involves certain configurations of Media Termination Points (MTP). One-way audio may be observed when an MTP is configured with the g729ar8 codec only. In certain situations, an interruption in service may occur and a stack trace will be generated by the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) process when processing the Session Description Protocol SDP portion of a SIP call. This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCtc61990 ( registered customers only) and has been assigned CVE identifier CVE-2011-2561. The third DoS vulnerability involves a coredump when processing certain SIP INVITE messages. This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCth43256 ( registered customers only) and has been assigned CVE identifier CVE-2011-2562. The remaining two DoS vulnerabilities involve the Service Advertisement Framework (SAF). Successful exploitation could cause the device to reload. These vulnerabilities are documented in Cisco Bug IDs CSCth26669 ( registered customers only) and CSCth19417 ( registered customers only) and have been assigned CVE identifiers CVE-2011-2563 and CVE-2011-2564, respectively. Cisco Intercompany Media Engine Release 8.x is also affected by these vulnerabilities. A separate Cisco Security Advisory has been published to disclose the vulnerabilities that affect the Cisco Intercompany Media Engine. That advisory is available at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20110824-ime.shtml Note: An established TCP connection with a three-way handshake is required to trigger the SAF vulnerabilities. Vulnerability Scoring Details +---------------------------- Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss * CSCtf97162 - CCM Application Restarts During TCP Flood CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * CSCtc61990 - Coredump may be experienced when processing certain SIP packets CVSS Base Score - 7.1 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Medium Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 5.9 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * CSCth43256 - Coredump may be experienced when processing certain SIP packets CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * CSCth26669 - CUCM may experience a reload when receiving certain UCM client msgs CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * CSCth19417 - CUCM may experience a reload when receiving certain UCM client msgs CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== Successful exploitation of the vulnerabilities that are described in this advisory could result in the interruption of voice services. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. Cisco recommends upgrading to a release equal to or later than the release in the Recommended Releases column of the table. +---------------------------------------+ | Cisco Unified | Recommended | | Communications Manager | Releases | | Version | | |-------------------------+-------------| | 6.x | 6.1(5)SU3 | |-------------------------+-------------| | 7.x | 7.1(5b)SU4 | |-------------------------+-------------| | 8.0 | 8.0(3a)SU2 | |-------------------------+-------------| | 8.5 | 8.5(1)SU2, | | | 8.6(1) | +---------------------------------------+ Workarounds =========== A workaround exists for the SIP DoS vulnerabilities. SIP processing is enabled by default. * Step 3: Change the SIP Interoperability Enabled parameter to False, and click Save. Note: For a SIP processing change to take effect, the Cisco CallManager service must be restarted. * Step 3: Change the Packet Capture Enabled parameter to False, and click Save. For information on how to restart the service, refer to the "Restarting the Cisco CallManager Service" section of the document at the following location: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/voice_ip_comm/cucm/admin/7_1_2/ccmcfg/b03dpi.html#wp1075124 Additional mitigations that can be deployed on Cisco devices in the network are available in the companion document "Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin: Identifying and Mitigating Exploitation of the Multiple Vulnerabilities in Cisco Unified Communications Manager" which is available at the following location: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20110824-cucm-ime.shtml Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at: http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerabilities described in this advisory. These vulnerabilities were found during internal testing and during the troubleshooting of customer service requests. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20110824-cucm.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +---------------------------------------+ | Revision | | Initial | | 1.0 | 2011-August-24 | public | | | | release. | +---------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at: http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt +-------------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright 2010-2011 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. +-------------------------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.5 (SunOS) iFcDBQFOVFpYQXnnBKKRMNARCOCeAPwP66zH85V+OOW8YRl94JMDc+UpiRzqoqUl 6C0WGFrBJgD/eR7bXF71he/ByVHVpfpY3qaX8M45+MqcqzIDrM6hbCY= =kz9x -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ . ---------------------------------------------------------------------- The Secunia CSI 5.0 Beta - now available for testing Find out more, take a free test drive, and share your opinion with us: http://secunia.com/blog/242 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: Cisco Unified Communications Manager Packet Capture Service Denial of Service SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA45741 VERIFY ADVISORY: Secunia.com http://secunia.com/advisories/45741/ Customer Area (Credentials Required) https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=45741 RELEASE DATE: 2011-08-25 DISCUSS ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/45741/#comments AVAILABLE ON SITE AND IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Last Update * Popularity * Comments * Criticality Level * Impact * Where * Solution Status * Operating System / Software * CVE Reference(s) http://secunia.com/advisories/45741/ ONLY AVAILABLE IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Authentication Level * Report Reliability * Secunia PoC * Secunia Analysis * Systems Affected * Approve Distribution * Remediation Status * Secunia CVSS Score * CVSS https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=45741 ONLY AVAILABLE WITH SECUNIA CSI AND SECUNIA PSI: * AUTOMATED SCANNING http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/personal/ http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/corporate/wsus_sccm_3rd_third_party_patching/ DESCRIPTION: A vulnerability has been reported in Cisco Unified Communications Manager, which can be exploited by malicious people to cause a DoS (Denial of Service). PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: Reported by the vendor. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20110824-cucm.shtml OTHER REFERENCES: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ DEEP LINKS: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ EXTENDED DESCRIPTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ EXTENDED SOLUTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ EXPLOIT: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ----------------------------------------------------------------------

Unspecified vulnerability in the Service Advertisement Framework (SAF) in Cisco Unified Communications Manager (aka CUCM, formerly CallManager) 8.x before 8.5(1) and Cisco Intercompany Media Engine 8.x before 8.5(1) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device reload) via crafted SAF packets, aka Bug ID CSCth26669. Cisco Unified Communications Manager is a call processing component in the Cisco IP Telephony solution. The Service Advertisement Framework (SAF) has a denial of service attack. An unauthenticated attacker can use these vulnerabilities to send specially crafted SAF packets to the affected device. The attacker exploits the vulnerability to overload the device. An attacker can exploit these issues to cause an affected device to reload, denying service to legitimate users. These issues are being tracked by Cisco Bug IDs CSCth26669 and CSCth19417. Intercompany Media Engine versions 8.0.x are affected. A workaround exists for the SIP and Packet Capture Service DoS vulnerabilities. Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable +-------------------------------- All supported versions of Cisco Unified Communications Manager are affected by one or more of the vulnerabilities described in this advisory. The first DoS vulnerability involves the Packet Capture Service which is enabled by default. The Packet Capture Service fails to timeout or close idle TCP connections. This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCtf97162 ( registered customers only) and has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifier CVE-2011-2560. The second DoS vulnerability involves certain configurations of Media Termination Points (MTP). One-way audio may be observed when an MTP is configured with the g729ar8 codec only. In certain situations, an interruption in service may occur and a stack trace will be generated by the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) process when processing the Session Description Protocol SDP portion of a SIP call. This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCtc61990 ( registered customers only) and has been assigned CVE identifier CVE-2011-2561. The third DoS vulnerability involves a coredump when processing certain SIP INVITE messages. This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCth43256 ( registered customers only) and has been assigned CVE identifier CVE-2011-2562. These vulnerabilities are documented in Cisco Bug IDs CSCth26669 ( registered customers only) and CSCth19417 ( registered customers only) and have been assigned CVE identifiers CVE-2011-2563 and CVE-2011-2564, respectively. That advisory is available at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20110824-ime.shtml Note: An established TCP connection with a three-way handshake is required to trigger the SAF vulnerabilities. Vulnerability Scoring Details +---------------------------- Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss * CSCtf97162 - CCM Application Restarts During TCP Flood CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * CSCtc61990 - Coredump may be experienced when processing certain SIP packets CVSS Base Score - 7.1 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Medium Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 5.9 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * CSCth43256 - Coredump may be experienced when processing certain SIP packets CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * CSCth26669 - CUCM may experience a reload when receiving certain UCM client msgs CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * CSCth19417 - CUCM may experience a reload when receiving certain UCM client msgs CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== Successful exploitation of the vulnerabilities that are described in this advisory could result in the interruption of voice services. In certain instances, the affected Cisco Unified Communications Manager processes will restart, but repeated attacks may result in a sustained DoS condition. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. Cisco recommends upgrading to a release equal to or later than the release in the Recommended Releases column of the table. +---------------------------------------+ | Cisco Unified | Recommended | | Communications Manager | Releases | | Version | | |-------------------------+-------------| | 6.x | 6.1(5)SU3 | |-------------------------+-------------| | 7.x | 7.1(5b)SU4 | |-------------------------+-------------| | 8.0 | 8.0(3a)SU2 | |-------------------------+-------------| | 8.5 | 8.5(1)SU2, | | | 8.6(1) | +---------------------------------------+ Workarounds =========== A workaround exists for the SIP DoS vulnerabilities. SIP processing is enabled by default. Customers who do not require SIP processing can use the following instructions to disable SIP processing: * Step 1: Log into the Cisco Unified Communications Manager Administration Interface. * Step 3: Change the SIP Interoperability Enabled parameter to False, and click Save. Note: For a SIP processing change to take effect, the Cisco CallManager service must be restarted. For information on how to restart the service, refer to the "Restarting the Cisco CallManager Service" section of the document at the following location: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/voice_ip_comm/cucm/admin/7_1_2/ccmcfg/b03dpi.html#wp1075124 It is possible to mitigate these vulnerabilities by implementing filtering on screening devices and only permitting access to TCP ports 5060 and 5061 and UDP ports 5060 and 5061 from networks that require SIP access to Cisco Unified Communications Manager servers. A workaround exists for the DoS vulnerabilities involving the Packet Capture Service in Cisco Communications Manager version 4.x. Customers who do not require the Packet Capture Service for troubleshooting can use the following instructions to disable this process: * Step 1: Log into the Cisco Unified Communications Manager Administration web interface. * Step 3: Change the Packet Capture Enabled parameter to False, and click Save. Note: For the Packet Capture Service change to take effect, the Cisco CallManager service must be restarted. For information on how to restart the service, refer to the "Restarting the Cisco CallManager Service" section of the document at the following location: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/voice_ip_comm/cucm/admin/7_1_2/ccmcfg/b03dpi.html#wp1075124 Additional mitigations that can be deployed on Cisco devices in the network are available in the companion document "Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin: Identifying and Mitigating Exploitation of the Multiple Vulnerabilities in Cisco Unified Communications Manager" which is available at the following location: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20110824-cucm-ime.shtml Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at: http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerabilities described in this advisory. These vulnerabilities were found during internal testing and during the troubleshooting of customer service requests. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20110824-cucm.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +---------------------------------------+ | Revision | | Initial | | 1.0 | 2011-August-24 | public | | | | release. | +---------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at: http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt +-------------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright 2010-2011 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. +-------------------------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.5 (SunOS) iFcDBQFOVFpYQXnnBKKRMNARCOCeAPwP66zH85V+OOW8YRl94JMDc+UpiRzqoqUl 6C0WGFrBJgD/eR7bXF71he/ByVHVpfpY3qaX8M45+MqcqzIDrM6hbCY= =kz9x -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ . There are no available workarounds to mitigate these vulnerabilities. Details ======= Cisco Intercompany Media Engine provides a technique for establishing direct IP connectivity between enterprises by combining peer-to-peer technologies with the existing public switched telephone network (PSTN) infrastructure. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- The Secunia CSI 5.0 Beta - now available for testing Find out more, take a free test drive, and share your opinion with us: http://secunia.com/blog/242 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: Cisco Unified Communications Manager Multiple Denial of Service Vulnerabilities SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA45738 VERIFY ADVISORY: Secunia.com http://secunia.com/advisories/45738/ Customer Area (Credentials Required) https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=45738 RELEASE DATE: 2011-08-25 DISCUSS ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/45738/#comments AVAILABLE ON SITE AND IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Last Update * Popularity * Comments * Criticality Level * Impact * Where * Solution Status * Operating System / Software * CVE Reference(s) http://secunia.com/advisories/45738/ ONLY AVAILABLE IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Authentication Level * Report Reliability * Secunia PoC * Secunia Analysis * Systems Affected * Approve Distribution * Remediation Status * Secunia CVSS Score * CVSS https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=45738 ONLY AVAILABLE WITH SECUNIA CSI AND SECUNIA PSI: * AUTOMATED SCANNING http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/personal/ http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/corporate/wsus_sccm_3rd_third_party_patching/ DESCRIPTION: Multiple vulnerabilities have been reported in Cisco Unified Communications Manager, which can be exploited by malicious people to cause a DoS (Denial of Service). Note: This vulnerability only affects version 7.0.x and later. The vulnerabilities are reported in versions 6.x, 7.x, and 8.x. SOLUTION: Update to version 6.1(5)SU3, 7.1(5b)SU4, 8.0(3a)SU2, 8.5(1)SU2, or 8.6(1). PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: Reported by the vendor. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20110824-cucm.shtml OTHER REFERENCES: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ DEEP LINKS: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ EXTENDED DESCRIPTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ EXTENDED SOLUTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ EXPLOIT: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ----------------------------------------------------------------------

Unspecified vulnerability in the Service Advertisement Framework (SAF) in Cisco Unified Communications Manager (aka CUCM, formerly CallManager) 8.x before 8.5(1) and Cisco Intercompany Media Engine 8.x before 8.5(1) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device reload) via crafted SAF packets, aka Bug ID CSCth19417. Cisco Unified Communications Manager is a call processing component in the Cisco IP Telephony solution. An unauthenticated attacker can send a specially crafted SAF packet to the affected device. The attacker can exploit the vulnerability to reload the device. These issues are being tracked by Cisco Bug IDs CSCth26669 and CSCth19417. Intercompany Media Engine versions 8.0.x are affected. A workaround exists for the SIP and Packet Capture Service DoS vulnerabilities. Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable +-------------------------------- All supported versions of Cisco Unified Communications Manager are affected by one or more of the vulnerabilities described in this advisory. The first DoS vulnerability involves the Packet Capture Service which is enabled by default. The Packet Capture Service fails to timeout or close idle TCP connections. This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCtf97162 ( registered customers only) and has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifier CVE-2011-2560. The second DoS vulnerability involves certain configurations of Media Termination Points (MTP). One-way audio may be observed when an MTP is configured with the g729ar8 codec only. In certain situations, an interruption in service may occur and a stack trace will be generated by the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) process when processing the Session Description Protocol SDP portion of a SIP call. This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCtc61990 ( registered customers only) and has been assigned CVE identifier CVE-2011-2561. The third DoS vulnerability involves a coredump when processing certain SIP INVITE messages. This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCth43256 ( registered customers only) and has been assigned CVE identifier CVE-2011-2562. These vulnerabilities are documented in Cisco Bug IDs CSCth26669 ( registered customers only) and CSCth19417 ( registered customers only) and have been assigned CVE identifiers CVE-2011-2563 and CVE-2011-2564, respectively. That advisory is available at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20110824-ime.shtml Note: An established TCP connection with a three-way handshake is required to trigger the SAF vulnerabilities. Vulnerability Scoring Details +---------------------------- Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss * CSCtf97162 - CCM Application Restarts During TCP Flood CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * CSCtc61990 - Coredump may be experienced when processing certain SIP packets CVSS Base Score - 7.1 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Medium Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 5.9 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * CSCth43256 - Coredump may be experienced when processing certain SIP packets CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * CSCth26669 - CUCM may experience a reload when receiving certain UCM client msgs CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * CSCth19417 - CUCM may experience a reload when receiving certain UCM client msgs CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== Successful exploitation of the vulnerabilities that are described in this advisory could result in the interruption of voice services. In certain instances, the affected Cisco Unified Communications Manager processes will restart, but repeated attacks may result in a sustained DoS condition. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. Cisco recommends upgrading to a release equal to or later than the release in the Recommended Releases column of the table. +---------------------------------------+ | Cisco Unified | Recommended | | Communications Manager | Releases | | Version | | |-------------------------+-------------| | 6.x | 6.1(5)SU3 | |-------------------------+-------------| | 7.x | 7.1(5b)SU4 | |-------------------------+-------------| | 8.0 | 8.0(3a)SU2 | |-------------------------+-------------| | 8.5 | 8.5(1)SU2, | | | 8.6(1) | +---------------------------------------+ Workarounds =========== A workaround exists for the SIP DoS vulnerabilities. SIP processing is enabled by default. Customers who do not require SIP processing can use the following instructions to disable SIP processing: * Step 1: Log into the Cisco Unified Communications Manager Administration Interface. * Step 3: Change the SIP Interoperability Enabled parameter to False, and click Save. Note: For a SIP processing change to take effect, the Cisco CallManager service must be restarted. For information on how to restart the service, refer to the "Restarting the Cisco CallManager Service" section of the document at the following location: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/voice_ip_comm/cucm/admin/7_1_2/ccmcfg/b03dpi.html#wp1075124 It is possible to mitigate these vulnerabilities by implementing filtering on screening devices and only permitting access to TCP ports 5060 and 5061 and UDP ports 5060 and 5061 from networks that require SIP access to Cisco Unified Communications Manager servers. A workaround exists for the DoS vulnerabilities involving the Packet Capture Service in Cisco Communications Manager version 4.x. Customers who do not require the Packet Capture Service for troubleshooting can use the following instructions to disable this process: * Step 1: Log into the Cisco Unified Communications Manager Administration web interface. * Step 3: Change the Packet Capture Enabled parameter to False, and click Save. Note: For the Packet Capture Service change to take effect, the Cisco CallManager service must be restarted. For information on how to restart the service, refer to the "Restarting the Cisco CallManager Service" section of the document at the following location: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/voice_ip_comm/cucm/admin/7_1_2/ccmcfg/b03dpi.html#wp1075124 Additional mitigations that can be deployed on Cisco devices in the network are available in the companion document "Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin: Identifying and Mitigating Exploitation of the Multiple Vulnerabilities in Cisco Unified Communications Manager" which is available at the following location: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20110824-cucm-ime.shtml Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at: http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerabilities described in this advisory. These vulnerabilities were found during internal testing and during the troubleshooting of customer service requests. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20110824-cucm.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-bulletins@lists.first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +---------------------------------------+ | Revision | | Initial | | 1.0 | 2011-August-24 | public | | | | release. | +---------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at: http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt +-------------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright 2010-2011 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. +-------------------------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.5 (SunOS) iFcDBQFOVFpYQXnnBKKRMNARCOCeAPwP66zH85V+OOW8YRl94JMDc+UpiRzqoqUl 6C0WGFrBJgD/eR7bXF71he/ByVHVpfpY3qaX8M45+MqcqzIDrM6hbCY= =kz9x -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ . There are no available workarounds to mitigate these vulnerabilities. Details ======= Cisco Intercompany Media Engine provides a technique for establishing direct IP connectivity between enterprises by combining peer-to-peer technologies with the existing public switched telephone network (PSTN) infrastructure. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- The Secunia CSI 5.0 Beta - now available for testing Find out more, take a free test drive, and share your opinion with us: http://secunia.com/blog/242 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: Cisco Unified Communications Manager Multiple Denial of Service Vulnerabilities SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA45738 VERIFY ADVISORY: Secunia.com http://secunia.com/advisories/45738/ Customer Area (Credentials Required) https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=45738 RELEASE DATE: 2011-08-25 DISCUSS ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/45738/#comments AVAILABLE ON SITE AND IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Last Update * Popularity * Comments * Criticality Level * Impact * Where * Solution Status * Operating System / Software * CVE Reference(s) http://secunia.com/advisories/45738/ ONLY AVAILABLE IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Authentication Level * Report Reliability * Secunia PoC * Secunia Analysis * Systems Affected * Approve Distribution * Remediation Status * Secunia CVSS Score * CVSS https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=45738 ONLY AVAILABLE WITH SECUNIA CSI AND SECUNIA PSI: * AUTOMATED SCANNING http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/personal/ http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/corporate/wsus_sccm_3rd_third_party_patching/ DESCRIPTION: Multiple vulnerabilities have been reported in Cisco Unified Communications Manager, which can be exploited by malicious people to cause a DoS (Denial of Service). Note: This vulnerability only affects version 7.0.x and later. The vulnerabilities are reported in versions 6.x, 7.x, and 8.x. SOLUTION: Update to version 6.1(5)SU3, 7.1(5b)SU4, 8.0(3a)SU2, 8.5(1)SU2, or 8.6(1). PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: Reported by the vendor. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20110824-cucm.shtml OTHER REFERENCES: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ DEEP LINKS: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ EXTENDED DESCRIPTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ EXTENDED SOLUTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ EXPLOIT: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ----------------------------------------------------------------------

Citrix Access Gateway is a universal SSL VPN device. Part of the input on the relevant login page is missing filtering before returning to the user, and the attacker can exploit the vulnerability for cross-site scripting attacks, executing arbitrary HTML and script code on the target user's browser. Get sensitive information or hijack user sessions. The Citrix Access Gateway is prone to a cross-site scripting vulnerability because the application fails to properly sanitize user-supplied input. This may help the attacker steal cookie-based authentication credentials and launch other attacks. Citrix Access Gateway Enterprise Edition versions 9.2-49.8 and prior are vulnerable. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- The Secunia CSI 5.0 Beta - now available for testing Find out more, take a free test drive, and share your opinion with us: http://secunia.com/blog/242 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: Citrix Access Gateway Unspecified Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA45726 VERIFY ADVISORY: Secunia.com http://secunia.com/advisories/45726/ Customer Area (Credentials Required) https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=45726 RELEASE DATE: 2011-08-25 DISCUSS ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/45726/#comments AVAILABLE ON SITE AND IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Last Update * Popularity * Comments * Criticality Level * Impact * Where * Solution Status * Operating System / Software * CVE Reference(s) http://secunia.com/advisories/45726/ ONLY AVAILABLE IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Authentication Level * Report Reliability * Secunia PoC * Secunia Analysis * Systems Affected * Approve Distribution * Remediation Status * Secunia CVSS Score * CVSS https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=45726 ONLY AVAILABLE WITH SECUNIA CSI AND SECUNIA PSI: * AUTOMATED SCANNING http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/personal/ http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/corporate/wsus_sccm_3rd_third_party_patching/ DESCRIPTION: A vulnerability has been reported in Citrix Access Gateway, which can be exploited by malicious people to conduct cross-site scripting attacks. Certain unspecified input related to the logon portal is not properly sanitised before being returned to the user. SOLUTION: Apply update. Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: Reported by the vendor. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: http://support.citrix.com/article/CTX129971 OTHER REFERENCES: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ DEEP LINKS: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ EXTENDED DESCRIPTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ EXTENDED SOLUTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ EXPLOIT: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/vulnerability_intelligence/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ----------------------------------------------------------------------