VARIoT IoT vulnerabilities database

All ADB broadband gateways / routers based on the Epicentro platform are affected by a privilege escalation vulnerability where attackers can gain access to the command line interface (CLI) if previously disabled by the ISP, escalate their privileges, and perform further attacks. plural ADB Broadband gateways and routers contain vulnerabilities related to authorization, authority, and access control.Information is obtained, information is altered, and service operation is disrupted (DoS) There is a possibility of being put into a state. ADBbroadbandgateways/routersonEpicentroplatform is a gateway and router device for the Epicentro platform from ADB, Switzerland. An elevation of privilege vulnerability exists in ADBbroadbandgateways/routers based on the Epicentro platform

All ADB broadband gateways / routers based on the Epicentro platform are affected by an authorization bypass vulnerability where attackers are able to access and manipulate settings within the web interface that are forbidden to end users (e.g., by the ISP). An attacker would be able to enable the TELNET server or other settings as well. plural ADB Broadband gateways and routers contain vulnerabilities related to authorization, authority, and access control.Information may be tampered with. ADBbroadbandgateways/routersonEpicentroplatform is a gateway and router device for the Epicentro platform from ADB, Switzerland. A security vulnerability exists in ADBbroadbandgateways/routers based on the Epicentro platform

MikroTikRouterOS is a routing operating system based on Linux kernel development, compatible with x86PC routing software, which can be used to turn a standard PC into a professional router. Winbox is a software for remotely managing RouterOS based on Windows, providing an intuitive and convenient graphical interface. There are arbitrary file access vulnerabilities in MikrotikWinbox. An attacker can download arbitrary files, including the user database file of RouterOS, through a carefully constructed request package.

Improper Validation of Array Index In the adreno OpenGL driver in Snapdragon Automobile, Snapdragon Mobile and Snapdragon Wear, an out-of-bounds access can occur in SurfaceFlinger. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability to cause out-of-bounds access

Improper restriction of communication channel to intended endpoints vulnerability in HTTP daemon in Synology SSL VPN Client before 1.2.4-0224 allows remote attackers to conduct man-in-the-middle attacks via a crafted payload. Synology SSL VPN Client Contains vulnerabilities related to channel and path errors.Information is obtained, information is altered, and service operation is disrupted (DoS) There is a possibility of being put into a state. Synology SSL VPN Client is a VPN client software developed by Synology for connecting to internal encrypted networks. A remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to implement a man-in-the-middle attack with a specially crafted payload

A vulnerability in Trend Micro Maximum Security's (Consumer) 2018 (versions 12.0.1191 and below) User-Mode Hooking (UMH) driver could allow an attacker to create a specially crafted packet that could alter a vulnerable system in such a way that malicious code could be injected into other processes. Trend Micro Maximum Security Contains a code injection vulnerability.Information is obtained, information is altered, and service operation is disrupted (DoS) There is a possibility of being put into a state

Entrust Datacard Syntera CS 5.x has XSS via the name field of "Domain or Computer Name" in the login page. Entrust Datacard Syntera CS Contains a cross-site scripting vulnerability.Information may be obtained and information may be altered. Entrust Datacard Syntera CS is an integrated suite of Entrust Datacard Corporation in the United States for connecting Datacard issuing systems and special software

An issue was discovered on Diqee Diqee360 devices. A firmware update process, integrated into the firmware, starts at boot and tries to find the update folder on the microSD card. It executes code, without a digital signature, as root from the /mnt/sdcard/$PRO_NAME/upgrade.sh or /sdcard/upgrage_360/upgrade.sh pathname. Diqee Diqee360 The device contains vulnerabilities related to security functions.Information is obtained, information is altered, and service operation is disrupted (DoS) There is a possibility of being put into a state. Diqee Diqee360 is an intelligent sweeping robot equipment produced by China Diqee Company. Diqee There is a security vulnerability in Diqee360. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code on the system by sending a specially crafted request

An issue was discovered on Dongguan Diqee Diqee360 devices. The affected vacuum cleaner suffers from an authenticated remote code execution vulnerability. An authenticated attacker can send a specially crafted UDP packet, and execute commands on the vacuum cleaner as root. The bug is in the function REQUEST_SET_WIFIPASSWD (UDP command 153). A crafted UDP packet runs "/mnt/skyeye/mode_switch.sh %s" with an attacker controlling the %s variable. In some cases, authentication can be achieved with the default password of 888888 for the admin account. Diqee Diqee360 The device contains a command injection vulnerability.Information is obtained, information is altered, and service operation is disrupted (DoS) There is a possibility of being put into a state. Diqee Diqee360 is an intelligent sweeping robot equipment produced by China Diqee Company

Huawei smart phones Emily-AL00A with software 8.1.0.106(SP2C00) and 8.1.0.107(SP5C00) have a Factory Reset Protection (FRP) bypass vulnerability. An attacker gets some user's smart phone and performs some special operations in the guide function. The attacker may exploit the vulnerability to bypass FRP function and use the phone normally. Emily-AL00A Contains vulnerabilities related to authorization, permissions, and access control.Information is obtained, information is altered, and service operation is disrupted (DoS) There is a possibility of being put into a state. HuaweiEmily-AL00A is a smartphone device from China's Huawei company. There is a security vulnerability in the HuaweiEmily-AL00A8.1.0.106 (SP2C00) version and 8.1.0.107 (SP5C00)

Airties 5444 1.0.0.18 and 5444TT 1.0.0.18 devices allow XSS. Airties 5444 and 5444TT Contains a cross-site scripting vulnerability.Information may be obtained and information may be altered. Both Airties 5444 and 5444TT are modem products of Turkish company Airties. A remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to inject arbitrary web script or HTML

AutoEnt is a picture configuration software. AutoEnt has a memory corruption vulnerability. An attacker could exploit the vulnerability to cause memory corruption when reading a project file

Shenzhen INVT Electric Co., Ltd. is a product and service provider in the fields of electrical transmission, industrial control and new energy. The INVT VS series HMI programming software has a memory read out-of-bounds vulnerability. The vulnerability is caused by the failure of the file to verify the header of the project file. Attackers can use the vulnerability to cause memory reads to cross the boundary, causing a denial of service vulnerability. If the vulnerability is successfully exploited, it may also cause arbitrary code execution

Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Address Book Editor in Synology CardDAV Server before 6.0.8-0086 allows remote authenticated users to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the (1) family_name, (2) given_name, or (3) additional_name parameter. Synology CardDAV Server Contains a cross-site scripting vulnerability.Information may be obtained and information may be altered. Synology CardDAV Server is an application from Synology for synchronizing contacts. Address Book Editor is one of the address book editors

Unquoted service paths in Intel Processor Diagnostic Tool (IPDT) before version 4.1.0.27 allows a local attacker to potentially execute arbitrary code. Intel Processor Diagnostic Tool (IPDT) is a processor function diagnostic tool of Intel Corporation. A security vulnerability exists in versions prior to Intel IPDT 4.1.0.27. Intel published advisory SA-00140 <https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00140.html> on 2018-06-27 and updated installers on 2018-05-18. The vulnerabilities can be exploited in standard installations of Windows where the user^WUAC-"protected administrator" account created during Windows setup is used, without elevation. This precondition holds for the majority of Windows installations: according to Microsoft's own security intelligence reports <https://www.microsoft.com/security/sir>, about 1/2 to 3/4 of the about 600 million Windows installations which send telemetry data have only ONE active user account. #1 Denial of service through insecure file permissions ====================================================== The downloadable executable installer (really: executable self-extractor built with WinZIP) IPDT_Installer_4.1.0.24.exe creates a subdirectory with random name in %TEMP%, copies itself into this subdirectory and then executes its copy. The subdirectory inherits the NTFS ACLs from its parent %TEMP%, and so does the copy of the executable self-extractor. For this well-known and well-documented vulnerability see <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/377.html> and <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/379.html> plus <https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/29.html> Proof of concept/demonstration: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1. download IPDT_Installer_4.1.0.24.exe (quite some clueless copycats still offer it, violating Intel's copyright; <http://d.computerbild.de/downloads/7835763/IPDT_Installer_4.1.0.24.exe>) and save it in your "Downloads" directory"; 2. add the NTFS access control list entry (D;OIIO;WP;;;WD) meaning "deny execution of files in this directory for everyone, inheritable to files in all subdirectories" to the (user's) %TEMP% directory. 3. execute IPDT_Installer_4.1.024.exe: notice the complete failure of the executable installer^Wself-extractor, WITHOUT error message! #2 Escalation of privilege through insecure file permissions ============================================================ Although the (copy of the) executable self-extractor runs with administrative privileges (its embedded "application manifest" specifies 'requireAdministrator'), it extracts its payload, the REAL installers setup.exe and setup64.exe, plus the batch script setup.bat, UNPROTECTED into the user's %TEMP% directory, CD's into %TEMP% and finally executes the extracted batch script %TEMP%\setup.bat: --- setup.bat --- echo off ver | findstr 6.1.7600 if %errorlevel%==0 goto WinUnsup ver | findstr 6.0.6001 if %errorlevel%==0 goto WinUnsup if "%programfiles(x86)%XXX"=="XXX" goto 32BIT :64BIT setup64.exe goto END :32BIT setup.exe goto END :WinUnsup echo Intel Processor Diagnostic Tool cannot be installed on this Operating System echo Please go to Online support page to view list of supported Oerating Systems pause :END exit 0 --- EOF --- The extracted files inherit the NTFS ACLs from their parent %TEMP%, allowing "full access" for the unprivileged (owning) user, who can replace/overwrite the files between their creation and execution. Since the files are executed with administrative privileges, this vulnerability results in arbitrary code execution with escalation of privilege. Proof of concept/demonstration: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1. create the following batch script in an arbitrary directory: --- IPDT.CMD --- :LOOP1 @If Not Exist "%TEMP%\setup.exe" Goto :LOOP1 Echo >"%TEMP%\setup.bat" WhoAMI.exe /all Echo >>"%TEMP%\setup.bat" Pause :LOOP2 @If Not Exist "%TEMP%\setup64.exe" Goto :LOOP2 Copy /Y %COMSPEC% "%TEMP%\setup.exe" :LOOP3 @Copy %COMSPEC% "%TEMP%\setup64.exe" @If ERRORLEVEL 1 Goto :LOOP3 --- EOF --- NOTE: the batch script needs to win a race (which it almost always will, due to the size of the files extracted). 2. execute the batch script per double-click; 3. execute IPDT_Installer_4.1.024.exe per double-click: notice the command processor started instead one of the executable installers, running with administrative privileges. #3 Escalation of privilege through unsafe search path ===================================================== In Windows Vista and newer versions, the current working directory can be removed from the executable search path: <https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms684269.aspx> The batch script setup.bat calls setup.exe and setup64.exe without a path, so the command processor doesn't find the extracted setup.exe and setup64.exe in its CWD and searches them via %PATH%. %PATH% is under full control of the unprivileged user, who can create rogue setup.exe and setup64.exe in an arbitrary directory he adds to the %PATH%, resulting again in arbitrary code execution with escalation of privilege. For this well-known and well-documented vulnerability see <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/426.html> and <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/427.html> plus <https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html>. Proof of concept/demonstration: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1. start an unprivileged command prompt in an arbitrary directory where the unprivileged user can create files, for example the user's "Downloads" directory; 2. add this (current working) directory to the user's PATH: PATH %CD%;%PATH% REG.exe Add HKCU\Environment /V PATH /T REG_SZ /D "%CD%" /F 3. copy the command processor %COMSPEC% (or any rogue executable of your choice) as setup.exe and setup64.exe into the current (working) directory: COPY %COMSPEC% "%CD%\setup.exe" COPY %COMSPEC% "%CD%\setup64.exe" 4. set the environment variable NoDefaultCurrentDirectoryInExePath to an arbitrary value: SET NoDefaultCurrentDirectoryInExePath=* REG.exe Add HKCU\Environment /V NoDefaultCurrentDirectoryInExePath /T REG_SZ /D "*" /F 5. execute IPDT_Installer_4.1.024.exe per double-click: notice the command processor started instead of the extracted executable installers, running with administrative privileges. #4 Escalation of privilege through DLL search order hijacking ============================================================= The extracted executable installers setup.exe and setup64.exe, built with the crapware known as InstallShield, load multiple Windows system DLLs from their "application directory" %TEMP% instead from Windows' "system directory" %SystemRoot%\System32\ To quote Raymond Chen <https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20121031-00/?p=6203> | a rogue DLL in the TEMP directory is a trap waiting to be sprung. An unprivileged attacker running in the same user account can copy rogue DLLs into %TEMP%; these are loaded and their DllMain() routine executed with administrative privileges, once more resulting in arbitrary code execution with escalation of privilege. For this well-known and well-documented vulnerability see <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/426.html> and <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/427.html> plus <https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html>. Proof of concept/demonstration: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1. follow the instructions from <https://skanthak.homepage.t-online.de/minesweeper.html> and build a minefield of forwarder DLLs in your %TEMP% directory; NOTE: if you can't or don't want to build the minefield, download <https://skanthak.homepage.t-online.de/download/SENTINEL.DLL> and save it as UXTheme.dll, DWMAPI.dll, NTMARTA.dll and MSI.dll in your %TEMP% directory. 2. execute IPDT_Installer_4.1.0.24.exe: notice the message boxes displayed from the DLLs built in step 1! NOTE: on a fully patched Windows 7 SP1, setup64.exe loads at least the following 32-bit DLLs from %TEMP%: UXTheme.dll, Version.dll, NTMARTA.dll and MSI.dll Due to its filename, setup.exe additionally loads WinMM.dll, SAMCli.dll, MSACM32.dll, SFC.dll, SFC_OS.dll, DWMAPI.dll and MPR.dll. Fix: ==== 1. DUMP all those forever vulnerable executable installers and self-extractors; provide an .MSI package or an .INF script plus a .CAB archive instead! 2. NEVER use an unqualified filename to execute/load an application or a DLL, ALWAYS specify their fully qualified pathname! Mitigations: ============ 1. DON'T execute executable self-extractors. 2. NEVER execute executable self-extractors with administrative privileges. 3. extract the payload of the self-extractor with a SAFE and SECURE unzip.exe into a properly protected directory. 4. exercise STRICT privilege separation: use separate unprivileged user accounts and privileged administrator account, DISABLE the "security theatre" UAC in the unprivileged user accounts. stay tuned Stefan Kanthak PS: the "portable executable" IPDT_Installer_4.1.024.exe has an export directory, but does NOT export any symbols: both the numbers of names and functions are 0, and the RVAs of the functions, names and ordinals arrays are 0 too. Timeline: ========= 2018-03-28 sent vulnerability report to <secure@intel.com> no reply, not even an acknowledgement of receipt 2018-04-05 resent vulnerability report to <secure@intel.com>, CC: to CERT/CC no reply, not even an acknowledgement of receipt 2018-05-03 resent vulnerability report via HackerOne 2018-05-04 Intel acknowledges receipt 2018-05-17 Intel confirms the reported vulnerabilities 2018-05-21 Intel publishes fixed installers, with a dangling reference to SA-00140 in the release notes, plus inaccuracies regarding the dependencies of IPDT NO notification sent to me that fixes have been published! 2018-06-05 sent report about the errors in the release notes after stumbling over the fixes 2018-06-12 Intel acknowledges the report regarding the notes 2018-06-27 Intel publishes their advisory SA-00140 AGAIN no notification sent that the advisory has been published! Intel's understanding of coordinated disclosure looks rather weird to me

Installation tool IPDT (Intel Processor Diagnostic Tool) 4.1.0.24 sets permissions of installed files incorrectly, allowing for execution of arbitrary code and potential privilege escalation. Intel Processor Diagnostic Tool (IPDT) is a processor function diagnostic tool of Intel Corporation. Intel published advisory SA-00140 <https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00140.html> on 2018-06-27 and updated installers on 2018-05-18. The vulnerabilities can be exploited in standard installations of Windows where the user^WUAC-"protected administrator" account created during Windows setup is used, without elevation. This precondition holds for the majority of Windows installations: according to Microsoft's own security intelligence reports <https://www.microsoft.com/security/sir>, about 1/2 to 3/4 of the about 600 million Windows installations which send telemetry data have only ONE active user account. #1 Denial of service through insecure file permissions ====================================================== The downloadable executable installer (really: executable self-extractor built with WinZIP) IPDT_Installer_4.1.0.24.exe creates a subdirectory with random name in %TEMP%, copies itself into this subdirectory and then executes its copy. The subdirectory inherits the NTFS ACLs from its parent %TEMP%, and so does the copy of the executable self-extractor. For this well-known and well-documented vulnerability see <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/377.html> and <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/379.html> plus <https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/29.html> Proof of concept/demonstration: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1. download IPDT_Installer_4.1.0.24.exe (quite some clueless copycats still offer it, violating Intel's copyright; <http://d.computerbild.de/downloads/7835763/IPDT_Installer_4.1.0.24.exe>) and save it in your "Downloads" directory"; 2. add the NTFS access control list entry (D;OIIO;WP;;;WD) meaning "deny execution of files in this directory for everyone, inheritable to files in all subdirectories" to the (user's) %TEMP% directory. 3. execute IPDT_Installer_4.1.024.exe: notice the complete failure of the executable installer^Wself-extractor, WITHOUT error message! #2 Escalation of privilege through insecure file permissions ============================================================ Although the (copy of the) executable self-extractor runs with administrative privileges (its embedded "application manifest" specifies 'requireAdministrator'), it extracts its payload, the REAL installers setup.exe and setup64.exe, plus the batch script setup.bat, UNPROTECTED into the user's %TEMP% directory, CD's into %TEMP% and finally executes the extracted batch script %TEMP%\setup.bat: --- setup.bat --- echo off ver | findstr 6.1.7600 if %errorlevel%==0 goto WinUnsup ver | findstr 6.0.6001 if %errorlevel%==0 goto WinUnsup if "%programfiles(x86)%XXX"=="XXX" goto 32BIT :64BIT setup64.exe goto END :32BIT setup.exe goto END :WinUnsup echo Intel Processor Diagnostic Tool cannot be installed on this Operating System echo Please go to Online support page to view list of supported Oerating Systems pause :END exit 0 --- EOF --- The extracted files inherit the NTFS ACLs from their parent %TEMP%, allowing "full access" for the unprivileged (owning) user, who can replace/overwrite the files between their creation and execution. Proof of concept/demonstration: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1. create the following batch script in an arbitrary directory: --- IPDT.CMD --- :LOOP1 @If Not Exist "%TEMP%\setup.exe" Goto :LOOP1 Echo >"%TEMP%\setup.bat" WhoAMI.exe /all Echo >>"%TEMP%\setup.bat" Pause :LOOP2 @If Not Exist "%TEMP%\setup64.exe" Goto :LOOP2 Copy /Y %COMSPEC% "%TEMP%\setup.exe" :LOOP3 @Copy %COMSPEC% "%TEMP%\setup64.exe" @If ERRORLEVEL 1 Goto :LOOP3 --- EOF --- NOTE: the batch script needs to win a race (which it almost always will, due to the size of the files extracted). 2. execute the batch script per double-click; 3. execute IPDT_Installer_4.1.024.exe per double-click: notice the command processor started instead one of the executable installers, running with administrative privileges. #3 Escalation of privilege through unsafe search path ===================================================== In Windows Vista and newer versions, the current working directory can be removed from the executable search path: <https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms684269.aspx> The batch script setup.bat calls setup.exe and setup64.exe without a path, so the command processor doesn't find the extracted setup.exe and setup64.exe in its CWD and searches them via %PATH%. %PATH% is under full control of the unprivileged user, who can create rogue setup.exe and setup64.exe in an arbitrary directory he adds to the %PATH%, resulting again in arbitrary code execution with escalation of privilege. For this well-known and well-documented vulnerability see <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/426.html> and <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/427.html> plus <https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html>. Proof of concept/demonstration: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1. start an unprivileged command prompt in an arbitrary directory where the unprivileged user can create files, for example the user's "Downloads" directory; 2. add this (current working) directory to the user's PATH: PATH %CD%;%PATH% REG.exe Add HKCU\Environment /V PATH /T REG_SZ /D "%CD%" /F 3. copy the command processor %COMSPEC% (or any rogue executable of your choice) as setup.exe and setup64.exe into the current (working) directory: COPY %COMSPEC% "%CD%\setup.exe" COPY %COMSPEC% "%CD%\setup64.exe" 4. set the environment variable NoDefaultCurrentDirectoryInExePath to an arbitrary value: SET NoDefaultCurrentDirectoryInExePath=* REG.exe Add HKCU\Environment /V NoDefaultCurrentDirectoryInExePath /T REG_SZ /D "*" /F 5. execute IPDT_Installer_4.1.024.exe per double-click: notice the command processor started instead of the extracted executable installers, running with administrative privileges. #4 Escalation of privilege through DLL search order hijacking ============================================================= The extracted executable installers setup.exe and setup64.exe, built with the crapware known as InstallShield, load multiple Windows system DLLs from their "application directory" %TEMP% instead from Windows' "system directory" %SystemRoot%\System32\ To quote Raymond Chen <https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20121031-00/?p=6203> | a rogue DLL in the TEMP directory is a trap waiting to be sprung. An unprivileged attacker running in the same user account can copy rogue DLLs into %TEMP%; these are loaded and their DllMain() routine executed with administrative privileges, once more resulting in arbitrary code execution with escalation of privilege. For this well-known and well-documented vulnerability see <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/426.html> and <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/427.html> plus <https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html>. Proof of concept/demonstration: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1. follow the instructions from <https://skanthak.homepage.t-online.de/minesweeper.html> and build a minefield of forwarder DLLs in your %TEMP% directory; NOTE: if you can't or don't want to build the minefield, download <https://skanthak.homepage.t-online.de/download/SENTINEL.DLL> and save it as UXTheme.dll, DWMAPI.dll, NTMARTA.dll and MSI.dll in your %TEMP% directory. 2. execute IPDT_Installer_4.1.0.24.exe: notice the message boxes displayed from the DLLs built in step 1! NOTE: on a fully patched Windows 7 SP1, setup64.exe loads at least the following 32-bit DLLs from %TEMP%: UXTheme.dll, Version.dll, NTMARTA.dll and MSI.dll Due to its filename, setup.exe additionally loads WinMM.dll, SAMCli.dll, MSACM32.dll, SFC.dll, SFC_OS.dll, DWMAPI.dll and MPR.dll. Fix: ==== 1. DUMP all those forever vulnerable executable installers and self-extractors; provide an .MSI package or an .INF script plus a .CAB archive instead! 2. NEVER use an unqualified filename to execute/load an application or a DLL, ALWAYS specify their fully qualified pathname! Mitigations: ============ 1. DON'T execute executable self-extractors. 2. NEVER execute executable self-extractors with administrative privileges. 3. extract the payload of the self-extractor with a SAFE and SECURE unzip.exe into a properly protected directory. 4. exercise STRICT privilege separation: use separate unprivileged user accounts and privileged administrator account, DISABLE the "security theatre" UAC in the unprivileged user accounts. stay tuned Stefan Kanthak PS: the "portable executable" IPDT_Installer_4.1.024.exe has an export directory, but does NOT export any symbols: both the numbers of names and functions are 0, and the RVAs of the functions, names and ordinals arrays are 0 too. Timeline: ========= 2018-03-28 sent vulnerability report to <secure@intel.com> no reply, not even an acknowledgement of receipt 2018-04-05 resent vulnerability report to <secure@intel.com>, CC: to CERT/CC no reply, not even an acknowledgement of receipt 2018-05-03 resent vulnerability report via HackerOne 2018-05-04 Intel acknowledges receipt 2018-05-17 Intel confirms the reported vulnerabilities 2018-05-21 Intel publishes fixed installers, with a dangling reference to SA-00140 in the release notes, plus inaccuracies regarding the dependencies of IPDT NO notification sent to me that fixes have been published! 2018-06-05 sent report about the errors in the release notes after stumbling over the fixes 2018-06-12 Intel acknowledges the report regarding the notes 2018-06-27 Intel publishes their advisory SA-00140 AGAIN no notification sent that the advisory has been published! Intel's understanding of coordinated disclosure looks rather weird to me

TP-Link Archer C1200 1.13 Build 2018/01/24 rel.52299 EU devices have XSS via the PATH_INFO to the /webpages/data URI. TP-Link Archer C1200 The device contains a cross-site scripting vulnerability.Information may be obtained and information may be altered. TP-LinkArcherC1200 is a wireless router product of China TP-LINK. A cross-site scripting vulnerability exists in the TP-LinkArcherC12001.13Build2018/01/24rel.52299EU version due to a program failing to filter special characters or illegal input. A remote attacker can use the PATH_INFO to steal the cookie and redirect the user to a malicious website

uniquesig0/InternalSite/InitParams.aspx in Microsoft Forefront Unified Access Gateway 2010 allows remote attackers to trigger outbound DNS queries for arbitrary hosts via a comma-separated list of URLs in the orig_url parameter, possibly causing a traffic amplification and/or SSRF outcome. Microsoft Forefront Unified Access Gateway Contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability.Information is obtained, information is altered, and service operation is disrupted (DoS) There is a possibility of being put into a state. Microsoft Forefront Unified Access Gateway is a Microsoft SSL VPN gateway server. The solution mainly provides application intelligence technology and fine-grained access control functions. A security vulnerability exists in the uniquesig0/InternalSite/InitParams.aspx file in Microsoft Forefront UAG version 2010. A remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a specially crafted request to perform DNS queries on arbitrary hosts

Beijing Hollysys is a provider of automation and information technology solutions. The company's business is concentrated in three areas: industrial automation, rail transportation automation and medical automation. Beijing Hollysys LKS Safety FA-AutoThink has a denial of service vulnerability. The vulnerability is caused by the GetElement function in Ldmdl.dll failing to process the number of malformed elements 0xf9. An attacker could exploit the vulnerability to cause an assignment null pointer to appear, resulting in a denial of service vulnerability

In Schneider Electric Pelco Sarix Professional 1st generation cameras with firmware versions prior to 3.29.69, by sending a specially crafted request an authenticated user can view password in clear text and results in privilege escalation. SchneiderElectricPelcoSarixProfessional1stgenerationcameras is an IP camera device from Schneider Electric, France. A security vulnerability exists in Schneider Electric PelcoSarix Professional1stgenerationcameras using firmware prior to 3.29.69