ID

VAR-201912-0636

CVE

CVE-2019-8672

TITLE

plural Apple Updates to product vulnerabilities

DESCRIPTION

Multiple memory corruption issues were addressed with improved memory handling. This issue is fixed in iOS 12.4, macOS Mojave 10.14.6, tvOS 12.4, watchOS 5.3, Safari 12.1.2, iTunes for Windows 12.9.6, iCloud for Windows 7.13, iCloud for Windows 10.6. Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to arbitrary code execution. Apple Has released an update for each product.The expected impact depends on each vulnerability, but can be affected as follows: * Arbitrary code execution * Insufficient access restrictions * information leak * Service operation interruption (DoS) * Information falsification * Privilege escalation * Sandbox avoidance. WebKit is prone to a cross-site scripting vulnerability and multiple memory-corruption vulnerabilities. An attacker may leverage these issues to execute arbitrary script code in the browser of an unsuspecting user in the context of the affected site or execute arbitrary code in the context of the affected system. This may allow the attacker to steal cookie-based authentication credentials and launch other attacks. Failed exploit attempts will likely cause a denial-of-service condition. Apple Safari, etc. are all products of Apple (Apple). Apple Safari is a web browser that is the default browser included with the Mac OS X and iOS operating systems. Apple iOS is an operating system developed for mobile devices. Apple tvOS is a smart TV operating system. WebKit is one of the web browser engine components. WebKitGTK and WPE WebKit prior to version 2.24.1 failed to properly apply configured HTTP proxy settings when downloading livestream video (HLS, DASH, or Smooth Streaming), an error resulting in deanonymization. This issue was corrected by changing the way livestreams are downloaded. (CVE-2019-6237) WebKitGTK and WPE WebKit prior to version 2.24.1 are vulnerable to address bar spoofing upon certain JavaScript redirections. An attacker could cause malicious web content to be displayed as if for a trusted URI. This is similar to the CVE-2018-8383 issue in Microsoft Edge. (CVE-2019-8601) An out-of-bounds read was addressed with improved input validation. (CVE-2019-8644) A logic issue existed in the handling of synchronous page loads. (CVE-2019-8689) A logic issue existed in the handling of document loads. (CVE-2019-8719) This fixes a remote code execution in webkitgtk4. No further details are available in NIST. This issue is fixed in watchOS 6.1. This issue is fixed in watchOS 6.1. This issue is fixed in watchOS 6.1. (CVE-2019-8766) "Clear History and Website Data" did not clear the history. The issue was addressed with improved data deletion. This issue is fixed in macOS Catalina 10.15. A user may be unable to delete browsing history items. (CVE-2019-8768) An issue existed in the drawing of web page elements. Visiting a maliciously crafted website may reveal browsing history. (CVE-2019-8769) This issue was addressed with improved iframe sandbox enforcement. (CVE-2019-8846) WebKitGTK up to and including 2.26.4 and WPE WebKit up to and including 2.26.4 (which are the versions right prior to 2.28.0) contains a memory corruption issue (use-after-free) that may lead to arbitrary code execution. (CVE-2020-10018) A use-after-free flaw exists in WebKitGTK. A malicious website may be able to cause a denial of service. A DOM object context may not have had a unique security origin. A file URL may be incorrectly processed. (CVE-2020-3885) A race condition was addressed with additional validation. An application may be able to read restricted memory. (CVE-2020-3901) An input validation issue was addressed with improved input validation. (CVE-2020-3902). JSC: JSValue use-after-free in ValueProfiles Related CVE Numbers: CVE-2019-8672. While fuzzing JSC, I encountered the following JS program which crashes JSC from current HEAD and release (/System/Library/Frameworks/JavaScriptCore.framework/Resources/jsc): \t// Run with --useConcurrentJIT=false --thresholdForJITAfterWarmUp=10 \tfunction fullGC() { \t\tfor (var i = 0; i < 10; i++) { \t\t\tnew Float64Array(0x1000000); \t\t} \t} \tfunction v62() { \t\tfunction v141() { \t\t\ttry { \t\t\t\tconst v146 = v141(); \t\t\t} catch(v147) { \t\t\t\tconst v154 = Object(); \t\t\t\tfunction v155(v156,v157,v158) { \t\t\t\t\ttry { \t\t\t\t\t\t// This typed array gets collected \t\t\t\t\t\t// but is still referenced from the \t\t\t\t\t\t// value profile of TypedArray.values \t\t\t\t\t\tconst v167 = new Uint32Array(); \t\t\t\t\t\tconst v171 = v167.values(); \t\t\t\t\t} catch(v177) { \t\t\t\t\t} \t\t\t\t} \t\t\t\tconst v181 = v155(); \t\t\t} \t\t} \t\tv141(); \t\tfunction edenGC() { \t\t\tfor (let v194 = 0; v194 < 100; v194++) { \t\t\t\tconst v204 = new Float64Array(0x10000); \t\t\t} \t\t} \t\tconst v205 = edenGC(); \t} \tfor (let i = 0; i < 6; i++) { \t\tconst v209 = v62(); \t} \tfullGC(); If the loop that calls v62 is run 100 instead of 6 times it will also crash without --thresholdForJITAfterWarmUp=10, albeit a bit less reliable. Running this sample will crash JSC in debug builds with an assertion like this: \tASSERTION FAILED: structureIndex < m_capacity \tSource/JavaScriptCore/runtime/StructureIDTable.h(175) : JSC::Structure *JSC::StructureIDTable::get(JSC::StructureID) \t1 0x101aadcf9 WTFCrash \t2 0x101aadd19 WTFCrashWithSecurityImplication \t3 0x10000cb18 JSC::StructureIDTable::get(unsigned int) \t4 0x10000ca23 JSC::VM::getStructure(unsigned int) \t5 0x10000c7cf JSC::JSCell::structure(JSC::VM&) const \t6 0x10001887b JSC::JSCell::structure() const \t7 0x10072fc05 JSC::speculationFromCell(JSC::JSCell*) \t8 0x10072fd9f JSC::speculationFromValue(JSC::JSValue) \t9 0x1006963dc JSC::ValueProfileBase<1u>::computeUpdatedPrediction(JSC::ConcurrentJSLocker const&) ... The crash is due to a JSValue pointing to a previously freed chunk which will have its JSCell header overwritten. As such, it then crashes when accessing the structure table out-of-bounds with the clobbered structure ID. The JSValue that is being accessed is part of a ValueProfile: a data structure attached to bytecode operations which keeps track of input types that have been observed for its operation. During execution in the interpreter or baseline JIT, input types for operations will be stored in their associated ValueProfile as can e.g. be seen in the implementation of the low-level interpreter (LLInt) [1]. This is a fundamental mechanism of current JS engines allowing optimizing JIT compilers (like the DFG and FTL) to speculate about types of variables in the compiled program by inspecting previously observed types collected in these ValueProfiles. A ValueProfile is implemented by the ValueProfileBase C++ struct: struct ValueProfileBase { ... int m_bytecodeOffset; // -1 for prologue unsigned m_numberOfSamplesInPrediction { 0 }; SpeculatedType m_prediction { SpecNone }; EncodedJSValue m_buckets[totalNumberOfBuckets]; }; Here, m_buckets will store the raw JSValues that have been observed during execution. m_prediction in turn will contain the current type prediction [2] for the associated value, which is what the JIT compilers ultimately rely on. The type prediction is regularly computed from the observed values in computeUpdatedPrediction [3]. This raises the question how the JSValues in m_buckets are kept alive during GC, as they are not stored in a MarkedArgumentBuffer [4] or similar (which automatically inform the GC of the objects and thus keep them alive). The answer is that they are in fact not kept alive during GC by the ValueProfiles themselves. Instead, computeUpdatedPrediction [3] is invoked from finalizeUnconditionally [5] at the end of the GC marking phase and will clear the m_buckets array before the pointers might become dangling. Basically, it works like this: * Observed JSValues are simply stored into ValueProfiles at runtime by the interpreter or baseline JIT without informing the GC about these references * Eventually, GC kicks in and starts its marking phase in which it visits all reachable objects and marks them as alive * Afterwards, before sweeping, the GC invokes various callbacks (called \"unconditionalFinalizers\") [6] on certain objects (e.g. CodeBlocks) * The CodeBlock finalizers update all value profiles, which in turn causes their current speculated type to be merged with the runtime values that were observed since the last update * Afterwards, all entries in the m_buckets array of the ValueProfiles are cleared to zero [7]. As such, the ValueProfiles no longer store any pointers to JSObjects * Finally, the sweeping phase runs and frees all JSCells that have not been marked For some time now, JSC has used lightweight GC cycles called \"eden\" collections. These will keep mark bits from previous eden collections and thus only scan newly allocated objects, not the entire object graph. As such they are quicker than a \"full\" GC, but might potentially leave unused (\"garbage\") objects alive which will only be collected during the next full collection. See also [8] for an in depth explanation of JSC's current garbage collector. As described above, the function finalizeMarkedUnconditionalFinalizers [6] is responsible for invoking some callback on objects that have been marked (and thus are alive) after the marking phase. However, during eden collections this function only iterates over JSCells that have been marked in the *current* eden collection, not any of the previous ones *. As such, it is possible that a CodeBlock has been marked in a previous eden collection (and is thus still alive), but hasn't been marked in the current one and will thus not be \"unconditionally finalized\". In that case, its ValueProfile will not be cleared and will still potentially contain pointers to various JSObjects, which, however, aren't protected from GC and thus might be freed by it. This is what happens in the program above: the TypedArray.values function is a JS builtin [9] and will thus be JIT compiled. At the time of the crash it will be baseline JIT compiled and thus store the newly allocated Uint32Array into one of its ValueProfile [10]. Directly afterwards, the compiled code raises another stack overflow exception [11]. As such, the Uint32Array is not used any further and no more references to it are taken which could protect it from GC. As such, the array will be collected during the next (eden) GC round. However, the CodeBlock for TypedArray.values was already marked in a previous eden collection and will not be finalized, thus leaving the pointer to the freed TypedArray dangling in the ValueProfile. During the next full GC, the CodeBlock is again \"unconditionally finalized\" and will then inspects its m_buckets, thus crashing when using the freed JSValue. The infinite recursion and following stack overflow exceptions in this sample might be necessary to force a situation in which the newly allocated Uint32Array is only stored into a profiling slot and nowhere else. But maybe they are also simply required to cause the right sequence of GC invocations. This bug is subject to a 90 day disclosure deadline. After 90 days elapse or a patch has been made broadly available (whichever is earlier), the bug report will become visible to the public. * This can be seen in the implementation of IsoCellSet::forEachMarkedCell which in addition to the mark bit checks if the JSCell is also in the current bit set of the IsoCell [12], into which CodeBlocks are put when they are visited [13] during marking, but are then removed from it during finalization [14] after marking completes [1] https://github.com/WebKit/webkit/blob/5dfe4ae818eba9866d5979035b72c482c16cbd6b/Source/JavaScriptCore/llint/LowLevelInterpreter64.asm#L76 [2] https://github.com/WebKit/webkit/blob/5dfe4ae818eba9866d5979035b72c482c16cbd6b/Source/JavaScriptCore/bytecode/SpeculatedType.h#L40 [3] https://github.com/WebKit/webkit/blob/5dfe4ae818eba9866d5979035b72c482c16cbd6b/Source/JavaScriptCore/bytecode/ValueProfile.h#L129 [4] https://github.com/WebKit/webkit/blob/5dfe4ae818eba9866d5979035b72c482c16cbd6b/Source/JavaScriptCore/runtime/ArgList.h#L31 [5] https://github.com/WebKit/webkit/blob/5dfe4ae818eba9866d5979035b72c482c16cbd6b/Source/JavaScriptCore/bytecode/CodeBlock.cpp#L1357 [6] https://github.com/WebKit/webkit/blob/5dfe4ae818eba9866d5979035b72c482c16cbd6b/Source/JavaScriptCore/heap/Heap.cpp#L1504 [7] https://github.com/WebKit/webkit/blob/5dfe4ae818eba9866d5979035b72c482c16cbd6b/Source/JavaScriptCore/bytecode/ValueProfile.h#L139 [8] https://webkit.org/blog/7122/introducing-riptide-webkits-retreating-wavefront-concurrent-garbage-collector/ [9] https://github.com/WebKit/webkit/blob/5dfe4ae818eba9866d5979035b72c482c16cbd6b/Source/JavaScriptCore/builtins/TypedArrayPrototype.js#L71 [10] https://github.com/WebKit/webkit/blob/5dfe4ae818eba9866d5979035b72c482c16cbd6b/Source/JavaScriptCore/jit/JIT.cpp#L699 [11] https://github.com/WebKit/webkit/blob/5dfe4ae818eba9866d5979035b72c482c16cbd6b/Source/JavaScriptCore/jit/JIT.cpp#L710 [12] https://github.com/WebKit/webkit/blob/5dfe4ae818eba9866d5979035b72c482c16cbd6b/Source/JavaScriptCore/heap/IsoCellSetInlines.h#L74 [13] https://github.com/WebKit/webkit/blob/5dfe4ae818eba9866d5979035b72c482c16cbd6b/Source/JavaScriptCore/bytecode/CodeBlock.cpp#L978 [14] https://github.com/WebKit/webkit/blob/5dfe4ae818eba9866d5979035b72c482c16cbd6b/Source/JavaScriptCore/bytecode/CodeBlock.cpp#L1378 Found by: saelo@google.com . CVE-2019-8649: Sergei Glazunov of Google Project Zero Installation note: Safari 12.1.2 may be obtained from the Mac App Store. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Debian Security Advisory DSA-4515-1 security@debian.org https://www.debian.org/security/ Alberto Garcia September 04, 2019 https://www.debian.org/security/faq - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Package : webkit2gtk CVE ID : CVE-2019-8644 CVE-2019-8649 CVE-2019-8658 CVE-2019-8666 CVE-2019-8669 CVE-2019-8671 CVE-2019-8672 CVE-2019-8673 CVE-2019-8676 CVE-2019-8677 CVE-2019-8678 CVE-2019-8679 CVE-2019-8680 CVE-2019-8681 CVE-2019-8683 CVE-2019-8684 CVE-2019-8686 CVE-2019-8687 CVE-2019-8688 CVE-2019-8689 CVE-2019-8690 Several vulnerabilities have been discovered in the webkit2gtk web engine: CVE-2019-8644 G. You can see more details on the WebKitGTK and WPE WebKit Security Advisory WSA-2019-0004. For the stable distribution (buster), these problems have been fixed in version 2.24.4-1~deb10u1. We recommend that you upgrade your webkit2gtk packages. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 APPLE-SA-2019-7-22-1 iOS 12.4 iOS 12.4 is now available and addresses the following: Core Data Available for: iPhone 5s and later, iPad Air and later, and iPod touch 6th generation and later Impact: A remote attacker may be able to leak memory Description: An out-of-bounds read was addressed with improved input validation. CVE-2019-8646: Natalie Silvanovich of Google Project Zero Core Data Available for: iPhone 5s and later, iPad Air and later, and iPod touch 6th generation and later Impact: A remote attacker may be able to cause arbitrary code execution Description: A use after free issue was addressed with improved memory management. CVE-2019-8647: Samuel Groß and Natalie Silvanovich of Google Project Zero Core Data Available for: iPhone 5s and later, iPad Air and later, and iPod touch 6th generation and later Impact: A remote attacker may be able to cause unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution Description: A memory corruption issue was addressed with improved input validation. CVE-2019-8660: Samuel Groß and Natalie Silvanovich of Google Project Zero FaceTime Available for: iPhone 5s and later, iPad Air and later, and iPod touch 6th generation and later Impact: A remote attacker may be able to cause arbitrary code execution Description: A memory corruption issue was addressed with improved input validation. CVE-2019-8648: Tao Huang and Tielei Wang of Team Pangu Found in Apps Available for: iPhone 5s and later, iPad Air and later, and iPod touch 6th generation and later Impact: A remote attacker may be able to leak memory Description: This issue was addressed with improved checks. CVE-2019-8663: Natalie Silvanovich of Google Project Zero Foundation Available for: iPhone 5s and later, iPad Air and later, and iPod touch 6th generation and later Impact: A remote attacker may be able to cause unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution Description: An out-of-bounds read was addressed with improved input validation. CVE-2019-8641: Samuel Groß and Natalie Silvanovich of Google Project Zero Heimdal Available for: iPhone 5s and later, iPad Air and later, and iPod touch 6th generation and later Impact: An issue existed in Samba that may allow attackers to perform unauthorized actions by intercepting communications between services Description: This issue was addressed with improved checks to prevent unauthorized actions. CVE-2018-16860: Isaac Boukris and Andrew Bartlett of the Samba Team and Catalyst libxslt Available for: iPhone 5s and later, iPad Air and later, and iPod touch 6th generation and later Impact: A remote attacker may be able to view sensitive information Description: A stack overflow was addressed with improved input validation. CVE-2019-13118: found by OSS-Fuzz Messages Available for: iPhone 5s and later, iPad Air and later, and iPod touch 6th generation and later Impact: A remote attacker may cause an unexpected application termination Description: A denial of service issue was addressed with improved validation. CVE-2019-8665: Michael Hernandez of XYZ Marketing Profiles Available for: iPhone 5s and later, iPad Air and later, and iPod touch 6th generation and later Impact: A malicious application may be able to restrict access to websites Description: A validation issue existed in the entitlement verification. CVE-2019-8698: Luke Deshotels, Jordan Beichler, and William Enck of North Carolina State University; Costin Carabaș and Răzvan Deaconescu of University POLITEHNICA of Bucharest Quick Look Available for: iPhone 5s and later, iPad Air and later, and iPod touch 6th generation and later Impact: An attacker may be able to trigger a use-after-free in an application deserializing an untrusted NSDictionary Description: This issue was addressed with improved checks. CVE-2019-8662: Natalie Silvanovich and Samuel Groß of Google Project Zero Siri Available for: iPhone 5s and later, iPad Air and later, and iPod touch 6th generation and later Impact: A remote attacker may be able to leak memory Description: An out-of-bounds read was addressed with improved input validation. CVE-2019-8646: Natalie Silvanovich of Google Project Zero Telephony Available for: iPhone 5s and later, iPad Air and later, and iPod touch 6th generation and later Impact: The initiator of a phone call may be able to cause the recipient to answer a simultaneous Walkie-Talkie connection Description: A logic issue existed in the answering of phone calls. CVE-2019-8699: Marius Alexandru Boeru (@mboeru) and an anonymous researcher UIFoundation Available for: iPhone 5s and later, iPad Air and later, and iPod touch 6th generation and later Impact: Parsing a maliciously crafted office document may lead to an unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution Description: An out-of-bounds read was addressed with improved input validation. CVE-2019-8657: riusksk of VulWar Corp working with Trend Micro's Zero Day Initiative Wallet Available for: iPhone 5s and later, iPad Air and later, and iPod touch 6th generation and later Impact: A user may inadvertently complete an in-app purchase while on the lock screen Description: The issue was addressed with improved UI handling. CVE-2019-8690: Sergei Glazunov of Google Project Zero WebKit Available for: iPhone 5s and later, iPad Air and later, and iPod touch 6th generation and later Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to universal cross site scripting Description: A logic issue existed in the handling of synchronous page loads. CVE-2019-8649: Sergei Glazunov of Google Project Zero WebKit Available for: iPhone 5s and later, iPad Air and later, and iPod touch 6th generation and later Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to universal cross site scripting Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management. CVE-2019-8658: akayn working with Trend Micro's Zero Day Initiative WebKit Available for: iPhone 5s and later, iPad Air and later, and iPod touch 6th generation and later Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to arbitrary code execution Description: Multiple memory corruption issues were addressed with improved memory handling. CVE-2019-8644: G. Geshev working with Trend Micro's Zero Day Initiative CVE-2019-8666: Zongming Wang (王宗明) and Zhe Jin (金哲) from Chengdu Security Response Center of Qihoo 360 Technology Co. Ltd. CVE-2019-8669: akayn working with Trend Micro's Zero Day Initiative CVE-2019-8671: Samuel Groß of Google Project Zero CVE-2019-8672: Samuel Groß of Google Project Zero CVE-2019-8673: Soyeon Park and Wen Xu of SSLab at Georgia Tech CVE-2019-8676: Soyeon Park and Wen Xu of SSLab at Georgia Tech CVE-2019-8677: Jihui Lu of Tencent KeenLab CVE-2019-8678: an anonymous researcher, Anthony Lai (@darkfloyd1014) of Knownsec, Ken Wong (@wwkenwong) of VXRL, Jeonghoon Shin (@singi21a) of Theori, Johnny Yu (@straight_blast) of VX Browser Exploitation Group, Chris Chan (@dr4g0nfl4me) of VX Browser Exploitation Group, Phil Mok (@shadyhamsters) of VX Browser Exploitation Group, Alan Ho (@alan_h0) of Knownsec, Byron Wai of VX Browser Exploitation CVE-2019-8679: Jihui Lu of Tencent KeenLab CVE-2019-8680: Jihui Lu of Tencent KeenLab CVE-2019-8681: G. Geshev working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative CVE-2019-8683: lokihardt of Google Project Zero CVE-2019-8684: lokihardt of Google Project Zero CVE-2019-8685: akayn, Dongzhuo Zhao working with ADLab of Venustech, Ken Wong (@wwkenwong) of VXRL, Anthony Lai (@darkfloyd1014) of VXRL, and Eric Lung (@Khlung1) of VXRL CVE-2019-8686: G. Geshev working with Trend Micro's Zero Day Initiative CVE-2019-8687: Apple CVE-2019-8688: Insu Yun of SSLab at Georgia Tech CVE-2019-8689: lokihardt of Google Project Zero Additional recognition Game Center We would like to acknowledge Min (Spark) Zheng and Xiaolong Bai of Alibaba Inc. for their assistance. MobileInstallation We would like to acknowledge Dany Lisiansky (@DanyL931) for their assistance. Installation note: This update is available through iTunes and Software Update on your iOS device, and will not appear in your computer's Software Update application, or in the Apple Downloads site. Make sure you have an Internet connection and have installed the latest version of iTunes from https://www.apple.com/itunes/ iTunes and Software Update on the device will automatically check Apple's update server on its weekly schedule. When an update is detected, it is downloaded and the option to be installed is presented to the user when the iOS device is docked. We recommend applying the update immediately if possible. Selecting Don't Install will present the option the next time you connect your iOS device. The automatic update process may take up to a week depending on the day that iTunes or the device checks for updates. You may manually obtain the update via the Check for Updates button within iTunes, or the Software Update on your device. To check that the iPhone, iPod touch, or iPad has been updated: * Navigate to Settings * Select General * Select About. The version after applying this update will be "iOS 12.4". Information will also be posted to the Apple Security Updates web site: https://support.apple.com/kb/HT201222 This message is signed with Apple's Product Security PGP key, and details are available at: https://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAEBCAAdFiEEDNXJVNCJJEAVmJdZeC9tht7TK3EFAl01+gkACgkQeC9tht7T K3GiqhAAqXvJwj2vzGGKsGDDyR1fIO3lHOGejNiKvnJ+lgLu5AN8z3LnYTG2RNJS cjz1albBWwDAo0YUTWTdx1czBtJt4v4c+DjfTuzEurGVjgj1vyi2t8/PSVmR12Nm IvFCTYHorirY8/PgX4Sn4AtVxDR/PN0TtDufqbAiySNlMEQ19GmcBIkzwkCtiBt4 f5ZWRsx/htr6b5bXKy/2boUHQTGTjimFILM0IA0nmYgidFBcdk19Oi8qnTLS5srd 5iRERVr8yE7tiqG6YBLINYi3cyCo6mVKe267T6yEko6QV7h4DMZNIODFVf5NDqG4 g8q3Ptvs+QNEV7rl5ranwjIQ5kXF01SoMf2VWzJ191/gRRIbto+JQ9o9sQP6bAHb 84YZoFFZp79z1CGIc3G+4DJUk8VvkREYsvB4CAqjFxOq8Dt+dArsf/ngfA5rImcK sNUlcRraE5LmchkfRdKle2gI1r4wwmRocIfjTsTO3o5bxmJFlXhFmapuz3nnuPSR XvOC9J7AbsfpdQypgQFt0iOnrDnI+jS6LGB+1XNJ3ULjZQy7ynNbKfDKpDE2g/Z4 KxxPkQ5wso4hRGrRszC1AFl9ZuJTl0LqqVdwlWOB1Cjz7389OcxzJakn6zHOSN+H szVduQcxzxi6ZOsbEui0m8OypDkgA1WV1VDitBAEw58yHaOOtoU= =OYVw -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- . CVE-2019-9506: Daniele Antonioli of SUTD, Singapore, Dr. Nils Ole Tippenhauer of CISPA, Germany, and Prof

AFFECTED PRODUCTS

CVSS

PROBLEMTYPE DATA

THREAT TYPE

remote

TYPE

buffer error

CONFIGURATIONS

EXPLOIT AVAILABILITY

PATCH

EXTERNAL IDS

REFERENCES

CREDITS

Google Security Research,Samuel Groß of Google Project Zero,akayn working with Trend Micro's Zero Day Initiative Samuel GroÃ? of Google Project Zero Soyeon Park and Wen Xu of SSLab at Georgia Tech lokihardt of Google Project Zero akayn, A,Apple,akayn working with Trend Micro's Zero Day InitiativeSamuel GroÃ? of Google Project ZeroSoyeon Park and Wen Xu of SSLab at Georgia Techlokihardt of Google Project Zeroakayn, Ken Wong (@wwkenwong) of VXRL, Dongzhuo Zhao working with ADLab of Venustech

SOURCES

LAST UPDATE DATE

2026-02-06T19:40:26.445000+00:00

SOURCES UPDATE DATE