ID

VAR-201510-0102

CVE

CVE-2015-7904

TITLE

Infinite Automation Mango Automation File upload vulnerability

DESCRIPTION

Unrestricted file upload vulnerability in Infinite Automation Mango Automation 2.5.x and 2.6.x before 2.6.0 build 430 allows remote authenticated users to execute arbitrary JSP code via vectors involving an upload of an image file. Supplementary information : CWE Vulnerability type by CWE-434: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type ( Unlimited upload of dangerous types of files ) Has been identified. Infinite Automation Mango Automation is an open source web-based SCADA (data acquisition and monitoring control), HMI and automation software from Infinite Automation Systems, USA. An arbitrary-file-upload vulnerability 2. Multiple information-disclosure vulnerabilities 3. A command-execution vulnerability 4. An SQL-injection vulnerability 5. A cross-site request forgery vulnerability 6. A cross-site scripting vulnerability Attackers may leverage these issues to steal cookie-based authentication credentials, execute arbitrary script code in the browser, perform unauthorized actions, gain unauthorized access, obtain sensitive information, compromise the application, access or modify data and to execute arbitrary commands in the context of the vulnerable application; other attacks are also possible. n.jsp).Tested on: Microsoft Windows 7 Professional SP1 (EN) 32/64bitMicrosoft Windows 7 Ultimate SP1 (EN) 32/64bitJetty(9.2.2.v20140723)Java(TM) SE Runtime Environment (build 1.8.0_51-b16)Java HotSpot(TM) Client VM (build 25.51-b03, mixed mode). It is easy, affordable, and open source.The application is prone to a reflected cross-sitescripting vulnerability due to a failure to properlysanitize user-supplied input to the 'username' POSTparameter in the 'login.htm' script. Product web page: http://www.infiniteautomation.com/ Affected version: 2.5.2 and 2.6.0 beta (build 327) Summary: Mango Automation is a flexible SCADA, HMI And Automation software application that allows you to view, log, graph, animate, alarm, and report on data from sensors, equipment, PLCs, databases, webpages, etc. It is easy, affordable, and open source. An attacker can entice a logged-in user to visit a specially crafted URL which will produce a system exception with stack trace on the Jetty server. When this error occurs, the debug option generates a status page with all the information from the visitor, meaning that the attacker is able to see usernames, password hashes, e-mails and of course, Cookie sessions). Using the generated error, the attacker can easily perform session hijacking and take over the system using previously discovered vulnerabilities by just visiting the status page non-authenticated. Tested on: Microsoft Windows 7 Professional SP1 (EN) 32/64bit Microsoft Windows 7 Ultimate SP1 (EN) 32/64bit Jetty(9.2.2.v20140723) Java(TM) SE Runtime Environment (build 1.8.0_51-b16) Java HotSpot(TM) Client VM (build 25.51-b03, mixed mode) Vulnerability discovered by Gjoko 'LiquidWorm' Krstic @zeroscience Advisory ID: ZSL-2015-5260 Advisory URL: http://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2015-5260.php 20.08.2015 -- One scenario is where the attacker visits the following URL and takes over the admin session (given that the administrator didn't manually disabled the debugging and has produced some exception in current session): - http://localhost:8080/status/ Other scenario is where the attacker sends a link to the victim so the victim after clicking on the link, generates exception and writes all his session attributes in the status page: - http://localhost/status/mango.json?time=$ - http://localhost/status/ Sample status output: \"$\"\r\n\r\n\r\nSESSION ATTRIBUTES\r\n sessionUser=User [id=6, username=n00b, password=NWoZK3kTsExUV00Ywo1G5jlUKKs=, email=z@s.l, phone=123321, admin=true, disabled=false, dataSourcePermissions=[], dataPointPermissions=[], homeUrl=, lastLogin=1440142956496, receiveAlarmEmails=0, receiveOwnAuditEvents=false, timezone=]\r\n LONG_POLL_DATA_TIMEOUT=1440143583487\r\n LONG_POLL_DATA=[com.serotonin.m2m2.web.dwr.longPoll.LongPollData@839308, com.serotonin.m2m2.web.dwr.longPoll.LongPollData@1b4dafa]\r\n\r\n\r\nCONTEXT ATTRIBUTES\r\n DwrContainer=org.directwebremoting.impl.DefaultContainer@138158\r\n constants.EventType.EventTypeNames.AUDIT=AUDIT\r\n constants.SystemEventType.TYPE_USER_LOGIN=USER_LOGIN\r\n constants.Permissions.DataPointAccessTypes.READ=1\r\n org.directwebremoting.ContainerList=[org.directwebremoting.impl.DefaultContainer@138158]\r\n constants.DataTypes.BINARY=1\r\n constants.UserComment.TYPE_EVENT=1\r\n constants.SystemEventType.TYPE_SYSTEM_STARTUP=SYSTEM_STARTUP\r\n javax.servlet.ServletConfig=org.eclipse.jetty.servlet.ServletHolder$Config@bc620e\r\n Also you can list all of the Classes known to DWR: - http://localhost:8080/dwr/index.html

IOT TAXONOMY

AFFECTED PRODUCTS

CVSS

PROBLEMTYPE DATA

THREAT TYPE

remote

TYPE

other

CONFIGURATIONS

EXPLOIT AVAILABILITY

PATCH

EXTERNAL IDS

REFERENCES

CREDITS

Vulnerability discovered by Gjoko Krstic

SOURCES

LAST UPDATE DATE

2025-04-13T23:09:45.721000+00:00

SOURCES UPDATE DATE

SOURCES RELEASE DATE