ID

VAR-200802-0044

CVE

CVE-2008-0529

TITLE

Cisco Unified IP Phone of SCCP as well as SIP Protocol Multiple remote vulnerabilities in

DESCRIPTION

Buffer overflow in the telnet server in Cisco Unified IP Phone 7906G, 7911G, 7941G, 7961G, 7970G, and 7971G running SCCP firmware might allow remote authenticated users to execute arbitrary code via a crafted command. An arbitrary code may be executed via a command created by a third party.Please refer to the “Overview” for the impact of this vulnerability. An attacker can exploit these issues to execute arbitrary code with superuser privileges or crash the affected device, denying service to legitimate users. There are workarounds for several of these vulnerabilities. Cisco has made free software available to address this issue for affected customers. Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable +-------------------------------- No other Cisco products are known to be vulnerable. This vulnerability is corrected in SCCP firmware version 8.0(8) and SIP firmware version 8.8(0). This vulnerability is documented in CVE-2008-0530 leavingcisco.com and Cisco Bug IDs CSCsj74818 and CSCsk21863. It is possible to cause a vulnerable device to reboot by sending a large ICMP echo request packet. This vulnerability is corrected in SCCP firmware version 8.0(6). This vulnerability is documented in CVE-2008-0526 leavingcisco.com and Cisco Bug ID CSCsh71110. By sending a specially crafted HTTP request to TCP port 80 on a vulnerable phone, it may be possible to cause the phone to reboot. It is possible to workaround this issue by disabling the internal HTTP server on vulnerable phones. The internal HTTP server only listens to TCP port 80. This vulnerability is corrected in SCCP firmware version 3.2(17) for 7935 devices and SCCP firmware version 3.3(15) for 7936 devices. This vulnerability is documented in CVE-2008-0527 leavingcisco.com and Cisco Bug ID CSCsk20026. By sending a specially crafted to packet to TCP port 22 on a vulnerable phone, it may be possible for an unauthenticated attacker to cause the phone to reboot. It is possible to workaround this issue by disabling the internal SSH server on vulnerable phones. The internal SSH server only listens to TCP port 22. This vulnerability is corrected in SCCP firmware version 8.2(2)SR2. This vulnerability is documented in CVE-2004-2486 leavingcisco.com and Cisco Bug ID CSCsh79629. This vulnerability is corrected in SIP firmware version 8.8(0). This vulnerability is documented in CVE-2008-0528 leavingcisco.com and Cisco Bug ID CSCsj74786. The telnet server is disabled by default and can be configured to allow either privileged or unprivileged user-level access. If the telnet server is enabled for privileged or unprivileged access, the phone password parameter must additionally be configured to permit telnet access. It is possible to workaround this issue by disabling the internal telnet server on vulnerable phones. This vulnerability is corrected in SIP firmware version 8.8(0). This vulnerability is documented in CVE-2008-0529 leavingcisco.com and Cisco Bug ID CSCsj78359. If an attacker controls the SIP proxy to which a vulnerable phone is registered, attempts to register, or the attacker can act as a man-in-the-middle, it may be possible to send a malicious challenge/response message to a phone and execute arbitrary code. This vulnerability is corrected in SIP firmware version 8.8(0). This vulnerability is documented in CVE-2008-0531 leavingcisco.com and Cisco Bug ID CSCsj74765. Vulnerability Scoring Details ============================= Cisco is providing scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. Cisco will provide a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. CVSS is a standards based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at: http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss CSCsj74818 - DNS Response Parsing Stack Overflow CVSS Base Score - 10.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 8.3 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCsk21863 - DNS Response Parsing Stack Overflow CVSS Base Score - 10.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 8.3 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCsh71110 - 7940/7960 IP Phone ICMP Denial of Service CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCsk20026 - IP Phone HTTP Vulnerability CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCsh79629 - TNP Phone SSH Vulnerability CVSS Base Score - 10.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 8.3 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCsj74786 - SIP Mime Boundary Overflow CVSS Base Score - 10.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 8.3 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCsj78359 - SIP 40/60:Telnet access stack overflow CVSS Base Score - 8.5 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Medium Authentication - Single Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 7 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed CSCsj74765 - SIP Proxy Response Overflow CVSS Base Score - 7.3 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - High Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.3 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities may cause vulnerable IP phone devices to reboot which will interrupt client voice services and, in some cases, allow the execution of arbitrary code. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center ("TAC") or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. Workarounds =========== Workarounds are available for several of the vulnerabilities. Disabling unnecessary internal phone Telnet and HTTP servers will eliminate exposure to the Telnet Server overflow and HTTP Server DoS vulnerabilities. It is possible to mitigate these vulnerabilities with access control lists (ACL). Filters that deny ICMP Echo Request, TCP port 22 (SSH), TCP port 23 (Telnet), TCP port 80 (HTTP), TCP/UDP port 53 (DNS) and TCP/UDP port 5060 (SIP) should be deployed at voice/data network boundaries as part of a tACL policy for protection of traffic which enters the network at ingress access points. This policy should be configured to protect the network device and other devices behind it where the filter is applied. Additional information about tACLs is available in "Transit Access Control Lists: Filtering at Your Edge": http://www.cisco.com/en/US/tech/tk648/tk361/technologies_white_paper09186a00801afc76.shtml Additional mitigation techniques that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin companion document for this advisory: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20080116-phone.shtml Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco will make free software available to address this vulnerability for affected customers. This advisory will be updated as fixed software becomes available. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found a http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-license-agreement.html , or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml. Do not contact either "psirt@cisco.com" or "security-alert@cisco.com" for software upgrades. Fixed firmware for all SCCP-related vulnerabilities can be obtained here: http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/ip-7900ser?psrtdcat20e2 Fixed Firmware for SIP-Related Vulnerabilities All the SIP-related vulnerabilities referenced in this advisory are fixed in SIP firmware version 8.0(6) and later for Cisco Unified IP Phone 7940, 7940G, 7960 and 7960G devices, which can be obtained here: http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/sip-ip-phone7960?psrtdcat20e2 Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreement with third-party support organizations such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but who do not hold a Cisco service contract and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should get their upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Have your product serial number available and give the URL of this notice as evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml for additional TAC contact information, including special localized telephone numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerabilities described in this advisory. The SIP MIME Boundary, Telnet Server, DNS Response Parsing and SIP Proxy Response overflows were reported to Cisco by Jon Griffin and Mustaque Ahamad of the School of Computer Science at the Georgia Institute of Technology. The HTTP Server DoS was reported to Cisco by Sven Weizenegger of T-Systems. The Large ICMP Echo Request DoS vulnerability was reported to Cisco by a customer. The SSH Server DoS was discovered internally by Cisco. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080213-phone.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@cisco.com * first-teams@first.org * bugtraq@securityfocus.com * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org * cisco@spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +----------------------------------------+ | Revision | | Initial | | 1.0 | 2008-February-13 | public | | | | release. | +----------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at: http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iD8DBQFHsxkJ86n/Gc8U/uARAkIXAJ45lC0HwhFYS0qwgFMkWfvvnyeoBgCglw0y ePH+n78tRXxwRSzEPmNJcak= =YQOM -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- . ---------------------------------------------------------------------- A new version (0.9.0.0 - Release Candidate 1) of the free Secunia PSI has been released. The new version includes many new and advanced features, which makes it even easier to stay patched. Successful exploitation may allow execution of arbitrary code but requires e.g. control of a SIP proxy. PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: 1) Reported by the vendor 2-5) Jon Griffin and Mustaque Ahamad, School of Computer Science, Georgia Institute of Technology 6) Reported by a Cisco customer 7) Sven Weizenegger, T-Systems ORIGINAL ADVISORY: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080213-phone.shtml ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help everybody keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ----------------------------------------------------------------------

AFFECTED PRODUCTS

CVSS

PROBLEMTYPE DATA

THREAT TYPE

remote

TYPE

buffer overflow

CONFIGURATIONS

PATCH

EXTERNAL IDS

REFERENCES

CREDITS

Jon GriffinMustaque AhamadSven Weizenegger

SOURCES

LAST UPDATE DATE

2025-04-10T21:52:52.451000+00:00

SOURCES UPDATE DATE

SOURCES RELEASE DATE